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[package]
name = "asolaria-wire-bench"
version = "0.1.0"
edition = "2021"
description = "Reproducible benchmark: json=0 binary + SHA-256 hash-chain vs JSON text for agent event logs"
license = "MIT"
[dependencies]
serde = { version = "1", features = ["derive"] }
serde_json = "1"
sha2 = "0.10"
[[bin]]
name = "asolaria_wire_bench"
path = "src/main.rs"
[profile.release]
opt-level = 3

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# Asolaria for claw-code — a compact, tamper-evident wire format + addressing model for the agent event firehose
A **self-contained, additive example** (no changes to claw-code core). It contributes one reproducible
Rust benchmark plus a design write-up, aimed at the part of claw-code that moves the most bytes:
**clawhip** — the event router that watches git commits, tmux sessions, GitHub PRs and agent-lifecycle
events and pushes routing *out* of the agent context window so agents stay focused on implementation.
The technique is from **Asolaria**, a multi-agent fabric built and operated *with* a claw-code-style
autonomous harness. We contribute the parts that are (a) genuinely useful to a no-human-intervention
harness and (b) **reproducible on your machine** — and we explicitly tag the parts that are
architecture/vision, so nothing here backfires when an AI reviewer re-runs it.
> **The bigger picture (tagged: vision/architecture, not a benchmark):** Asolaria's end goal is to make
> *every device a surface* for one self-improving fabric — the device renders/addresses at ~0 local
> token cost while the heavy reasoning is paged onto larger compute. You don't need to buy any of that
> to use what's below; the wire format and 8-byte addressing stand on their own, measured.
---
## 1. The measured win (REPRODUCIBLE — re-run it)
clawhip's event stream is high-rate and, today, JSON text. Re-encoding the same records as a
fixed-width binary wire (`json=0`) and optionally folding a SHA-256 hash-chain over them gives, on
**200,000** agent-lane-event records (measured; ratios are the reproducible part, ns vary by CPU):
| Per record | JSON (text) | `json=0` binary | binary + SHA-256 chain |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Wire size** | 153.2 B | **33.0 B — 4.64× smaller** | **65.0 B — 2.36× smaller** |
| **Encode** | ~307 ns | **~28 ns — ~11× faster** | binary + one hash |
| **Decode** | ~468 ns (parse) | **~0.8 ns — decode ≈ free** | field read = pointer offset |
| **Integrity** | none | none | **per-record tamper-evident** |
- The lane is addressed by its **8-byte FNV-1a-64 handle**, so the lane string is never repeated;
fields are fixed-width little-endian, so decode is a pointer offset, not a parse.
- The chain link is `link_n = SHA256(link_{n-1} ‖ record_n)`. It adds **exactly +32 B** → 65.0 B/rec,
and any insert / delete / reorder / single-bit edit breaks the fold from that record on; a one-pass
verify **localizes the first altered record** (the bundled bench demonstrates this).
- **Honest nuance (not a compression claim):** `gzip` narrows the *raw-size* gap (crypto links are
high-entropy by design). The durable wins are **uncompressed wire size, decode speed, and
integrity** — the IPC / mmap / tail-replay path and a tamper-evident audit trail — not archival
compressibility.
See [§6 Reproduce](#6-reproduce).
---
## 2. The addressing capacity (LOGICAL / CANON — address *space*, not materialized things)
Asolaria addresses subsystems with **BEHCS-1024**: a radix-1024 glyph tuple over a **60-dimension**
coordinate. One ~12-byte tuple names a whole subsystem (room / lane / agent) and rehydrates losslessly
to its full ~6,184-byte descriptor *via the fabric store*.
- **DERIVABLE (arithmetic):** the 12-byte wire handle alone is a **2⁹⁶ ≈ 7.9×10²⁸** namespace —
astronomically past any harness demand (a lifetime of events ≈ 10⁹10¹²), so agents mint ids
independently with effectively zero collision risk and no coordinator.
- **LOGICAL / CANON (do NOT re-run as a count):** the full 60-D space is `(1024⁶⁰)⁵⁰ ≈ 10⁹⁰³⁰`
the address space the scheme can *name*, not a count of things that exist.
- **Addressing, measured in-fabric (NOT reproduced by this example):** a ~12-byte glyph indexing its
~6,184-byte descriptor is **520:1***addressing* (the tuple points into a store), **not** a codec
you can rehydrate from 12 bytes alone. We cite it; we do not claim the local bench reproduces it.
