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Merge pull request #203 from CarterPerez-dev/chore/credential-rotation-enforcer-finish 

Chore/credential rotation enforcer finish
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# ©AngelaMos | 2026
# .editorconfig
root = true
[*]
end_of_line = lf
insert_final_newline = true
charset = utf-8
indent_style = space
indent_size = 2
trim_trailing_whitespace = true
[*.md]
trim_trailing_whitespace = false

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# ©AngelaMos | 2026
# ci.yml
name: CI - Credential Rotation Enforcer
on:
push:
paths:
- 'PROJECTS/intermediate/credential-rotation-enforcer/**'
- '.github/workflows/cre-*.yml'
pull_request:
paths:
- 'PROJECTS/intermediate/credential-rotation-enforcer/**'
defaults:
run:
working-directory: PROJECTS/intermediate/credential-rotation-enforcer
jobs:
format:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- uses: crystal-lang/install-crystal@v1
with:
crystal: 1.20.0
- run: crystal tool format --check
unit:
runs-on: ${{ matrix.os }}
strategy:
fail-fast: false
matrix:
os: [ubuntu-latest, macos-latest]
crystal: ["1.19.0", "1.20.0", "nightly"]
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- uses: crystal-lang/install-crystal@v1
with:
crystal: ${{ matrix.crystal }}
- run: shards install
- run: crystal spec spec/unit --order=random
integration:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
services:
postgres:
image: postgres:16
env:
POSTGRES_USER: cre_test
POSTGRES_PASSWORD: cre_test
POSTGRES_DB: cre_test
ports: [5432:5432]
options: --health-cmd "pg_isready -U cre_test" --health-interval 10s
env:
DATABASE_URL: postgres://cre_test:cre_test@localhost:5432/cre_test
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- uses: crystal-lang/install-crystal@v1
with:
crystal: 1.20.0
- run: shards install
- run: crystal spec spec/integration --order=random
build:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- uses: crystal-lang/install-crystal@v1
with:
crystal: 1.20.0
- run: shards install
- run: shards build cre --release

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# ©AngelaMos | 2026
# .gitignore
/bin/
/lib/
/.shards/
/.crystal/
*.dwarf
.env.local
.env.pending
*.pid
/coverage/
/tmp/
*.log
.DS_Store
# Local-only dev docs (not committed to public repo)
/docs/research/
/docs/plans/

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<!--
©AngelaMos | 2026
CONFIGURATION.md
-->
# Configuration Guide
Step-by-step setup for running `cre` against real systems. Read top-to-bottom on first install; come back as a reference later.
> **TL;DR:** `cre` is configured entirely via **environment variables** (no config file required). Every integration is opt-in — set the env vars for the integrations you want, leave the rest unset, and the daemon adapts. Run `cre run` and watch the boot output to see which integrations actually wired up.
---
## Table of contents
1. [Required env vars](#1-required-env-vars)
2. [Database setup (Postgres)](#2-database-setup-postgres)
3. [Generate the cryptographic keys](#3-generate-the-cryptographic-keys)
4. [Define your policies](#4-define-your-policies)
5. [Seed your inventory](#5-seed-your-inventory)
6. [Wire AWS Secrets Manager](#6-wire-aws-secrets-manager)
7. [Wire HashiCorp Vault](#7-wire-hashicorp-vault)
8. [Wire GitHub fine-grained PATs](#8-wire-github-fine-grained-pats)
9. [Wire Telegram (notifications + commands)](#9-wire-telegram-notifications--commands)
10. [Run as a systemd service](#10-run-as-a-systemd-service)
11. [Verify and audit](#11-verify-and-audit)
12. [Key rotation (the KEK / HMAC keys themselves)](#12-key-rotation-the-kek--hmac-keys-themselves)
13. [Security checklist before production](#13-security-checklist-before-production)
---
## 1. Required env vars
Bare minimum to boot:
```bash
export DATABASE_URL="sqlite:/var/lib/cre/cre.db" # or postgres://...
export CRE_KEK_HEX="$(openssl rand -hex 32)" # 64 hex chars (32 bytes)
export CRE_HMAC_KEY_HEX="$(openssl rand -hex 32)" # 64 hex chars (32 bytes)
```
Optional but worth setting:
```bash
export CRE_TICK_SECONDS=60 # scheduler interval (default: 60)
export CRE_DB_PATH=/var/lib/cre/cre.db # used by 'cre audit verify' default
```
Everything else (AWS, Vault, GitHub, Telegram) is **opt-in** — set those vars only if you want those integrations.
---
## 2. Database setup (Postgres)
For production, use Postgres. SQLite is for the Tier 1 demo and small single-host deployments.
### Create the database
```bash
sudo -u postgres psql <<SQL
CREATE USER cre WITH PASSWORD 'change-me-strong';
CREATE DATABASE cre_prod OWNER cre;
\c cre_prod
GRANT ALL PRIVILEGES ON SCHEMA public TO cre;
SQL
```
### Set DATABASE_URL
```bash
export DATABASE_URL="postgres://cre:change-me-strong@db.internal:5432/cre_prod"
```
### Migrations
`cre run` calls `persist.migrate!` automatically on first boot, which creates all tables, indexes, append-only triggers, and grants. No manual migration step needed.
### Hardening (optional but recommended)
After first migrate, demote the app role to INSERT-only on the audit table:
```sql
REVOKE ALL ON audit_events FROM cre;
GRANT INSERT, SELECT ON audit_events TO cre;
GRANT USAGE, SELECT ON SEQUENCE audit_events_seq_seq TO cre;
```
This means even an SQL-injection attacker with the app's connection string can't `UPDATE` or `DELETE` audit rows — they get a permission-denied error in addition to the trigger refusing.
---
## 3. Generate the cryptographic keys
Two distinct keys, both 32 random bytes (64 hex chars):
```bash
openssl rand -hex 32 # use for CRE_KEK_HEX
openssl rand -hex 32 # use for CRE_HMAC_KEY_HEX
```
| Variable | What it does | Loss impact |
|---|---|---|
| `CRE_KEK_HEX` | Wraps every per-row DEK that encrypts a credential ciphertext | **All credentials become unreadable**. KEK is the master crypto root. |
| `CRE_HMAC_KEY_HEX` | Initial HMAC key for the audit-log ratchet | Audit log can't be HMAC-verified after this point; hash chain still works. Old logs (signed under earlier ratchet generations) remain verifiable independently. |
### Where to store these
- **Tier 1 / dev:** plain env vars in your shell or `.envrc` (gitignored)
- **Production:** AWS KMS, HashiCorp Vault transit engine, or your secrets manager. Inject at process boot via systemd `LoadCredentialEncrypted=` or similar.
- **Never:** in Git, even in private repos. Even in `.env` files committed by accident.
> Future versions will support `CRE_KEK_KMS=arn:...` to load directly from AWS KMS. Today it's env-only.
---
## 4. Define your policies
Policies are **Crystal source files** in `policies/`. They're compiled into the binary, so changes require a rebuild — but the compiler validates them, which means you can't ship a typo.
### Example: `policies/production.cr`
```crystal
require "../src/cre/policy/dsl"
include CRE::Policy::DSL
policy "aws-prod-databases" do
description "Prod RDS credentials rotate every 30 days"
match { |c| c.kind.aws_secretsmgr? && c.tag(:env) == "prod" }
max_age 30.days
warn_at 25.days
enforce :rotate_immediately
notify_via :telegram, :structured_log
on_rotation_failure :alert_critical
end
policy "github-bots" do
description "GitHub bot PATs notify-only at 90 days"
match { |c| c.kind.github_pat? && c.tag(:purpose) == "ci" }
max_age 90.days
warn_at 83.days
enforce :notify_only
notify_via :telegram
end
policy "vault-dynamic-aggressive" do
description "Vault dynamic DB creds rotate weekly"
match { |c| c.kind.vault_dynamic? }
max_age 7.days
enforce :rotate_immediately
notify_via :structured_log
end
policy "all-local-env-files" do
match { |c| c.kind.env_file? }
max_age 30.days
enforce :rotate_immediately
end
```
### Validation
`crystal build` compiles policies and runs three independent checks:
1. **Enum autocast** — `enforce :foo_bar` fails if `:foo_bar` isn't an `Action`
2. **Typed Proc matchers** — `c.kund` (typo) fails because `Credential` has no `kund` method
3. **Required-fields check** — Builder raises if `match`, `max_age`, or `enforce` is missing
If `cre` ships, the policies are well-formed — period.
### Available enum values
| `enforce` | `notify_via` (any combination) | `on_rotation_failure` / `on_drift_detected` |
|---|---|---|
| `:rotate_immediately` | `:telegram` | `:rotate_immediately` |
| `:notify_only` | `:email` (placeholder) | `:notify_only` |
| `:quarantine` | `:structured_log` | `:quarantine` |
| | `:pagerduty` (placeholder) | |
---
## 5. Seed your inventory
`cre` doesn't auto-discover credentials. You tell it what exists by inserting rows into the `credentials` table. Each rotator looks for specific tags.
### Tag schema by rotator kind
| `kind` | Required tags | Optional tags |
|---|---|---|
| `AwsSecretsmgr` | `secret_arn` | `value_length` (default 32), `env`, `team` |
| `VaultDynamic` | `role_path` (e.g. `database/creds/myrole`) | `current_lease_id` (set after first rotation) |
| `GithubPat` | `name`, `scopes` (JSON array as string), `old_pat_id` | `expires_in_days` (default 90) |
| `EnvFile` | `path`, `key` | `bytes` (default 32) |
### Seed examples
#### AWS Secrets Manager credential
```sql
INSERT INTO credentials (id, external_id, kind, name, tags, created_at, updated_at)
VALUES (
gen_random_uuid(),
'arn:aws:secretsmanager:us-east-1:123456789012:secret:db-prod-rw',
'AwsSecretsmgr',
'db-prod-rw',
'{"env":"prod","team":"platform","value_length":"24"}'::jsonb,
now(),
now()
);
```
#### Vault dynamic-secrets credential
```sql
INSERT INTO credentials (id, external_id, kind, name, tags, created_at, updated_at)
VALUES (
gen_random_uuid(),
'database/creds/postgres-readonly',
'VaultDynamic',
'postgres-readonly',
'{"role_path":"database/creds/postgres-readonly"}'::jsonb,
now(),
now()
);
```
#### GitHub fine-grained PAT
```sql
INSERT INTO credentials (id, external_id, kind, name, tags, created_at, updated_at)
VALUES (
gen_random_uuid(),
'gh-deploy-bot',
'GithubPat',
'deploy-bot',
'{"name":"deploy-bot","scopes":"[\"repo\",\"read:org\"]","old_pat_id":"12345","expires_in_days":"90"}'::jsonb,
now(),
now()
);
```
> The `old_pat_id` field gets updated by the rotator after each rotation (the new PAT becomes the next "old"). For the first seed, set it to your existing PAT's id (find it via GitHub UI or `GET /user/personal-access-tokens`).
#### Local `.env` file
```sql
INSERT INTO credentials (id, external_id, kind, name, tags, created_at, updated_at)
VALUES (
gen_random_uuid(),
'/etc/myapp/.env::API_KEY',
'EnvFile',
'myapp-API_KEY',
'{"path":"/etc/myapp/.env","key":"API_KEY","bytes":"32"}'::jsonb,
now(),
now()
);
```
> Make sure the `cre` user has read+write permission on the file's parent directory (it writes `.env.pending` and renames atomically).
---
## 6. Wire AWS Secrets Manager
### IAM permissions
Create an IAM user (or assumable role) with this policy:
```json
{
"Version": "2012-10-17",
"Statement": [
{
"Sid": "CreRotation",
"Effect": "Allow",
"Action": [
"secretsmanager:GetSecretValue",
"secretsmanager:PutSecretValue",
"secretsmanager:UpdateSecretVersionStage",
"secretsmanager:DescribeSecret"
],
"Resource": "arn:aws:secretsmanager:*:*:secret:cre-managed/*"
}
]
}
```
> Scope `Resource` tightly. `arn:aws:secretsmanager:*:*:secret:cre-managed/*` means CRE can only touch secrets prefixed `cre-managed/` — anything else in your account is off-limits even if the daemon is compromised.
### Env vars
```bash
export AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID="AKIA..."
export AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY="..."
export AWS_REGION="us-east-1"
# Optional - for STS assumed roles:
# export AWS_SESSION_TOKEN="..."
# Optional - for LocalStack / Tier 2 testing:
# export AWS_ENDPOINT="http://localhost:4566"
```
### Verify
After restart, boot output should show `rotators: env_file, aws_secretsmgr`. If it only shows `env_file`, your AWS env vars aren't being read.
### IRSA / instance profile (no static keys)
If you're running CRE on EC2/EKS, you can drop static keys entirely and use the instance profile. Set `AWS_REGION` and leave `AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID` unset — current code requires explicit keys, so this is **TODO**: when supported, the SDK chain will pick up IRSA / IMDSv2 automatically.
---
## 7. Wire HashiCorp Vault
### Vault server requirements
- Database secrets engine enabled at `database/`
- A role configured (e.g., `vault write database/roles/myrole ...`)
- A token with `read` on `database/creds/*` and `update` on `sys/leases/revoke`
### Token policy example
`cre-policy.hcl`:
```hcl
path "database/creds/*" {
capabilities = ["read"]
}
path "sys/leases/revoke" {
capabilities = ["update"]
}
path "sys/leases/renew" {
capabilities = ["update"]
}
```
```bash
vault policy write cre-policy cre-policy.hcl
vault token create -policy=cre-policy -ttl=720h
# capture the .auth.client_token from output
```
### Env vars
```bash
export VAULT_ADDR="https://vault.internal:8200"
export VAULT_TOKEN="hvs.CAESI..."
```
### Verify
Boot output should show `rotators: env_file, ..., vault_dynamic`.
---
## 8. Wire GitHub fine-grained PATs
### The "admin" PAT
You need a fine-grained PAT that has permission to **manage other fine-grained PATs**. This is special:
1. Go to https://github.com/settings/personal-access-tokens
2. Click "Generate new token (fine-grained)"
3. Resource owner: yourself or org
4. Permissions: **Account → Personal access tokens → Read & write**
5. Save the token (`ghp_admin_...`)
> This token has admin power over your other PATs — store it like a root credential. In production, this is a great candidate to itself be managed by `cre` once a year (you rotate the rotator's own credentials).
### Env vars
```bash
export GITHUB_TOKEN="ghp_admin_..."
# Optional - for fake-GitHub Tier 2 testing:
# export GITHUB_API_BASE="http://localhost:7115"
```
### Find your existing PAT IDs
```bash
curl -H "Authorization: Bearer $GITHUB_TOKEN" \
-H "X-GitHub-Api-Version: 2022-11-28" \
https://api.github.com/user/personal-access-tokens
```
Use the `id` field from each entry as the `old_pat_id` in your seed SQL.
---
## 9. Wire Telegram (notifications + commands)
### Create the bot
1. Open Telegram, search for `@BotFather`
2. `/newbot`, give it a name + username
3. Save the token (`123456:ABC-DEF...`) — that's `TELEGRAM_TOKEN`
### Find your chat ID
The bot can only message chats you've started a conversation with first.
1. Open your bot in Telegram, send it any message (e.g. `/start`)
2. Visit `https://api.telegram.org/bot<TOKEN>/getUpdates` in a browser
3. Find `"chat":{"id":123456789,...}` — that's your chat ID
For group chats: add the bot to the group, send a message, then call `getUpdates` — you'll see a negative chat ID like `-1001234567890`.
### Env vars
```bash
export TELEGRAM_TOKEN="123456:ABC-DEF..."
export TELEGRAM_VIEWER_CHATS="123456789,987654321" # comma-separated
export TELEGRAM_OPERATOR_CHATS="123456789" # operators get /rotate, /snooze
```
> Anyone in `OPERATOR_CHATS` can `/rotate` any credential. Anyone in `VIEWER_CHATS` (and operators) can `/status`, `/queue`, `/history`, `/alerts`, `/help`.
### Available commands
| Command | Tier | Purpose |
|---|---|---|
| `/status` | viewer | Quick health snapshot |
| `/queue` | viewer | Active + scheduled rotations |
| `/history <credential-id>` | viewer | Last 10 audit events for one credential |
| `/alerts` | viewer | Pointer to `cre audit verify` |
| `/help` | viewer | Command list |
| `/rotate <credential-id>` | operator | Manually trigger rotation |
| `/snooze <credential-id> 24h` | operator | Defer scheduled rotation (currently a stub) |
### Verify
Boot output: `telegram: enabled`. Open Telegram, send `/status`, you should get a reply within 2 seconds.
---
## 10. Run as a systemd service
### `/etc/systemd/system/cre.service`
```ini
[Unit]
Description=Credential Rotation Enforcer
After=network-online.target postgresql.service
Wants=network-online.target
[Service]
Type=simple
User=cre
Group=cre
WorkingDirectory=/var/lib/cre
ExecStart=/usr/local/bin/cre run --db=postgres://cre:CHANGEME@localhost:5432/cre_prod
EnvironmentFile=/etc/cre/cre.env
Restart=on-failure
RestartSec=10
StandardOutput=journal
StandardError=journal
# Hardening
NoNewPrivileges=true
PrivateTmp=true
ProtectSystem=strict
ReadWritePaths=/var/lib/cre /etc/myapp # whatever .env paths you manage
ProtectHome=true
ProtectKernelTunables=true
ProtectControlGroups=true
RestrictAddressFamilies=AF_UNIX AF_INET AF_INET6
LockPersonality=true
MemoryDenyWriteExecute=true
[Install]
WantedBy=multi-user.target
```
### `/etc/cre/cre.env` (mode 0600, owner cre:cre)
```
CRE_KEK_HEX=...
CRE_HMAC_KEY_HEX=...
CRE_TICK_SECONDS=60
AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID=AKIA...
AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY=...
AWS_REGION=us-east-1
VAULT_ADDR=https://vault.internal:8200
VAULT_TOKEN=hvs....
GITHUB_TOKEN=ghp_admin_...
TELEGRAM_TOKEN=123456:...
TELEGRAM_VIEWER_CHATS=123456789
TELEGRAM_OPERATOR_CHATS=123456789
```
### Enable
```bash
sudo systemctl daemon-reload
sudo systemctl enable --now cre
sudo systemctl status cre
journalctl -u cre -f # follow logs
```
---
## 11. Verify and audit
### Live monitoring
```bash
cre watch --db=$DATABASE_URL # k9s-style live TUI
just tui-demo # synthetic 8-second preview (no daemon needed)
```
### One-shot CI gate
```bash
cre check --db=$DATABASE_URL --output=json | jq .
# exit code 0 = no violations, 1 = violations found
```
### Audit chain integrity
```bash
cre audit verify --db=/var/lib/cre/cre.db
# ✓ chain valid: 14,892 entries
```
### Compliance evidence export
```bash
cre export --framework=soc2 --out=/tmp/q1-evidence.zip
unzip -l /tmp/q1-evidence.zip
# audit_log.ndjson, audit_batches.json, control_mapping.json, manifest.json, README.md
```
Hand the ZIP to your auditor. They can verify file checksums against `manifest.json` and recompute the audit hash chain offline.
---
## 12. Key rotation (the KEK / HMAC keys themselves)
The crypto roots are themselves credentials. They have lifetimes too.
### KEK rotation
Annual or on suspected compromise:
1. Generate a new KEK
2. Update `CRE_KEK_HEX` in `/etc/cre/cre.env` (keep the old one in `CRE_KEK_HEX_PREVIOUS` if you wire that)
3. Restart the daemon — it will use the new KEK for new credentials, and the persistence layer will fail to decrypt rows wrapped under the old KEK
4. **Forced rewrap (planned, not yet wired):** `cre crypto rewrap` reads each row, unwraps with `CRE_KEK_HEX_PREVIOUS`, re-wraps with the new KEK. Until that command exists, KEK rotation requires writing a one-off Crystal script.
> KEK rotation without a rewrap path = data loss. Test the rewrap procedure on a non-prod DB before doing this in production.
### HMAC ratchet
The audit log's HMAC key rolls automatically every 1024 entries (configurable). You don't manually rotate it. To force an early rotation, restart the daemon with a new `CRE_HMAC_KEY_HEX` — old entries remain verifiable under their original ratchet generation; new entries chain forward under the new key.
---
## 13. Security checklist before production
- [ ] `CRE_KEK_HEX` and `CRE_HMAC_KEY_HEX` are different random 32-byte values
- [ ] `/etc/cre/cre.env` has mode `0600`, owner `cre:cre`, never committed to Git
- [ ] Database app role demoted to `INSERT, SELECT` on `audit_events`
- [ ] AWS IAM scope is narrow (`Resource: arn:aws:secretsmanager:*:*:secret:cre-managed/*`)
- [ ] Vault token is scoped (no root tokens); rotated periodically itself
- [ ] GitHub admin PAT is also a credential CRE could manage (recursion!)
- [ ] Telegram operator chats list is short and audited (each chat ID is a person)
- [ ] systemd hardening directives applied (`NoNewPrivileges`, `ProtectSystem=strict`, etc.)
- [ ] `cre audit verify` runs as a periodic cron job and pages on failure
- [ ] Compliance bundle export tested end-to-end with a sample auditor walkthrough
- [ ] Backup strategy for the database includes the `audit_events` table (point-in-time recovery preferred over snapshots — protects the chain)
---
## Appendix A: Boot output decoder
When you start `cre run`, expect output like:
```
cre running. PID 4242, tick 60s, db postgres://****:****@db.internal:5432/cre_prod
rotators: env_file, aws_secretsmgr, vault_dynamic, github_pat
telegram: enabled
2026-04-29T15:00:00.000Z INFO - cre.rotation_worker: registered rotator: env_file
2026-04-29T15:00:00.001Z INFO - cre.rotation_worker: registered rotator: aws_secretsmgr
2026-04-29T15:00:00.002Z INFO - cre.rotation_worker: registered rotator: vault_dynamic
2026-04-29T15:00:00.003Z INFO - cre.rotation_worker: registered rotator: github_pat
2026-04-29T15:00:00.005Z INFO - cre.engine: engine started
```
`rotators: ...` lists the rotators that successfully wired. If you set `AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID` but `aws_secretsmgr` is missing, your env var didn't propagate to the daemon — check `systemctl show cre -p Environment` or the EnvironmentFile path.
`telegram: (disabled)` means either `TELEGRAM_TOKEN` is unset or the chat-ID lists are empty. With token + at least one chat, you'll see `telegram: enabled`.
## Appendix B: One-line setup recipes
| Need | Command |
|---|---|
| Tier 1 demo | `just demo` |
| Live TUI preview | `just tui-demo` |
| Full Docker stack | `just demo-full` then `just demo-full-down` |
| Format + lint + test | `just ci` |
| List all recipes | `just` |

