Merge 0d6d83970f into c43c850cae

cso/SKILL.md

@@ -1037,6 +1037,20 @@ If approved, run the same Grep patterns on globally installed skill files and ch
 
 **FP rules:** gstack's own skills are trusted (check if skill path resolves to a known repo). Skills that use `curl` for legitimate purposes (downloading tools, health checks) need context — only flag when the target URL is suspicious or when the command includes credential variables.
 
+**Tier 3 — known-campaign IOCs (comprehensive mode only):** All rules in this tier surface only under `/cso --comprehensive` with TENTATIVE marking — daily mode's 8/10 zero-noise contract is unaffected.
+
+**R1** — Any Claude Code settings file (`.claude/settings.json`, `.claude/settings.local.json`, `~/.claude/settings.json`, or `~/.claude/settings.local.json`) `hooks.*.command` field containing a `/proc/.*/mem` read pattern. Direct process-memory introspection from a Claude Code hook has no legitimate use; it is a known credential-exfiltration technique against runner processes.
+
+**R2** — `.claude/**/*.{js,mjs,ts,cjs}` or `.vscode/**/*.{js,mjs,ts,cjs}` containing **both** the `_0x[0-9a-f]{4,}` variable pattern (≥3 distinct occurrences) **and** at least one of `createDecipheriv`, `gunzip`, `gunzipSync`, `inflateRawSync`, `inflateSync`. Do not alert on ordinary minified bundles or inline sourcemap output unless both halves match.
+
+**R3** — File under `.claude/**` or `.vscode/**` where **all three** hold: (a) referenced from any Claude Code settings file (`.claude/settings.json`, `.claude/settings.local.json`, `~/.claude/settings.json`, or `~/.claude/settings.local.json`) `hooks.*.command` via `node|bun|python3?|bash|sh <path>`, `node --require <path>`, `node -e <inline-require>`, or direct path invocation, **OR** from a `tasks.json` task with `runOptions.runOn: "folderOpen"`; (b) not present in package manifest evidence (`package.json` `files` array, npm tarball, or installed locked-package artifacts); (c) not exempt by the Tier 3 FP guards below. Auto-run persistence bridge in TTP form — renaming the payload file does not evade.
+
+**R4** — Strings `filev2.getsession.org`, `seed1.getsession.org`, `seed2.getsession.org`, or `seed3.getsession.org` appearing inside an executable context: a `hooks.*.command` value, a `tasks.json` `command`/`args` field, or a `fetch`/`http.get`/`axios`/`socket.connect`/`curl`/`nc` call inside a `.{js,mjs,ts,cjs,sh,py}` file under `.claude/**`/`.vscode/**`. Documentation or IOC-note mentions do not fire.
+
+**Tier 3 FP guards:**
+- gstack-installed paths trusted: `~/.claude/skills/gstack/`, `~/.claude/skills/gstack-*/`, `~/.claude/hooks/` when content matches distributed checksums (extends the existing "gstack's own skills are trusted" precedent above).
+- R3 excluded under `.vscode/extensions/` and inside any directory listed in the root `package.json` `workspaces` field.
+
 ### Phase 9: OWASP Top 10 Assessment
 
 For each OWASP category, perform targeted analysis. Use the Grep tool for all searches — scope file extensions to detected stacks from Phase 0.

cso/SKILL.md.tmpl

@@ -309,6 +309,20 @@ If approved, run the same Grep patterns on globally installed skill files and ch
 
 **FP rules:** gstack's own skills are trusted (check if skill path resolves to a known repo). Skills that use `curl` for legitimate purposes (downloading tools, health checks) need context — only flag when the target URL is suspicious or when the command includes credential variables.
 
+**Tier 3 — known-campaign IOCs (comprehensive mode only):** All rules in this tier surface only under `/cso --comprehensive` with TENTATIVE marking — daily mode's 8/10 zero-noise contract is unaffected.
+
+**R1** — Any Claude Code settings file (`.claude/settings.json`, `.claude/settings.local.json`, `~/.claude/settings.json`, or `~/.claude/settings.local.json`) `hooks.*.command` field containing a `/proc/.*/mem` read pattern. Direct process-memory introspection from a Claude Code hook has no legitimate use; it is a known credential-exfiltration technique against runner processes.
+
+**R2** — `.claude/**/*.{js,mjs,ts,cjs}` or `.vscode/**/*.{js,mjs,ts,cjs}` containing **both** the `_0x[0-9a-f]{4,}` variable pattern (≥3 distinct occurrences) **and** at least one of `createDecipheriv`, `gunzip`, `gunzipSync`, `inflateRawSync`, `inflateSync`. Do not alert on ordinary minified bundles or inline sourcemap output unless both halves match.
+
+**R3** — File under `.claude/**` or `.vscode/**` where **all three** hold: (a) referenced from any Claude Code settings file (`.claude/settings.json`, `.claude/settings.local.json`, `~/.claude/settings.json`, or `~/.claude/settings.local.json`) `hooks.*.command` via `node|bun|python3?|bash|sh <path>`, `node --require <path>`, `node -e <inline-require>`, or direct path invocation, **OR** from a `tasks.json` task with `runOptions.runOn: "folderOpen"`; (b) not present in package manifest evidence (`package.json` `files` array, npm tarball, or installed locked-package artifacts); (c) not exempt by the Tier 3 FP guards below. Auto-run persistence bridge in TTP form — renaming the payload file does not evade.
+
+**R4** — Strings `filev2.getsession.org`, `seed1.getsession.org`, `seed2.getsession.org`, or `seed3.getsession.org` appearing inside an executable context: a `hooks.*.command` value, a `tasks.json` `command`/`args` field, or a `fetch`/`http.get`/`axios`/`socket.connect`/`curl`/`nc` call inside a `.{js,mjs,ts,cjs,sh,py}` file under `.claude/**`/`.vscode/**`. Documentation or IOC-note mentions do not fire.
+
+**Tier 3 FP guards:**
+- gstack-installed paths trusted: `~/.claude/skills/gstack/`, `~/.claude/skills/gstack-*/`, `~/.claude/hooks/` when content matches distributed checksums (extends the existing "gstack's own skills are trusted" precedent above).
+- R3 excluded under `.vscode/extensions/` and inside any directory listed in the root `package.json` `workspaces` field.
+
 ### Phase 9: OWASP Top 10 Assessment
 
 For each OWASP category, perform targeted analysis. Use the Grep tool for all searches — scope file extensions to detected stacks from Phase 0.