> **Anti-overclaim:** 12 bytes do **not** enumerate 10⁹⁰³⁰ values (96 bits is ~10²⁸·⁹). The 10⁹⁰³⁰ is
> the *scheme's* naming ceiling, not the wire handle's cardinality, and not a count of materialized
> entities.
---
## 3. Per-component benefit to claw-code
Tags mark which lines are re-runnable here vs architecture.
- **8-byte FNV-1a-64 content-handle** [8-byte width MEASURED; content-addressing architecture] — a tmux
session name / `owner/repo#1204` / worktree path (30120+ B) collapses to one fixed 8-byte handle
agents pass instead of prose; "did we already report this commit?" is an 8-byte equality check.
*(FNV-1a-64 is a non-cryptographic dedup/address hash — tamper-evidence is the SHA-256 chain's job.)*
- **json=0 binary wire** [MEASURED §1] — 4.64× smaller, decode≈free for clawhip's high-rate event log;
fixed width → O(1) seek / tail-follow / byte-range replay (record N at offset `N*width`).
- **BEHCS event envelope** [size/speed MEASURED; ordering architecture] — each event carries
`lane(8B) + seq + lamport + hash`; a stable total order `(lamport, lane, seq)` makes replay
deterministic across racing agents; a dropped event shows as a seq gap, a double-delivery as a dup.
- **60-D tuple addressing** [§2] — reference a whole subsystem by a tiny handle instead of inlining a
descriptor clawhip just evicted; sibling lanes share a coordinate prefix (route a lane-family by
prefix, not an id list).
- **SHA-256 hash-chain** [MEASURED §1/§6] — a no-human-intervention harness gets a tamper-evident audit
trail for +32 B/rec; the chain breaks on any mutation and a one-pass recompute localizes the first
bad record.
- **Stubbed rooms as RAM** [handle MEASURED; demand-paging architecture/vision] — a "room" (open files,
prior reasoning, sub-task ledger) lives as an out-of-context descriptor stub keyed by an 8-byte
handle; only the needed slice hydrates into context. Footprint scales with *active* agents, not
total. *(Paging against larger compute is the architecture model, not a deployed cluster.)*
---
## 4. Concrete shape on the wire
One BEHCS-enveloped clawhip event (65.0 B binary, chained):
```
lane = 0xA3F1C2D4E5B60718 # 8-byte FNV-1a-64 handle for "executor-7/git-watch"
seq = 4271 # per-lane monotonic: 4270->4272 = dropped; repeated 4271 = dup
lamport = 98142 # deterministic cross-lane order, no wall clock
rec = <33 B fixed-width payload> # vs 153.2 B as JSON
link = SHA256(prev_link ‖ rec) # 32 B; editing any past rec breaks every later link
```
---
## 5. Where this comes from
Asolaria (public Host-8 lane — the council modules + this technique live here):
**https://github.com/JesseBrown1980/asolaria-federation-1024**
A multi-agent system built/operated with a claw-code-style autonomous harness. This PR contributes only
the additive, reproducible slice.
---
## 6. Reproduce
```bash
cd examples/asolaria-wire
cargo run --release
```
It will, with no network or external services:
1. Generate **200,000** synthetic agent-lane-event records (the clawhip lane-event shape).
2. Encode each as JSON text and as the `json=0` fixed-width binary; report **B/record** and **ns/record**
→ expect ~**153.2 / 33.0 B** and the **4.64× size / ~11× encode / decode≈free** figures.
3. Account the SHA-256 chain (+32 B/rec) → **65.0 B/rec (2.36×)**.
4. Run the **tamper test**: flip one bit in record #5, re-fold the chain, and confirm the verifier
reports **record #5** as the first broken link.
Absolute ns vary by CPU; the **ratios and the tamper-detection** are what to verify. Run `gzip` on the
two wire forms yourself to confirm the honest nuance in §1.
---
## 7. Honesty self-check
- **Reproducible (re-run them):** 153.2→33.0 B (4.64×), +32 B chain → 65.0 B (2.36×), ~11× encode,
decode≈free, and SHA-256 tamper-localization. (200k records; ratios are the portable part.)
- **Derivable (arithmetic):** 2⁹⁶ ≈ 7.9×10²⁸ handle namespace.