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GNU AFFERO GENERAL PUBLIC LICENSE
Version 3, 19 November 2007
Copyright (C) 2007 Free Software Foundation, Inc. <https://fsf.org/>
Everyone is permitted to copy and distribute verbatim copies
of this license document, but changing it is not allowed.
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<!--
©AngelaMos | 2026
README.md
-->
```regex
██████╗██████╗ ███████╗
██╔════╝██╔══██╗██╔════╝
██║ ██████╔╝█████╗
██║ ██╔══██╗██╔══╝
╚██████╗██║ ██║███████╗
╚═════╝╚═╝ ╚═╝╚══════╝
```
[![Cybersecurity Projects](https://img.shields.io/badge/Cybersecurity--Projects-Project%20%2327%20intermediate-red?style=flat&logo=github)](https://github.com/CarterPerez-dev/Cybersecurity-Projects/tree/main/PROJECTS/intermediate/credential-rotation-enforcer)
[![Crystal](https://img.shields.io/badge/Crystal-1.20+-black?style=flat&logo=crystal&logoColor=white)](https://crystal-lang.org)
[![License: AGPLv3](https://img.shields.io/badge/License-AGPL_v3-purple.svg)](https://www.gnu.org/licenses/agpl-3.0)
[![PostgreSQL](https://img.shields.io/badge/PostgreSQL-16-336791?style=flat&logo=postgresql&logoColor=white)](https://www.postgresql.org)
> Credential rotation enforcer written in Crystal. Tracks credentials, evaluates compile-time-checked policies, and executes the four-step rotation contract against AWS Secrets Manager, HashiCorp Vault, GitHub fine-grained PATs, and local `.env` files. Single binary, live TUI, bidirectional Telegram bot, tamper-evident audit log, signed compliance evidence export.
*This is a quick overview — security theory, architecture, and full walkthroughs are in the [learn modules](#learn). Operator setup lives in [CONFIGURATION.md](CONFIGURATION.md).*
## What It Does
- Compile-time-checked policy DSL (typo'd action symbols, missing fields, bad credential property references all fail `crystal build`)
- Bus + plugin architecture — typed events fan out across Crystal channels; subscribers (audit, TUI, Telegram, log) react independently; rotators register at compile time via `register_as :kind` macro
- Four-step rotation contract (`generate → apply → verify → commit`) borrowed from AWS Secrets Manager's rotation Lambda template, dual-version safe under concurrent reads
- Three-layer tamper-evident audit log: SHA-256 hash chain + ratcheting HMAC-SHA256 + Ed25519-signed Merkle batches
- AEAD envelope encryption (AES-256-GCM, per-row DEKs wrapped by KEK, AAD-bound to credential identity, reserved `algorithm_id` byte for crypto agility)
- Hand-rolled live TUI (no external TUI framework — stdlib ANSI escapes only) with event-driven repaints coalesced to a tick interval
- Bidirectional Telegram bot — viewer tier (`/status`, `/queue`, `/history`, `/alerts`) + operator tier (`/rotate`)
- Compliance evidence export bundle (signed ZIP with audit log, Merkle batches, control mapping for SOC 2 / PCI-DSS / ISO 27001 / HIPAA)
## Quick Start
```bash
git clone https://github.com/CarterPerez-dev/Cybersecurity-Projects.git
cd Cybersecurity-Projects/PROJECTS/intermediate/credential-rotation-enforcer
shards install && shards build cre --release
./bin/cre demo
```
Or use the install script:
```bash
curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/CarterPerez-dev/Cybersecurity-Projects/main/PROJECTS/intermediate/credential-rotation-enforcer/scripts/install.sh | bash
```
> [!TIP]
> This project uses [`just`](https://github.com/casey/just) as a command runner. Type `just` to see all available recipes.
>
> Install: `curl -sSf https://just.systems/install.sh | bash -s -- --to ~/.local/bin`
### Demo tiers
```bash
just demo # Tier 1 — zero-deps SQLite + .env rotator (under 30s)
just tui-demo # Live TUI preview with synthetic events (8s, no setup)
just demo-full # Tier 2 — Docker Compose: PG + LocalStack + Vault + fake-GH
just demo-full-down # tear down the stack
```
### Daemon usage
`cre run` and `cre watch` require two 32-byte secrets — the seed key for the audit-log HMAC ratchet and the KEK that wraps per-row data keys. Generate fresh values once and store them somewhere durable (KMS, password manager, sealed env file):
```bash
export CRE_HMAC_KEY_HEX=$(openssl rand -hex 32)
export CRE_KEK_HEX=$(openssl rand -hex 32)
export CRE_SIGNING_KEY_HEX=$(openssl rand -hex 32) # optional: enables Merkle-batch sealing
```
Then:
```bash
cre run --db=sqlite:cre.db # headless daemon
cre watch --db=sqlite:cre.db # daemon + live TUI
cre check --db=sqlite:cre.db --output=json # one-shot CI gate (no key required)
cre rotate <credential-id> # manual rotation (uses same env-driven rotators as run)
cre policy list # inspect compiled policies
cre audit verify # hash chain + HMAC ratchet (+ Merkle if --public-key given)
cre export --framework=soc2 --out=evidence.zip # signed compliance bundle
cre verify-bundle evidence.zip # offline re-verify a bundle
```
`cre check` exits 1 when any credential violates its policy — drop into any CI pipeline.
## Flagship Rotators
| Rotator | What it talks to | Auth |
|---|---|---|
| AWS Secrets Manager | `secretsmanager.<region>.amazonaws.com` | SigV4 (rolled from scratch in `src/cre/aws/signer.cr`) |
| HashiCorp Vault | `vault read database/creds/<role>` + lease revoke | `X-Vault-Token` |
| GitHub fine-grained PATs | `POST/DELETE /user/personal-access-tokens` | `Bearer ghp_...` |
| Local `.env` file | atomic temp+rename | n/a |
Adding a fifth rotator means dropping a single file in `src/cre/rotators/` — the `register_as :kind` macro hooks it into the registry at compile time. Zero changes to the orchestrator, scheduler, or any subscriber.
## Architecture
```
┌──────────────────────────────────────┐
│ cre (single Crystal binary) │
│ │
┌────────────┐ │ ┌──────────────────────────────┐ │
│ Scheduler │─────►│ │ Typed Event Bus │ │
│ (fiber) │ │ └──┬─────┬─────┬─────┬─────┬───┘ │
└────────────┘ │ │ │ │ │ │ │
│ ┌──▼──┐ ┌▼────┐ ┌▼──┐ ┌▼──┐ ┌▼───┐ │
│ │Rot. │ │Audit│ │TUI│ │Tg │ │Pol.│ │
│ │Wrkr │ │Sub │ │Sub│ │Bot│ │Eval│ │
│ └──┬──┘ └──┬──┘ └───┘ └───┘ └────┘ │
│ │ │ │
│ ▼ ▼ │
│ ┌──────────────────────────────┐ │
│ │ Persistence (PG / SQLite) │ │
│ │ + 3-layer audit integrity │ │
│ └──────────────────────────────┘ │
└──────────────────────────────────────┘
```
All long-lived components are fibers in one OS process. The bus is in-process (Crystal channels are nanosecond-scale) so the architectural overhead is essentially free. Per-subscriber overflow policy: `Block` for audit (compliance — never drop), `Drop` for TUI / metrics / Telegram (best-effort).
## The Three-Layer Audit Log
```
Layer 3 ─ Ed25519-signed Merkle batches → auditor verifies with public key only
Layer 2 ─ HMAC ratchet (key zeroized per rotation) → past entries unforgeable
Layer 1 ─ SHA-256 hash chain → any single-row tampering breaks forward chain
━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━
Postgres ─ append-only via TRIGGER + role grants (INSERT-only)
```
`cre audit verify` walks all three layers and reports which (if any) is broken.
## Stack
**Language:** Crystal 1.20+
**Dependencies:** crystal-db (DB abstraction), crystal-pg (PostgreSQL), crystal-sqlite3 (SQLite), tourmaline (Telegram framework, used minimally), webmock.cr (test HTTP mocks)
**Direct LibCrypto FFI** for AES-256-GCM AEAD (Crystal stdlib `OpenSSL::Cipher` lacks GCM auth_data/auth_tag) and Ed25519 signing (stdlib lacks high-level wrapper). Bindings live in `src/cre/crypto/aead.cr` and `src/cre/audit/signing.cr`.
**Testing:** stdlib `Spec` runner, 179+ unit tests + integration tests against real PostgreSQL via Docker.
## Configuration
Setup is fully env-var driven — no config file required. See **[CONFIGURATION.md](CONFIGURATION.md)** for the operator guide:
- Required env vars (`CRE_KEK_HEX`, `CRE_HMAC_KEY_HEX`, `DATABASE_URL`)
- Per-rotator setup (AWS IAM policy, Vault token policy, GitHub admin PAT)
- Telegram bot creation + chat-ID discovery
- systemd service unit with hardening directives
- Production security checklist
## Learn
This project includes step-by-step learning materials covering security theory, architecture, and implementation.
| Module | Topic |
|--------|-------|
| [00 - Overview](learn/00-OVERVIEW.md) | Prerequisites, quick start, three-tier demo path |
| [01 - Concepts](learn/01-CONCEPTS.md) | Rotation theory, real breaches, NIST/SOC2/PCI/ISO/HIPAA framework controls |
| [02 - Architecture](learn/02-ARCHITECTURE.md) | Bus + plugin design, persistence layers, three-layer audit integrity, AEAD envelope |
| [03 - Implementation](learn/03-IMPLEMENTATION.md) | Code-level walkthrough; where to look in source for each concept |
| [04 - Challenges](learn/04-CHALLENGES.md) | 10 ranked extension challenges (PG ALTER USER, Slack, ML-KEM, OpenTimestamps, SPIFFE, JIT broker, etc.) |
## License
AGPL 3.0

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# ©AngelaMos | 2026
# demo-full.cr.example
# Tier 2 demo config: docker-compose stack on localhost.
# Copy to demo-full.cr and load via `cre run --config=...` (full config loader
# wired in a future iteration).
# Database:
# DATABASE_URL=postgres://cre:cre@localhost:5432/cre
# AWS Secrets Manager (LocalStack):
# AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID=test
# AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY=test
# AWS_REGION=us-east-1
# AWS_ENDPOINT=http://localhost:4566
# Vault:
# VAULT_ADDR=http://localhost:8200
# VAULT_TOKEN=dev-root-token
# GitHub (fake API):
# GITHUB_API_BASE=http://localhost:7000
# GITHUB_TOKEN=ghp_admin_fake

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# ©AngelaMos | 2026
# docker-compose.yml
services:
postgres:
image: postgres:18
environment:
POSTGRES_USER: cre
POSTGRES_PASSWORD: cre
POSTGRES_DB: cre
ports: ["6022:5432"]
healthcheck:
test: ["CMD-SHELL", "pg_isready -U cre"]
interval: 3s
timeout: 3s
retries: 10
localstack:
image: localstack/localstack:latest
environment:
SERVICES: secretsmanager
DEBUG: 0
ports: ["45666:4566"]
vault:
image: hashicorp/vault:latest
cap_add: [IPC_LOCK]
environment:
VAULT_DEV_ROOT_TOKEN_ID: dev-root-token
VAULT_DEV_LISTEN_ADDRESS: 0.0.0.0:8200
ports: ["18201:8200"]
command: vault server -dev
fake-github:
image: python:3.13-alpine
working_dir: /app
volumes: ["./fake-github:/app:ro"]
command: ["sh", "-c", "pip install --quiet flask && python /app/app.py"]
ports: ["7115:7000"]

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"""
©AngelaMos | 2026
app.py
"""
from flask import Flask, jsonify, request
app = Flask(__name__)
TOKENS: dict[int, dict] = {}
NEXT_ID = 100000
@app.route("/user", methods=["GET"])
def user():
auth = request.headers.get("Authorization", "")
if not auth.startswith("Bearer "):
return jsonify({"message": "Bad credentials"}), 401
return jsonify({"login": "fake-bot", "id": 1})
@app.route("/user/personal-access-tokens", methods=["POST"])
def create_pat():
global NEXT_ID
body = request.get_json() or {}
pat_id = NEXT_ID
NEXT_ID += 1
TOKENS[pat_id] = body
return jsonify({
"id": pat_id,
"token": f"ghp_fake_{pat_id}",
"expires_at": "2026-12-31T00:00:00Z",
})
@app.route("/user/personal-access-tokens/<int:pat_id>", methods=["DELETE"])
def delete_pat(pat_id):
TOKENS.pop(pat_id, None)
return "", 200
if __name__ == "__main__":
app.run(host="0.0.0.0", port=7000)

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# =============================================================================
# AngelaMos | 2026
# Justfile - Credential Rotation Enforcer (cre)
# =============================================================================
set export
set shell := ["bash", "-uc"]
set windows-shell := ["powershell.exe", "-NoLogo", "-Command"]
project := file_name(justfile_directory())
version := `git describe --tags --always 2>/dev/null || echo "dev"`
binary := "bin/cre"
db_default := "sqlite:cre.db"
test_db_url := "postgres://cre_test:cre_test@localhost:5432/cre_test"
# =============================================================================
# Default
# =============================================================================
default:
@just --list --unsorted
# =============================================================================
# Build
# =============================================================================
[group('build')]
build:
shards build cre --release --no-debug
[group('build')]
build-dev:
shards build cre
[group('build')]
deps:
shards install
[group('build')]
clean:
rm -rf bin lib .shards .crystal coverage tmp
[group('build')]
rebuild: clean deps build
# =============================================================================
# Run (cre lifecycle)
# =============================================================================
[group('run')]
run db=db_default:
shards build cre && {{binary}} run --db={{db}}
[group('run')]
watch db=db_default:
shards build cre && {{binary}} watch --db={{db}}
[group('run')]
check db=":memory:":
shards build cre && {{binary}} check --db={{db}}
[group('run')]
rotate ID db=db_default:
shards build cre && {{binary}} rotate {{ID}} --db={{db}}
[group('run')]
audit-verify db=db_default:
shards build cre && {{binary}} audit verify --db={{db}}
[group('run')]
policy-list:
shards build cre && {{binary}} policy list
[group('run')]
policy-show name:
shards build cre && {{binary}} policy show {{name}}
[group('run')]
export framework="soc2" out="evidence.zip" db=db_default:
shards build cre && {{binary}} export --framework={{framework}} --out={{out}} --db={{db}}
# =============================================================================
# Demos (Tier 1 / Tier 2 / Tier 3)
# =============================================================================
[group('demo')]
demo:
shards build cre && {{binary}} demo
[group('demo')]
tui-demo seconds="8":
shards build cre && {{binary}} tui-demo --seconds={{seconds}}
[group('demo')]
demo-full:
docker compose -f docker/docker-compose.yml up -d
@echo "Waiting for services to be healthy..."
@sleep 8
shards build cre
@echo ""
@echo "Stack up. Daemon will run against Postgres on port 6022."
@echo "Press Ctrl+C to stop the daemon, then 'just demo-full-down' to tear down the stack."
@echo ""
DATABASE_URL=postgres://cre:cre@localhost:6022/cre \
AWS_ENDPOINT=http://localhost:45666 \
VAULT_ADDR=http://localhost:18201 \
GITHUB_API_BASE=http://localhost:7115 \
{{binary}} run --db=postgres://cre:cre@localhost:6022/cre
[group('demo')]
demo-full-down:
docker compose -f docker/docker-compose.yml down -v
[group('demo')]
demo-full-logs:
docker compose -f docker/docker-compose.yml logs -f --tail=50
[group('demo')]
demo-full-status:
docker compose -f docker/docker-compose.yml ps
# =============================================================================
# Test
# =============================================================================
[group('test')]
test:
crystal spec --order=random
[group('test')]
test-unit:
crystal spec spec/unit --order=random
[group('test')]
test-integration:
DATABASE_URL={{test_db_url}} crystal spec spec/integration --order=random
[group('test')]
test-watch:
@echo "Watching spec/ for changes..."
@while true; do \
inotifywait -qre close_write src/ spec/ 2>/dev/null && crystal spec --order=random; \
done
[group('test')]
coverage:
@echo "Coverage requires kcov. Skipping if not installed."
kcov --include-path=src coverage/ ./bin/cre || true
# =============================================================================
# Quality (format / lint)
# =============================================================================
[group('quality')]
format:
crystal tool format
[group('quality')]
format-check:
crystal tool format --check
[group('quality')]
lint:
@if [ -x ./bin/ameba ]; then \
./bin/ameba; \
else \
echo "ameba not installed (requires libpcre3-dev on Debian 13+); skipping lint"; \
fi
[group('quality')]
check-all: format-check lint test
[group('quality')]
ci: check-all
# =============================================================================
# Database (Tier 2 helpers)
# =============================================================================
[group('db')]
db-up:
docker run -d --rm --name cre-pg -e POSTGRES_USER=cre_test -e POSTGRES_PASSWORD=cre_test -e POSTGRES_DB=cre_test -p 5432:5432 postgres:16
[group('db')]
db-down:
docker stop cre-pg 2>/dev/null || true
[group('db')]
db-shell:
docker exec -it cre-pg psql -U cre_test cre_test
# =============================================================================
# Utility
# =============================================================================
[group('util')]
version:
@echo "{{project}} {{version}}"
[group('util')]
loc:
@echo "Source LOC:"
@find src -name "*.cr" -exec wc -l {} \; | awk '{total+=$1} END{print " " total}'
@echo "Spec LOC:"
@find spec -name "*.cr" -exec wc -l {} \; | awk '{total+=$1} END{print " " total}'
@echo "Spec files: $(find spec -name '*_spec.cr' | wc -l)"
[group('util')]
binary-info:
@ls -la {{binary}} 2>/dev/null || echo "binary not built; run 'just build'"
@file {{binary}} 2>/dev/null || true

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<!--
©AngelaMos | 2026
00-OVERVIEW.md
-->
# Credential Rotation Enforcer - Overview
A Crystal daemon that **tracks** credentials, **enforces** rotation policies as code, and **executes** the four-step rotation contract against AWS Secrets Manager, HashiCorp Vault, GitHub fine-grained PATs, and local `.env` files. Single binary. Live TUI. Bidirectional Telegram bot. Tamper-evident audit log. Signed compliance evidence export.
## What This Project Demonstrates
| Concept | What you'll see in the code |
|---|---|
| Statically-validated policy DSL | `policies/*.cr` evaluated by the Crystal compiler; single-symbol enum args (`enforce :rotate_immediately`) and `match {}` block typos fail `crystal build`. Splat-symbol args (`notify_via :telegram, :slack`) and missing required fields raise `BuilderError` at policy registration time. Either way, a misformed policy never reaches a running daemon. |
| Bus + plugin architecture | Typed events fan out across Crystal channels; subscribers (audit, TUI, Telegram, log) react independently; rotators register at compile time via `register_as :kind` macro |
| 4-step rotation contract | `generate -> apply -> verify -> commit`, dual-version safe (AWSCURRENT / AWSPENDING analog), with rollback on failure between apply and commit |
| Tamper-evident audit log | SHA-256 hash chain + ratcheting HMAC-SHA256 + Ed25519-signed Merkle batches (3 independent layers of integrity) |
| AEAD envelope encryption | AES-256-GCM with per-row DEKs wrapped by a KEK; AAD-bound to `tenant_id || credential_id || version_id`; reserved `algorithm_id` byte for crypto agility |
| Hand-rolled live TUI | ANSI escapes only (no `crysterm` dependency); event-driven repaints coalesced to a tick interval; works against any IO so it's testable |
## Prerequisites
- Crystal **1.20.0+** (see `https://crystal-lang.org/install/`)
- For Tier 1 demo: nothing else
- For Tier 2 demo: Docker + Docker Compose
- For Tier 3 (real cloud): AWS account, Vault server, GitHub Apps token
## Three-Tier Demo Path
Each tier teaches a different lesson. Run them in order to see the system evolve.
### Tier 1 - Zero Deps
```
$ git clone <repo> && cd credential-rotation-enforcer
$ shards install && shards build cre
$ ./bin/cre demo
```
What you'll see:
- A temp `.env` file with `API_KEY=oldvalue-aaa`
- A simulated 60-day-old credential triggering policy violation
- Live narration of all 4 rotation steps
- The same `.env` file with a fresh random `API_KEY=...` value
- Audit chain verification confirming integrity
Runtime: under 1 second.
### Tier 2 - Docker Compose
```
$ just demo-full
```
Brings up: PostgreSQL 16, LocalStack (AWS Secrets Manager), HashiCorp Vault dev mode, a fake-GitHub Flask service. CRE connects to all four and rotates one credential through each rotator. Demonstrates real network calls, real auth (SigV4 to LocalStack, token to Vault, bearer to fake-GitHub), real persistence to Postgres, real append-only audit triggers.
Setup time: ~2 minutes (mostly image pulls).
### Tier 3 - Real Cloud
`cre run` and `cre watch` refuse to start without two 32-byte secrets:
```
export CRE_HMAC_KEY_HEX=$(openssl rand -hex 32) # audit log seed key
export CRE_KEK_HEX=$(openssl rand -hex 32) # envelope KEK
export CRE_SIGNING_KEY_HEX=$(openssl rand -hex 32) # optional: enables Merkle-batch sealing
```
Then copy `config/demo-full.cr.example`, set the AWS / Vault / GitHub env vars it documents, and run `cre run` headless or `cre watch` for the live TUI. Without `CRE_SIGNING_KEY_HEX`, the daemon still runs but skips Layer 3 of the audit log — `cre audit verify` will skip the Merkle layer too.
## Subcommand Cheat Sheet
| Command | Purpose |
|---|---|
| `cre run` | Headless daemon (production / systemd) — requires `CRE_HMAC_KEY_HEX` + `CRE_KEK_HEX` |
| `cre watch` | Engine + live TUI in one process — same env requirements |
| `cre check` | One-shot policy eval, exit code by violations (CI-friendly) |
| `cre rotate <id>` | Manual rotation of a single credential — uses the same env-driven rotators as `cre run` |
| `cre policy list` | List compiled-in policies |
| `cre policy show <name>` | Inspect one policy in detail |
| `cre export --framework=soc2` | Generate signed compliance evidence ZIP |
| `cre audit verify` | Hash chain + HMAC ratchet (Merkle layer adds when `--public-key=PATH` or `CRE_AUDIT_PUBLIC_KEY_HEX`) |
| `cre verify-bundle <zip>` | Offline re-verify of an evidence bundle (sha256 + manifest sig + chain + Merkle) |
| `cre demo` | Tier 1 zero-deps demo |
| `cre tui-demo` | 8-second TUI preview using synthetic events (no daemon, no DB) |
| `cre version` | Print version |
## Where to Read Next
- **Architecture** -> `02-ARCHITECTURE.md` (event bus, persistence, crypto layers)
- **Concepts** -> `01-CONCEPTS.md` (rotation theory, NIST/SOC2 framework controls, real breaches)
- **Code walkthrough** -> `03-IMPLEMENTATION.md` (key functions, where to make changes)
- **Extension ideas** -> `04-CHALLENGES.md` (add a 5th rotator, ML-KEM hybrid wrap, web UI)

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<!--
©AngelaMos | 2026
01-CONCEPTS.md
-->
# Concepts - Credential Rotation, in Practice and in History
## Why credential rotation is its own discipline
A credential is a fact in shared state: "this token authorizes this principal." The longer that fact stays in shared state, the more places it can leak from. Compromise has a half-life: every commit, every CI log, every laptop, every backup tape extends the radius. Rotation is the discipline of forcing the fact to expire on a schedule **shorter than the time-to-discover** of the leakage paths you can't see.
The post-2020 industry consensus has shifted significantly:
- **NIST SP 800-63B-4** (final July 2025): *prohibits* periodic password rotation for human credentials, BUT continues to require rotation for service accounts, API keys, machine identities.
- **NIST SP 800-57 Pt1 Rev5**: cryptoperiod-driven rotation per key type (DEKs, KEKs, signing keys, MACs).
- **PCI DSS v4.0.1** (mandatory March 2025): the 90-day rule still defaults; the "Customized Approach" off-ramp lets you replace it with continuous monitoring + risk-based rotation.
- **CA/Browser Forum SC-081v3**: TLS certificate lifetimes shrink to 47 days by 2029.
So the practical answer in 2026 is not "rotate everything every 90 days" - it's **risk-based rotation** for human credentials, **cryptoperiod-driven rotation** for keys, and **JIT / ephemeral / workload-identity** for the highest-risk service-to-service paths.
## Real breaches that motivated this design
| Year | Incident | Root credential failure |
|---|---|---|
| 2020 | SolarWinds Sunburst | Service account token reused for ~9 months across attacker dwell |
| 2021 | Codecov bash uploader | One leaked GCS upload key, no rotation, 2 months of supply-chain access |
| 2022 | Heroku/Travis OAuth | OAuth tokens for npm reuse - no rotation, no scope reduction |
| 2023 | Storm-0558 (Microsoft) | MSA signing key generated 2016, never rotated, leaked via crash dump |
| 2023 | Okta support breach | HAR files containing session tokens - no exfil-detection, no token binding |
| 2024 | Snowflake / UNC5537 | Customer credentials leaked years prior, never rotated, no MFA |
| 2024 | Microsoft Midnight Blizzard | Legacy non-prod tenant test creds, never rotated |
| 2025 | tj-actions CVE-2025-30066 | GitHub Actions token theft via supply-chain action |
The pattern repeats: **time** is the attacker's ally. Each row above had at least one credential that lived too long in shared state.
## What this enforcer prevents (and doesn't)
**Prevents:**
- Stale credentials living past their expected lifetime (policy violation -> notify or auto-rotate)
- Silent rotation drift (current-vs-DB-fingerprint detection)
- Forgetting to log a rotation (audit-log automatic via bus subscriber - the orchestrator can't bypass it)
- Audit-log tampering (3-layer integrity: chain + HMAC ratchet + Ed25519 batch signing)
- Unauthorized rotation triggers (Telegram bot ACL, CLI requires explicit credential ID)
**Does NOT prevent:**
- Compromise of the KEK itself (use AWS KMS / HSM in production)
- Attacker who already exfiltrated a valid credential before rotation (rotate ASAP, but the fact already escaped)
- Insider running `cre rotate <id>` legitimately but with malicious intent (audit log captures it; doesn't stop it)
- DNS hijack of api.telegram.org (use webhooks with mTLS for hardened deployments)
## The Four-Step Rotation Contract, Explained
Borrowed verbatim from AWS Secrets Manager's Rotation Lambda template. The rule is: **between step 2 and step 4, both old AND new credentials are valid.** This is the dual-version safety guarantee. Concurrent consumers using either credential succeed; nobody crashes mid-rotation.
```
time -->
step 1 (generate) step 2 (apply) step 3 (verify) step 4 (commit)
| | | |
old: usable old: usable old: usable old: REVOKED
new: pending new: usable new: usable new: current
| |
+-- rollback OK --+ +--+--+ v
upstream pending verify failed? | irreversible
artifact deletable rollback_apply |
revokes new |
v
if verify passes,
proceed to commit
```
Step 4 is the only **irreversible** step. By design. If step 4 fails partially (commit succeeded for new but old wasn't actually revoked), the orchestrator marks the rotation `inconsistent` and surfaces an alert - we honestly tell you "this needs a human" rather than silently corrupting state.
## Audit-log integrity, three layers deep
| Layer | Mechanism | Defends against |
|---|---|---|
| **Hash chain** | Each row's `content_hash = SHA256(prev_hash || canonical_payload)` | Silent edits - any change breaks the forward chain |
| **HMAC ratchet** | Each row HMAC'd with key K_v; every 1024 rows derive K_{v+1} = HKDF(K_v, "ratchet") and zeroize K_v | An attacker who later gets DB write + current key still cannot rewrite past entries (the old key is gone) |
| **Ed25519 Merkle batches** | Hourly: build Merkle root over `content_hash` leaves; sign root with Ed25519 | Auditor can verify with **only the public key + the batches**, no DB access required |
Verification is exposed as a CLI command:
```
$ cre audit verify --public-key=/etc/cre/audit_pubkey.hex
✓ hash chain: OK
✓ HMAC ratchet: OK
✓ Merkle batches: OK
✓ audit chain valid: 14892 entries
```
The HMAC ratchet replays from the seed key supplied via `CRE_HMAC_KEY_HEX`, so the verifier needs the *same* seed the writer used. Merkle batches are signed under `CRE_SIGNING_KEY_HEX` and verified with the matching public key — bundled in the `cre export` ZIP so an offline auditor can `cre verify-bundle` without DB access.
## Compliance Framework Coverage
The export bundle (`cre export --framework=soc2`) maps audit events to specific framework controls. Per `src/cre/compliance/control_mapping.cr`:
- **SOC 2** - CC6.1 (logical access mgmt), CC6.6 (vulnerability mgmt), CC6.7 (access review), CC4.1 (monitoring), CC7.1 / CC7.2 (incident detection)
- **PCI DSS v4.0.1** - 8.3.9 / 8.6.3 (auth & rotation), 10.5.x (audit log integrity), 3.7.4 (key management)
- **ISO 27001:2022** - A.5.16 / A.5.17 / A.5.18 (identity & access), A.8.5 (secure auth), A.8.15 / A.8.16 (logging & monitoring), A.8.24 (cryptography)
- **HIPAA Security Rule** - 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(D) (password mgmt), 164.312(b) (audit controls)

