5 Commits

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
Garry Tan	008dd65b1f	v1.64.0.0 fix wave: full tracker audit — 90 fixes, 52 issues closed, ~50 community PRs absorbed (#2571) ... * fix(hooks): nest freeze/careful permissionDecision under hookSpecificOutput Claude Code ignores a top-level permissionDecision, so the /freeze deny and /careful ask guards silently allowed everything. Nest both under hookSpecificOutput with permissionDecisionReason, update the shape-blind tests to pin the nested form, and document the constraint in both skill templates (regen included). Closes half of #1459 (freeze enforcement chain). Contributed by @jawadakram20 (PR #2331; team-init hunk deferred to the dedicated team-init fix). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(team-init): required-mode hook blocks with nested schema + exit 2 The generated check-gstack.sh emitted a flat permissionDecision payload and exited 0, which Claude Code ignores — required mode enforced nothing. The generated hook now nests the deny under hookSpecificOutput and exits 2 so the block holds even if the JSON schema drifts again. Adds a temp-repo regression test that runs the generated hook under both installed and missing-gstack homes. Fixes #2413, #2296. Contributed by @Masashi-Ono0611 (PR #2423). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(careful): close three check-careful bypasses via real JSON extraction The grep-based command extractor stopped at the first escaped quote, so any quoted argument truncated the command before the pattern checks ran — `git commit -m "wip" && rm -rf /` was silently allowed. Replace it with a python3/node JSON parse that fails CLOSED on unreadable payloads, add an IFS/base64-to-shell obfuscation tripwire, and stop multi-line commands from riding the single-line safe-exception whitelist (line-based grep would have approved `rm -rf /` when a later line matched node_modules — a hazard the real newline decoding exposed). Contributed by @wtamminga (PR #2426; the -R hunk was dropped — it landed in v1.61.0.0 — and output shapes updated to the nested hookSpecificOutput form). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(review,autoplan): require explicit run_in_background: false on specialist agents Claude Code v2.1.198 made subagents run in the background by default, which inverted the old "do not use the flag" guidance: review-army specialists and autoplan dual voices silently launched in the background and the merge step could proceed before they completed — regressing the #497 fix. The generated guidance now instructs an explicit run_in_background: false, and a static tripwire fails the free suite if the inert inverted phrasing ever returns to any generated SKILL.md. Fixes #2440. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(investigate): anchor the scope-lock freeze hook on $HOME, not CLAUDE_SKILL_DIR The investigate skill's PreToolUse hooks and Scope Lock probe resolved check-freeze.sh via ${CLAUDE_SKILL_DIR}, which does not exist when frontmatter hooks run — the || exit 0 tail then failed open, so the debug scope boundary silently never engaged (#1871 follow-up). Anchor all four sites on $HOME/.claude/skills/gstack/ like careful/freeze, and add a static test asserting no frontmatter command: line in the guard-family skills ever references CLAUDE_SKILL_DIR again. Fixes #2469; closes the last live half of #1459 together with the freeze/careful hookSpecificOutput fix. The broader portable-install-root rewrite stays #1882 (its own focused PR per the TODOS.md decision). Reported with a fix by @maxpetrusenkoagent (PR #1873; absorbed narrowly — the cwd-walk rewrite belongs to #1882). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(redact): scan large diffs in line-aligned slices; stop digit-UUIDs matching as cards/phones The prepush guard blocked any push whose added lines exceeded the engine's 1 MiB cap with engine.input_too_large — a size error naming no credential — which trains people onto GSTACK_REDACT_PREPUSH=skip. Scan in 768 KiB line-aligned slices instead (no pattern is multi-line, so a boundary cannot bisect a secret); a single oversized line still goes to the engine intact and fails closed. Also suppress card/phone matches whose span sits ENTIRELY inside a UUID — digit-only UUID fixtures were 14 of 21 MEDIUM findings on an ordinary branch, the noise level that stops people reading MEDIUM at all. Fixes #2304. Contributed by @luckywenapere (PR #2543). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(redact): block Google OAuth client secrets and Telegram bot tokens at HIGH GOCSPX-prefixed client secrets and <bot_id>:<35-char> Telegram tokens are never-publishable credential shapes with unambiguous formats — both now block at HIGH like the other live-format credentials. Contributed by @francis-eye (PR #2357). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(redact-prepush): resolve the real push base instead of EMPTY_TREE whole-repo scans When the remote default branch is not main/master (or origin/HEAD is unset), the merge-base guess failed and the hook fell back to scanning the ENTIRE repository as added lines — re-attributing long-pushed secrets to the current push and, on any real repo, tripping the engine byte cap so the push blocked having scanned nothing. Derive the base from commits reachable from no remote-tracking branch, keep the empty-tree path only for genuinely fresh repos, and split the block message so an unscannable diff is reported as "could not scan (fail closed)" rather than "credential found — rotate it". Contributed by @stormeoio (PR #2398). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(redact-prepush): preserve the trailing newline handed to chained pre-push.local The chaining wrapper captured stdin with $(cat), which strips the trailing newline — a chained shell hook built on `while read` then never entered its loop for the final (usually only) ref line and exited 0, failing OPEN. Use the printf-x sentinel so the byte-exact input reaches the chained hook, with tests covering both the pass-through and the short-circuit paths. Contributed by @francis-eye (PR #2358). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(redact-prepush): close the ext-diff, header-lookalike, and ref-parse bypasses Three ways the pushed diff escaped scanning: (1) a user-level diff.external or textconv driver replaced the diff with its own output — zero '+' lines, so the scan saw nothing (now --no-ext-diff --no-textconv); (2) an added content line whose text begins with "++" renders as "+++…" and the blanket header skip dropped it (now hunk-aware header detection); (3) a pre-push ref line that failed to parse was silently skipped, leaving that ref unscanned (now fails closed with the offending line named). Minimal reimplementation of the two confirmed bypasses from PR #2498 by @lubosxyz (the full PR overlaps the chunked-scan work absorbed separately), plus the unparseable-ref hardening. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(pair-agent): keep the ngrok authtoken out of the transcript and shell argv The not-authed flow told the user to paste their ngrok authtoken into the chat so the agent could run `ngrok config add-authtoken` — putting a live credential in the transcript, tool-call argv, and anything the transcript syncs to. The user now runs the auth command in their own terminal; the agent only verifies via `ngrok config check`, and a pasted token triggers a rotate-and-reauth instruction. A static test pins that no agent-run bash fence ever contains add-authtoken again. Fixes #2335. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(update-check): crash emits CHECK_FAILED instead of reading as up-to-date gstack-update-check signals "up to date" with SILENCE, and it runs under set -e — so any unguarded mid-script failure exited quietly and was indistinguishable from a current install. Observed live as a 45-release silent-staleness incident. An ERR trap (with -E so it propagates into functions) now emits a CHECK_FAILED sentinel naming the line and status, and exits 0 so caller `|| true` guards can't eat it. Behavioral tests cover both the crash and the healthy-silent paths; egress-receipt wiring is untouched and still pinned by test/egress-receipt-wiring.test.ts. Fixes #1974. (#2378's HEAD-SHA staleness half was already fixed on main by the ls-remote + SHA-pinned VERSION resolution — close as already-fixed.) Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(deps): bump diff 7.0.0 → 9.0.0 (GHSA-73rr-hh4g-fpgx parsePatch DoS) The advisory affects diff 6.x–8.0.2. The only API this repo uses is Diff.diffLines (browse/src/snapshot.ts:571, browse/src/meta-commands.ts:728), which is unchanged across the major hop; snapshot tests pass against 9.0.0. Closes #1588. Contributed by @genisis0x (PR #1599; VERSION collateral stripped, lockfile regenerated fresh). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * ci(evals): skip eval jobs deterministically on fork PRs Fork PRs never receive repository secrets, so every API-calling eval failed at SDK auth — but only when Docker-cache luck let the jobs start at all, making fork PRs randomly red or grey. Skip the eval and report jobs explicitly for fork-origin PRs, keep the image BUILD (validates Dockerfile.ci changes) without the push a fork token can't perform, and leave full coverage for same-repo PRs, pushes, and dispatches. Contributed by @andrey-esipov (PR #2345). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(extension): deny token/port reads to content-script and foreign senders background.js answered getPort — port, connected state, AND the browse server auth token — to any sender that passed the type allowlist, including content scripts running in web-page context and, behind only the sender.id check, anything without extension-page provenance. The getToken sender.tab restriction covered getToken alone, and only after getPort had already handed out the token. Single decision point now: extension/sender-auth.js classifies each message type; the eight privileged types (getPort, setPort, getServerUrl, getToken, fetchRefs, command, sidebar-command, getTabState) require an own-extension-page sender (chrome-extension://<own id>/ URL, no sender.tab, own sender.id). Denied senders get { error: 'unauthorized' } and nothing else — never the token, never the port. Content-script flows (elementPicked, pickerCancelled, inspectResult, openSidePanel) are untouched, and the sidepanel/popup keep the getPort token field their connect path reads. The policy mirrors the v1.63 server-side model: AUTH_TOKEN is released only to the pinned extension Origin via POST /extension-token, so the extension must not re-leak it to contexts the server would never have trusted. browse/test/extension-sender-auth.test.ts drives the real background.js onMessage listener under a chrome stub with four sender shapes (own extension page, own content script, foreign extension id, missing sender.url) and pins that denied responses carry no token/port fields, that a denied setPort never persists, that a denied command never reaches the network, and that the inspector + tab-state flows keep working. The helper is loaded via importScripts in the classic service worker and require()-able from bun tests. Contributed by @punksterlabs (PR #1822; reimplemented against the v1.63 POST /extension-token pinned-origin model). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * test(update-check): fixture links gstack-egress-lib.sh — all 38 tests failed on main v1.63.0.0 made bin/gstack-update-check source bin/gstack-egress-lib.sh unconditionally, but the test fixture's GSTACK_DIR only linked gstack-config — every test died at the source line (0/38 pass on pristine main, verified). The suite-truncation bug hid it: the runner was killed by an earlier file's delayed process.exit before this file ran. Link the lib like the real install layout the script assumes. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(browse): capture active-tab state before close() — last-tab auto-create raced the close event closeTab checked `tabId === this.activeTabId` AFTER awaiting page.close(), but the page 'close' event handler can fire during that await and reassign activeTabId — losing the race meant the last-tab auto-create never ran, leaving the manager with zero tabs. Capture wasActive before closing, and only reassign activeTabId when it no longer points at a live tab. Part of the test-integrity repairs unmasked by the suite-truncation fix. Contributed by @time-attack (PR #2230, browser-manager hunk). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * test(browse): delete the orphaned sidebar chat-queue suite; align sidebar-ux/tabs with the PTY-only sidebar browse/test/sidebar-integration.test.ts tested the /sidebar-command queue path ripped in v1.14 (34 references to removed endpoints — 11 permanent failures masked by suite truncation). sidebar-ux.test.ts carried 73 failures pinning the same dead surface (pickSidebarModel, ANALYSIS_WORDS); the trim keeps its 108 live tests, including the background.js token/allowlist gates. sidebar-tabs gets the two matching expectation updates. Closes #2420, #1980. Contributed by @time-attack (PR #2230, sidebar hunks; the security-sidepanel-dom deletion was NOT taken — that suite pins the live sidepanel DOM surface and passes). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * test(browse): align dual-listener and terminal-agent static guards with the current source Two static-grep guards pinned superseded source shapes and failed once the suite actually ran them: the tunnel dispatch gate is args-aware since the --out disk-write ban (canDispatchOverTunnel takes command AND args), and lazy PTY spawn routes through the maybeSpawnPty helper since v1.44. The updated assertions pin the current, stricter shapes (open() never spawns; the helper is the only spawnClaude caller). Contributed by @time-attack (PR #2230, dual-listener + terminal-agent hunks). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(test): remove all 8 delayed process.exit teardown bombs — the tier-1 gate can finally fail bun test runs every file in ONE process, so a 500ms setTimeout(process.exit(0)) armed in afterAll fired mid-way through a LATER file and killed the entire suite with exit 0 and no summary — only ~16 of 434 files ran, and every downstream failure was invisible (observed live throughout this wave's enumeration). Changes, all guarded by fault injection: - Replace every delayed-exit teardown with a time-boxed close of the file's own browser (8 files across browse/ and design/); stub the daemon /shutdown timer instead of letting its unconditional process.exit tear the runner down. - test/no-suicide-exit.test.ts: static tripwire — no *.test.ts may schedule a delayed process.exit again. - test/exit-propagation.test.ts + fixtures: fault injection with REAL bun output proves the truncation shape (exit 0, no summary) and that scripts/test-free-shards.ts now detects it: a shard exiting 0 WITHOUT bun's final summary line is treated as FAILED (exit code alone is not evidence of completion). - handoff: the three headed-mode integration tests are darwin-skipped with a pointer to the known macOS headed-launch breakage (#2242/#2554); they keep running on Linux CI. Un-skip in the browse-daemon wave. - feedback-roundtrip: repair the handler call sites unmasked by the fix — handlers take (command, args, session, bm); passing the manager where a session belongs broke all six tests. - user-slug-fallback: HOME isolation makes endpoint_hash deterministic. Fixes #2421, #2435. Contributed by @sneakygriff (PR #2172) with repairs from @time-attack (PR #2230 feedback-roundtrip hunks); supersedes PR #2252 by @whd4 (same defect, credited). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * test: include design/test/ in the free suite and the sharded runner design/test was absent from both the package.json test globs and TEST_ROOTS in scripts/test-free-shards.ts — its tests (including one of the teardown bombs removed in the previous commit) never ran in any CI or local free run, so design fixes could ship without their unit tests executing. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(make-pdf): reject directories when resolving the browse binary access(X_OK) is true for directories (they carry the execute/traverse bit on POSIX and pass the Windows existence check too), so cwd-dependent resolution could pick the ~/.claude/skills/browse alias DIRECTORY as the browse binary. Every browse call then exited 4 with empty stderr, which make-pdf surfaced as "Chromium failed to launch" against a perfectly healthy Chromium (#2156). Guard isExecutable with statSync().isFile() so only regular files qualify. Contributed by @jwilk-hrep (PR #2538). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(make-pdf): write browse-bound temp files under the safe-dirs allowlist os.tmpdir() on macOS resolves to /var/folders/..., which fails browse's safe-dirs validation ([/tmp, cwd]) since the v1.6.0.0 --from-file tightening. Default PDF output (generate with no -o), the preview HTML, tmpFile() scratch files, and setup's smoke-test fixture/output all wrote there, so browse rejected the paths it was asked to read or write. Export PAYLOAD_TMP_DIR from browseClient (the existing TEMP_DIR convention: os.tmpdir() on Windows, /tmp elsewhere) and route orchestrator.ts and setup.ts temp files through it. Contributed by @lvthewah (PR #2505; the browse-binary directory guard from that PR landed separately via PR #2538). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(make-pdf): stop URLs swallowing smartypants placeholders A bare autolinked URL (<a href="X">X</a>) has zero whitespace between the URL text and its own closing tag. TAG_RE carves that </a> into a NUL-delimited SMARTPANTS_PRESERVED placeholder BEFORE the URL pass runs, and URL_RE's \S+ swallowed the adjacent placeholder into the URL match. The restore pass is single-shot, so the inner placeholder never restored: raw "SMARTPANTS_PRESERVED_N" text leaked into the rendered link, the </a> vanished, and link-blue styling bled into the rest of the document (#2084). Excluding the NUL sentinel (\u0000) from the URL character class stops the match from crossing into an already-carved zone. Contributed by @marshaung (PR #2280; PR #2339 by @BrendaB24 covered the same smartypants defect). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(make-pdf): no blank first page when content precedes the first H1 Two paths put invisible content ahead of the first H1 and cost users a blank page 1 (#1904): - A visually-empty preamble (leading <style> block, HTML comment) became its own .chapter. That section took the `.chapter:first-of-type { break-before: auto }` exception, so the first real chapter inherited `break-before: page` and started on page 2. Non-rendering preambles now fold into the first real chapter (markup preserved, no page break); real text preambles keep their own chapter. - Leading YAML frontmatter rendered as a literal paragraph of body text on its own first page (marked has no frontmatter awareness). It is now stripped before parsing; a `---` thematic break elsewhere is untouched. Contributed by @jbetala7 (PR #1913). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(browse): allow about:blank so a restarted daemon can initialise The daemon opens its own first tab on about:blank, so blocking it in validateNavigationUrl meant a restarted daemon could never recreate the blank tab it starts from — and `browse newtab about:blank`, which `make-pdf setup` runs as its Chromium smoke test, failed and surfaced as "Chromium failed to launch" against a healthy browser. Allow about:blank ONLY, never the about: scheme: about:blank has no origin, loads nothing and runs nothing, while about:config and friends are real surfaces. Exact href match (lower-cased, since the URL parser normalises the protocol but not the opaque part), so about:blankfoo stays blocked. Contributed by @jwilk-hrep (PR #2537). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(design): drop gpt-image-2 tool model that 400s under the gpt-4o orchestrator The Responses API rejects pairing a gpt-4o orchestrator with an image_generation tool spec'd as model: "gpt-image-2" (400 invalid_request_error), which took every design image call offline — generate, variants, iterate (both threaded and fresh paths), evolve, and /design-shotgun (#1771). gpt-image-2 is only valid under a gpt-5 orchestrator; with gpt-4o the tool must omit the model field (defaults to gpt-image-1). Remove the model field at all five call sites and add a static-grep tripwire test (design/test/image-gen-pairing.test.ts) that fails CI if any design/src module reintroduces the gpt-4o + gpt-image-2 pairing. Re-enabling gpt-image-2 later requires bumping the orchestrator off gpt-4o in the same diff, which the tripwire permits. Contributed by @Pablosinyores (PR #1773). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(design): variants AbortError message reports the real 240s timeout generateVariant arms its abort at 240_000 ms but the AbortError branch returned "Timeout (120s)" — off by 2x, so a user staring at the failure could not tell whether to bump the timeout, retry, or drop the call. Report the actual configured bound, and pin it with a test that forces the abort path (fast-forwarding only the 240_000 ms timer) and asserts the surfaced string matches. Contributed by @vryahn (PR #1774). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(memory-ingest): stop silently ingesting 0 pages — include gitignored staging, reconcile counts Pages stage into ~/.gstack/.staging-ingest-*/ inside a repo whose .gitignore is `*`, and gbrain import honours .gitignore — so it collected 0 files, imported nothing, and the ingest still reported "written: N" from the STAGED count while advancing state, meaning no future run ever retried. Three layers now: (1) pass --include-gitignored (root cause); (2) if the installed gbrain predates the flag, retry without it (subcommand --help is generic, so the attempt is the only probe) with an upgrade pointer; (3) reconcile gbrain's imported+unchanged accounting against the staged count and REFUSE to advance state on a shortfall, naming the gitignore collision. Fixes #2144, #2104. Contributed by @gawievanblerk (PR #2560) and @Charles-Grant (PR #2486). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(autoplan): task aggregator returned zero tasks on every run — jq scope bug Inside ($commits | split("|") | ...) the "." context is the split ARRAY, so the filter's bare .commit raised "Cannot index array with string" on every record — and the 2>/dev/null swallowed it, so aggregation silently produced zero tasks no matter how many the reviews emitted. Bind .commit to $c before the pipe. Reproduced live before the fix; regenerated autoplan/SKILL.md. Fixes #2018. Contributed by @kkroo (PR #2416; regenerated against the current template). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(session-update): un-wedge auto-upgrade — autostash over local patches, log the pull's real reason On a normal install the tracked files ARE locally patched (skill-prefix name rewrites, gbrain-refresh blocks), so the bare `git pull --ff-only` refused on every run and auto-upgrade froze forever — observed as 308 consecutive PULL_FAILED entries with the reason discarded by 2>/dev/null. Pull now runs --autostash (local patches ride over the update and pop back), stderr is captured into the log so a genuine failure names its cause, an autostash pop conflict recovers to a clean tree and re-renders the patches (gstack-patch-names + gbrain-refresh, both idempotent), and a successful pull re-renders them as a self-heal. Behavioral tests cover the wedge shape and the reason logging. Fixes #2566. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * test: raise the free-suite per-test timeout to 30s bun's 5s default is fine for a file run solo, but the monolithic free suite shares one process across 100+ files whose browser instances contend for launch slots — Playwright tests that pass in isolation time out mid-suite. 30s matches the ceiling the enumeration runs used; the sharded runner (test:free) is unaffected. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(question-log): parse native AskUserQuestion answers — every native answer logged as __unknown__ Current Claude Code returns AskUserQuestion results as an OBJECT map keyed by question text ({answers: {question: label}}); the hook only handled the legacy array shapes, so 86% of live records carried user_choice __unknown__ — and the bin then scored every one as followed_recommendation false, silently poisoning plan-tune metrics. Adds the object-map extraction (exact + whitespace-normalized + single-question pairing, multiSelect joins, annotations as free_text), strips the (Recommended) suffix from BOTH sides of the comparison, skips the computation entirely on extraction failure, and logs unrecognized shapes to hook-errors.log instead of embedding them in the record. Fixes #2336, #2206. Based on the working patch in #2336 by @yijisoo; suffix comparison fix contributed by @chuchu2781 (PR #2400). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(slug): canonicalize slash branches to dash form — review history stops splitting Branch-name sanitization disagreed across gstack (four incompatible rules), so reviews for the same slash-named branch landed in multiple files and the ship dashboard missed entries. gstack-slug now canonicalizes / to - in one place, and ship's review lookup routes through it; goldens regenerated against the current templates. Fixes #1127, #2550. Contributed by @ShuratCode (PR #2465; duplicate fixes by @xrfael-dev and two others in PRs #1851/#1699/#1621, credited). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(slug): resolve the project root by marker walk-up — subdirectory sessions stop misfiling state gstack-slug derived everything from pwd, so a session in a subdirectory got the subdir's basename as its slug (or an outer monorepo's remote), misfiling reviews/decisions/learnings under a phantom project — and the per-pwd cache made the wrong answer permanent. The resolver now walks up from pwd: outermost STRONG marker wins (.git, package.json, pyproject.toml, Cargo.toml, Gemfile, go.mod, .project.yaml), weak content markers (README, LICENSE) catch non-code project folders, deploy artifacts are deliberately not markers, and GSTACK_PROJECT_SLUG remains the escape hatch. The cache self-heals on mismatch. Main-side invariants preserved on top: the unconditional [a-zA-Z0-9._-] re-sanitize before echo and slash→dash branch canonicalization. Fixes #1125. Contributed by @ajeenkya (PR #1702; rebased over the sanitize and branch-canonicalization work that landed after it). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(hooks): shared spawn-bin helper — all three AskUserQuestion hooks were inert on Windows The plan-tune hooks resolved bin scripts via new URL(import.meta.url).pathname (which doubles the drive letter on Windows: /C:/C:/...) and spawnSync'd extensionless bash scripts directly (unrunnable without a shell association) — so question logging, preferences, and the error fallback all silently no-op'd on Windows, and /plan-tune collected no data. A single spawn-bin.ts helper now owns bin resolution (fileURLToPath) and win32 bash routing for every hook, with static tripwires so a future hook can't reintroduce the raw pattern. This is the one Windows-spawn idiom for hook code. Fixes #2356. Contributed by @rafassousa (PR #2504; supersedes PR #2399 by @chuchu2781). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(model-overlays): add fable-5, opus-4-8, and sonnet-5 overlays + resolver mappings model-overlays/ had no entry for the current Claude generation, so every session on a Claude 5 family or Opus 4.8 model fell through to the generic claude.md nudges. Adds the three overlays with resolver mappings and per-overlay tests; generated output for the default host is unchanged (overlays activate by detected model). Closes #2509. Contributed by @chrisquorum (PRs #2246, #2243, #2247). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(windows): grant icacls ACEs by *SID, not unqualified username An unqualified username handed to icacls is ambiguous: on a machine whose hostname equals the username (a common Windows setup), it resolves to the MACHINE account instead of the user. Combined with /inheritance:r, that leaves ~/.gstack with a single ACE matching nobody — the process that just "secured" the directory locks itself out, and icacls still reports success. Both icacls sites in the repo (restrictFilePermissions and restrictDirectoryPermissions in browse/src/file-permissions.ts — the only icacls call sites; setup has none) now grant via icacls' literal-SID form `*<SID>`, resolved once per process from System32\whoami.exe (pinned to System32 because a bare `whoami` under a bash-flavoured PATH picks up the MSYS build, which rejects /user). Fallback when the SID can't be resolved is the domain-qualified `USERDOMAIN\username` name, which is unambiguous where the bare username was not. Windows-only regression tests assert the hardened directory stays usable by the calling process (readdir + write), which is exactly the check that a not-toThrow assertion sailed past before. Contributed by @asizux2 (PR #2479); the same defect was independently fixed by @Icandi40, @chiragborse1, @IntegriGit and @voltapix26. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(windows): forward windowsHide through the bun-polyfill spawn shims windowsHide is the one spawn option where Node's default is the opposite of Bun's: Node shows the child's console window, Bun.spawn hides it. The polyfill's spawn and spawnSync shims dropped the option entirely, so the Node fallback path (dist/bun-polyfill.cjs) silently inverted the behavior on the one platform the shim exists to serve — every watchdog respawn of the terminal agent popped a visible bun.exe console window. Three sites fixed: - Bun.spawnSync shim: forwards windowsHide with Bun-matching default true - Bun.spawn shim: same (stdio:'ignore' silences output but does NOT suppress the console window on Windows) - spawnTerminalAgent in terminal-agent-control.ts: explicit windowsHide: true, so the Node fallback path behaves like Bun-native An explicit windowsHide: false is honored at both shims. Three focused tests pin the default-true, default-true-sync, and explicit-false paths by intercepting child_process in a subprocess; the test file's require path now uses forward slashes so it survives interpolation into a JS string literal on Windows. Supersedes PRs #2523, #2294 and #2290, which each covered a subset of these sites. Contributed by @jerrynicholsai (PR #2539); earlier fixes by @jwilk-hrep, @rroojrooj and @WimvandenHeijkant covered subsets of the same sites. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(watchdog): signal-0 liveness, tick-scaled respawn guard, windowsHide Three-bug chain behind the Windows terminal-agent leak (console window strobing every 60s, one orphaned agent per watchdog tick until the box ran out of committable memory): 1. isProcessAlive shelled out to `tasklist /FI "PID eq <pid>"` on Windows with a 3s timeout. A Bun.spawnSync that hits its timeout still RETURNS with partial stdout, so the `.includes()` PID match read a LIVE agent as dead — killAgentByRecord skipped the kill, the watchdog respawned around the survivor, and every orphan slowed the next tasklist enough to produce the next false negative. Now: `process.kill(pid, 0)` on every platform (Node and Bun both map signal 0 to an OpenProcess existence check on Windows), with EPERM counted as alive. No subprocess, no timeout, no console window. 