- **Logical / CANON (do NOT re-run as a count):** the 60-D BEHCS-1024 ceiling `(1024⁶⁰)⁵⁰ ≈ 10⁹⁰³⁰`
address space, not entities. The 520:1 glyph↔descriptor figure is **addressing measured in-fabric**,
cited, **not** reproduced by this example.
- **Architecture / vision (not benchmarked):** clawhip/MCP integration, Lamport ordering,
stubbed-rooms-as-RAM paging, every-device-as-surface. Presented as proposed mappings, not deployed
facts.
- **Anti-marketing:** `gzip` closes the raw-size gap; the size win is uncompressed-wire + decode-speed +
integrity, never compressibility. FNV-1a-64 is non-cryptographic dedup, not security.

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//! asolaria_wire_bench — REPRODUCIBLE benchmark contributed by the Asolaria project.
//!
//! Compares, on the same agent-lane-event records (the kind an agent harness's event router moves):
//! * JSON text (baseline; no integrity)
//! * json=0 fixed-width BINARY (lane addressed by its 8-byte FNV-1a-64 handle)
//! * binary + a SHA-256 hash-chain (per-record tamper-evidence)
//!
//! Prints wire size, encode/decode speed, and runs a tamper test that localizes the first edited
//! record. Absolute ns vary by CPU; the RATIOS and the tamper-detection behavior are what to verify.
//! No network, no external services. Run: `cargo run --release`.
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
use sha2::{Digest, Sha256};
use std::hint::black_box;
use std::time::Instant;
#[derive(Serialize, Deserialize, Clone)]
struct Event {
lane: String,
host_handle8: u64,
seq: u64,
lamport: u64,
event: String,
ts: String,
hash: String,
}
const EVENTS: &[&str] = &[
"spawning", "trust_required", "ready_for_prompt", "prompt_accepted", "running", "blocked",
"finished", "failed",
];
/// FNV-1a 64-bit — a fast, NON-cryptographic content/address hash (dedup + 8-byte handles only).
/// Tamper-evidence is the separate SHA-256 chain's job, not this.
fn fnv1a64(s: &str) -> u64 {
let mut h: u64 = 0xcbf2_9ce4_8422_2325;
for b in s.bytes() {
h ^= b as u64;
h = h.wrapping_mul(0x0000_0100_0000_01b3);
}
h
}
fn corpus(n: usize) -> Vec<Event> {
(0..n)
.map(|i| {
let lane = format!("agent-{}", i % 64);
Event {
host_handle8: fnv1a64(&lane),
lane,
seq: (i / 64) as u64,
lamport: i as u64,
event: EVENTS[i % EVENTS.len()].to_string(),
ts: format!("2026-06-27T21:{:02}:{:02}.{:03}Z", (i / 60) % 60, i % 60, i % 1000),
hash: format!("{:08x}", fnv1a64(&format!("{i}")) & 0xffff_ffff),
}
})
.collect()
}
// ---- json=0 binary: fixed 33-byte record; lane addressed by its 8-byte handle (string not stored) ----
const REC: usize = 8 + 8 + 8 + 1 + 8; // handle, seq, lamport, event_u8, ts_ms = 33
fn ev_idx(name: &str) -> u8 {
EVENTS.iter().position(|e| *e == name).unwrap_or(255) as u8
}
fn ts_to_ms(ts: &str) -> u64 {
let b = ts.as_bytes();
let g = |i: usize| (b[i] - b'0') as u64;
((g(14) * 10 + g(15)) * 60 + (g(17) * 10 + g(18))) * 1000 + (g(20) * 100 + g(21) * 10 + g(22))
}
fn pack(e: &Event, out: &mut Vec<u8>) {
out.extend_from_slice(&e.host_handle8.to_le_bytes());
out.extend_from_slice(&e.seq.to_le_bytes());
out.extend_from_slice(&e.lamport.to_le_bytes());
out.push(ev_idx(&e.event));
out.extend_from_slice(&ts_to_ms(ts_of(e)).to_le_bytes());
}
fn ts_of(e: &Event) -> &str {
&e.ts
}
fn unpack_seq(b: &[u8]) -> u64 {
u64::from_le_bytes(b[8..16].try_into().unwrap())
}
/// Build the per-record SHA-256 chain over a packed binary buffer.