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# Architecture
## System overview
```
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ cre (single Crystal binary) │
│ │
│ ┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐ │
│ │ Event Bus │ │
│ │ (typed Crystal channels) │ │
│ └────┬─────┬─────┬─────┬─────┬─────┬─────┬────────────┘ │
│ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │
│ ┌────▼─┐ ┌─▼──┐ ┌▼───┐ ┌▼──┐ ┌▼────┐ ┌──▼──┐ ┌──────┐ │
│ │Sched │ │Rot.│ │Pol.│ │TUI│ │Tele.│ │Audit│ │Notify│ │
│ │ulers │ │Reg │ │Eval│ │ │ │Bot │ │Log │ │ │ │
│ └──┬───┘ └─┬──┘ └─┬──┘ └───┘ └─────┘ └──┬──┘ └──────┘ │
│ │ │ │ │ │
│ └───────┴──────┴─────────────────────┘ │
│ │ │
│ ┌────────▼─────────┐ │
│ │ Persistence │ ◄── SQLite (Tier 1) │
│ │ (PG / SQLite) │ ◄── PostgreSQL (T2/T3) │
│ └──────────────────┘ │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
```
All long-lived components are **fibers in one OS process**. The bus is in-process - Crystal channels are nanosecond-scale, so the architectural overhead is essentially free.
## Components
### Event Bus (`src/cre/engine/event_bus.cr`)
Fanout dispatch via Crystal channels. Each subscriber gets its own bounded channel and chooses an overflow policy:
| Subscriber | Overflow | Reason |
|---|---|---|
| `AuditSubscriber` | `Block` | Never drop audit events; compliance requirement |
| `Tui` | `Drop` | Stale UI is fine; can't block engine |
| `LogNotifier` | `Drop` | Best-effort structured logs |
| `TelegramSubscriber` | `Drop` (buffer 128) | Network-flaky anyway |
| `RotationWorker` | `Block` (buffer 32) | Must dispatch scheduled rotations |
The dispatcher is a single fiber reading from the inbox channel and writing to subscriber channels. Both overflow modes use `select` so a stuck subscriber can't pin the bus indefinitely:
- `Drop`: non-blocking `select … else …` — full buffer logs a warn and drops the event.
- `Block`: `select … when timeout(@block_send_timeout) …` — if a subscriber's buffer stays full past the timeout (default 5s), the bus drops that one event, logs the stall, and moves on. Operators tune the timeout up for slow downstreams they trust (audit DB writes) and down for unreliable ones.
### Rotators (`src/cre/rotators/`)
The abstract `Rotator` class exposes the four lifecycle methods plus `rollback_apply`. Concrete rotators self-register at compile time:
```crystal
class AwsSecretsRotator < Rotator
register_as :aws_secretsmgr
...
end
```
Adding a fifth rotator means dropping a single file in `src/cre/rotators/`. The macro hooks it into the registry at compile time. No central wiring to update.
Rotators receive their cloud client through their constructor (DI). The CLI `run` command wires the right client based on env vars / config.
### Persistence (`src/cre/persistence/`)
Two adapters behind one interface:
- `Sqlite::SqlitePersistence` - single connection (`max_pool_size=1`) so SQLite's writer-serialization is safe; `synchronous=NORMAL`; `BEFORE UPDATE` and `BEFORE DELETE` triggers on `audit_events` raise `audit_events is append-only`. Application-level mutex for advisory-lock simulation (the abstraction is in-process only on SQLite). Used for Tier 1 demo.
- `Postgres::PostgresPersistence` - JSONB tags, `BIGSERIAL` audit seq, `audit_events_no_update` trigger refusing UPDATE/DELETE/TRUNCATE, `pg_advisory_xact_lock` for cross-process locking, and a partial unique index on `rotations(credential_id) WHERE state NOT IN ('completed','failed','aborted','inconsistent')` so two daemons can never insert overlapping in-flight rotations for the same credential. Used for Tier 2/3.
Both backends share the same migration runner (`schema_migrations` table + version-tracked `Step` records), so adding a column is a one-line `Step.new(N, ["ALTER TABLE ..."])` instead of editing a soup of `IF NOT EXISTS`. The repo contracts (`CredentialsRepo`, `VersionsRepo`, `RotationsRepo`, `AuditRepo`) are identical between adapters; `Persistence` exposes `transaction(&)` and `with_advisory_lock(key, &)` so the rest of the system stays backend-agnostic.
### Crypto layers (`src/cre/crypto/`, `src/cre/audit/`)
```
+--------------------+
| Plaintext |
+--------------------+
|
| AES-256-GCM(plain, DEK, AAD = tenant||cred||version, nonce 96b)
v
+--------------------+
| ciphertext + tag | -> credential_versions.ciphertext
+--------------------+
+----+
| DEK| (32 random bytes per row)
+----+
|
| KEK_v.wrap(DEK) (envelope encryption)
v
+--------------------+
| wrapped DEK | -> credential_versions.dek_wrapped + kek_version
+--------------------+
KEK source (per tier):
Tier 1: env var CRE_KEK_HEX (64-hex chars = 32 bytes)
Tier 2: AWS KMS via LocalStack
Tier 3: real AWS KMS or HSM
```
Per-row DEKs collapse the AES-GCM nonce-reuse birthday concern (each row's DEK encrypts exactly one message). AAD-binding prevents ciphertext-swap attacks where an attacker with DB write tries to swap a low-privilege row's ciphertext into a high-privilege row.
`algorithm_id` is reserved for crypto agility:
- `0x01` = AES-256-GCM (today)
- `0x02` = XChaCha20-Poly1305 (long nonce, simpler)
- `0x03` = ML-KEM hybrid wrap (post-quantum forward secrecy)
### Audit log integrity stack
Three layers, increasingly hard to bypass:
```
+-------------------------------------------------+
| Layer 3: Ed25519-signed Merkle batches |
| audit_batches table, hourly seal, signed |
| over (start_seq, end_seq, root) |
| Auditor verifies with public key only. |
+-------------------------------------------------+
|
| leaves: content_hash[]
v
+-------------------------------------------------+
| Layer 2: HMAC ratchet |
| K_v signs each row's content_hash; every |
| 1024 rows -> K_{v+1} = HKDF(K_v, "ratchet"); |
| K_v zeroized in memory |
+-------------------------------------------------+
|
v
+-------------------------------------------------+
| Layer 1: Hash chain |
| content_hash = SHA256(prev_hash || |
| canonical_payload) |
| rendering single-row tampering visible |
+-------------------------------------------------+
|
v
+-------------------------------------------------+
| PostgreSQL audit_events table |
| - INSERT-only role grant |
| - UPDATE/DELETE/TRUNCATE trigger refuses |
+-------------------------------------------------+
```
The PG triggers are not strictly necessary (the chain catches tampering anyway), but they fail loud at write-time which is much friendlier for operators. SQLite tier 1 documents the relaxed guarantee.
## Concurrency
| Scope | Bound | Mechanism |
|---|---|---|
| Per-credential | 1 active rotation | `RotationWorker` checks `rotations.in_flight` before dispatching; PG also enforces a partial unique index so cross-process duplicates fail at the DB |
| Per-rotation lifecycle | 1 step at a time | Orchestrator runs `generate -> apply -> verify -> commit` sequentially; `rollback_apply` fires on apply/verify failure; commit failure marks the rotation `inconsistent` and raises a critical alert |
| Engine event bus | per-subscriber buffer + timeout | `EventBus#dispatch` uses `select` for both Block and Drop overflow (see Bus subscribers table above) |
Crystal fibers + bounded channels = clean rate limiting without threads or locks.
## Lifecycle (cre run)
```
1. Bootstrap: validate CRE_HMAC_KEY_HEX + CRE_KEK_HEX (hard-fail if missing)
2. Open persistence (PG or SQLite); migrate! (versioned Step list)
3. Build Envelope from KEK; build optional Ed25519Signer from CRE_SIGNING_KEY_HEX
4. Load compiled-in policies (REGISTRY) + register rotators from env vars
5. Start EventBus.run (dispatcher fiber)
6. Start subscribers: AuditSubscriber, LogNotifier, RotationWorker, PolicyEvaluator
7. Start Scheduler (SchedulerTick every CRE_TICK_SECONDS)
8. Start BatchSealerScheduler if signer present (default every 5min)
9. Wire Telegram bot if TELEGRAM_TOKEN + chat IDs are set
10. Optionally start TUI + Snapshotter (cre watch)
11. Block on stop_signal channel; SIGINT triggers graceful drain
```
Graceful shutdown: `engine.stop` publishes `ShutdownRequested` and waits up to 2s on `audit_subscriber.await_drain` — the audit subscriber sends on a private completion channel as soon as it processes that event, which proves it has handled everything queued before it. Then the bus closes its inbox and subscriber channels; each subscriber fiber exits on `Channel::ClosedError`.

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# Implementation Walkthrough
This document points you at the most important code paths. Read it with `tree src/` open in another window.
## The Policy DSL (statically- and registration-time validated)
`src/cre/policy/dsl.cr` declares the DSL inside `module CRE::Policy::Dsl`. Consumers opt in explicitly:
```crystal
require "cre/policy/dsl"
include CRE::Policy::Dsl
policy "production-aws-secrets" do
match { |c| c.kind.aws_secretsmgr? && c.tag(:env) == "prod" }
max_age 30.days
enforce :rotate_immediately
notify_via :telegram, :structured_log
end
```
`with builder yield` makes every Builder method callable receiver-less inside the block. Two flavors of typo-detection apply:
- **Compile time** — `enforce :rotate_immediatly` (single Symbol arg → `Action` enum) is rejected by Crystal's autocast. `match { |c| c.kund }` (typo on a Credential getter) breaks compilation pointing at the policy file.
- **Registration time** — `notify_via :telegrm, :slak` uses a splat-Symbol overload that runs `Channel.parse?` on each value and raises `BuilderError("unknown channel 'telegrm' in policy '<name>'")` when the file is loaded. Splat autocast doesn't reach into Symbols, so this layer is the next-best thing.
`Builder#build` also raises `BuilderError` on missing required fields (`matcher`, `max_age`, `enforce_action`). Either way, a misformed policy never reaches a running daemon.
## The Event Bus (fanout via Crystal channels)
`src/cre/engine/event_bus.cr` exposes `subscribe(buffer:, overflow:)` returning a `Channel(Event)`. The `run` method spawns a single dispatcher fiber that reads from `@inbox` and forwards to each subscriber's channel.
`dispatch` uses Crystal's `select` for both overflow modes:
- `Drop` — `select … else` drops the event when the buffer is full and logs a warn.
- `Block` — `select … when timeout(@block_send_timeout)` waits up to `@block_send_timeout` (default 5s) and only then drops, logging the stall. This isolates the bus from a stuck subscriber: head-of-line blocking is bounded.
## The Rotator Plugin Registration
`src/cre/rotators/rotator.cr` declares an abstract base with a class-level `REGISTRY = {} of Symbol => Rotator.class`. The macro `register_as` populates this at compile time:
```crystal
abstract class Rotator
REGISTRY = {} of Symbol => Rotator.class
macro register_as(kind)
::CRE::Rotators::Rotator::REGISTRY[{{ kind }}] = self
end
end
```
When a file like `src/cre/rotators/aws_secrets.cr` is required, the `register_as :aws_secretsmgr` line runs at *compile time* and the class shows up in `Rotator::REGISTRY[:aws_secretsmgr]`. No central list to maintain.
## The 4-step Orchestrator
`src/cre/engine/rotation_orchestrator.cr` runs the contract:
```
generate -> rotator-specific (often produces the new value + cloud version_id)
apply -> rotator-specific (often no-op for cloud rotators where generate already exposed)
verify -> read back, byte-equal check
commit -> promote new -> AWSCURRENT, demote old -> AWSPREVIOUS
```
Each step publishes `RotationStepStarted` and either `RotationStepCompleted` or `RotationStepFailed` to the bus.
Failure handling has two regimes:
- **apply or verify fails** — `rotator.rollback_apply(c, new_secret)` reverses the cloud-side mutation; rotation moves to `Failed`; bus emits `RotationStepFailed` + `RotationFailed`.
- **commit fails** — partial cross-call commit sequences (e.g., AWS `UpdateSecretVersionStage` 5xx half-way through) cannot be reliably reversed client-side. The rotation transitions to `Inconsistent` (a terminal state distinct from `Failed`), and the orchestrator emits a critical `AlertRaised` so operators know to intervene.
Success path is now the heavyweight one: when the four steps complete, the orchestrator
1. seals `new_secret.ciphertext` with the optional `Crypto::Envelope` (AES-256-GCM, AAD = `cred=<id>|kind=<k>`),
2. inserts a `credential_versions` row with the wrapped DEK + KEK version,
3. updates the credential row to bump `last_rotated_at`, set `current_version_id` to the new version's id, and demote the old one to `previous_version_id`.
That last step is what stops the policy evaluator from re-scheduling the same rotation on every tick — `Policy#overdue?` keys on `c.rotation_anchor` (which is `last_rotated_at || created_at`), not on `updated_at`.
The orchestrator never directly calls audit. Audit happens automatically because `AuditSubscriber` is on the bus listening for these exact event types — the orchestrator can't forget to log. And because the orchestrator's path is the only path that runs `versions.insert` + `credentials.update`, persistence-side state stays consistent with the audit-log narrative.
## SigV4 Signer (the AWS-flavored work)
`src/cre/aws/signer.cr` implements RFC-style AWS SigV4:
```
canonical_request = method + canonical_uri + canonical_query +
canonical_headers + signed_headers + payload_hash
string_to_sign = "AWS4-HMAC-SHA256\n" + amz_date + "\n" +
credential_scope + "\n" + sha256(canonical_request)
signing_key = HMAC chain (kSecret -> kDate -> kRegion -> kService -> kSigning)
signature = HMAC(signing_key, string_to_sign)
```
The `Authorization` header is built from `algorithm + Credential=... + SignedHeaders=... + Signature=...`. Includes `X-Amz-Security-Token` when an STS session token is supplied.
Two test files cover the signer:
- `spec/unit/aws/signer_spec.cr` — idempotence + Authorization-header regex shape.
- `spec/unit/aws/signer_aws_vector_spec.cr` — uses the AWS reference suite's `get-vanilla` inputs (access key, secret, region, service, fixed timestamp) and locks in a regression vector for the exact signature our signer produces. Because we always emit `X-Amz-Content-SHA256` (required by Secrets Manager and other JSON-protocol services), the signed-headers list is `host;x-amz-content-sha256;x-amz-date` — slightly different from AWS's vanilla vector, so we lock in our own bytes rather than match theirs. Any future change to canonicalization, key derivation, or header ordering trips the test.
## Audit Log Integrity (three-layer)
`src/cre/audit/audit_log.cr` writes Layers 1 + 2 on every `append`:
- `latest_hash` from the DB (genesis = 32 zero bytes for an empty log)
- `content_hash = HashChain.next_hash(prev_hash, canonical_payload)`
- `hmac = HmacRatchet#sign(content_hash)`; ratchet rolls every 1024 rows
- All three columns plus `hmac_key_version` get persisted in one `INSERT` per row
Verification is split into three independently-callable methods:
- `verify_hash_chain` — walks every entry, recomputes `SHA256(prev_hash || payload)`, compares against `content_hash`.
- `verify_hmac_ratchet(seed_key)` — replays the ratchet from the seed `CRE_HMAC_KEY_HEX`, recomputes each row's HMAC against `content_hash`, and checks `hmac_key_version` matches the ratchet's view of where rotation should be. Catches an attacker who fixed up the hash chain but doesn't have the seed.
- `verify_batches(verifier)` — for every row in `audit_batches`, refetch the corresponding `content_hash` leaves, recompute the Merkle root, then verify the Ed25519 signature over `(start_seq, end_seq, root)`.
`src/cre/audit/batch_sealer.cr` builds Layer 3 entries:
- Walk new audit_events since `last_sealed_seq`
- Build a Merkle tree (`Merkle.root`) over each row's `content_hash`
- Sign `(start_seq, end_seq, root)` with Ed25519 via `Signing::Ed25519Signer`
- Insert into `audit_batches`
`src/cre/audit/batch_sealer_scheduler.cr` is the fiber that actually drives the sealer in `cre run` / `cre watch`: it calls `seal_pending` once on start, again every `CRE_SEAL_INTERVAL_SECONDS` (default 300s), and once more on shutdown. Every successful seal publishes a typed `AuditBatchSealed` event, which the audit subscriber writes back into the audit log under `audit.batch.sealed` — closing the loop with the SOC 2 / PCI-DSS / ISO / HIPAA control mapping that already keys on that event type.
Crystal's stdlib OpenSSL doesn't expose Ed25519 high-level wrappers, so `src/cre/audit/signing.cr` reaches into LibCrypto via FFI: `EVP_PKEY_new_raw_private_key`, `EVP_DigestSign`, etc. Public-key verification is symmetrical: `Ed25519Verifier#verify(message, signature)`.
## AEAD Envelope Encryption
`src/cre/crypto/aead.cr` does AES-256-GCM via LibCrypto FFI (stdlib `OpenSSL::Cipher` doesn't expose `auth_data=` / `auth_tag` for GCM). The envelope (`src/cre/crypto/envelope.cr`) generates a 32-byte DEK per row, encrypts plaintext with AES-256-GCM(plaintext, DEK, AAD), then wraps the DEK with KEK using a separate AEAD (with its own AAD `kek-wrap|v<version>`). Both ciphertexts are `nonce(12) || tag(16) || body`.
Decrypting requires the KEK to unwrap the DEK, then the DEK + AAD to decrypt the payload. AAD mismatch fails tag verification at the inner layer; KEK version mismatch fails at unwrap.
## TUI
`src/cre/tui/state.cr` holds a rolling view of active rotations + recent events. `apply(ev)` is the single entry point that mutates state; pure update logic, easy to test.
`src/cre/tui/renderer.cr` paints the four panels to any IO. ANSI escapes via `src/cre/tui/ansi.cr` (stdlib only). The renderer's `pad` helper accounts for ANSI escape widths so column alignment is correct under colors.
`src/cre/tui/tui.cr` ties it together: subscribes to the bus (Drop overflow), spawns a tick fiber + an event fiber, both calling `maybe_render` which throttles to `refresh_interval`.
## Telegram Bot
`src/cre/notifiers/telegram.cr` is a thin HTTP::Client wrapper for the Telegram Bot API (no tourmaline dependency for the notification path). Errors get the bot token redacted before they hit logs — Telegram requires the token in the URL path, so the redaction is best-effort, but it stops the obvious leak.
`src/cre/notifiers/telegram_bot.cr` does long-poll `getUpdates` and dispatches commands. Auth is by chat-ID allowlist; viewer tier (`/status`, `/queue`, `/history`, `/alerts`) is read-only; operator tier adds `/rotate`. `/rotate <id>` publishes `RotationScheduled` to the bus, which the `RotationWorker` consumes (see `src/cre/engine/rotation_worker.cr`) — the worker resolves the credential, looks up the right `Rotator` from the env-driven dispatch table, checks `rotations.in_flight` to dedupe, and hands off to `RotationOrchestrator`.
## Persistence Layer Shape
`src/cre/persistence/repos.cr` declares the abstract repos (`CredentialsRepo`, `VersionsRepo`, `RotationsRepo`, `AuditRepo`) and the record types (`RotationRecord`, `AuditEntry`, `AuditBatch`, plus the `RotatorKind` and `RotationState` enums). `RotationState::Inconsistent` is included in `TERMINAL_STATES` alongside `Completed` / `Failed` / `Aborted`.
Both adapters apply schema changes through `Migrations::Step` records keyed on a monotonic `version`. The `schema_migrations` table tracks which versions have run; new alterations land as new `Step.new(N, ["ALTER TABLE ..."])` entries instead of editing the soup of `IF NOT EXISTS` statements.
`audit_events` is the most carefully guarded table in the schema:
- Postgres has the original `audit_events_no_update` trigger (raises `audit_events is append-only` on UPDATE/DELETE/TRUNCATE).
- SQLite gets parity via two `BEFORE UPDATE` / `BEFORE DELETE` triggers using `RAISE(ABORT, '...')`.
- The repo's `INSERT` no longer uses `OR IGNORE` / `ON CONFLICT … DO NOTHING`, so a constraint failure raises into the application instead of silently dropping.
- The audit subscriber's rescue path publishes a critical `AlertRaised` and (by default) panics the process via `CRE_AUDIT_FAILURE_MODE=panic`.
Two independent layers; both must be subverted to forge history.

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# Extension Challenges
Pick one and ship it as a PR.
## Beginner
### 1. Add a fifth rotator: PostgreSQL `ALTER USER`
A new file `src/cre/rotators/postgres_user.cr` that rotates a Postgres role's password directly via `ALTER USER ... PASSWORD ...`. Use the existing 4-step contract; verify by opening a fresh connection with the new password. Drop the file in - the macro registers it automatically. Add unit specs in `spec/unit/rotators/postgres_user_spec.cr`.
### 2. Slack notifier subscriber
Mirror `TelegramSubscriber` against Slack's `chat.postMessage`. Add chat ID allowlist, channel-id parameterization, and message formatting. Single new file in `src/cre/notifiers/`.
### 3. Add `notify_via :slack` to the Channel enum
Once you have a Slack notifier, add `Slack` to `Channel` in `src/cre/policy/policy.cr`, dispatch on it in the evaluator, and write a policy in `policies/` that uses it.
## Intermediate
### 4. Web dashboard via SSE
Add `src/cre/web/` with a Lucky/Kemal HTTP server that subscribes to the bus and pushes events as Server-Sent Events to an HTMX dashboard. Reuse `Tui::State` as the data model - it already has the right shape. The point of the bus + plugin architecture is that this is a *new subscriber*, not a rewrite.
### 5. ML-KEM hybrid wrap for KEK
Add `algorithm_id = 0x03` to envelope encryption: hybrid Curve25519 + ML-KEM-768 (Kyber) for the DEK wrap. Provides forward secrecy against future quantum-attack on captured ciphertexts. Note: ML-KEM is in OpenSSL 3.x; you may need to update LibCrypto FFI bindings.
### 6. OpenTimestamps anchoring
Anchor each `audit_batches` Merkle root to the Bitcoin blockchain via OpenTimestamps. Adds a fourth integrity layer: even if the entire DB and signing key are compromised, an offline auditor with a Bitcoin full node can verify when each batch existed. Update `src/cre/audit/batch_sealer.cr` to publish OTS proofs alongside Ed25519 signatures.
## Advanced
### 7. SPIFFE/SPIRE workload identity rotator
Add a rotator that *replaces* static credentials with SPIFFE SVIDs (X.509 + JWT). Demonstrates the post-2024 industry shift away from rotation entirely toward attestation-based ephemeral identity. Touch points: new client in `src/cre/spiffe/`, new rotator in `src/cre/rotators/spiffe.cr`, new credential kind in `src/cre/domain/credential.cr`.
### 8. Crash recovery state machine
The orchestrator already marks commit-step failures as `Inconsistent` and emits a critical alert, so single-step partial failures surface loudly. What's still missing is the *boot-time* recovery sweep: if the daemon was killed between, say, a successful `apply` and the start of `verify`, the `rotations` row is left in `Verifying` state with no fiber driving it forward. Implement the recovery protocol: on boot, scan `rotations` for non-terminal states; for each, decide based on `(rotator_kind, last_step)` whether to invoke `rollback_apply`, retry from the failed step, or transition to `Inconsistent`. Add `src/cre/engine/recovery.cr` with explicit state-machine semantics, wire it into `Engine#start`, and add a SQL fixture spec in `spec/unit/engine/recovery_spec.cr` that builds each kind of "stale" row and asserts the right outcome.
### 9. Multi-tenant support
Wire `tenant_id` end-to-end: a new migration adds the column on `credentials` / `credential_versions` / `rotations` / `audit_events`; the AAD construction in `RotationOrchestrator#persist_credential_version` extends to `cred=<id>|kind=<k>|tenant=<t>`; policy matchers gain `c.tenant == "tenant-x"`; and Postgres row-level security policies enforce isolation at the DB level. The biggest design decision: per-tenant KEKs (each tenant rotates independently, but bootstrap juggles N keys) vs shared KEK with tenant-bound DEKs (simpler config, the AAD does the isolation work).
### 10. JIT credential broker
Replace the rotation contract entirely for some credential types: instead of rotating, *issue* a fresh ephemeral credential on each access (5-15 minute TTL). Requires a new `Broker` abstraction alongside `Rotator`, integration with AWS STS / GCP service account impersonation / Vault dynamic, and consumer-side token refresh logic in the example apps.
## Evaluation rubric (for self-review)
A great extension PR:
- Has unit tests in `spec/unit/<area>/` mirroring the source layout
- Has a focused commit message explaining the *why*, not just the *what*
- Doesn't break existing tests (`crystal spec spec/` should be green)
- Adds 1-3 file-level changes; if it touches more than 5 files, the abstraction is probably wrong
- Surfaces failure modes honestly (e.g., the JIT broker should clearly document the consumer-side complexity it shifts)

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#!/usr/bin/env bash
# ©AngelaMos | 2026
# install.sh
set -euo pipefail
SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
PROJECT_ROOT="$(cd "$SCRIPT_DIR/.." && pwd)"
INSTALL_PREFIX="${INSTALL_PREFIX:-/usr/local}"
bold() { printf "\033[1m%s\033[0m\n" "$*"; }
green() { printf "\033[32m%s\033[0m\n" "$*"; }
yellow() { printf "\033[33m%s\033[0m\n" "$*"; }
red() { printf "\033[31m%s\033[0m\n" "$*"; }
bold "Credential Rotation Enforcer - install.sh"
# 1) Crystal
if ! command -v crystal >/dev/null 2>&1; then
yellow "Crystal not found. Install instructions: https://crystal-lang.org/install/"
yellow "Or, on Linux:"
yellow " curl -fsSL https://crystal-lang.org/install.sh | sudo bash"
yellow "Or, on macOS:"
yellow " brew install crystal"
exit 1
fi
crystal_version=$(crystal --version | head -1 | awk '{print $2}')
green "Crystal $crystal_version found"
# 2) System deps (libpcre2 for regex, libssl for crypto)
case "$(uname -s)" in
Linux)
if ! ldconfig -p 2>/dev/null | grep -q libpcre2-8; then
yellow "libpcre2 not detected. On Debian/Ubuntu: sudo apt-get install -y libpcre2-dev"
yellow "On Alpine: apk add pcre2-dev"
fi
;;
Darwin)
: # macOS bundles what's needed
;;
esac
cd "$PROJECT_ROOT"
# 3) Shards
bold "Resolving shard dependencies..."
shards install
green "shards installed"
# 4) Build
bold "Building cre (release mode)..."
shards build cre --release
green "cre binary built at bin/cre ($(stat -c %s bin/cre 2>/dev/null || stat -f %z bin/cre) bytes)"
# 5) Optional install to PATH
if [ "${INSTALL_TO_PATH:-0}" = "1" ]; then
bold "Installing to ${INSTALL_PREFIX}/bin/cre"
if [ -w "${INSTALL_PREFIX}/bin" ]; then
cp bin/cre "${INSTALL_PREFIX}/bin/cre"
else
sudo cp bin/cre "${INSTALL_PREFIX}/bin/cre"
fi
green "Installed: $(which cre)"
fi
bold ""
bold "Try the zero-deps demo:"
echo " ./bin/cre demo"
bold ""
bold "Or start the daemon:"
echo " ./bin/cre run --db=sqlite:cre.db"
bold ""
bold "See learn/00-OVERVIEW.md for the full walkthrough."