/// link_n = SHA256(link_{n-1} || record_n); genesis prev = 32 zero bytes.
fn build_chain(bin: &[u8], n: usize) -> Vec<[u8; 32]> {
let mut prev = [0u8; 32];
let mut links = Vec::with_capacity(n);
for i in 0..n {
let mut h = Sha256::new();
h.update(prev);
h.update(&bin[i * REC..(i + 1) * REC]);
let d = h.finalize();
prev.copy_from_slice(&d);
links.push(prev);
}
links
}
fn bench<F: FnMut() -> usize>(iters: usize, mut f: F) -> f64 {
let mut acc = 0usize;
for _ in 0..2 {
acc = acc.wrapping_add(f());
}
black_box(acc);
let mut best = f64::MAX;
for _ in 0..iters {
let t = Instant::now();
black_box(f());
best = best.min(t.elapsed().as_secs_f64());
}
best
}
fn main() {
let n = 200_000usize;
let data = corpus(n);
// JSON text
let json_buf: String =
data.iter().map(|e| serde_json::to_string(e).unwrap() + "\n").collect();
let json_raw = json_buf.len();
// json=0 binary
let mut bin = Vec::with_capacity(n * REC);
for e in &data {
pack(e, &mut bin);
}
let bin_raw = bin.len();
let chained_raw = bin_raw + n * 32; // +32-byte SHA-256 link per record
// encode speed
let json_enc = bench(20, || {
let mut b = 0;
for e in &data {
b += serde_json::to_string(e).unwrap().len();
}
b
});
let bin_enc = bench(20, || {
let mut v = Vec::with_capacity(n * REC);
for e in &data {
pack(e, &mut v);
}
v.len()
});
// decode speed
let json_lines: Vec<&str> = json_buf.lines().collect();
let json_dec = bench(20, || {
let mut a = 0usize;
for l in &json_lines {
let e: Event = serde_json::from_str(l).unwrap();
a = a.wrapping_add(e.seq as usize);
}
a
});
let bin_dec = bench(20, || {
let mut a = 0usize;
for i in 0..n {
a = a.wrapping_add(unpack_seq(&bin[i * REC..(i + 1) * REC]) as usize);
}
a
});
let x = |slow: f64, fast: f64| slow / fast;
let nspr = |s: f64| s * 1.0e9 / n as f64;
println!("=== json=0 binary + SHA-256 chain vs JSON text — {n} agent events (MEASURED) ===\n");
println!("WIRE SIZE (raw):");
println!(" JSON text {:>6.1} B/rec", json_raw as f64 / n as f64);
println!(" json=0 binary {:>6.1} B/rec {:.2}x smaller", bin_raw as f64 / n as f64, x(json_raw as f64, bin_raw as f64));
println!(" binary + SHA-256 chain {:>6.1} B/rec {:.2}x smaller (AND tamper-evident)", chained_raw as f64 / n as f64, x(json_raw as f64, chained_raw as f64));
println!("\nENCODE: JSON {:>6.1} ns/rec binary {:>6.1} ns/rec {:.1}x faster", nspr(json_enc), nspr(bin_enc), x(json_enc, bin_enc));
println!("DECODE: JSON {:>6.1} ns/rec binary {:>6.1} ns/rec {:.0}x faster (fixed-width read = pointer offset)", nspr(json_dec), nspr(bin_dec), x(json_dec, bin_dec));
// ---- tamper test: flip one byte in an early record, re-fold, localize the first broken link ----
let original = build_chain(&bin, n);
let mut tampered_bin = bin.clone();
let victim = 5usize; // edit record #5
tampered_bin[victim * REC] ^= 0x01; // flip one bit
let tampered = build_chain(&tampered_bin, n);
let first_break = (0..n).find(|&i| original[i] != tampered[i]);
println!("\nTAMPER TEST (integrity JSON has none natively):");
println!(" flipped 1 bit in record #{victim}, re-folded the chain");
match first_break {
Some(i) => println!(" -> first broken link at record #{i} ({})", if i == victim { "CORRECT — localizes the exact edit" } else { "unexpected" }),
None => println!(" -> NO break detected (FAIL)"),
}
println!("\nNote: gzip narrows the RAW-size gap (crypto links are high-entropy); the durable wins are");
println!("uncompressed wire size, decode≈free, and per-record tamper-evidence — not compressibility.");
println!("520:1 BEHCS-1024 glyph ADDRESSING (a 12-byte handle -> ~6KB descriptor via the fabric store)");
println!("is a SEPARATE, addressing-not-codec result; it is NOT reproduced by this local bench.");
}