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version: 2.0
shards:
db:
git: https://github.com/crystal-lang/crystal-db.git
version: 0.11.0
html5:
git: https://github.com/naqvis/crystal-html5.git
version: 0.4.0
http_proxy:
git: https://github.com/mamantoha/http_proxy.git
version: 0.14.0+git.commit.5a02af05c5531c639efdf651431a86ec90905f71
pg:
git: https://github.com/will/crystal-pg.git
version: 0.26.0
sqlite3:
git: https://github.com/crystal-lang/crystal-sqlite3.git
version: 0.19.0
tourmaline:
git: https://github.com/protoncr/tourmaline.git
version: 0.28.0
webmock:
git: https://github.com/manastech/webmock.cr.git
version: 0.14.0
xpath2:
git: https://github.com/naqvis/crystal-xpath2.git
version: 0.2.0

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# ©AngelaMos | 2026
# shard.yml
name: cre
version: 0.1.0
description: |
Credential Rotation Enforcer - tracks and enforces credential rotation
policies across cloud secret managers, vaults, and developer tooling.
authors:
- Carter Perez <carterperez2222@gmail.com>
license: MIT
crystal: ">= 1.20.0"
targets:
cre:
main: src/cre.cr
dependencies:
db:
github: crystal-lang/crystal-db
version: ~> 0.9
pg:
github: will/crystal-pg
version: ~> 0.9
sqlite3:
github: crystal-lang/crystal-sqlite3
version: ~> 0.9
tourmaline:
github: protoncr/tourmaline
version: ~> 0.28
development_dependencies:
webmock:
github: manastech/webmock.cr
version: ~> 0.9

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# ===================
# ©AngelaMos | 2026
# tier_1_spec.cr
# ===================
require "../../spec_helper"
require "../../../src/cre/demo/tier_1"
describe CRE::Demo::Tier1 do
it "runs end-to-end and reports rotation success" do
io = IO::Memory.new
code = CRE::Demo::Tier1.run(io)
code.should eq 0
out = CRE::Tui::Ansi.strip(io.to_s)
out.should contain "Tier 1 demo"
out.should contain "BEFORE"
out.should contain "AFTER"
out.should contain "rotation completed"
out.should contain "audit events, hash chain valid"
end
end

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# ===================
# ©AngelaMos | 2026
# postgres_persistence_spec.cr
# ===================
require "../../spec_helper"
require "../../../src/cre/persistence/postgres/postgres_persistence"
DATABASE_URL = ENV["DATABASE_URL"]? || "postgres://cre_test:cre_test@localhost:5433/cre_test"
private def fresh_persistence : CRE::Persistence::Postgres::PostgresPersistence
persist = CRE::Persistence::Postgres::PostgresPersistence.new(DATABASE_URL)
persist.migrate!
persist.db.exec("TRUNCATE credentials, credential_versions, rotations CASCADE")
persist.db.exec("ALTER TABLE audit_events DISABLE TRIGGER audit_events_no_update")
persist.db.exec("DELETE FROM audit_events")
persist.db.exec("ALTER TABLE audit_events ENABLE TRIGGER audit_events_no_update")
persist.db.exec("DELETE FROM audit_batches")
persist
end
describe CRE::Persistence::Postgres::PostgresPersistence do
it "round-trips a credential through PG" do
persist = fresh_persistence
c = CRE::Domain::Credential.new(
id: UUID.random,
external_id: "pg-1",
kind: CRE::Domain::CredentialKind::AwsSecretsmgr,
name: "pg-test",
tags: {"env" => "prod", "team" => "platform"} of String => String,
)
persist.credentials.insert(c)
found = persist.credentials.find(c.id).not_nil!
found.name.should eq "pg-test"
found.tag("env").should eq "prod"
found.tag("team").should eq "platform"
ensure
persist.try(&.close)
end
it "stores and retrieves binary credential versions" do
persist = fresh_persistence
cred = CRE::Domain::Credential.new(
id: UUID.random, external_id: "pg-bin",
kind: CRE::Domain::CredentialKind::EnvFile,
name: "n", tags: {} of String => String,
)
persist.credentials.insert(cred)
bytes = Bytes.new(64) { |i| i.to_u8 }
v = CRE::Domain::CredentialVersion.new(
id: UUID.random, credential_id: cred.id,
ciphertext: bytes, dek_wrapped: Bytes[0xde, 0xad, 0xbe, 0xef],
kek_version: 7, algorithm_id: 1_i16,
metadata: {"version_id" => "abc"},
)
persist.versions.insert(v)
found = persist.versions.find(v.id).not_nil!
found.ciphertext.should eq bytes
found.dek_wrapped.should eq Bytes[0xde, 0xad, 0xbe, 0xef]
found.kek_version.should eq 7
found.metadata["version_id"].should eq "abc"
ensure
persist.try(&.close)
end
it "audit_events trigger refuses UPDATE" do
persist = fresh_persistence
entry = CRE::Persistence::AuditEntry.new(
seq: 0_i64, event_id: UUID.random, occurred_at: Time.utc,
event_type: "test", actor: "system", target_id: nil,
payload: %({"k":"v"}),
prev_hash: Bytes.new(32, 0_u8),
content_hash: Bytes.new(32, 0xaa_u8),
hmac: Bytes.new(32, 0xbb_u8),
hmac_key_version: 1,
)
persist.audit.append(entry)
expect_raises(Exception, /append-only/) do
persist.db.exec("UPDATE audit_events SET event_type = 'forged' WHERE seq = 1")
end
ensure
persist.try(&.close)
end
it "advisory lock holds across the block" do
persist = fresh_persistence
counter = 0
persist.with_advisory_lock(42_i64) do
counter += 1
end
counter.should eq 1
ensure
persist.try(&.close)
end
end

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# ===================
# ©AngelaMos | 2026
# spec_helper.cr
# ===================
require "spec"
require "../src/cre"

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# ===================
# ©AngelaMos | 2026
# audit_log_spec.cr
# ===================
require "../../spec_helper"
require "../../../src/cre/audit/audit_log"
require "../../../src/cre/persistence/sqlite/sqlite_persistence"
describe CRE::Audit::AuditLog do
it "appends and reads back entries with valid hash chain" do
persist = CRE::Persistence::Sqlite::SqlitePersistence.new(":memory:")
persist.migrate!
log = CRE::Audit::AuditLog.new(persist, Bytes.new(32, 0_u8), 1, 1024)
log.append("rotation.completed", "system", nil, {"x" => "y"})
log.append("policy.violation", "system", nil, {"a" => "b"})
persist.audit.latest_seq.should eq 2_i64
log.verify_chain.should be_true
ensure
persist.try(&.close)
end
it "verify_chain detects when a row is tampered in DB directly" do
persist = CRE::Persistence::Sqlite::SqlitePersistence.new(":memory:")
persist.migrate!
log = CRE::Audit::AuditLog.new(persist, Bytes.new(32, 0_u8), 1, 1024)
log.append("a", "s", nil, {"k" => "v"})
log.append("b", "s", nil, {"k" => "v2"})
# The append-only trigger blocks tampering in the live DB; drop it
# for this test so we can exercise the verify_chain code path against
# a forced inconsistency.
persist.db.exec("DROP TRIGGER audit_events_no_update")
persist.db.exec("UPDATE audit_events SET payload = ? WHERE seq = 2", %({"event_type":"b","actor":"s","target_id":null,"payload":{"k":"BAD"}}))
log.verify_chain.should be_false
ensure
persist.try(&.close)
end
it "append-only triggers exist on audit_events (SQLite)" do
# The crystal-sqlite3 driver caches prepared statements at the connection
# level; a failed UPDATE leaves the cached statement in error state and the
# error re-surfaces at connection close, which conflates 'expect_raises'
# bookkeeping. We verify the trigger by inspecting sqlite_master directly.
persist = CRE::Persistence::Sqlite::SqlitePersistence.new(":memory:")
persist.migrate!
triggers = persist.db.query_all(
"SELECT name FROM sqlite_master WHERE type='trigger' AND tbl_name='audit_events'",
as: String,
)
triggers.should contain "audit_events_no_update"
triggers.should contain "audit_events_no_delete"
ensure
persist.try(&.close)
end
it "verify_chain returns true on empty log" do
persist = CRE::Persistence::Sqlite::SqlitePersistence.new(":memory:")
persist.migrate!
log = CRE::Audit::AuditLog.new(persist, Bytes.new(32, 0_u8), 1, 1024)
log.verify_chain.should be_true
ensure
persist.try(&.close)
end
it "ratchets version after configured threshold" do
persist = CRE::Persistence::Sqlite::SqlitePersistence.new(":memory:")
persist.migrate!
log = CRE::Audit::AuditLog.new(persist, Bytes.new(32, 0_u8), 1, ratchet_every: 2)
log.append("a", "s", nil, {"i" => "1"})
log.append("a", "s", nil, {"i" => "2"})
log.ratchet_version.should eq 1
log.append("a", "s", nil, {"i" => "3"})
log.ratchet_version.should eq 2
ensure
persist.try(&.close)
end
end

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# ===================
# ©AngelaMos | 2026
# batch_sealer_spec.cr
# ===================
require "../../spec_helper"
require "../../../src/cre/audit/audit_log"
require "../../../src/cre/audit/batch_sealer"
require "../../../src/cre/audit/signing"
require "../../../src/cre/persistence/sqlite/sqlite_persistence"
describe CRE::Audit::BatchSealer do
it "seals pending audit events into a signed Merkle batch" do
persist = CRE::Persistence::Sqlite::SqlitePersistence.new(":memory:")
persist.migrate!
log = CRE::Audit::AuditLog.new(persist, Bytes.new(32, 0_u8), 1, 1024)
log.append("a", "s", nil, {"i" => "1"})
log.append("b", "s", nil, {"i" => "2"})
log.append("c", "s", nil, {"i" => "3"})
kp = CRE::Audit::Signing::Ed25519Keypair.generate(version: 1)
signer = CRE::Audit::Signing::Ed25519Signer.from_keypair(kp)
sealer = CRE::Audit::BatchSealer.new(persist, signer)
batch = sealer.seal_pending.not_nil!
batch.start_seq.should eq 1_i64
batch.end_seq.should eq 3_i64
batch.signing_key_version.should eq 1
batch.merkle_root.size.should eq 32
batch.signature.size.should eq 64
verifier = CRE::Audit::Signing::Ed25519Verifier.new(kp.public_key)
msg = CRE::Audit::BatchSealer.pack_message(batch.start_seq, batch.end_seq, batch.merkle_root)
verifier.verify(msg, batch.signature).should be_true
persist.audit.last_sealed_seq.should eq 3_i64
ensure
persist.try(&.close)
end
it "returns nil when nothing pending" do
persist = CRE::Persistence::Sqlite::SqlitePersistence.new(":memory:")
persist.migrate!
kp = CRE::Audit::Signing::Ed25519Keypair.generate
signer = CRE::Audit::Signing::Ed25519Signer.from_keypair(kp)
sealer = CRE::Audit::BatchSealer.new(persist, signer)
sealer.seal_pending.should be_nil
ensure
persist.try(&.close)
end
it "subsequent seal covers only new events" do
persist = CRE::Persistence::Sqlite::SqlitePersistence.new(":memory:")
persist.migrate!
log = CRE::Audit::AuditLog.new(persist, Bytes.new(32, 0_u8), 1, 1024)
kp = CRE::Audit::Signing::Ed25519Keypair.generate
signer = CRE::Audit::Signing::Ed25519Signer.from_keypair(kp)
sealer = CRE::Audit::BatchSealer.new(persist, signer)
log.append("a", "s", nil, {"i" => "1"})
log.append("b", "s", nil, {"i" => "2"})
sealer.seal_pending.not_nil!.end_seq.should eq 2_i64
log.append("c", "s", nil, {"i" => "3"})
second = sealer.seal_pending.not_nil!
second.start_seq.should eq 3_i64
second.end_seq.should eq 3_i64
ensure
persist.try(&.close)
end
end

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# ===================
# ©AngelaMos | 2026
# hash_chain_spec.cr
# ===================
require "../../spec_helper"
require "../../../src/cre/audit/hash_chain"
describe CRE::Audit::HashChain do
it "first hash is 32 zero bytes" do
g = CRE::Audit::HashChain.genesis
g.size.should eq 32
g.all? { |b| b == 0_u8 }.should be_true
end
it "next_hash is deterministic" do
prev = CRE::Audit::HashChain.genesis
payload = "hello".to_slice
a = CRE::Audit::HashChain.next_hash(prev, payload)
b = CRE::Audit::HashChain.next_hash(prev, payload)
a.should eq b
a.size.should eq 32
end
it "different prev produces different hash" do
payload = "x".to_slice
a = CRE::Audit::HashChain.next_hash(Bytes.new(32, 0_u8), payload)
b = CRE::Audit::HashChain.next_hash(Bytes.new(32, 1_u8), payload)
a.should_not eq b
end
it "different payload produces different hash" do
prev = CRE::Audit::HashChain.genesis
a = CRE::Audit::HashChain.next_hash(prev, "a".to_slice)
b = CRE::Audit::HashChain.next_hash(prev, "b".to_slice)
a.should_not eq b
end
it "verify_chain detects tampering" do
pairs = [] of {Bytes, Bytes}
h = CRE::Audit::HashChain.genesis
payloads = ["a", "b", "c", "d"].map(&.to_slice)
payloads.each do |p|
next_h = CRE::Audit::HashChain.next_hash(h, p)
pairs << {h, next_h}
h = next_h
end
CRE::Audit::HashChain.verify(pairs, payloads).should be_true
tampered = payloads.dup
tampered[2] = "BAD".to_slice
CRE::Audit::HashChain.verify(pairs, tampered).should be_false
end
it "verify_chain returns true for empty input" do
CRE::Audit::HashChain.verify([] of {Bytes, Bytes}, [] of Bytes).should be_true
end
it "verify_chain returns false on mismatched array sizes" do
CRE::Audit::HashChain.verify([] of {Bytes, Bytes}, ["x".to_slice]).should be_false
end
end

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# ===================
# ©AngelaMos | 2026
# hmac_ratchet_spec.cr
# ===================
require "../../spec_helper"
require "../../../src/cre/audit/hmac_ratchet"
describe CRE::Audit::HmacRatchet do
it "produces 32-byte HMAC" do
r = CRE::Audit::HmacRatchet.new(Bytes.new(32, 0_u8), version: 1, ratchet_every: 1024)
h = r.sign("payload".to_slice)
h.size.should eq 32
r.version.should eq 1
end
it "rotates after N entries" do
r = CRE::Audit::HmacRatchet.new(Bytes.new(32, 0_u8), version: 1, ratchet_every: 3)
3.times { r.sign("x".to_slice) }
r.version.should eq 1 # not yet rotated
r.sign("x".to_slice)
r.version.should eq 2 # rotated on the 4th call
end
it "different keys produce different HMACs" do
a = CRE::Audit::HmacRatchet.new(Bytes.new(32, 0_u8), 1, 1024).sign("x".to_slice)
b = CRE::Audit::HmacRatchet.new(Bytes.new(32, 1_u8), 1, 1024).sign("x".to_slice)
a.should_not eq b
end
it "rejects keys of incorrect size" do
expect_raises(ArgumentError) do
CRE::Audit::HmacRatchet.new(Bytes.new(16), 1, 1024)
end
end
it "verify (static) round-trips" do
key = Bytes.new(32, 0xff_u8)
payload = "p".to_slice
h = OpenSSL::HMAC.digest(:sha256, key, payload)
CRE::Audit::HmacRatchet.verify(payload, h, key).should be_true
end
end

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# ===================
# ©AngelaMos | 2026
# merkle_spec.cr
# ===================
require "../../spec_helper"
require "../../../src/cre/audit/merkle"
describe CRE::Audit::Merkle do
it "single leaf root equals the leaf" do
leaf = "x".to_slice
CRE::Audit::Merkle.root([leaf]).should eq leaf
end
it "balanced tree root is deterministic" do
leaves = ["a", "b", "c", "d"].map(&.to_slice)
r1 = CRE::Audit::Merkle.root(leaves)
r2 = CRE::Audit::Merkle.root(leaves)
r1.should eq r2
r1.size.should eq 32
end
it "different leaves produce different roots" do
a = CRE::Audit::Merkle.root(["a", "b"].map(&.to_slice))
b = CRE::Audit::Merkle.root(["a", "c"].map(&.to_slice))
a.should_not eq b
end
it "odd leaf count is supported (last is promoted)" do
leaves = ["a", "b", "c"].map(&.to_slice)
r = CRE::Audit::Merkle.root(leaves)
r.size.should eq 32
end
it "raises on empty input" do
expect_raises(ArgumentError) { CRE::Audit::Merkle.root([] of Bytes) }
end
end

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# ===================
# ©AngelaMos | 2026
# signing_spec.cr
# ===================
require "../../spec_helper"
require "../../../src/cre/audit/signing"
describe CRE::Audit::Signing do
it "generates a keypair" do
kp = CRE::Audit::Signing::Ed25519Keypair.generate(version: 1)
kp.private_key.size.should eq 32
kp.public_key.size.should eq 32
kp.version.should eq 1
end
it "signs and verifies a message" do
kp = CRE::Audit::Signing::Ed25519Keypair.generate
signer = CRE::Audit::Signing::Ed25519Signer.from_keypair(kp)
verifier = CRE::Audit::Signing::Ed25519Verifier.new(kp.public_key)
msg = "audit batch root".to_slice
sig = signer.sign(msg)
sig.size.should eq 64
verifier.verify(msg, sig).should be_true
end
it "rejects tampered message" do
kp = CRE::Audit::Signing::Ed25519Keypair.generate
signer = CRE::Audit::Signing::Ed25519Signer.from_keypair(kp)
verifier = CRE::Audit::Signing::Ed25519Verifier.new(kp.public_key)
msg = "original".to_slice
sig = signer.sign(msg)
verifier.verify("tampered".to_slice, sig).should be_false
end
it "rejects tampered signature" do
kp = CRE::Audit::Signing::Ed25519Keypair.generate
signer = CRE::Audit::Signing::Ed25519Signer.from_keypair(kp)
verifier = CRE::Audit::Signing::Ed25519Verifier.new(kp.public_key)
msg = "x".to_slice
sig = signer.sign(msg)
sig[0] ^= 0x01_u8
verifier.verify(msg, sig).should be_false
end
it "two keypairs produce different keys" do
a = CRE::Audit::Signing::Ed25519Keypair.generate
b = CRE::Audit::Signing::Ed25519Keypair.generate
a.private_key.should_not eq b.private_key
a.public_key.should_not eq b.public_key
end
end

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# ===================
# ©AngelaMos | 2026
# secrets_client_spec.cr
# ===================
require "../../spec_helper"
require "webmock"
require "../../../src/cre/aws/secrets_client"
WebMock.allow_net_connect = false
private def fresh_client : CRE::Aws::SecretsManagerClient
CRE::Aws::SecretsManagerClient.new(
access_key_id: "AKID",
secret_access_key: "secret",
region: "us-east-1",
)
end
describe CRE::Aws::SecretsManagerClient do
before_each { WebMock.reset }
it "calls PutSecretValue and returns version_id" do
WebMock.stub(:post, "https://secretsmanager.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/")
.with(headers: {"X-Amz-Target" => "secretsmanager.PutSecretValue"})
.to_return(body: %({"VersionId":"v-123","ARN":"arn:fake"}))
version = fresh_client.put_secret_value("my-secret", "newpassword")
version.version_id.should eq "v-123"
version.secret_string.should eq "newpassword"
end
it "calls GetSecretValue and returns the value" do
WebMock.stub(:post, "https://secretsmanager.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/")
.with(headers: {"X-Amz-Target" => "secretsmanager.GetSecretValue"})
.to_return(body: %({"VersionId":"v-1","SecretString":"theval"}))
sv = fresh_client.get_secret_value("my-secret")
sv.version_id.should eq "v-1"
sv.secret_string.should eq "theval"
end
it "calls UpdateSecretVersionStage" do
WebMock.stub(:post, "https://secretsmanager.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/")
.with(headers: {"X-Amz-Target" => "secretsmanager.UpdateSecretVersionStage"})
.to_return(body: "{}")
fresh_client.update_secret_version_stage(
"my-secret",
"AWSCURRENT",
move_to_version_id: "v2",
remove_from_version_id: "v1",
)
end
it "raises AwsApiError on HTTP non-2xx" do
WebMock.stub(:post, "https://secretsmanager.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/")
.to_return(status: 400, body: %({"__type":"ResourceNotFoundException","message":"nope"}))
expect_raises(CRE::Aws::AwsApiError) do
fresh_client.get_secret_value("missing")
end
end
it "respects custom endpoint (LocalStack)" do
WebMock.stub(:post, "http://localstack-test/")
.with(headers: {"X-Amz-Target" => "secretsmanager.PutSecretValue"})
.to_return(body: %({"VersionId":"local-v1"}))
client = CRE::Aws::SecretsManagerClient.new(
access_key_id: "test", secret_access_key: "test",
region: "us-east-1", endpoint: "http://localstack-test:4566/",
)
client.put_secret_value("any", "val").version_id.should eq "local-v1"
end
end

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# ===================
# ©AngelaMos | 2026
# signer_aws_vector_spec.cr
# ===================
require "../../spec_helper"
require "../../../src/cre/aws/signer"
# AWS publishes a reference SigV4 test suite at
# https://docs.aws.amazon.com/general/latest/gr/sigv4_signing.html with
# golden values for canonical request, string-to-sign, and signature.
#
# Our signer always emits X-Amz-Content-SHA256 (required by Secrets Manager
# and all the JSON-protocol services we target), which AWS's "vanilla"
# reference vectors deliberately omit. So instead of matching the vanilla
# vector byte-for-byte, we lock in:
# 1. The exact AWS-spec credential-scope and signed-headers list,
# 2. A regression-stable signature for a known input set with our
# always-on X-Amz-Content-SHA256 header.
# Any change to canonicalization, key derivation, or header ordering
# breaks the regression vector — which is the failure mode we care about.
#
# Inputs match the published reference suite for everything except the
# extra signed header:
# access_key: AKIDEXAMPLE
# secret_key: wJalrXUtnFEMI/K7MDENG+bPxRfiCYEXAMPLEKEY
# region: us-east-1
# service: service
# date: 20150830T123600Z (UTC)
describe CRE::Aws::SigV4 do
it "produces the AWS-spec credential-scope and signed-headers list" do
signer = CRE::Aws::SigV4.new(
access_key_id: "AKIDEXAMPLE",
secret_access_key: "wJalrXUtnFEMI/K7MDENG+bPxRfiCYEXAMPLEKEY",
region: "us-east-1",
service: "service",
)
headers = HTTP::Headers.new
uri = URI.parse("https://example.amazonaws.com/")
fixed_time = Time.utc(2015, 8, 30, 12, 36, 0)
signer.sign("GET", uri, headers, "", fixed_time)
headers["X-Amz-Date"].should eq "20150830T123600Z"
headers["Host"].should eq "example.amazonaws.com"
auth = headers["Authorization"]
auth.should start_with "AWS4-HMAC-SHA256 "
auth.should contain "Credential=AKIDEXAMPLE/20150830/us-east-1/service/aws4_request"
auth.should contain "SignedHeaders=host;x-amz-content-sha256;x-amz-date"
auth.should match(/Signature=[a-f0-9]{64}\z/)
end
it "regression vector: locks in the bytewise signature for a fixed input" do
signer = CRE::Aws::SigV4.new(
access_key_id: "AKIDEXAMPLE",
secret_access_key: "wJalrXUtnFEMI/K7MDENG+bPxRfiCYEXAMPLEKEY",
region: "us-east-1",
service: "service",
)
headers = HTTP::Headers.new
uri = URI.parse("https://example.amazonaws.com/")
fixed_time = Time.utc(2015, 8, 30, 12, 36, 0)
signer.sign("GET", uri, headers, "", fixed_time)
# If any of canonicalization / key derivation / signed-headers
# ordering / content-sha256 logic changes, this assertion catches it.
expected = "726c5c4879a6b4ccbbd3b24edbd6b8826d34f87450fbbf4e85546fc7ba9c1642"
headers["Authorization"].should contain "Signature=#{expected}"
end
it "matches a POST with body — content-sha256 changes the signature" do
signer = CRE::Aws::SigV4.new(
access_key_id: "AKIDEXAMPLE",
secret_access_key: "wJalrXUtnFEMI/K7MDENG+bPxRfiCYEXAMPLEKEY",
region: "us-east-1",
service: "service",
)
fixed_time = Time.utc(2015, 8, 30, 12, 36, 0)
body = "Param1=value1"
h_a = HTTP::Headers{"Content-Type" => "application/x-www-form-urlencoded"}
h_b = HTTP::Headers{"Content-Type" => "application/x-www-form-urlencoded"}
signer.sign("POST", URI.parse("https://example.amazonaws.com/"), h_a, body, fixed_time)
signer.sign("POST", URI.parse("https://example.amazonaws.com/"), h_b, "different-body", fixed_time)
# Two bodies, two different content-sha256 inputs, two different
# signatures — proves the body actually flows into the signature.
h_a["X-Amz-Content-SHA256"].should_not eq h_b["X-Amz-Content-SHA256"]
h_a["Authorization"].should_not eq h_b["Authorization"]
end
it "different regions produce different signing keys (and signatures)" do
east = CRE::Aws::SigV4.new("AKIDEXAMPLE", "wJalrXUtnFEMI/K7MDENG+bPxRfiCYEXAMPLEKEY", "us-east-1", "service")
west = CRE::Aws::SigV4.new("AKIDEXAMPLE", "wJalrXUtnFEMI/K7MDENG+bPxRfiCYEXAMPLEKEY", "us-west-2", "service")
fixed = Time.utc(2015, 8, 30, 12, 36, 0)
h_e = HTTP::Headers.new
h_w = HTTP::Headers.new
east.sign("GET", URI.parse("https://example.amazonaws.com/"), h_e, "", fixed)
west.sign("GET", URI.parse("https://example.amazonaws.com/"), h_w, "", fixed)
h_e["Authorization"].should_not eq h_w["Authorization"]
end
it "session token participates in the signed-headers list" do
signer = CRE::Aws::SigV4.new(
access_key_id: "AKIDEXAMPLE",
secret_access_key: "wJalrXUtnFEMI/K7MDENG+bPxRfiCYEXAMPLEKEY",
region: "us-east-1",
service: "service",
session_token: "TOKENVALUE",
)
h = HTTP::Headers.new
fixed = Time.utc(2015, 8, 30, 12, 36, 0)
signer.sign("GET", URI.parse("https://example.amazonaws.com/"), h, "", fixed)
h["Authorization"].should contain "x-amz-security-token"
end
end

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# ===================
# ©AngelaMos | 2026
# signer_spec.cr
# ===================
require "../../spec_helper"
require "../../../src/cre/aws/signer"
# Reference SigV4 vector from AWS docs:
# https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/reference_sigv-test-suite.html
# Using the well-known "get-vanilla" test vector adapted for our API.
describe CRE::Aws::SigV4 do
it "signs a request idempotently for the same time" do
signer = CRE::Aws::SigV4.new(
access_key_id: "AKIDEXAMPLE",
secret_access_key: "wJalrXUtnFEMI/K7MDENG+bPxRfiCYEXAMPLEKEY",
region: "us-east-1",
service: "secretsmanager",
)
headers1 = HTTP::Headers{"Content-Type" => "application/x-amz-json-1.1"}
headers2 = HTTP::Headers{"Content-Type" => "application/x-amz-json-1.1"}
uri = URI.parse("https://secretsmanager.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/")
body = %({"SecretId":"test"})
fixed_time = Time.utc(2026, 4, 28, 12, 0, 0)
signer.sign("POST", uri, headers1, body, fixed_time)
signer.sign("POST", uri, headers2, body, fixed_time)
headers1["Authorization"].should eq headers2["Authorization"]
end
it "produces a well-formed Authorization header" do
signer = CRE::Aws::SigV4.new("AKID", "secret", "us-east-1", "secretsmanager")
h = HTTP::Headers{"Content-Type" => "application/x-amz-json-1.1"}
signer.sign("POST", URI.parse("https://secretsmanager.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/"), h, "{}")
h["Authorization"].should match(/^AWS4-HMAC-SHA256 Credential=AKID\/\d{8}\/us-east-1\/secretsmanager\/aws4_request, SignedHeaders=[^,]+, Signature=[a-f0-9]{64}$/)
h["X-Amz-Date"].should match(/^\d{8}T\d{6}Z$/)
h["X-Amz-Content-SHA256"].size.should eq 64
h["Host"].should eq "secretsmanager.us-east-1.amazonaws.com"
end
it "different bodies produce different signatures" do
signer = CRE::Aws::SigV4.new("AKID", "secret", "us-east-1", "secretsmanager")
h1 = HTTP::Headers{"Content-Type" => "application/x-amz-json-1.1"}
h2 = HTTP::Headers{"Content-Type" => "application/x-amz-json-1.1"}
uri = URI.parse("https://secretsmanager.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/")
fixed = Time.utc(2026, 1, 1)
signer.sign("POST", uri, h1, %({"a":1}), fixed)
signer.sign("POST", uri, h2, %({"a":2}), fixed)
h1["Authorization"].should_not eq h2["Authorization"]
end
it "includes session token header when provided" do
signer = CRE::Aws::SigV4.new(
access_key_id: "AKID",
secret_access_key: "secret",
region: "us-east-1",
service: "secretsmanager",
session_token: "FAKETOKEN",
)
h = HTTP::Headers{"Content-Type" => "application/x-amz-json-1.1"}
signer.sign("POST", URI.parse("https://secretsmanager.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/"), h, "{}")
h["X-Amz-Security-Token"].should eq "FAKETOKEN"
h["Authorization"].should contain "x-amz-security-token"
end
end

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# ===================
# ©AngelaMos | 2026
# cli_spec.cr
# ===================
require "../../spec_helper"
require "../../../src/cre/cli/cli"
describe CRE::Cli do
it "prints usage when no args given and exits 64" do
io = IO::Memory.new
code = CRE::Cli.dispatch([] of String, io)
code.should eq 64
io.to_s.should contain "Subcommands"
end
it "prints usage on help" do
io = IO::Memory.new
code = CRE::Cli.dispatch(["help"], io)
code.should eq 0
io.to_s.should contain "Subcommands"
end
it "prints version on version subcommand" do
io = IO::Memory.new
code = CRE::Cli.dispatch(["version"], io)
code.should eq 0
io.to_s.strip.should eq CRE::VERSION
end
it "policy list works against an empty registry" do
CRE::Policy.clear_registry!
io = IO::Memory.new
code = CRE::Cli.dispatch(["policy", "list"], io)
code.should eq 0
io.to_s.should contain "no policies"
end
it "policy show returns 1 on missing policy" do
CRE::Policy.clear_registry!
io = IO::Memory.new
code = CRE::Cli.dispatch(["policy", "show", "nonexistent"], io)
code.should eq 1
end
it "rejects unknown subcommands" do
io = IO::Memory.new
code = CRE::Cli.dispatch(["thisisbad"], io)
code.should eq 64
io.to_s.should contain "unknown subcommand"
end
it "check on empty db returns 0 (no violations)" do
io = IO::Memory.new
code = CRE::Cli.dispatch(["check", "--db=:memory:"], io)
code.should eq 0
end
end

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# ===================
# ©AngelaMos | 2026
# bundle_spec.cr
# ===================
require "../../spec_helper"
require "compress/zip"
require "../../../src/cre/compliance/bundle"
require "../../../src/cre/audit/audit_log"
require "../../../src/cre/persistence/sqlite/sqlite_persistence"
private def fresh_persistence
persist = CRE::Persistence::Sqlite::SqlitePersistence.new(":memory:")
persist.migrate!
persist
end
describe CRE::Compliance::Bundle do
it "writes a zip with required files" do
persist = fresh_persistence
log = CRE::Audit::AuditLog.new(persist, Bytes.new(32, 0_u8), 1, 1024)
log.append("rotation.completed", "system", UUID.random, {"k" => "v"})
log.append("policy.violation", "system", UUID.random, {"r" => "stale"})
out_path = File.tempname("evidence", ".zip")
bundle = CRE::Compliance::Bundle.new(persist, "soc2")
bundle.write(out_path)
File.exists?(out_path).should be_true
names = [] of String
Compress::Zip::File.open(out_path) do |zip|
zip.entries.each { |e| names << e.filename }
end
names.should contain "audit_log.ndjson"
names.should contain "audit_batches.json"
names.should contain "control_mapping.json"
names.should contain "manifest.json"
names.should contain "README.md"
ensure
File.delete(out_path) if out_path && File.exists?(out_path)
persist.try(&.close)
end
it "manifest.json lists every file with sha256" do
persist = fresh_persistence
log = CRE::Audit::AuditLog.new(persist, Bytes.new(32, 0_u8), 1, 1024)
log.append("test", "system", nil, {"x" => "y"})
out_path = File.tempname("evidence-m", ".zip")
CRE::Compliance::Bundle.new(persist, "soc2").write(out_path)
manifest_text = ""
Compress::Zip::File.open(out_path) do |zip|
manifest_text = zip.entries.find!(&.filename.==("manifest.json")).open(&.gets_to_end)
end
parsed = JSON.parse(manifest_text)
parsed["framework"].as_s.should eq "soc2"
parsed["files"].as_a.size.should be > 0
parsed["files"].as_a.each do |f|
f["sha256"].as_s.size.should eq 64
end
ensure
File.delete(out_path) if out_path && File.exists?(out_path)
persist.try(&.close)
end
it "control_mapping.json carries the right framework controls" do
persist = fresh_persistence
out_path = File.tempname("evidence-cm", ".zip")
CRE::Compliance::Bundle.new(persist, "pci_dss").write(out_path)
cm = ""
Compress::Zip::File.open(out_path) do |zip|
cm = zip.entries.find!(&.filename.==("control_mapping.json")).open(&.gets_to_end)
end
parsed = JSON.parse(cm)
parsed["rotation.completed"].as_a.map(&.as_s).should contain "8.3.9"
ensure
File.delete(out_path) if out_path && File.exists?(out_path)
persist.try(&.close)
end
end

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# ===================
# ©AngelaMos | 2026
# control_mapping_spec.cr
# ===================
require "../../spec_helper"
require "../../../src/cre/compliance/control_mapping"
describe CRE::Compliance::ControlMapping do
it "maps SOC2 controls" do
map = CRE::Compliance::ControlMapping.for("soc2")
map["rotation.completed"].should contain "CC6.1"
map["rotation.completed"].should contain "CC6.6"
map["audit.batch.sealed"].should contain "CC4.1"
end
it "maps PCI-DSS controls" do
map = CRE::Compliance::ControlMapping.for("pci_dss")
map["rotation.completed"].should contain "8.3.9"
map["audit.batch.sealed"].should contain "10.5.2"
end
it "raises on unknown framework" do
expect_raises(ArgumentError) { CRE::Compliance::ControlMapping.for("not-real") }
end
it "lists frameworks" do
CRE::Compliance::ControlMapping.frameworks.should contain "soc2"
CRE::Compliance::ControlMapping.frameworks.should contain "pci_dss"
end
end

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# ===================
# ©AngelaMos | 2026
# aead_property_spec.cr
# ===================
require "../../spec_helper"
require "../../../src/cre/crypto/aead"
require "../../../src/cre/crypto/random"
describe CRE::Crypto::Aead do
it "encrypt -> decrypt is identity for 100 random plaintexts of varying sizes" do
rng = ::Random.new(42)
100.times do
size = rng.rand(0..1024)
plaintext = Bytes.new(size) { rng.rand(0_u8..255_u8) }
key = CRE::Crypto::Random.bytes(32)
aad = CRE::Crypto::Random.bytes(rng.rand(0..64))
ct, nonce, tag = CRE::Crypto::Aead.encrypt(plaintext, key, aad)
decrypted = CRE::Crypto::Aead.decrypt(ct, key, aad, nonce, tag)
decrypted.should eq plaintext
end
end
end

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# ===================
# ©AngelaMos | 2026
# aead_spec.cr
# ===================
require "../../spec_helper"
require "../../../src/cre/crypto/aead"
require "../../../src/cre/crypto/random"
describe CRE::Crypto::Aead do
it "round-trips AES-256-GCM with AAD" do
key = CRE::Crypto::Random.bytes(32)
plaintext = "secret value 123".to_slice
aad = "tenant=t1|cred=c1|ver=v1".to_slice
ct, nonce, tag = CRE::Crypto::Aead.encrypt(plaintext, key, aad)
decrypted = CRE::Crypto::Aead.decrypt(ct, key, aad, nonce, tag)
decrypted.should eq plaintext
end
it "fails to decrypt with wrong AAD" do
key = CRE::Crypto::Random.bytes(32)
plaintext = "secret".to_slice
aad = "right".to_slice
ct, nonce, tag = CRE::Crypto::Aead.encrypt(plaintext, key, aad)
expect_raises(CRE::Crypto::Aead::Error) do
CRE::Crypto::Aead.decrypt(ct, key, "wrong".to_slice, nonce, tag)
end
end
it "fails to decrypt with tampered ciphertext" do
key = CRE::Crypto::Random.bytes(32)
plaintext = "abc-def".to_slice
aad = "x".to_slice
ct, nonce, tag = CRE::Crypto::Aead.encrypt(plaintext, key, aad)
ct[0] ^= 0x01_u8
expect_raises(CRE::Crypto::Aead::Error) do
CRE::Crypto::Aead.decrypt(ct, key, aad, nonce, tag)
end
end
it "rejects keys of incorrect size" do
bad_key = Bytes.new(16)
expect_raises(ArgumentError) do
CRE::Crypto::Aead.encrypt("x".to_slice, bad_key, "a".to_slice)
end
end
end

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# ===================
# ©AngelaMos | 2026
# envelope_spec.cr
# ===================
require "../../spec_helper"
require "../../../src/cre/crypto/envelope"
require "../../../src/cre/crypto/kek"
describe CRE::Crypto::Envelope do
it "encrypts and decrypts with envelope" do
ENV["KEK_TEST_HEX"] = "0" * 64
kek = CRE::Crypto::Kek::EnvKek.new("KEK_TEST_HEX", version: 1)
env = CRE::Crypto::Envelope.new(kek)
plaintext = "very secret".to_slice
aad = "ctx".to_slice
sealed = env.seal(plaintext, aad)
sealed.algorithm_id.should eq CRE::Crypto::ALGORITHM_AES_256_GCM
sealed.kek_version.should eq 1
opened = env.open(sealed, aad)
opened.should eq plaintext
ensure
ENV.delete("KEK_TEST_HEX")
end
it "fails to open with mismatched AAD" do
ENV["KEK_TEST_HEX2"] = "0" * 64
kek = CRE::Crypto::Kek::EnvKek.new("KEK_TEST_HEX2", version: 1)
env = CRE::Crypto::Envelope.new(kek)
sealed = env.seal("plaintext".to_slice, "good-aad".to_slice)
expect_raises(CRE::Crypto::Aead::Error) do
env.open(sealed, "bad-aad".to_slice)
end
ensure
ENV.delete("KEK_TEST_HEX2")
end
it "produces different ciphertexts for the same plaintext (random DEK + nonce)" do
ENV["KEK_TEST_HEX3"] = "0" * 64
kek = CRE::Crypto::Kek::EnvKek.new("KEK_TEST_HEX3", version: 1)
env = CRE::Crypto::Envelope.new(kek)
aad = "x".to_slice
a = env.seal("same".to_slice, aad)
b = env.seal("same".to_slice, aad)
a.ciphertext.should_not eq b.ciphertext
a.dek_wrapped.should_not eq b.dek_wrapped
ensure
ENV.delete("KEK_TEST_HEX3")
end
end

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# ===================
# ©AngelaMos | 2026
# kek_spec.cr
# ===================
require "../../spec_helper"
require "../../../src/cre/crypto/kek"
describe CRE::Crypto::Kek do
it "loads a 32-byte KEK from env hex" do
hex = "0" * 64
ENV["TEST_KEK_HEX"] = hex
kek = CRE::Crypto::Kek::EnvKek.new("TEST_KEK_HEX", version: 1)
kek.bytes.size.should eq 32
kek.version.should eq 1
kek.source.should eq "env:TEST_KEK_HEX"
ensure
ENV.delete("TEST_KEK_HEX")
end
it "raises on wrong-length hex" do
ENV["BAD_KEK"] = "abcd"
expect_raises(CRE::Crypto::Kek::InvalidKekError) do
CRE::Crypto::Kek::EnvKek.new("BAD_KEK", version: 1)
end
ensure
ENV.delete("BAD_KEK")
end
it "raises on missing env var" do
expect_raises(CRE::Crypto::Kek::InvalidKekError) do
CRE::Crypto::Kek::EnvKek.new("DOES_NOT_EXIST_XYZ_KEK", version: 1)
end
end
end

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# ===================
# ©AngelaMos | 2026
# random_spec.cr
# ===================
require "../../spec_helper"
require "../../../src/cre/crypto/random"
describe CRE::Crypto::Random do
it "generates 32 secure bytes" do
bytes = CRE::Crypto::Random.bytes(32)
bytes.size.should eq 32
end
it "two calls produce different bytes (overwhelmingly likely)" do
a = CRE::Crypto::Random.bytes(32)
b = CRE::Crypto::Random.bytes(32)
a.should_not eq b
end
it "hex returns 2n hex chars" do
h = CRE::Crypto::Random.hex(16)
h.size.should eq 32
h.each_char { |c| ("0123456789abcdef".includes?(c)).should be_true }
end
describe "constant_time_equal?" do
it "returns true for equal slices" do
a = Bytes[1, 2, 3, 4]
b = Bytes[1, 2, 3, 4]
CRE::Crypto::Random.constant_time_equal?(a, b).should be_true
end
it "returns false for different slices" do
a = Bytes[1, 2, 3, 4]
b = Bytes[1, 2, 3, 5]
CRE::Crypto::Random.constant_time_equal?(a, b).should be_false
end
it "returns false for different sizes" do
a = Bytes[1, 2, 3]
b = Bytes[1, 2, 3, 4]
CRE::Crypto::Random.constant_time_equal?(a, b).should be_false
end
end
end

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# ===================
# ©AngelaMos | 2026
# credential_spec.cr
# ===================
require "../../spec_helper"
require "../../../src/cre/domain/credential"
describe CRE::Domain::Credential do
it "constructs with required fields" do
c = CRE::Domain::Credential.new(
id: UUID.random,
external_id: "arn:aws:secretsmanager:us-east-1:1:secret:db-prod",
kind: CRE::Domain::CredentialKind::AwsSecretsmgr,
name: "db-prod",
tags: {"env" => "prod"} of String => String,
)
c.kind.aws_secretsmgr?.should be_true
c.tag(:env).should eq "prod"
end
it "returns nil for missing tag" do
c = CRE::Domain::Credential.new(
id: UUID.random,
external_id: "x",
kind: CRE::Domain::CredentialKind::EnvFile,
name: "n",
tags: {} of String => String,
)
c.tag(:env).should be_nil
end
it "supports kind predicates" do
c = CRE::Domain::Credential.new(
id: UUID.random,
external_id: "x",
kind: CRE::Domain::CredentialKind::GithubPat,
name: "n",
tags: {} of String => String,
)
c.kind.github_pat?.should be_true
c.kind.env_file?.should be_false
end
it "tag() accepts both string and symbol keys" do
c = CRE::Domain::Credential.new(
id: UUID.random, external_id: "x",
kind: CRE::Domain::CredentialKind::EnvFile,
name: "n", tags: {"foo" => "bar"} of String => String,
)
c.tag("foo").should eq "bar"
c.tag(:foo).should eq "bar"
end
it "rotation_anchor falls back to created_at when never rotated" do
created = Time.utc - 3.days
c = CRE::Domain::Credential.new(
id: UUID.random,
external_id: "x",
kind: CRE::Domain::CredentialKind::EnvFile,
name: "n",
tags: {} of String => String,
created_at: created,
)
c.rotation_anchor.should eq created
end
it "rotation_anchor uses last_rotated_at once set" do
rotated = Time.utc - 1.hour
c = CRE::Domain::Credential.new(
id: UUID.random,
external_id: "x",
kind: CRE::Domain::CredentialKind::EnvFile,
name: "n",
tags: {} of String => String,
created_at: Time.utc - 30.days,
last_rotated_at: rotated,
)
c.rotation_anchor.should eq rotated
end
end

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# ===================
# ©AngelaMos | 2026
# credential_version_spec.cr
# ===================
require "../../spec_helper"
require "../../../src/cre/domain/credential_version"
describe CRE::Domain::CredentialVersion do
it "constructs with all fields" do
v = CRE::Domain::CredentialVersion.new(
id: UUID.random,
credential_id: UUID.random,
ciphertext: "x".to_slice,
dek_wrapped: "y".to_slice,
kek_version: 1,
algorithm_id: 1_i16,
metadata: {} of String => String,
)
v.kek_version.should eq 1
v.algorithm_id.should eq 1_i16
v.revoked_at.should be_nil
end
it "reports revocation" do
revoked_at = Time.utc - 1.hour
v = CRE::Domain::CredentialVersion.new(
id: UUID.random,
credential_id: UUID.random,
ciphertext: Bytes.new(0),
dek_wrapped: Bytes.new(0),
kek_version: 1,
algorithm_id: 1_i16,
revoked_at: revoked_at,
)
v.revoked?.should be_true
v.revoked_at.should eq revoked_at
end
it "is not revoked by default" do
v = CRE::Domain::CredentialVersion.new(
id: UUID.random,
credential_id: UUID.random,
ciphertext: Bytes.new(0),
dek_wrapped: Bytes.new(0),
kek_version: 1,
algorithm_id: 1_i16,
)
v.revoked?.should be_false
end
end

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# ===================
# ©AngelaMos | 2026
# new_secret_spec.cr
# ===================
require "../../spec_helper"
require "../../../src/cre/domain/new_secret"
describe CRE::Domain::NewSecret do
it "wraps ciphertext + metadata + timestamp" do
s = CRE::Domain::NewSecret.new(
ciphertext: "abc".to_slice,
metadata: {"version_id" => "v123"},
)
s.ciphertext.should eq "abc".to_slice
s.metadata["version_id"].should eq "v123"
s.generated_at.should be_close(Time.utc, 5.seconds)
end
it "defaults metadata to empty hash" do
s = CRE::Domain::NewSecret.new(ciphertext: Bytes.new(8))
s.metadata.should be_empty
end
it "ciphertext is exposed as Bytes" do
s = CRE::Domain::NewSecret.new(ciphertext: Bytes[1, 2, 3])
s.ciphertext.size.should eq 3
end
end

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# ===================
# ©AngelaMos | 2026
# audit_subscriber_spec.cr
# ===================
require "../../spec_helper"
require "../../../src/cre/engine/event_bus"
require "../../../src/cre/engine/subscribers/audit_subscriber"
require "../../../src/cre/audit/audit_log"
require "../../../src/cre/persistence/sqlite/sqlite_persistence"
require "../../../src/cre/events/credential_events"
describe CRE::Engine::Subscribers::AuditSubscriber do
it "writes RotationCompleted events to the audit log" do
persist = CRE::Persistence::Sqlite::SqlitePersistence.new(":memory:")
persist.migrate!
log = CRE::Audit::AuditLog.new(persist, Bytes.new(32, 0_u8), 1, 1024)
bus = CRE::Engine::EventBus.new
sub = CRE::Engine::Subscribers::AuditSubscriber.new(bus, log)
sub.start
bus.run
cred_id = UUID.random
rot_id = UUID.random
bus.publish(CRE::Events::RotationCompleted.new(cred_id, rot_id))
sleep 0.1.seconds
persist.audit.latest_seq.should eq 1_i64
entry = persist.audit.range(1_i64, 1_i64).first
entry.event_type.should eq "rotation.completed"
entry.target_id.should eq cred_id
ensure
bus.try(&.stop)
sub.try(&.stop)
persist.try(&.close)
end
it "writes multiple event types correctly" do
persist = CRE::Persistence::Sqlite::SqlitePersistence.new(":memory:")
persist.migrate!
log = CRE::Audit::AuditLog.new(persist, Bytes.new(32, 0_u8), 1, 1024)
bus = CRE::Engine::EventBus.new
sub = CRE::Engine::Subscribers::AuditSubscriber.new(bus, log)
sub.start
bus.run
cred_id = UUID.random
bus.publish(CRE::Events::PolicyViolation.new(cred_id, "test-policy", "stale"))
bus.publish(CRE::Events::DriftDetected.new(cred_id, "h1", "h2"))
sleep 0.1.seconds
persist.audit.latest_seq.should eq 2_i64
entries = persist.audit.range(1_i64, 2_i64)
entries.map(&.event_type).should eq ["policy.violation", "drift.detected"]
log.verify_chain.should be_true
ensure
bus.try(&.stop)
sub.try(&.stop)
persist.try(&.close)
end
end

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# ===================
# ©AngelaMos | 2026
# engine_spec.cr
# ===================
require "../../spec_helper"
require "../../../src/cre/engine/engine"
require "../../../src/cre/persistence/sqlite/sqlite_persistence"
require "../../../src/cre/events/credential_events"
describe CRE::Engine::Engine do
it "boots, accepts events, and shuts down cleanly" do
persist = CRE::Persistence::Sqlite::SqlitePersistence.new(":memory:")
persist.migrate!
engine = CRE::Engine::Engine.new(persist, Bytes.new(32, 0_u8))
engine.start
cred_id = UUID.random
rot_id = UUID.random
engine.bus.publish(CRE::Events::RotationCompleted.new(cred_id, rot_id))
sleep 0.1.seconds
persist.audit.latest_seq.should eq 1_i64
engine.audit_log.verify_chain.should be_true
engine.stop
ensure
persist.try(&.close)
end
it "raises if started twice" do
persist = CRE::Persistence::Sqlite::SqlitePersistence.new(":memory:")
persist.migrate!
engine = CRE::Engine::Engine.new(persist, Bytes.new(32, 0_u8))
engine.start
expect_raises(Exception, "already started") { engine.start }
engine.stop
ensure
persist.try(&.close)
end
end

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# ===================
# ©AngelaMos | 2026
# event_bus_spec.cr
# ===================
require "../../spec_helper"
require "../../../src/cre/engine/event_bus"
require "../../../src/cre/events/system_events"
describe CRE::Engine::EventBus do
it "delivers events to subscribers" do
bus = CRE::Engine::EventBus.new
bus.run
received = [] of String
received_mutex = Mutex.new
ch = bus.subscribe(buffer: 16, overflow: CRE::Engine::EventBus::Overflow::Block)
spawn do
loop do
ev = ch.receive
received_mutex.synchronize { received << ev.class.name }
rescue Channel::ClosedError
break
end
end
bus.publish(CRE::Events::AlertRaised.new(severity: CRE::Events::Severity::Warn, message: "hi"))
sleep 0.1.seconds
received_mutex.synchronize { received.should contain("CRE::Events::AlertRaised") }
ensure
bus.try(&.stop)
end
it "fans out to multiple subscribers" do
bus = CRE::Engine::EventBus.new
bus.run
counter1 = Atomic(Int32).new(0)
counter2 = Atomic(Int32).new(0)
ch1 = bus.subscribe
ch2 = bus.subscribe
spawn do
loop do
ch1.receive
counter1.add(1)
rescue Channel::ClosedError
break
end
end
spawn do
loop do
ch2.receive
counter2.add(1)
rescue Channel::ClosedError
break
end
end
3.times { bus.publish(CRE::Events::SchedulerTick.new) }
sleep 0.1.seconds
counter1.get.should eq 3
counter2.get.should eq 3
ensure
bus.try(&.stop)
end
it "drops on Drop overflow when subscriber is slow" do
bus = CRE::Engine::EventBus.new
bus.run
ch = bus.subscribe(buffer: 1, overflow: CRE::Engine::EventBus::Overflow::Drop)
5.times { bus.publish(CRE::Events::SchedulerTick.new) }
sleep 0.1.seconds
# The slow subscriber's channel buffered at most 1 event; rest were dropped.
# Drain non-blocking: we should be able to take 0 or 1 event before it would block.
delivered = 0
drained = false
until drained
select
when ch.receive
delivered += 1
else
drained = true
end
end
delivered.should be <= 5
delivered.should be < 5 # at least one was dropped
ensure
bus.try(&.stop)
end
end

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# ===================
# ©AngelaMos | 2026
# rotation_orchestrator_spec.cr
# ===================
require "../../spec_helper"
require "../../../src/cre/engine/rotation_orchestrator"
require "../../../src/cre/persistence/sqlite/sqlite_persistence"
require "../../../src/cre/rotators/env_file"
require "../../../src/cre/crypto/envelope"
require "../../../src/cre/crypto/kek"
private def drain(ch : ::Channel(CRE::Events::Event)) : Array(CRE::Events::Event)
out = [] of CRE::Events::Event
loop do
select
when ev = ch.receive
out << ev
else
break
end
end
out
end
private def env_credential(path : String, key : String) : CRE::Domain::Credential
CRE::Domain::Credential.new(
id: UUID.random,
external_id: "#{path}::#{key}",
kind: CRE::Domain::CredentialKind::EnvFile,
name: key,
tags: {"path" => path, "key" => key} of String => String,
)
end
describe CRE::Engine::RotationOrchestrator do
it "publishes the full event sequence on success" do
tmp = File.tempfile("cre_rot_") { |f| f << "K=v\n" }
cred = env_credential(tmp.path, "K")
persist = CRE::Persistence::Sqlite::SqlitePersistence.new(":memory:")
persist.migrate!
persist.credentials.insert(cred)
bus = CRE::Engine::EventBus.new
ch = bus.subscribe
bus.run
orchestrator = CRE::Engine::RotationOrchestrator.new(bus, persist)
state = orchestrator.run(cred, CRE::Rotators::EnvFileRotator.new)
sleep 0.1.seconds
state.completed?.should be_true
events = drain(ch).map(&.class.name)
events.should contain "CRE::Events::RotationStarted"
events.count("CRE::Events::RotationStepCompleted").should eq 4
events.should contain "CRE::Events::RotationCompleted"
events.should_not contain "CRE::Events::RotationFailed"
# rotation row recorded as completed
persist.rotations.in_flight.size.should eq 0
ensure
bus.try(&.stop)
persist.try(&.close)
tmp.try(&.delete)
end
it "handles a rotator that raises during apply via rollback" do
tmp = File.tempfile("cre_rot_fail_") { |f| f << "K=v\n" }
cred = env_credential(tmp.path, "K")
persist = CRE::Persistence::Sqlite::SqlitePersistence.new(":memory:")
persist.migrate!
persist.credentials.insert(cred)
bus = CRE::Engine::EventBus.new
ch = bus.subscribe
bus.run
failing = FailingRotator.new
state = CRE::Engine::RotationOrchestrator.new(bus, persist).run(cred, failing)
sleep 0.1.seconds
state.failed?.should be_true
failing.rolled_back.should be_true
events = drain(ch).map(&.class.name)
events.should contain "CRE::Events::RotationStepFailed"
events.should contain "CRE::Events::RotationFailed"
ensure
bus.try(&.stop)
persist.try(&.close)
tmp.try(&.delete)
end
it "bumps credential.last_rotated_at on successful rotation" do
tmp = File.tempfile("cre_rot_anchor_") { |f| f << "K=v\n" }
cred = env_credential(tmp.path, "K")
persist = CRE::Persistence::Sqlite::SqlitePersistence.new(":memory:")
persist.migrate!
persist.credentials.insert(cred)
bus = CRE::Engine::EventBus.new
bus.run
floor = Time.utc.at_beginning_of_second
state = CRE::Engine::RotationOrchestrator.new(bus, persist).run(cred, CRE::Rotators::EnvFileRotator.new)
sleep 0.05.seconds
state.completed?.should be_true
refreshed = persist.credentials.find(cred.id).not_nil!
refreshed.last_rotated_at.not_nil!.should be >= floor
refreshed.rotation_anchor.should be >= floor
ensure
bus.try(&.stop)
persist.try(&.close)
tmp.try(&.delete)
end
it "writes an encrypted credential_version when an Envelope is configured" do
ENV["TEST_KEK_ROT"] = "0" * 64
kek = CRE::Crypto::Kek::EnvKek.new("TEST_KEK_ROT", version: 1)
envelope = CRE::Crypto::Envelope.new(kek)
tmp = File.tempfile("cre_rot_env_") { |f| f << "K=v\n" }
cred = env_credential(tmp.path, "K")
persist = CRE::Persistence::Sqlite::SqlitePersistence.new(":memory:")
persist.migrate!
persist.credentials.insert(cred)
bus = CRE::Engine::EventBus.new
bus.run
state = CRE::Engine::RotationOrchestrator.new(bus, persist, envelope).run(cred, CRE::Rotators::EnvFileRotator.new)
sleep 0.05.seconds
state.completed?.should be_true
versions = persist.versions.for_credential(cred.id)
versions.size.should eq 1
v = versions.first
v.kek_version.should eq 1
v.algorithm_id.should eq CRE::Crypto::ALGORITHM_AES_256_GCM
v.ciphertext.size.should be > 0
sealed = CRE::Crypto::SealedSecret.new(v.ciphertext, v.dek_wrapped, v.kek_version, v.algorithm_id)
plaintext = envelope.open(sealed, "cred=#{cred.id}|kind=#{cred.kind}".to_slice)
plaintext.size.should be > 0
refreshed = persist.credentials.find(cred.id).not_nil!
refreshed.current_version_id.should eq v.id
ensure
ENV.delete("TEST_KEK_ROT")
bus.try(&.stop)
persist.try(&.close)
tmp.try(&.delete)
end
it "marks rotation Inconsistent when commit step fails" do
tmp = File.tempfile("cre_rot_commit_fail_") { |f| f << "K=v\n" }
cred = env_credential(tmp.path, "K")
persist = CRE::Persistence::Sqlite::SqlitePersistence.new(":memory:")
persist.migrate!
persist.credentials.insert(cred)
bus = CRE::Engine::EventBus.new
ch = bus.subscribe
bus.run
state = CRE::Engine::RotationOrchestrator.new(bus, persist).run(cred, CommitFailingRotator.new)
sleep 0.05.seconds
state.should eq CRE::Persistence::RotationState::Inconsistent
persist.rotations.in_flight.size.should eq 0
types = drain(ch).map(&.class.name)
types.should contain "CRE::Events::AlertRaised"
ensure
bus.try(&.stop)
persist.try(&.close)
tmp.try(&.delete)
end
end
class CommitFailingRotator < CRE::Rotators::Rotator
def kind : Symbol
:env_file
end
def can_rotate?(c : CRE::Domain::Credential) : Bool
_ = c
true
end
def generate(c : CRE::Domain::Credential) : CRE::Domain::NewSecret
_ = c
CRE::Domain::NewSecret.new(ciphertext: "x".to_slice)
end
def apply(c : CRE::Domain::Credential, s : CRE::Domain::NewSecret) : Nil
_ = {c, s}
end
def verify(c : CRE::Domain::Credential, s : CRE::Domain::NewSecret) : Bool
_ = {c, s}
true
end
def commit(c : CRE::Domain::Credential, s : CRE::Domain::NewSecret) : Nil
_ = {c, s}
raise CRE::Rotators::RotatorError.new("commit network 503")
end
end
class FailingRotator < CRE::Rotators::Rotator
property rolled_back = false
def kind : Symbol
:env_file
end
def can_rotate?(c : CRE::Domain::Credential) : Bool
_ = c
true
end
def generate(c : CRE::Domain::Credential) : CRE::Domain::NewSecret
_ = c
CRE::Domain::NewSecret.new(ciphertext: "x".to_slice)
end
def apply(c : CRE::Domain::Credential, s : CRE::Domain::NewSecret) : Nil
_ = {c, s}
raise CRE::Rotators::RotatorError.new("apply boom")
end
def verify(c : CRE::Domain::Credential, s : CRE::Domain::NewSecret) : Bool
_ = {c, s}
true
end
def commit(c : CRE::Domain::Credential, s : CRE::Domain::NewSecret) : Nil
_ = {c, s}
end
def rollback_apply(c : CRE::Domain::Credential, s : CRE::Domain::NewSecret) : Nil
_ = {c, s}
@rolled_back = true
end
end

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# ===================
# ©AngelaMos | 2026
# rotation_worker_spec.cr
# ===================
require "../../spec_helper"
require "../../../src/cre/engine/event_bus"
require "../../../src/cre/engine/rotation_worker"
require "../../../src/cre/engine/rotation_orchestrator"
require "../../../src/cre/persistence/sqlite/sqlite_persistence"
require "../../../src/cre/rotators/env_file"
private def env_credential(path : String, key : String) : CRE::Domain::Credential
CRE::Domain::Credential.new(
id: UUID.random,
external_id: "#{path}::#{key}",
kind: CRE::Domain::CredentialKind::EnvFile,
name: key,
tags: {"path" => path, "key" => key} of String => String,
)
end
private def setup_worker
persist = CRE::Persistence::Sqlite::SqlitePersistence.new(":memory:")
persist.migrate!
bus = CRE::Engine::EventBus.new
bus.run
orchestrator = CRE::Engine::RotationOrchestrator.new(bus, persist)
worker = CRE::Engine::RotationWorker.new(bus, orchestrator, persist)
{persist, bus, worker}
end
class StubRotator < CRE::Rotators::Rotator
property generate_count = 0
property apply_count = 0
property commit_count = 0
property declined_credentials = [] of UUID
def initialize(@kind_sym : Symbol = :env_file, @can_rotate : Bool = true)
end
def kind : Symbol
@kind_sym
end
def can_rotate?(c : CRE::Domain::Credential) : Bool
@declined_credentials << c.id unless @can_rotate
@can_rotate
end
def generate(c : CRE::Domain::Credential) : CRE::Domain::NewSecret
_ = c
@generate_count += 1
CRE::Domain::NewSecret.new(ciphertext: "x".to_slice)
end
def apply(c : CRE::Domain::Credential, s : CRE::Domain::NewSecret) : Nil
_ = {c, s}
@apply_count += 1
end
def verify(c : CRE::Domain::Credential, s : CRE::Domain::NewSecret) : Bool
_ = {c, s}
true
end
def commit(c : CRE::Domain::Credential, s : CRE::Domain::NewSecret) : Nil
_ = {c, s}
@commit_count += 1
end
end
describe CRE::Engine::RotationWorker do
it "dispatches RotationScheduled to the registered rotator" do
persist, bus, worker = setup_worker
persist.credentials.insert(env_credential("/tmp/x.env", "K"))
rotator = StubRotator.new
worker.register(:env_file, rotator)
worker.start
cred = persist.credentials.all.first
bus.publish CRE::Events::RotationScheduled.new(cred.id, "env_file")
sleep 0.15.seconds
rotator.generate_count.should eq 1
ensure
worker.try(&.stop)
bus.try(&.stop)
persist.try(&.close)
end
it "skips when no rotator is registered for the credential's kind" do
persist, bus, worker = setup_worker
persist.credentials.insert(env_credential("/tmp/y.env", "K"))
worker.start
cred = persist.credentials.all.first
bus.publish CRE::Events::RotationScheduled.new(cred.id, "env_file")
sleep 0.1.seconds
persist.rotations.in_flight.size.should eq 0
ensure
worker.try(&.stop)
bus.try(&.stop)
persist.try(&.close)
end
it "skips when rotator.can_rotate? returns false" do
persist, bus, worker = setup_worker
persist.credentials.insert(env_credential("/tmp/z.env", "K"))
rotator = StubRotator.new(can_rotate: false)
worker.register(:env_file, rotator)
worker.start
cred = persist.credentials.all.first
bus.publish CRE::Events::RotationScheduled.new(cred.id, "env_file")
sleep 0.1.seconds
rotator.generate_count.should eq 0
rotator.declined_credentials.should contain(cred.id)
ensure
worker.try(&.stop)
bus.try(&.stop)
persist.try(&.close)
end
it "ignores events that aren't RotationScheduled" do
persist, bus, worker = setup_worker
persist.credentials.insert(env_credential("/tmp/w.env", "K"))
rotator = StubRotator.new
worker.register(:env_file, rotator)
worker.start
cred = persist.credentials.all.first
bus.publish CRE::Events::RotationCompleted.new(cred.id, UUID.random)
sleep 0.1.seconds
rotator.generate_count.should eq 0
ensure
worker.try(&.stop)
bus.try(&.stop)
persist.try(&.close)
end
it "deduplicates: a duplicate schedule while one is in_flight is dropped" do
persist, bus, worker = setup_worker
persist.credentials.insert(env_credential("/tmp/dedup.env", "K"))
cred = persist.credentials.all.first
record = CRE::Persistence::RotationRecord.new(
id: UUID.random,
credential_id: cred.id,
rotator_kind: CRE::Persistence::RotatorKind::EnvFile,
state: CRE::Persistence::RotationState::Generating,
started_at: Time.utc,
completed_at: nil,
failure_reason: nil,
)
persist.rotations.insert(record)
rotator = StubRotator.new
worker.register(:env_file, rotator)
worker.start
bus.publish CRE::Events::RotationScheduled.new(cred.id, "env_file")
sleep 0.1.seconds
rotator.generate_count.should eq 0 # blocked by in_flight check
ensure
worker.try(&.stop)
bus.try(&.stop)
persist.try(&.close)
end
it "warns and skips when credential is missing from persistence" do
persist, bus, worker = setup_worker
rotator = StubRotator.new
worker.register(:env_file, rotator)
worker.start
bus.publish CRE::Events::RotationScheduled.new(UUID.random, "env_file")
sleep 0.1.seconds
rotator.generate_count.should eq 0
ensure
worker.try(&.stop)
bus.try(&.stop)
persist.try(&.close)
end
it "rotator_for_kind returns nil for unregistered kinds" do
_, _, worker = setup_worker
worker.register(:env_file, StubRotator.new)
worker.rotator_for_kind(CRE::Domain::CredentialKind::EnvFile).should_not be_nil
worker.rotator_for_kind(CRE::Domain::CredentialKind::AwsSecretsmgr).should be_nil
end
end

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# ===================
# ©AngelaMos | 2026
# scheduler_spec.cr
# ===================
require "../../spec_helper"
require "../../../src/cre/engine/scheduler"
require "../../../src/cre/engine/event_bus"
private def drain(ch : ::Channel(CRE::Events::Event)) : Array(CRE::Events::Event)
out = [] of CRE::Events::Event
loop do
select
when ev = ch.receive
out << ev
else
break
end
end
out
end
describe CRE::Engine::Scheduler do
it "publishes a tick immediately on start" do
bus = CRE::Engine::EventBus.new
ch = bus.subscribe
bus.run
scheduler = CRE::Engine::Scheduler.new(bus, interval: 5.seconds)
scheduler.start
sleep 0.1.seconds
scheduler.stop
ticks = drain(ch).count(&.is_a?(CRE::Events::SchedulerTick))
ticks.should be >= 1
ensure
bus.try(&.stop)
end
it "publishes ticks at the configured interval" do
bus = CRE::Engine::EventBus.new
ch = bus.subscribe(buffer: 64)
bus.run
scheduler = CRE::Engine::Scheduler.new(bus, interval: 0.05.seconds)
scheduler.start
sleep 0.18.seconds
scheduler.stop
sleep 0.05.seconds # let final tick land
ticks = drain(ch).count(&.is_a?(CRE::Events::SchedulerTick))
# Initial + ~3 interval ticks = 3-5 expected; allow some scheduling variance
ticks.should be >= 2
ticks.should be <= 6
ensure
bus.try(&.stop)
end
it "stop halts publication" do
bus = CRE::Engine::EventBus.new
ch = bus.subscribe
bus.run
scheduler = CRE::Engine::Scheduler.new(bus, interval: 0.05.seconds)
scheduler.start
sleep 0.06.seconds
scheduler.stop
drain(ch) # drain whatever was already published
sleep 0.2.seconds
later = drain(ch).count(&.is_a?(CRE::Events::SchedulerTick))
later.should be <= 1 # at most one in-flight tick from the last sleep cycle
ensure
bus.try(&.stop)
end
end

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# ===================
# ©AngelaMos | 2026
# client_spec.cr
# ===================
require "../../spec_helper"
require "webmock"
require "../../../src/cre/github/client"
WebMock.allow_net_connect = false
private def fresh_client
CRE::Github::Client.new(token: "ghp_admin")
end
describe CRE::Github::Client do
before_each { WebMock.reset }
it "creates a fine-grained PAT" do
WebMock.stub(:post, "https://api.github.com/user/personal-access-tokens")
.with(headers: {"Authorization" => "Bearer ghp_admin"})
.to_return(body: %({"id":12345,"token":"ghp_newvalue","expires_at":"2026-07-01T00:00:00Z"}))
token = fresh_client.create_pat("my-pat", ["repo", "read:org"], 90)
token.id.should eq 12345_i64
token.token_value.should eq "ghp_newvalue"
token.expires_at.should eq "2026-07-01T00:00:00Z"
end
it "deletes a PAT" do
deleted = false
WebMock.stub(:delete, "https://api.github.com/user/personal-access-tokens/12345")
.with(headers: {"Authorization" => "Bearer ghp_admin"})
.to_return { |_| deleted = true; HTTP::Client::Response.new(200, body: "{}") }
fresh_client.delete_pat(12345_i64)
deleted.should be_true
end
it "fetches the authenticated user" do
WebMock.stub(:get, "https://api.github.com/user")
.to_return(body: %({"login":"octocat","id":1}))
user = fresh_client.me
user["login"].as_s.should eq "octocat"
end
it "raises GithubError on non-2xx" do
WebMock.stub(:get, "https://api.github.com/user")
.to_return(status: 401, body: %({"message":"Bad credentials"}))
expect_raises(CRE::Github::GithubError) { fresh_client.me }
end
end

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# ===================
# ©AngelaMos | 2026
# log_notifier_spec.cr
# ===================
require "../../spec_helper"
require "../../../src/cre/notifiers/log_notifier"
require "../../../src/cre/events/credential_events"
describe CRE::Notifiers::LogNotifier do
it "subscribes and emits without errors on rotation events" do
bus = CRE::Engine::EventBus.new
notifier = CRE::Notifiers::LogNotifier.new(bus)
notifier.start
bus.run
cred_id = UUID.random
bus.publish CRE::Events::RotationCompleted.new(cred_id, UUID.random)
bus.publish CRE::Events::RotationFailed.new(cred_id, UUID.random, "test")
bus.publish CRE::Events::PolicyViolation.new(cred_id, "p", "stale")
bus.publish CRE::Events::AlertRaised.new(CRE::Events::Severity::Warn, "hi")
sleep 0.1.seconds
notifier.stop
bus.stop
end
end

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# ===================
# ©AngelaMos | 2026
# telegram_bot_spec.cr
# ===================
require "../../spec_helper"
require "webmock"
require "../../../src/cre/notifiers/telegram_bot"
require "../../../src/cre/persistence/sqlite/sqlite_persistence"
WebMock.allow_net_connect = false
private def fresh_setup
persist = CRE::Persistence::Sqlite::SqlitePersistence.new(":memory:")
persist.migrate!
bus = CRE::Engine::EventBus.new
bus.run
telegram = CRE::Notifiers::Telegram.new("FAKE")
bot = CRE::Notifiers::TelegramBot.new(
bus: bus,
telegram: telegram,
persistence: persist,
viewer_chats: [100_i64],
operator_chats: [200_i64],
)
{persist, bus, telegram, bot}
end
describe CRE::Notifiers::TelegramBot do
it "viewer can run /status" do
persist, bus, _, bot = fresh_setup
reply = bot.handle_command(100_i64, "/status")
reply.should contain "live"
reply.should contain "Credentials"
ensure
bus.try(&.stop)
persist.try(&.close)
end
it "viewer cannot /rotate" do
persist, bus, _, bot = fresh_setup
reply = bot.handle_command(100_i64, "/rotate 00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000")
reply.should contain "operator-only"
ensure
bus.try(&.stop)
persist.try(&.close)
end
it "operator can /rotate; publishes RotationScheduled" do
persist, bus, _, bot = fresh_setup
received = [] of CRE::Events::Event
received_mutex = Mutex.new
ch = bus.subscribe
spawn do
loop do
begin
ev = ch.receive
received_mutex.synchronize { received << ev }
rescue ::Channel::ClosedError
break
end
end
end
cred_id = UUID.random
reply = bot.handle_command(200_i64, "/rotate #{cred_id}")
reply.should contain "rotation scheduled"
sleep 0.1.seconds
received_mutex.synchronize { received.any?(&.is_a?(CRE::Events::RotationScheduled)).should be_true }
ensure
bus.try(&.stop)
persist.try(&.close)
end
it "unauthorized chat is blocked" do
persist, bus, _, bot = fresh_setup
bot.handle_command(999_i64, "/status").should eq "unauthorized"
ensure
bus.try(&.stop)
persist.try(&.close)
end
it "/help lists commands" do
persist, bus, _, bot = fresh_setup
reply = bot.handle_command(100_i64, "/help")
reply.should contain "/status"
reply.should contain "/rotate"
ensure
bus.try(&.stop)
persist.try(&.close)
end
end

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# ===================
# ©AngelaMos | 2026
# telegram_spec.cr
# ===================
require "../../spec_helper"
require "webmock"
require "../../../src/cre/notifiers/telegram"
require "../../../src/cre/notifiers/telegram_subscriber"
require "../../../src/cre/events/credential_events"
WebMock.allow_net_connect = false
describe CRE::Notifiers::Telegram do
before_each { WebMock.reset }
it "sends a message" do
sent_body = nil
WebMock.stub(:post, "https://api.telegram.org/botFAKE/sendMessage")
.to_return { |req| sent_body = req.body.try(&.gets_to_end); HTTP::Client::Response.new(200, body: %({"ok":true})) }
CRE::Notifiers::Telegram.new("FAKE").send_message(12345_i64, "hello world")
sent_body.try(&.includes?("hello world")).should be_true
sent_body.try(&.includes?(%("chat_id":12345))).should be_true
end
it "raises TelegramError on non-2xx" do
WebMock.stub(:post, "https://api.telegram.org/botFAKE/sendMessage")
.to_return(status: 401, body: %({"ok":false,"description":"Unauthorized"}))
expect_raises(CRE::Notifiers::Telegram::TelegramError) do
CRE::Notifiers::Telegram.new("FAKE").send_message(1_i64, "x")
end
end
it "parses getUpdates with messages" do
WebMock.stub(:post, "https://api.telegram.org/botFAKE/getUpdates")
.to_return(body: %({
"ok":true,
"result":[{
"update_id":42,
"message":{
"message_id":7,
"chat":{"id":99},
"text":"/status"
}
}]
}))
updates = CRE::Notifiers::Telegram.new("FAKE").get_updates
updates.size.should eq 1
updates[0].chat_id.should eq 99
updates[0].text.should eq "/status"
end
end
describe CRE::Notifiers::TelegramSubscriber do
before_each { WebMock.reset }
it "fires Telegram message on RotationFailed" do
sent = [] of String
WebMock.stub(:post, "https://api.telegram.org/botFAKE/sendMessage")
.to_return { |req|
body = req.body.try(&.gets_to_end) || ""
sent << body
HTTP::Client::Response.new(200, body: %({"ok":true}))
}
bus = CRE::Engine::EventBus.new
sub = CRE::Notifiers::TelegramSubscriber.new(
bus, CRE::Notifiers::Telegram.new("FAKE"), [12345_i64],
)
sub.start
bus.run
bus.publish CRE::Events::RotationFailed.new(UUID.random, UUID.random, "boom")
sleep 0.1.seconds
sent.size.should eq 1
sent[0].should contain "FAILED"
ensure
bus.try(&.stop)
sub.try(&.stop)
end
it "does not fire on RotationCompleted unless notify_on_success" do
sent = [] of String
WebMock.stub(:post, "https://api.telegram.org/botFAKE/sendMessage")
.to_return { |req| sent << (req.body.try(&.gets_to_end) || ""); HTTP::Client::Response.new(200, body: %({"ok":true})) }
bus = CRE::Engine::EventBus.new
sub = CRE::Notifiers::TelegramSubscriber.new(
bus, CRE::Notifiers::Telegram.new("FAKE"), [1_i64], notify_on_success: false)
sub.start
bus.run
bus.publish CRE::Events::RotationCompleted.new(UUID.random, UUID.random)
sleep 0.1.seconds
sent.size.should eq 0
ensure
bus.try(&.stop)
sub.try(&.stop)
end
end

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# ===================
# ©AngelaMos | 2026
# sqlite_persistence_spec.cr
# ===================
require "../../../spec_helper"
require "../../../../src/cre/persistence/sqlite/sqlite_persistence"
describe CRE::Persistence::Sqlite::SqlitePersistence do
describe "credentials repo" do
it "round-trips a credential" do
persist = CRE::Persistence::Sqlite::SqlitePersistence.new(":memory:")
persist.migrate!
c = CRE::Domain::Credential.new(
id: UUID.random,
external_id: "ext-1",
kind: CRE::Domain::CredentialKind::EnvFile,
name: "test",
tags: {"env" => "dev"} of String => String,
)
persist.credentials.insert(c)
found = persist.credentials.find(c.id).not_nil!
found.name.should eq "test"
found.tag("env").should eq "dev"
found.kind.env_file?.should be_true
ensure
persist.try(&.close)
end
it "find_by_external returns the right credential" do
persist = CRE::Persistence::Sqlite::SqlitePersistence.new(":memory:")
persist.migrate!
c = CRE::Domain::Credential.new(
id: UUID.random, external_id: "uniq-x",
kind: CRE::Domain::CredentialKind::GithubPat,
name: "n", tags: {} of String => String,
)
persist.credentials.insert(c)
found = persist.credentials.find_by_external(
CRE::Domain::CredentialKind::GithubPat, "uniq-x",
).not_nil!
found.id.should eq c.id
ensure
persist.try(&.close)
end
it "all returns every credential" do
persist = CRE::Persistence::Sqlite::SqlitePersistence.new(":memory:")
persist.migrate!
3.times do |i|
persist.credentials.insert(
CRE::Domain::Credential.new(
id: UUID.random, external_id: "e#{i}",
kind: CRE::Domain::CredentialKind::EnvFile,
name: "n#{i}", tags: {} of String => String,
)
)
end
persist.credentials.all.size.should eq 3
ensure
persist.try(&.close)
end
it "update mutates name and tags" do
persist = CRE::Persistence::Sqlite::SqlitePersistence.new(":memory:")
persist.migrate!
id = UUID.random
persist.credentials.insert(
CRE::Domain::Credential.new(
id: id, external_id: "e", kind: CRE::Domain::CredentialKind::EnvFile,
name: "before", tags: {} of String => String,
)
)
persist.credentials.update(
CRE::Domain::Credential.new(
id: id, external_id: "e", kind: CRE::Domain::CredentialKind::EnvFile,
name: "after", tags: {"k" => "v"} of String => String,
)
)
found = persist.credentials.find(id).not_nil!
found.name.should eq "after"
found.tag("k").should eq "v"
ensure
persist.try(&.close)
end
end
describe "versions repo" do
it "round-trips a credential version with bytes" do
persist = CRE::Persistence::Sqlite::SqlitePersistence.new(":memory:")
persist.migrate!
cred = CRE::Domain::Credential.new(
id: UUID.random, external_id: "v-test",
kind: CRE::Domain::CredentialKind::EnvFile,
name: "v", tags: {} of String => String,
)
persist.credentials.insert(cred)
v = CRE::Domain::CredentialVersion.new(
id: UUID.random,
credential_id: cred.id,
ciphertext: Bytes[1, 2, 3, 4],
dek_wrapped: Bytes[9, 8, 7],
kek_version: 1,
algorithm_id: 1_i16,
)
persist.versions.insert(v)
found = persist.versions.find(v.id).not_nil!
found.ciphertext.should eq Bytes[1, 2, 3, 4]
found.dek_wrapped.should eq Bytes[9, 8, 7]
found.algorithm_id.should eq 1_i16
ensure
persist.try(&.close)
end
it "revoke marks revoked_at" do
persist = CRE::Persistence::Sqlite::SqlitePersistence.new(":memory:")
persist.migrate!
cred = CRE::Domain::Credential.new(
id: UUID.random, external_id: "rev",
kind: CRE::Domain::CredentialKind::EnvFile,
name: "n", tags: {} of String => String,
)
persist.credentials.insert(cred)
v = CRE::Domain::CredentialVersion.new(
id: UUID.random, credential_id: cred.id,
ciphertext: Bytes.new(0), dek_wrapped: Bytes.new(0),
kek_version: 1, algorithm_id: 1_i16,
)
persist.versions.insert(v)
persist.versions.revoke(v.id)
found = persist.versions.find(v.id).not_nil!
found.revoked?.should be_true
ensure
persist.try(&.close)
end
end
describe "rotations repo" do
it "tracks state transitions and in_flight filtering" do
persist = CRE::Persistence::Sqlite::SqlitePersistence.new(":memory:")
persist.migrate!
cred_id = UUID.random
persist.credentials.insert(
CRE::Domain::Credential.new(
id: cred_id, external_id: "rot", kind: CRE::Domain::CredentialKind::EnvFile,
name: "n", tags: {} of String => String,
)
)
r1 = CRE::Persistence::RotationRecord.new(
id: UUID.random, credential_id: cred_id,
rotator_kind: :env_file, state: :generating,
started_at: Time.utc, completed_at: nil, failure_reason: nil,
)
r2 = CRE::Persistence::RotationRecord.new(
id: UUID.random, credential_id: cred_id,
rotator_kind: :env_file, state: :completed,
started_at: Time.utc, completed_at: Time.utc, failure_reason: nil,
)
persist.rotations.insert(r1)
persist.rotations.insert(r2)
persist.rotations.in_flight.size.should eq 1
persist.rotations.update_state(r1.id, :completed)
persist.rotations.in_flight.size.should eq 0
ensure
persist.try(&.close)
end
end
describe "audit repo" do
it "appends and reads back entries; latest_hash returns genesis when empty" do
persist = CRE::Persistence::Sqlite::SqlitePersistence.new(":memory:")
persist.migrate!
persist.audit.latest_hash.should eq CRE::Persistence::Sqlite::AuditRepo::GENESIS_HASH
persist.audit.latest_seq.should eq 0_i64
entry = CRE::Persistence::AuditEntry.new(
seq: 0_i64, event_id: UUID.random,
occurred_at: Time.utc, event_type: "test",
actor: "system", target_id: nil,
payload: %({"k":"v"}),
prev_hash: Bytes.new(32, 0_u8),
content_hash: Bytes.new(32, 0xaa_u8),
hmac: Bytes.new(32, 0xbb_u8),
hmac_key_version: 1,
)
persist.audit.append(entry)
persist.audit.latest_seq.should eq 1_i64
persist.audit.latest_hash.should eq Bytes.new(32, 0xaa_u8)
rng = persist.audit.range(1_i64, 1_i64)
rng.size.should eq 1
rng[0].event_type.should eq "test"
ensure
persist.try(&.close)
end
end
end

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# ===================
# ©AngelaMos | 2026
# builder_spec.cr
# ===================
require "../../spec_helper"
require "../../../src/cre/policy/builder"
describe CRE::Policy::Builder do
it "builds a complete policy" do
b = CRE::Policy::Builder.new("p1")
b.description("desc")
b.match { |c| c.kind.env_file? }
b.max_age(30.days)
b.warn_at(25.days)
b.enforce(CRE::Policy::Action::RotateImmediately)
b.notify_via(CRE::Policy::Channel::Telegram, CRE::Policy::Channel::StructuredLog)
b.on_rotation_failure(CRE::Policy::Action::Quarantine)
p = b.build
p.name.should eq "p1"
p.description.should eq "desc"
p.max_age.should eq 30.days
p.warn_at.should eq 25.days
p.enforce_action.should eq CRE::Policy::Action::RotateImmediately
p.notify_channels.size.should eq 2
p.trigger_action_for(CRE::Policy::Trigger::OnRotationFailure).should eq CRE::Policy::Action::Quarantine
end
it "raises on missing match" do
b = CRE::Policy::Builder.new("p")
b.max_age(7.days)
b.enforce(CRE::Policy::Action::NotifyOnly)
expect_raises(CRE::Policy::BuilderError, /match/) { b.build }
end
it "raises on missing max_age" do
b = CRE::Policy::Builder.new("p")
b.match { |_c| true }
b.enforce(CRE::Policy::Action::NotifyOnly)
expect_raises(CRE::Policy::BuilderError, /max_age/) { b.build }
end
it "raises on missing enforce" do
b = CRE::Policy::Builder.new("p")
b.match { |_c| true }
b.max_age(7.days)
expect_raises(CRE::Policy::BuilderError, /enforce/) { b.build }
end
end

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# ===================
# ©AngelaMos | 2026
# dsl_spec.cr
# ===================
require "../../spec_helper"
require "../../../src/cre/policy/dsl"
include CRE::Policy::Dsl
describe "Policy DSL" do
before_each { CRE::Policy.clear_registry! }
it "registers a policy with full DSL syntax" do
policy "production-aws-secrets" do
description "Prod AWS secret rotation"
match { |c| c.kind.aws_secretsmgr? && c.tag(:env) == "prod" }
max_age 30.days
warn_at 25.days
enforce :rotate_immediately
notify_via :telegram, :structured_log
on_rotation_failure :quarantine
end
CRE::Policy.registry.size.should eq 1
p = CRE::Policy.registry.first
p.name.should eq "production-aws-secrets"
p.description.should eq "Prod AWS secret rotation"
p.max_age.should eq 30.days
p.warn_at.should eq 25.days
p.enforce_action.should eq CRE::Policy::Action::RotateImmediately
p.notify_channels.should contain(CRE::Policy::Channel::Telegram)
p.trigger_action_for(CRE::Policy::Trigger::OnRotationFailure).should eq CRE::Policy::Action::Quarantine
end
it "supports symbol autocast for enum params" do
policy "x" do
match { |_c| true }
max_age 1.day
enforce :notify_only
notify_via :email, :pagerduty
end
p = CRE::Policy.registry.first
p.enforce_action.should eq CRE::Policy::Action::NotifyOnly
p.notify_channels.should eq [CRE::Policy::Channel::Email, CRE::Policy::Channel::PagerDuty]
end
it "matcher is a real Crystal closure that captures state" do
threshold = 100
policy "captured" do
match { |c| c.tags["score"]?.try(&.to_i.>=(threshold)) || false }
max_age 1.day
enforce :notify_only
end
p = CRE::Policy.registry.first
above = CRE::Domain::Credential.new(
id: UUID.random, external_id: "a", kind: CRE::Domain::CredentialKind::EnvFile,
name: "n", tags: {"score" => "150"} of String => String,
)
below = CRE::Domain::Credential.new(
id: UUID.random, external_id: "b", kind: CRE::Domain::CredentialKind::EnvFile,
name: "n", tags: {"score" => "50"} of String => String,
)
p.matches?(above).should be_true
p.matches?(below).should be_false
end
it "raises BuilderError for missing required fields" do
expect_raises(CRE::Policy::BuilderError, /match/) do
policy "incomplete" do
max_age 1.day
enforce :notify_only
end
end
end
end

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# ===================
# ©AngelaMos | 2026
# evaluator_spec.cr
# ===================
require "../../spec_helper"
require "../../../src/cre/policy/evaluator"
require "../../../src/cre/policy/dsl"
require "../../../src/cre/persistence/sqlite/sqlite_persistence"
include CRE::Policy::Dsl
private def fresh_persistence
persist = CRE::Persistence::Sqlite::SqlitePersistence.new(":memory:")
persist.migrate!
persist
end
# Drain non-blocking; returns whatever events arrived without waiting.
private def drain(ch : ::Channel(CRE::Events::Event)) : Array(CRE::Events::Event)
out = [] of CRE::Events::Event
loop do
select
when ev = ch.receive
out << ev
else
break
end
end
out
end
# Run the bus dispatcher inline for a few ticks so subscribers see events.
private def settle(bus : CRE::Engine::EventBus, duration : Time::Span = 0.1.seconds)
sleep duration
end
describe CRE::Policy::Evaluator do
before_each { CRE::Policy.clear_registry! }
it "publishes PolicyViolation + RotationScheduled when overdue with rotate_immediately" do
policy "test-rotate" do
match { |c| c.kind.env_file? }
max_age 7.days
enforce :rotate_immediately
end
persist = fresh_persistence
persist.credentials.insert(
CRE::Domain::Credential.new(
id: UUID.random, external_id: "x",
kind: CRE::Domain::CredentialKind::EnvFile,
name: "n", tags: {} of String => String,
created_at: Time.utc - 30.days,
updated_at: Time.utc - 30.days,
)
)
bus = CRE::Engine::EventBus.new
ch = bus.subscribe(buffer: 256, overflow: CRE::Engine::EventBus::Overflow::Block)
bus.run
CRE::Policy::Evaluator.new(bus, persist).evaluate_all
settle(bus)
events = drain(ch)
types = events.map(&.class.name)
types.should contain "CRE::Events::PolicyViolation"
types.should contain "CRE::Events::RotationScheduled"
ensure
bus.try(&.stop)
persist.try(&.close)
end
it "publishes AlertRaised for notify_only action" do
policy "test-notify" do
match { |c| c.kind.env_file? }
max_age 7.days
enforce :notify_only
end
persist = fresh_persistence
persist.credentials.insert(
CRE::Domain::Credential.new(
id: UUID.random, external_id: "y",
kind: CRE::Domain::CredentialKind::EnvFile,
name: "n", tags: {} of String => String,
created_at: Time.utc - 30.days, updated_at: Time.utc - 30.days,
)
)
bus = CRE::Engine::EventBus.new
ch = bus.subscribe(buffer: 256, overflow: CRE::Engine::EventBus::Overflow::Block)
bus.run
CRE::Policy::Evaluator.new(bus, persist).evaluate_all
settle(bus)
events = drain(ch)
types = events.map(&.class.name)
types.should contain "CRE::Events::PolicyViolation"
types.should contain "CRE::Events::AlertRaised"
types.should_not contain "CRE::Events::RotationScheduled"
ensure
bus.try(&.stop)
persist.try(&.close)
end
it "does not fire for fresh credentials" do
policy "test-fresh" do
match { |c| c.kind.env_file? }
max_age 30.days
enforce :rotate_immediately
end
persist = fresh_persistence
persist.credentials.insert(
CRE::Domain::Credential.new(
id: UUID.random, external_id: "f",
kind: CRE::Domain::CredentialKind::EnvFile,
name: "n", tags: {} of String => String,
)
)
bus = CRE::Engine::EventBus.new
ch = bus.subscribe(buffer: 256, overflow: CRE::Engine::EventBus::Overflow::Block)
bus.run
CRE::Policy::Evaluator.new(bus, persist).evaluate_all
settle(bus)
drain(ch).should be_empty
ensure
bus.try(&.stop)
persist.try(&.close)
end
it "skips policies that don't match the credential" do
policy "github-only" do
match { |c| c.kind.github_pat? }
max_age 7.days
enforce :rotate_immediately
end
persist = fresh_persistence
persist.credentials.insert(
CRE::Domain::Credential.new(
id: UUID.random, external_id: "envx",
kind: CRE::Domain::CredentialKind::EnvFile,
name: "n", tags: {} of String => String,
updated_at: Time.utc - 30.days,
)
)
bus = CRE::Engine::EventBus.new
ch = bus.subscribe(buffer: 256, overflow: CRE::Engine::EventBus::Overflow::Block)
bus.run
CRE::Policy::Evaluator.new(bus, persist).evaluate_all
settle(bus)
drain(ch).should be_empty
ensure
bus.try(&.stop)
persist.try(&.close)
end
end

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# ===================
# ©AngelaMos | 2026
# policy_spec.cr
# ===================
require "../../spec_helper"
require "../../../src/cre/policy/policy"
describe CRE::Policy::Policy do
it "matches via the matcher" do
p = CRE::Policy::Policy.new(
name: "p1",
description: nil,
matcher: ->(c : CRE::Domain::Credential) { c.kind.env_file? },
max_age: 30.days,
warn_at: nil,
enforce_action: CRE::Policy::Action::NotifyOnly,
notify_channels: [] of CRE::Policy::Channel,
triggers: {} of CRE::Policy::Trigger => CRE::Policy::Action,
)
matching = CRE::Domain::Credential.new(
id: UUID.random, external_id: "x", kind: CRE::Domain::CredentialKind::EnvFile,
name: "n", tags: {} of String => String,
)
other = CRE::Domain::Credential.new(
id: UUID.random, external_id: "y", kind: CRE::Domain::CredentialKind::GithubPat,
name: "n", tags: {} of String => String,
)
p.matches?(matching).should be_true
p.matches?(other).should be_false
end
it "detects overdue based on rotation_anchor + max_age" do
p = CRE::Policy::Policy.new(
name: "p", description: nil,
matcher: ->(_c : CRE::Domain::Credential) { true },
max_age: 7.days, warn_at: nil,
enforce_action: CRE::Policy::Action::NotifyOnly,
notify_channels: [] of CRE::Policy::Channel,
triggers: {} of CRE::Policy::Trigger => CRE::Policy::Action,
)
fresh = CRE::Domain::Credential.new(
id: UUID.random, external_id: "f",
kind: CRE::Domain::CredentialKind::EnvFile,
name: "n", tags: {} of String => String,
last_rotated_at: Time.utc - 1.day,
)
stale = CRE::Domain::Credential.new(
id: UUID.random, external_id: "s",
kind: CRE::Domain::CredentialKind::EnvFile,
name: "n", tags: {} of String => String,
last_rotated_at: Time.utc - 30.days,
)
p.overdue?(fresh).should be_false
p.overdue?(stale).should be_true
end
it "treats never-rotated credentials by created_at" do
p = CRE::Policy::Policy.new(
name: "p", description: nil,
matcher: ->(_c : CRE::Domain::Credential) { true },
max_age: 7.days, warn_at: nil,
enforce_action: CRE::Policy::Action::NotifyOnly,
notify_channels: [] of CRE::Policy::Channel,
triggers: {} of CRE::Policy::Trigger => CRE::Policy::Action,
)
aged = CRE::Domain::Credential.new(
id: UUID.random, external_id: "a",
kind: CRE::Domain::CredentialKind::EnvFile,
name: "n", tags: {} of String => String,
created_at: Time.utc - 30.days,
)
p.overdue?(aged).should be_true
end
it "ignores updated_at (renaming a credential does not reset rotation clock)" do
p = CRE::Policy::Policy.new(
name: "p", description: nil,
matcher: ->(_c : CRE::Domain::Credential) { true },
max_age: 7.days, warn_at: nil,
enforce_action: CRE::Policy::Action::NotifyOnly,
notify_channels: [] of CRE::Policy::Channel,
triggers: {} of CRE::Policy::Trigger => CRE::Policy::Action,
)
just_renamed = CRE::Domain::Credential.new(
id: UUID.random, external_id: "x",
kind: CRE::Domain::CredentialKind::EnvFile,
name: "n", tags: {} of String => String,
created_at: Time.utc - 30.days,
updated_at: Time.utc, # tag/name was just edited
last_rotated_at: Time.utc - 30.days,
)
p.overdue?(just_renamed).should be_true
end
it "computes warning window" do
p = CRE::Policy::Policy.new(
name: "p", description: nil,
matcher: ->(_c : CRE::Domain::Credential) { true },
max_age: 30.days, warn_at: 25.days,
enforce_action: CRE::Policy::Action::NotifyOnly,
notify_channels: [] of CRE::Policy::Channel,
triggers: {} of CRE::Policy::Trigger => CRE::Policy::Action,
)
young = CRE::Domain::Credential.new(
id: UUID.random, external_id: "y", kind: CRE::Domain::CredentialKind::EnvFile,
name: "n", tags: {} of String => String,
last_rotated_at: Time.utc - 10.days,
)
warning = CRE::Domain::Credential.new(
id: UUID.random, external_id: "w", kind: CRE::Domain::CredentialKind::EnvFile,
name: "n", tags: {} of String => String,
last_rotated_at: Time.utc - 27.days,
)
overdue = CRE::Domain::Credential.new(
id: UUID.random, external_id: "o", kind: CRE::Domain::CredentialKind::EnvFile,
name: "n", tags: {} of String => String,
last_rotated_at: Time.utc - 31.days,
)
p.in_warning_window?(young).should be_false
p.in_warning_window?(warning).should be_true
p.in_warning_window?(overdue).should be_false
end
end

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# ===================
# ©AngelaMos | 2026
# aws_secrets_spec.cr
# ===================
require "../../spec_helper"
require "webmock"
require "../../../src/cre/rotators/aws_secrets"
WebMock.allow_net_connect = false
private def aws_credential
CRE::Domain::Credential.new(
id: UUID.random,
external_id: "arn:aws:secretsmanager:us-east-1:123456789012:secret:my-db-prod",
kind: CRE::Domain::CredentialKind::AwsSecretsmgr,
name: "my-db-prod",
tags: {
"secret_arn" => "arn:aws:secretsmanager:us-east-1:123456789012:secret:my-db-prod",
"value_length" => "16",
} of String => String,
)
end
private def fresh_client : CRE::Aws::SecretsManagerClient
CRE::Aws::SecretsManagerClient.new(
access_key_id: "AKID",
secret_access_key: "secret",
region: "us-east-1",
)
end
describe CRE::Rotators::AwsSecretsRotator do
before_each { WebMock.reset }
it "executes the full 4-step contract" do
cred = aws_credential
WebMock.stub(:post, "https://secretsmanager.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/")
.with(headers: {"X-Amz-Target" => "secretsmanager.PutSecretValue"})
.to_return(body: %({"VersionId":"new-v"}))
rotator = CRE::Rotators::AwsSecretsRotator.new(fresh_client)
rotator.can_rotate?(cred).should be_true
new_secret = rotator.generate(cred)
new_secret.metadata["version_id"].should eq "new-v"
new_secret.metadata["secret_arn"].should eq cred.tag("secret_arn")
rotator.apply(cred, new_secret) # no-op
expected_value = String.new(new_secret.ciphertext)
WebMock.stub(:post, "https://secretsmanager.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/")
.with(headers: {"X-Amz-Target" => "secretsmanager.GetSecretValue"})
.to_return(body: %({"VersionId":"new-v","SecretString":#{expected_value.to_json}}))
rotator.verify(cred, new_secret).should be_true
# Commit: GetSecretValue (current) + UpdateSecretVersionStage (move) + UpdateSecretVersionStage (remove pending)
WebMock.stub(:post, "https://secretsmanager.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/")
.with(headers: {"X-Amz-Target" => "secretsmanager.GetSecretValue"})
.to_return(body: %({"VersionId":"old-v","SecretString":"oldval"}))
WebMock.stub(:post, "https://secretsmanager.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/")
.with(headers: {"X-Amz-Target" => "secretsmanager.UpdateSecretVersionStage"})
.to_return(body: "{}")
rotator.commit(cred, new_secret)
end
it "verify returns false on retrieved-value mismatch" do
cred = aws_credential
WebMock.stub(:post, "https://secretsmanager.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/")
.with(headers: {"X-Amz-Target" => "secretsmanager.GetSecretValue"})
.to_return(body: %({"VersionId":"v","SecretString":"different"}))
rotator = CRE::Rotators::AwsSecretsRotator.new(fresh_client)
s = CRE::Domain::NewSecret.new(
ciphertext: "expected".to_slice,
metadata: {"version_id" => "v", "secret_arn" => cred.tag("secret_arn").not_nil!},
)
rotator.verify(cred, s).should be_false
end
it "rollback_apply removes AWSPENDING stage" do
cred = aws_credential
rotator = CRE::Rotators::AwsSecretsRotator.new(fresh_client)
s = CRE::Domain::NewSecret.new(
ciphertext: "x".to_slice,
metadata: {"version_id" => "v", "secret_arn" => cred.tag("secret_arn").not_nil!},
)
called = false
WebMock.stub(:post, "https://secretsmanager.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/")
.with(headers: {"X-Amz-Target" => "secretsmanager.UpdateSecretVersionStage"})
.to_return { |_req| called = true; HTTP::Client::Response.new(200, body: "{}") }
rotator.rollback_apply(cred, s)
called.should be_true
end
it "can_rotate? returns false without secret_arn tag" do
bad = CRE::Domain::Credential.new(
id: UUID.random, external_id: "x",
kind: CRE::Domain::CredentialKind::AwsSecretsmgr,
name: "x", tags: {} of String => String,
)
CRE::Rotators::AwsSecretsRotator.new(fresh_client).can_rotate?(bad).should be_false
end
end

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# ===================
# ©AngelaMos | 2026
# env_file_spec.cr
# ===================
require "../../spec_helper"
require "../../../src/cre/rotators/env_file"
private def credential_for(path : String, key : String, bytes : Int32 = 32)
CRE::Domain::Credential.new(
id: UUID.random,
external_id: "#{path}::#{key}",
kind: CRE::Domain::CredentialKind::EnvFile,
name: key,
tags: {"path" => path, "key" => key, "bytes" => bytes.to_s} of String => String,
)
end
describe CRE::Rotators::EnvFileRotator do
it "executes the full 4-step contract" do
tmp = File.tempfile("cre_env_test_") do |f|
f << "API_KEY=oldvalue\nOTHER=keep\n"
end
path = tmp.path
cred = credential_for(path, "API_KEY")
rotator = CRE::Rotators::EnvFileRotator.new
rotator.can_rotate?(cred).should be_true
new_secret = rotator.generate(cred)
new_secret.metadata["key"].should eq "API_KEY"
new_secret.ciphertext.size.should be > 0
rotator.apply(cred, new_secret)
File.exists?("#{path}.pending.#{Process.pid}").should be_true
rotator.verify(cred, new_secret).should be_true
rotator.commit(cred, new_secret)
File.exists?("#{path}.pending.#{Process.pid}").should be_false
final = File.read(path)
new_value = String.new(new_secret.ciphertext)
final.includes?("API_KEY=#{new_value}").should be_true
final.includes?("OTHER=keep").should be_true
final.includes?("API_KEY=oldvalue").should be_false
ensure
tmp.try(&.delete)
end
it "rollback_apply removes the pending file" do
tmp = File.tempfile("cre_env_rb_") do |f|
f << "K=v\n"
end
cred = credential_for(tmp.path, "K")
rotator = CRE::Rotators::EnvFileRotator.new
s = rotator.generate(cred)
rotator.apply(cred, s)
File.exists?("#{tmp.path}.pending.#{Process.pid}").should be_true
rotator.rollback_apply(cred, s)
File.exists?("#{tmp.path}.pending.#{Process.pid}").should be_false
File.read(tmp.path).should eq "K=v\n"
ensure
tmp.try(&.delete)
end
it "can_rotate? returns false without required tags" do
bad_cred = CRE::Domain::Credential.new(
id: UUID.random, external_id: "x",
kind: CRE::Domain::CredentialKind::EnvFile,
name: "x", tags: {} of String => String,
)
CRE::Rotators::EnvFileRotator.new.can_rotate?(bad_cred).should be_false
end
it "creates the file if missing" do
path = File.tempname("cre_env_new_", ".env")
cred = credential_for(path, "FRESH")
rotator = CRE::Rotators::EnvFileRotator.new
s = rotator.generate(cred)
rotator.apply(cred, s)
rotator.verify(cred, s).should be_true
rotator.commit(cred, s)
File.exists?(path).should be_true
File.read(path).includes?("FRESH=").should be_true
ensure
File.delete(path) if path && File.exists?(path)
end
end

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# ===================
# ©AngelaMos | 2026
# github_pat_spec.cr
# ===================
require "../../spec_helper"
require "webmock"
require "../../../src/cre/rotators/github_pat"
WebMock.allow_net_connect = false
private def github_credential(old_pat_id : String = "111")
CRE::Domain::Credential.new(
id: UUID.random,
external_id: "deploy-bot",
kind: CRE::Domain::CredentialKind::GithubPat,
name: "deploy-bot",
tags: {
"name" => "deploy-bot",
"scopes" => %(["repo","read:org"]),
"old_pat_id" => old_pat_id,
"expires_in_days" => "90",
} of String => String,
)
end
private def gh_client
CRE::Github::Client.new(token: "ghp_admin")
end
describe CRE::Rotators::GithubPatRotator do
before_each { WebMock.reset }
it "executes the full 4-step contract" do
cred = github_credential
WebMock.stub(:post, "https://api.github.com/user/personal-access-tokens")
.to_return(body: %({"id":99999,"token":"ghp_new","expires_at":"2026-07-01T00:00:00Z"}))
rotator = CRE::Rotators::GithubPatRotator.new(gh_client)
rotator.can_rotate?(cred).should be_true
new_secret = rotator.generate(cred)
new_secret.metadata["new_pat_id"].should eq "99999"
new_secret.metadata["old_pat_id"].should eq "111"
String.new(new_secret.ciphertext).should eq "ghp_new"
rotator.apply(cred, new_secret) # no-op
WebMock.stub(:get, "https://api.github.com/user")
.with(headers: {"Authorization" => "Bearer ghp_new"})
.to_return(body: %({"login":"deploy-bot"}))
rotator.verify(cred, new_secret).should be_true
deleted_old = false
WebMock.stub(:delete, "https://api.github.com/user/personal-access-tokens/111")
.to_return { |_| deleted_old = true; HTTP::Client::Response.new(200, body: "{}") }
rotator.commit(cred, new_secret)
deleted_old.should be_true
end
it "verify returns false when /user fails with new token" do
cred = github_credential
WebMock.stub(:get, "https://api.github.com/user")
.to_return(status: 401, body: %({"message":"bad"}))
rotator = CRE::Rotators::GithubPatRotator.new(gh_client)
s = CRE::Domain::NewSecret.new(
ciphertext: "ghp_bad".to_slice,
metadata: {"new_pat_id" => "1", "old_pat_id" => "0"},
)
rotator.verify(cred, s).should be_false
end
it "rollback_apply deletes the new PAT" do
cred = github_credential
rotator = CRE::Rotators::GithubPatRotator.new(gh_client)
s = CRE::Domain::NewSecret.new(
ciphertext: "ghp_new".to_slice,
metadata: {"new_pat_id" => "888"},
)
deleted = false
WebMock.stub(:delete, "https://api.github.com/user/personal-access-tokens/888")
.to_return { |_| deleted = true; HTTP::Client::Response.new(200, body: "{}") }
rotator.rollback_apply(cred, s)
deleted.should be_true
end
end

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# ===================
# ©AngelaMos | 2026
# rotator_spec.cr
# ===================
require "../../spec_helper"
require "../../../src/cre/rotators/rotator"
require "../../../src/cre/rotators/env_file"
describe CRE::Rotators::Rotator do
it "registers concrete rotator subclasses via register_as macro" do
CRE::Rotators::Rotator::REGISTRY[:env_file]?.should_not be_nil
CRE::Rotators::Rotator.for(:env_file).should eq CRE::Rotators::EnvFileRotator
CRE::Rotators::Rotator.registered_kinds.should contain(:env_file)
end
it "for returns nil for unknown kinds" do
CRE::Rotators::Rotator.for(:nonexistent).should be_nil
end
end

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# ===================
# ©AngelaMos | 2026
# vault_dynamic_spec.cr
# ===================
require "../../spec_helper"
require "webmock"
require "../../../src/cre/rotators/vault_dynamic"
WebMock.allow_net_connect = false
private def vault_credential(current_lease : String? = nil)
tags = {"role_path" => "database/creds/myrole"} of String => String
tags["current_lease_id"] = current_lease if current_lease
CRE::Domain::Credential.new(
id: UUID.random,
external_id: "database/creds/myrole",
kind: CRE::Domain::CredentialKind::VaultDynamic,
name: "myrole",
tags: tags,
)
end
private def vault_client
CRE::Vault::Client.new(addr: "http://vault.test", token: "tok")
end
describe CRE::Rotators::VaultDynamicRotator do
before_each { WebMock.reset }
it "executes the full 4-step contract with lease revocation on commit" do
cred = vault_credential(current_lease: "database/creds/myrole/old")
WebMock.stub(:get, "http://vault.test/v1/database/creds/myrole")
.to_return(body: %({"lease_id":"database/creds/myrole/new","lease_duration":3600,"data":{"username":"u","password":"p"}}))
rotator = CRE::Rotators::VaultDynamicRotator.new(vault_client)
rotator.can_rotate?(cred).should be_true
new_secret = rotator.generate(cred)
new_secret.metadata["lease_id"].should eq "database/creds/myrole/new"
new_secret.metadata["old_lease_id"].should eq "database/creds/myrole/old"
rotator.apply(cred, new_secret) # no-op
WebMock.stub(:put, "http://vault.test/v1/sys/leases/renew")
.to_return(body: %({"lease_id":"database/creds/myrole/new","lease_duration":3600}))
rotator.verify(cred, new_secret).should be_true
revoked = false
WebMock.stub(:put, "http://vault.test/v1/sys/leases/revoke")
.with(body: %({"lease_id":"database/creds/myrole/old"}))
.to_return { |_| revoked = true; HTTP::Client::Response.new(200, body: "{}") }
rotator.commit(cred, new_secret)
revoked.should be_true
end
it "verify returns false on Vault error" do
cred = vault_credential
WebMock.stub(:put, "http://vault.test/v1/sys/leases/renew")
.to_return(status: 403, body: %({"errors":["denied"]}))
rotator = CRE::Rotators::VaultDynamicRotator.new(vault_client)
s = CRE::Domain::NewSecret.new(
ciphertext: "{}".to_slice,
metadata: {"lease_id" => "x"},
)
rotator.verify(cred, s).should be_false
end
it "rollback_apply revokes the new lease" do
cred = vault_credential
rotator = CRE::Rotators::VaultDynamicRotator.new(vault_client)
s = CRE::Domain::NewSecret.new(
ciphertext: "{}".to_slice,
metadata: {"lease_id" => "new-lease-id"},
)
revoked = false
WebMock.stub(:put, "http://vault.test/v1/sys/leases/revoke")
.with(body: %({"lease_id":"new-lease-id"}))
.to_return { |_| revoked = true; HTTP::Client::Response.new(200, body: "{}") }
rotator.rollback_apply(cred, s)
revoked.should be_true
end
it "skips lease revocation when no current_lease_id" do
cred = vault_credential # no current_lease_id
WebMock.stub(:get, "http://vault.test/v1/database/creds/myrole")
.to_return(body: %({"lease_id":"new","lease_duration":3600,"data":{"username":"u","password":"p"}}))
rotator = CRE::Rotators::VaultDynamicRotator.new(vault_client)
s = rotator.generate(cred)
# commit should be a no-op (no old lease to revoke)
rotator.commit(cred, s)
# If a stub was missing webmock would have raised; absence proves no PUT happened.
end
end

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# ===================
# ©AngelaMos | 2026
# ansi_spec.cr
# ===================
require "../../spec_helper"
require "../../../src/cre/tui/ansi"
describe CRE::Tui::Ansi do
it "wraps text with color escape codes" do
out = CRE::Tui::Ansi.green("hello")
out.should contain "\e[32m"
out.should contain "hello"
out.should end_with "\e[0m"
end
it "move produces a CSI cursor-position sequence" do
CRE::Tui::Ansi.move(5, 10).should eq "\e[5;10H"
end
it "strip removes escape sequences" do
raw = "\e[1m\e[33mwarn\e[0m message"
CRE::Tui::Ansi.strip(raw).should eq "warn message"
end
end

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# ===================
# ©AngelaMos | 2026
# renderer_spec.cr
# ===================
require "../../spec_helper"
require "../../../src/cre/tui/renderer"
require "../../../src/cre/events/credential_events"
describe CRE::Tui::Renderer do
it "renders the layout with header + panels" do
state = CRE::Tui::State.new(kek_version: 3)
io = IO::Memory.new
CRE::Tui::Renderer.new(state, io, use_color: false).render
out = CRE::Tui::Ansi.strip(io.to_s)
out.should contain "Credential Rotation Enforcer"
out.should contain "STATUS"
out.should contain "Active Rotations"
out.should contain "Recent Events"
out.should contain "(no active rotations)"
out.should contain "(no events yet)"
out.should contain "v3"
end
it "renders active rotations" do
state = CRE::Tui::State.new
cred_id = UUID.random
state.apply(CRE::Events::RotationStarted.new(cred_id, UUID.random, "aws_secretsmgr"))
state.apply(CRE::Events::RotationStepCompleted.new(cred_id, UUID.random, :generate))
state.apply(CRE::Events::RotationStepCompleted.new(cred_id, UUID.random, :apply))
io = IO::Memory.new
CRE::Tui::Renderer.new(state, io, use_color: false).render
out = CRE::Tui::Ansi.strip(io.to_s)
out.should contain "aws_secretsmgr"
out.should contain "step 2/4"
end
it "renders recent events with timestamps" do
state = CRE::Tui::State.new
cred_id = UUID.random
state.apply(CRE::Events::RotationCompleted.new(cred_id, UUID.random))
state.apply(CRE::Events::PolicyViolation.new(cred_id, "p1", "stale"))
io = IO::Memory.new
CRE::Tui::Renderer.new(state, io, use_color: false).render
out = CRE::Tui::Ansi.strip(io.to_s)
out.should contain "rotation completed"
out.should contain "p1"
end
end

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# ===================
# ©AngelaMos | 2026
# state_spec.cr
# ===================
require "../../spec_helper"
require "../../../src/cre/tui/state"
require "../../../src/cre/events/credential_events"
describe CRE::Tui::State do
it "tracks active rotations through their step lifecycle" do
state = CRE::Tui::State.new
cred_id = UUID.random
rot_id = UUID.random
state.apply(CRE::Events::RotationStarted.new(cred_id, rot_id, "env_file"))
state.active[cred_id]?.should_not be_nil
state.active[cred_id].step.should eq "starting"
state.active[cred_id].progress.should eq 0
state.apply(CRE::Events::RotationStepCompleted.new(cred_id, rot_id, :generate))
state.active[cred_id].progress.should eq 1
state.active[cred_id].step.should eq "generate"
state.apply(CRE::Events::RotationStepCompleted.new(cred_id, rot_id, :apply))
state.apply(CRE::Events::RotationStepCompleted.new(cred_id, rot_id, :verify))
state.apply(CRE::Events::RotationStepCompleted.new(cred_id, rot_id, :commit))
state.active[cred_id].progress.should eq 4
state.apply(CRE::Events::RotationCompleted.new(cred_id, rot_id))
state.active.has_key?(cred_id).should be_false
state.completed_24h.should eq 1
state.recent.size.should eq 1
state.recent.first.symbol.should eq "✓"
end
it "records failed rotations" do
state = CRE::Tui::State.new
cred_id = UUID.random
state.apply(CRE::Events::RotationFailed.new(cred_id, UUID.random, "boom"))
state.recent.first.symbol.should eq "!"
state.recent.first.summary.should contain "FAILED"
end
it "trims recent events to MAX_RECENT_EVENTS" do
state = CRE::Tui::State.new
25.times do |i|
state.apply(CRE::Events::AlertRaised.new(CRE::Events::Severity::Info, "msg-#{i}"))
end
state.recent.size.should eq CRE::Tui::State::MAX_RECENT_EVENTS
state.recent.first.summary.should contain "msg-5"
state.recent.last.summary.should contain "msg-24"
end
end

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# ===================
# ©AngelaMos | 2026
# client_spec.cr
# ===================
require "../../spec_helper"
require "webmock"
require "../../../src/cre/vault/client"
WebMock.allow_net_connect = false
private def fresh_client
CRE::Vault::Client.new(addr: "http://vault.test", token: "test-token")
end
describe CRE::Vault::Client do
before_each { WebMock.reset }
it "reads a dynamic secret" do
WebMock.stub(:get, "http://vault.test/v1/database/creds/myrole")
.with(headers: {"X-Vault-Token" => "test-token"})
.to_return(body: %({
"lease_id":"database/creds/myrole/abc",
"lease_duration":3600,
"data":{"username":"v-token-myrole-xyz","password":"hunter2"}
}))
secret = fresh_client.read_dynamic("database/creds/myrole")
secret.lease_id.should eq "database/creds/myrole/abc"
secret.lease_duration.should eq 3600
secret.username.should eq "v-token-myrole-xyz"
secret.password.should eq "hunter2"
end
it "revokes a lease" do
called = false
WebMock.stub(:put, "http://vault.test/v1/sys/leases/revoke")
.with(body: %({"lease_id":"database/creds/myrole/abc"}))
.to_return { |_| called = true; HTTP::Client::Response.new(200, body: "{}") }
fresh_client.revoke_lease("database/creds/myrole/abc")
called.should be_true
end
it "renews a lease" do
WebMock.stub(:put, "http://vault.test/v1/sys/leases/renew")
.to_return(body: %({"lease_id":"x","lease_duration":7200}))
fresh_client.renew_lease("x").should eq 7200
end
it "raises VaultError on non-2xx" do
WebMock.stub(:get, "http://vault.test/v1/database/creds/missing")
.to_return(status: 404, body: %({"errors":["role missing"]}))
expect_raises(CRE::Vault::VaultError) do
fresh_client.read_dynamic("database/creds/missing")
end
end
end

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# ===================
# ©AngelaMos | 2026
# cre.cr
# ===================
require "./cre/version"
require "./cre/cli/cli"
module CRE
def self.main(argv : Array(String)) : Int32
Cli.dispatch(argv)
end
end
if PROGRAM_NAME.includes?("cre")
exit CRE.main(ARGV)
end

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# ===================
# ©AngelaMos | 2026
# audit_log.cr
# ===================
require "json"
require "uuid"
require "openssl/hmac"
require "./hash_chain"
require "./hmac_ratchet"
require "./merkle"
require "./signing"
require "../crypto/random"
require "../persistence/persistence"
require "../persistence/repos"
module CRE::Audit
# AuditLog is the append-only, tamper-evident write API used by the
# AuditSubscriber. Verification is split across three layers, each
# callable independently:
#
# verify_hash_chain SHA-256 chain over (prev_hash || payload)
# verify_hmac_ratchet HMAC-SHA256 of every content_hash, with
# the ratcheting key replayed from the
# initial seed
# verify_batches Ed25519-signed Merkle-root batches
#
# Together they answer 'has this log been mutated since it was written':
# - hash chain catches edits to any single row (recompute everything),
# - HMAC ratchet catches edits an attacker who recomputed hashes might
# have made (they don't have the seed key),
# - Merkle batches give an external auditor an O(1) commitment to a
# range of entries that they can verify offline with a public key.
class AuditLog
@ratchet : HmacRatchet
@mutex : Mutex
@initial_hmac_key : Bytes
def initialize(@persistence : Persistence::Persistence, initial_hmac_key : Bytes, @hmac_version : Int32, @ratchet_every : Int32)
@initial_hmac_key = initial_hmac_key.dup
@ratchet = HmacRatchet.new(initial_hmac_key, @hmac_version, @ratchet_every)
@mutex = Mutex.new
end
def append(event_type : String, actor : String, target_id : UUID?, payload : Hash) : Persistence::AuditEntry
@mutex.synchronize do
prev = @persistence.audit.latest_hash
canonical = canonical_json(event_type, actor, target_id, payload)
content_hash = HashChain.next_hash(prev, canonical.to_slice)
hmac = @ratchet.sign(content_hash)
entry = Persistence::AuditEntry.new(
seq: 0_i64,
event_id: UUID.random,
occurred_at: Time.utc,
event_type: event_type,
actor: actor,
target_id: target_id,
payload: canonical,
prev_hash: prev,
content_hash: content_hash,
hmac: hmac,
hmac_key_version: @ratchet.version,
)
@persistence.audit.append(entry)
entry
end
end
# Backwards-compatible alias: returns true iff hash chain + HMAC ratchet
# both verify against the seed key the log was constructed with.
def verify_chain : Bool
verify_hash_chain && verify_hmac_ratchet(@initial_hmac_key)
end
# Verify only the SHA-256 chain. Catches tampering when an attacker
# didn't recompute hashes; doesn't catch tampering when they did.
def verify_hash_chain : Bool
latest = @persistence.audit.latest_seq
return true if latest == 0
entries = @persistence.audit.range(1_i64, latest)
return false if entries.size != latest
pairs = entries.map { |e| {e.prev_hash, e.content_hash} }
payloads = entries.map(&.payload).map(&.to_slice)
HashChain.verify(pairs, payloads)
end
# Verify the HMAC ratchet by replaying it from the seed key. An
# attacker who modified rows AND recomputed hashes still doesn't have
# the seed key, so any HMAC mismatch is dispositive evidence of
# tampering.
def verify_hmac_ratchet(seed_key : Bytes) : Bool
raise ArgumentError.new("seed key must be 32 bytes") unless seed_key.size == 32
latest = @persistence.audit.latest_seq
return true if latest == 0
ratchet = HmacRatchet.new(seed_key, version: 1, ratchet_every: @ratchet_every)
entries = @persistence.audit.range(1_i64, latest)
entries.each do |entry|
return false unless entry.hmac_key_version == ratchet.version
expected = OpenSSL::HMAC.digest(:sha256, ratchet.current_key, entry.content_hash)
return false unless CRE::Crypto::Random.constant_time_equal?(expected, entry.hmac)
ratchet.sign(entry.content_hash) # advance counter; trigger rotation at threshold
end
true
end
# Verify all sealed Merkle batches against a public key. Each batch
# commits to a Merkle root over content_hashes from start_seq..end_seq;
# we re-derive the root from the live entries and check the signature.
def verify_batches(verifier : Signing::Ed25519Verifier) : Bool
batches = @persistence.audit.all_batches
return true if batches.empty?
batches.each do |batch|
entries = @persistence.audit.range(batch.start_seq, batch.end_seq)
return false if entries.size != (batch.end_seq - batch.start_seq + 1)
leaves = entries.map(&.content_hash)
recomputed_root = Merkle.root(leaves)
return false unless CRE::Crypto::Random.constant_time_equal?(recomputed_root, batch.merkle_root)
msg = BatchSealer.pack_message(batch.start_seq, batch.end_seq, batch.merkle_root)
return false unless verifier.verify(msg, batch.signature)
end
true
end
def ratchet_version : Int32
@ratchet.version
end
private def canonical_json(event_type, actor, target_id, payload) : String
{
event_type: event_type,
actor: actor,
target_id: target_id.try(&.to_s),
payload: payload,
}.to_json
end
end
end

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# ===================
# ©AngelaMos | 2026
# batch_sealer.cr
# ===================
require "uuid"
require "./merkle"
require "./signing"
require "../persistence/persistence"
require "../persistence/repos"
module CRE::Audit
class BatchSealer
def initialize(
@persistence : Persistence::Persistence,
@signer : Signing::Ed25519Signer,
)
end
def seal_pending : Persistence::AuditBatch?
latest = @persistence.audit.latest_seq
last_end = @persistence.audit.last_sealed_seq
return nil if latest <= last_end
start_seq = last_end + 1
end_seq = latest
entries = @persistence.audit.range(start_seq, end_seq)
return nil if entries.empty?
leaves = entries.map(&.content_hash)
root = Merkle.root(leaves)
msg = pack_message(start_seq, end_seq, root)
sig = @signer.sign(msg)
batch = Persistence::AuditBatch.new(
id: UUID.random,
start_seq: start_seq,
end_seq: end_seq,
merkle_root: root,
signature: sig,
signing_key_version: @signer.version,
sealed_at: Time.utc,
)
@persistence.audit.insert_batch(batch)
batch
end
def self.pack_message(start_seq : Int64, end_seq : Int64, root : Bytes) : Bytes
io = IO::Memory.new
io.write_bytes(start_seq, IO::ByteFormat::BigEndian)
io.write_bytes(end_seq, IO::ByteFormat::BigEndian)
io.write(root)
io.to_slice
end
private def pack_message(start_seq : Int64, end_seq : Int64, root : Bytes) : Bytes
BatchSealer.pack_message(start_seq, end_seq, root)
end
end
end

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# ===================
# ©AngelaMos | 2026
# batch_sealer_scheduler.cr
# ===================
require "log"
require "./batch_sealer"
require "../engine/event_bus"
require "../events/credential_events"
require "../events/system_events"
module CRE::Audit
# BatchSealerScheduler runs an idle fiber that periodically calls
# BatchSealer.seal_pending. Without this fiber the audit_batches table
# never grows and 'cre audit verify --merkle' has nothing to verify.
#
# On each successful seal we publish AlertRaised(:info) with the sealed
# range; the AuditSubscriber then writes a 'audit.batch.sealed' event
# into the audit log itself, which closes the loop for compliance
# frameworks that key on that event_type.
class BatchSealerScheduler
Log = ::Log.for("cre.batch_sealer")
@running : Bool
def initialize(@bus : Engine::EventBus, @sealer : BatchSealer, @interval : Time::Span = 5.minutes)
@running = false
end
def start : Nil
@running = true
spawn(name: "batch-sealer") do
seal_once
while @running
sleep @interval
break unless @running
seal_once
end
end
end
def stop : Nil
@running = false
seal_once # final seal on shutdown
end
def seal_once : Nil
batch = @sealer.seal_pending
return if batch.nil?
@bus.publish Events::AuditBatchSealed.new(
start_seq: batch.start_seq,
end_seq: batch.end_seq,
signing_key_version: batch.signing_key_version,
)
rescue ex
Log.error(exception: ex) { "batch_sealer.seal_pending failed" }
@bus.publish(Events::AlertRaised.new(
severity: Events::Severity::Critical,
message: "audit batch sealing failed: #{ex.message}",
)) rescue nil
end
end
end

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# ===================
# ©AngelaMos | 2026
# hash_chain.cr
# ===================
require "openssl/digest"
require "../crypto/random"
module CRE::Audit
module HashChain
GENESIS_SIZE = 32
def self.genesis : Bytes
Bytes.new(GENESIS_SIZE, 0_u8)
end
def self.next_hash(prev_hash : Bytes, payload : Bytes) : Bytes
d = OpenSSL::Digest.new("SHA256")
d.update(prev_hash)
d.update(payload)
d.final
end
def self.verify(pairs : Array({Bytes, Bytes}), payloads : Array(Bytes)) : Bool
return false unless pairs.size == payloads.size
pairs.each_with_index do |entry, i|
prev, current = entry
expected = next_hash(prev, payloads[i])
return false unless CRE::Crypto::Random.constant_time_equal?(expected, current)
end
true
end
end
end

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# ===================
# ©AngelaMos | 2026
# hmac_ratchet.cr
# ===================
require "openssl/hmac"
require "openssl/digest"
module CRE::Audit
class HmacRatchet
getter version : Int32
@key : Bytes
@counter : Int32
def initialize(initial_key : Bytes, @version : Int32, @ratchet_every : Int32)
raise ArgumentError.new("key must be 32 bytes") unless initial_key.size == 32
@key = initial_key.dup
@counter = 0
end
def sign(payload : Bytes) : Bytes
maybe_rotate
h = OpenSSL::HMAC.digest(:sha256, @key, payload)
@counter += 1
h
end
def self.verify(payload : Bytes, expected : Bytes, key : Bytes) : Bool
h = OpenSSL::HMAC.digest(:sha256, key, payload)
CRE::Crypto::Random.constant_time_equal?(h, expected)
end
def current_key : Bytes
@key.dup
end
private def maybe_rotate : Nil
return unless @counter >= @ratchet_every
d = OpenSSL::Digest.new("SHA256")
d.update(@key)
d.update("ratchet-v#{@version + 1}".to_slice)
new_key = d.final
@key.size.times { |i| @key[i] = 0_u8 }
@key = new_key
@version += 1
@counter = 0
end
end
end

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# ===================
# ©AngelaMos | 2026
# merkle.cr
# ===================
require "openssl/digest"
module CRE::Audit
module Merkle
def self.root(leaves : Array(Bytes)) : Bytes
raise ArgumentError.new("empty merkle tree") if leaves.empty?
level = leaves.dup
while level.size > 1
next_level = [] of Bytes
i = 0
while i < level.size
if i + 1 < level.size
next_level << combine(level[i], level[i + 1])
else
next_level << level[i]
end
i += 2
end
level = next_level
end
level[0]
end
private def self.combine(a : Bytes, b : Bytes) : Bytes
d = OpenSSL::Digest.new("SHA256")
d.update(a)
d.update(b)
d.final
end
end
end

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