2. The respawn circuit-breaker was mathematically unreachable — verified in this tree: RESPAWN_GUARD_WINDOW_MS was a fixed 60_000 against a 60_000ms default tick, and each tick pushes at most one respawn timestamp, so three pushes span ~120s and can never coexist inside a 60s window (eviction is strict `>`, and setInterval drift plus per-tick work always ages the prior entry past the boundary). The guard could not fire at the default tick rate and a steady one-per-tick leak ran unbounded. The window now scales with the tick: max(60_000, tick * (RESPAWN_GUARD_MAX + 2)), so "3 crashes in quick succession → stop" holds at any tick value. 3. The tasklist probe popped a visible console per tick (no windowsHide). Removing the shell-out kills that site; the agent-spawn site itself already passes windowsHide: true (landed with the bun-polyfill windowsHide commit — PR #2414's terminal-agent-control.ts hunk is reconciled there rather than duplicated). New browse/test/process-liveness-windows.test.ts pins all three: no subprocess from the probe, a static tripwire against reintroducing `tasklist` + `PID eq` liveness checks in src/, the spawnTerminalAgent windowsHide + stdio contract, and the window-derived-from-tick arithmetic. terminal-agent-watchdog.test.ts test 4 now pins the window/tick relationship instead of the fixed literal that let this ship. Also converts `new URL(import.meta.url).pathname` to `import.meta.path` across the static-grep tests it touches — the pathname form yields /C:/... on Windows and breaks path.resolve. Contributed by @SYKhayyat (PR #2414). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(terminal-agent): tie agent lifetime to its owning browse server PID The terminal agent is intentionally detached so it survives the short-lived CLI launcher, but its real owner is the persistent browse server. If that server crashed or was killed before running normal shutdown, the agent was adopted by PID 1 and lived forever (#2019). spawnTerminalAgent now requires an ownerPid and exports it to the agent as BROWSE_OWNER_PID; all three spawn sites pass the server PID (cli.ts cold-start, cli.ts supervisor respawn, server.ts watchdog). The agent polls the owner with signal 0 every 15s (GSTACK_TERMINAL_OWNER_WATCHDOG_MS to tune) on an unref'd timer and, when the owner disappears, exits through the SAME cleanup path as an intentional SIGTERM shutdown — now re-entrancy-guarded and also removing the terminal-internal-token file alongside the port file and agent record. Runtime test spawns a real agent tied to a throwaway owner process, kills the owner, and asserts the agent exits and its discovery files (terminal-agent-pid, terminal-port) are gone. Reconciled with the watchdog commit's spawnTerminalAgent contract test (process-liveness-windows.test.ts now passes ownerPid and pins the BROWSE_OWNER_PID env forwarding). Closes #2019. Contributed by @csarigoz (PR #2530). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(windows): give the bun-polyfill spawn shim a real `exited` promise Bun.spawn exposes `proc.exited` as a Promise resolving to the exit code. The Node fallback shim (dist/bun-polyfill.cjs) returned no such field, so every `await proc.exited` on the Windows path resolved instantly to undefined — the Windows cookie picker (cookie-import-browser.ts races proc.exited at three sites) read stdout before the child produced it and silent-failed; browser-skill-commands and terminal-agent hit the same class. The shim now: - drains stdout/stderr eagerly into capped in-memory buffers (Node's Readables are pull-based; without draining, a child writing past the OS pipe buffer blocks in write() and 'exit' never fires), replaying them as fresh single-shot Web ReadableStreams so reads work before or after awaiting exit; - caps the buffer at 16 MB (GSTACK_SPAWN_MAX_BUFFER to override), still draining past the cap so a runaway child can't wedge or OOM; - resolves `exited` with Bun-matching codes (exit code, 128+signal, 1 on spawn error) after both pipes finish, and resolves on 'error' too — Node fires 'error' without 'exit' when the binary is missing, which otherwise hangs the await forever. Six tests pin exit codes, the read-after-exit ordering, spawn-failure resolution, the buffer cap, and the large-output drain. Adapted to the current test file (require path goes through the requirePath variable from the windowsHide commit), and the 1 MB drain test's child now exits in the write callback — on modern Node a pipe write past the OS buffer is async and process.exit() straight after write() truncates at ~64 KB even with a live reader, which fails the test for reasons unrelated to the shim. Contributed by @punksterlabs (PR #1743). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(setup): BROWSE_BIN carries the .exe suffix on Windows On Windows, `bun build --compile` emits browse.exe, but setup's BROWSE_BIN pointed at the suffixless path — so the post-build gate (`[ ! -x "$BROWSE_BIN" ]` → "browse binary missing") could never pass on Windows even after a fully successful build, while the build step itself reported success. Closes #2291. Applied the PR's override after the IS_WINDOWS detection, and also to the second BROWSE_BIN assignment the PR predates: the direct-Codex- install migration path re-derives BROWSE_BIN from the migrated dir and would otherwise drop the suffix again on Windows. Contributed by @rroojrooj (PR #1714). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(setup): link lib/ beside bin/ at all five host-install sites bin/ scripts import shared modules via ../lib (gstack-learnings-log → lib/jsonl-store.ts is the reported case), so any runtime root that exposes bin/ without lib/ breaks 13 bin/ commands — learnings-log, decision-log, telemetry and friends fail with "Cannot find module .../lib/jsonl-store.ts" on every non-Claude install, silently from the skills' perspective. All five host-install sites now carry lib/ next to bin/, each through the existing _link_or_copy helper (never raw ln — the static invariant in test/setup-windows-fallback.test.ts enforces this): - .agents sidecar (create_agents_sidecar asset loop) - Codex runtime root (create_codex_runtime_root) - Factory runtime root (create_factory_runtime_root) - OpenCode runtime root (create_opencode_runtime_root) - Kiro install block New test/setup-runtime-lib-command.test.ts executes the real setup shell for each root in a sandbox (both the symlink branch and the Windows copy branch of _link_or_copy) and runs gstack-learnings-log end-to-end from the installed root, asserting the learning lands in ~/.gstack/projects/<slug>/learnings.jsonl — plus a negative control proving a bin-without-lib root fails exactly the way the bug report did. gen-skill-docs.test.ts's setup-validation block pins the lib link at every site. Cross-checked against PRs #2433, #2410 and #2198: all three cover subsets of these sites; nothing they fix is missing here. Contributed by @fedster99 (PR #2262); overlapping fixes by @gregario, @lsendel and @netkurt. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(setup): ship supabase/config.sh with every host runtime root Distinct from the lib/-beside-bin/ defect: gstack-telemetry-sync, gstack-update-check, gstack-security-dashboard and gstack-community-dashboard all source $GSTACK_DIR/supabase/config.sh to resolve GSTACK_SUPABASE_URL, where GSTACK_DIR is the installed root (parent of bin/). The [ -f ... ] guard means a root without the file degrades SILENTLY — telemetry and update checks just stop resolving the project URL on non-Claude installs. Closes #2215. setup now links supabase/config.sh (file-level on purpose — migrations/ and functions/ are dev-only) via _link_or_copy at all five host-install sites: the PR's four (Codex, Factory, OpenCode runtime roots + the Kiro block) plus the .agents sidecar, whose bin/ resolves the same relative path and which the PR predates covering. The runtime-root test now asserts supabase/config.sh is present in every built root, on both the symlink and Windows-copy branches. Contributed by @jizusun (PR #2216). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * ci(windows): curate the fix-wave regression tests into the windows-latest run The windows-free-tests curated set is derived (POSIX-fragility regex scan + explicit deny list), and two of this wave's Windows regression files were auto-excluded on false-positive pattern hits: - browse/test/file-permissions.test.ts tripped the POSIX-mode-bitmask pattern, but every `mode & 0o777` assertion is platform-guarded — and the file carries the win32-only icacls-by-SID regression tests, which can only ever execute on windows-latest. - browse/test/terminal-agent-owner-watchdog.test.ts tripped the spawn(['bun','run',...]) pattern whose reason is the Playwright-bound browse server; it actually spawns terminal-agent.ts (fs/path/crypto + local helpers only, no Playwright at module scope), and the owner-PID orphan leak it pins was reported on Windows (#2019). Adds a KNOWN_WINDOWS_SAFE force-include list (mirror of KNOWN_WINDOWS_INCOMPATIBLE, each entry carrying its false-positive rationale) consulted before the pattern scan, and makes the owner-watchdog test's throwaway owner process Windows-portable (process.execPath instead of `sleep`, which a bare runner may not have). The wave's other new files need no wiring: process-liveness-windows and the bun-polyfill windowsHide/exited tests pass curation automatically; setup-runtime-lib-command self-skips on win32 by design (its Windows branch is exercised by simulating IS_WINDOWS=1 under bash), so force-including it would add a permanently-skipped file. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(setup): register the SessionStart hook with a bash prefix on Windows Windows can't execute an extensionless bash script directly — registering the bare gstack-session-update path made the hook pop the "Select an app" dialog on every session start (or silently never run), so team-mode auto-upgrade was dead on Windows installs. Companion to the hooks' spawn-bin routing: same defect class at the registration site. Contributed by @NikhileshNanduri (PR #1813; VERSION/CHANGELOG collateral stripped). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(setup): stop piping gen:skill-docs through tail — generator failures were masked setup piped doc generation through `tail -3`, so a generator crash kept the pipe's exit 0 and installs completed "successfully" with broken or missing SKILL.md files. Capture the real exit status at BOTH sites (the main gen:skill-docs step and the gbrain-detected gen:skill-docs:user regen — the second drifted in after the PR and its own test caught it), print the tail for UX, and fail loudly. Contributed by @DavidMiserak (PR #1898; VERSION/CHANGELOG collateral stripped; extended to the second pipe site). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(mktemp): move the X-run to the end of every temp-file template (BSD/busybox safe) BSD mktemp (macOS) does not substitute an X-run that has a suffix after it: `mktemp "$TMP_ROOT/codex-err-XXXXXX.txt"` creates a LITERAL codex-err-XXXXXX.txt on the first call (exit 0) and every later call fails with `mkstemp failed: File exists` — so /codex breaks from the SECOND run on every Mac, masquerading as a model stall. busybox mktemp (Alpine) rejects the template on the first run. Fixes #2091, #2370. Union of both community fixes, compared at the diff level: - PR #2372: all 11 source sites with a suffix after the X-run — codex SKILL.md.tmpl (5), claude SKILL.md.tmpl (3), bin/gstack-developer-profile (2, suffix folded into the prefix: .json.tmp.XXXXXX), and the office-hours codex pass in scripts/resolvers/review.ts (1). - PR #2103: the second half of #2091 — bin/gstack-paths now strips the trailing slash from TMP_ROOT at the source (macOS $TMPDIR ends in `/`), plus runtime tests pinning that normalization. New repo-wide tripwire in test/regression-issue2091-bsd-mktemp.test.ts: every .tmpl, every SKILL.md, and every scripts/resolvers/*.ts is swept — no mktemp template may carry a suffix after the X-run, with a self-test so the detector can't be quietly blinded. Generated SKILL.md files regenerated via gen:skill-docs in this commit. Contributed by @ShuratCode (PR #2103) and @noron12234 (PR #2372); PR #2285 by @cathrynlavery covered a subset. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(codex,review,ship): scope codex review with an explicit --base flag, never prompt text `codex review` takes its scope ONLY from --base/--commit/--uncommitted. The positional [PROMPT] is mutually exclusive with all three, and a prompt-only `codex review "<text>"` silently falls back to the uncommitted working-tree scope (verified on 0.144.1: it runs `git status --short; git diff` and reviews that) — so the previous prompt-based scoping produced a confidently-worded review of the WRONG changes and read "no changes" on a clean tree. Every diff pass now invokes `codex review --base <base>` with no prompt argument: /codex Step 2A default path, the /review structured pass, and the /ship adversarial-section pass (all via scripts/resolvers/review.ts). Custom review instructions keep their own `codex exec` path (the CLI rejects prompt + scope flag together), with the filesystem boundary preserved there. Two new Error Handling entries teach the failure shapes: the argv-parse error, and the "review says no changes on a branch full of changes" symptom. Tests updated to pin the new invariant instead of banning the fix: the old assertions required the diff range in prompt text and banned the `--base <base> -c '...'` substring, which the correct scoped form contains. Also deletes test/fixtures/golden-ship-claude.md — a 2,565-line orphaned fixture referenced by zero tests (the live goldens are in test/fixtures/golden/, compared by test/host-config.test.ts); the factory golden is refreshed from the regenerated output. Generated SKILL.md files regenerated via gen:skill-docs in this commit. Contributed by @fangearhq-boop (PR #2513). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(review,ship): run the codex diff passes under the timeout wrapper (#1036) The `_gstack_codex_timeout_wrapper` added in #1056 was wired into codex/SKILL.md but never into the /review and /ship diff passes, which kept running under a bare 5-minute Bash gate. An unwrapped stall returns no exit code and no output, which downstream reads as "Codex reviewed and found nothing" — a truncated pass silently became a clean bill. Measured on codex-cli 0.145.0: a pass was killed at 287s of a 300s budget mid-tool-call, and the same prompt completed in 336s. Both passes in scripts/resolvers/review.ts (adversarial `codex exec` and the structured `codex review --base` pass) now re-source gstack-codex-probe and run under `_gstack_codex_timeout_wrapper 540`, with the Bash tool gate raised to 600000 ms so the wrapper fires FIRST and a stall surfaces as a diagnosable exit 124. The timeout guidance now says a timed-out pass is MISSING COVERAGE, not a clean result, and points at the run's rollout log under ~/.codex/sessions/ for partial output. The stale "timeout doesn't exist on macOS" claim is gone — the wrapper resolves gtimeout, then timeout, then runs unwrapped, so it is safe without coreutils. Static guards in test/codex-hardening.test.ts pin all three sites (resolver, review/SKILL.md, ship/sections/adversarial.md): both calls wrapped, wrapper budget strictly under the Bash gate, and no reappearance of the macOS claim that steered these call sites away from the wrapper in the first place. The Claude-output path guard in test/gen-skill-docs.test.ts now scrubs ~/.codex/sessions/ (a user-facing Codex CLI path, same class as the ~/.codex/logs/ exemption) before banning Codex host paths. Generated files regenerated via gen:skill-docs; factory golden refreshed. Contributed by @aegixx (PR #2379). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(codex): sandbox the review path, fail the gate closed, order timeouts wrapper-first Closes #2496, #2524, #2477 — three defects in the class "a guard that reports success while doing nothing", all in codex/SKILL.md.tmpl: (a) Review sandbox. The default `codex review` path was the only codex call with no sandbox override, inheriting ~/.codex/config.toml's default — write access on a trusted project — while Important Rules claimed read-only. Top-level `codex review` has no -s/--sandbox flag (verified on 0.147.0), so the invocation now pins `-c 'sandbox_mode="read-only"'`, the same form the consult-resume path already uses. (b) Fail-closed verdict gate. The old rule ("no [P1] found → PASS") could not fail on the default path: native `codex review` output carries no bracketed tags, and a non-zero exit, expired auth, timeout, or empty result also contains no [P1] — all read as PASS. The gate is now an ordered, fail-closed check: non-zero exit → FAIL; empty output → FAIL; [P0]/[P1] (bracketed or codex's native labels) → FAIL with count; NO severity tags at all → FAIL requiring a human read; PASS is only reachable through the explicit tagged-advisory-only branch. [P0] is recognized as blocking, and the review-log findings count includes it. (c) Bash gate above the wrapper. Step 2A instructed `timeout: 300000` under a 330s wrapper, and Challenge's 300s gate sat under a 600s wrapper — the harness killed the call before the wrapper could emit its diagnosable exit-124 message. Every Bash gate now sits strictly ABOVE its wrapper: 360000 over the 330s review wrapper, 660000 over the 600s challenge/consult wrappers, with the ordering rationale stated at each site. Also from #2477/#2524: a new Error Handling entry for the model-entitlement 400 ("The '<model>' model is not supported...") pointing at the `model =` pin and `[notice.model_migrations]` in ~/.codex/config.toml and saying exactly which override to retry with (-m for exec-based modes, `-c model="..."` for review mode, which rejects -m); the Model & Reasoning section no longer documents `-m` for `/codex review`. Static assertions in test/codex-hardening.test.ts pin (a)-(c) across both the .tmpl and the generated SKILL.md: every scoped review invocation carries sandbox_mode="read-only" and never -s; the default-PASS sentence is banned and the fail-closed branches are present; and per-section, every Bash `timeout: N` is strictly greater than every wrapper budget, with 2A/2B/2C all required to be inspected. Generated SKILL.md regenerated via gen:skill-docs in this commit. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(preamble): quoted tilde made Artifacts Sync and telemetry-finalize dead code in 49 skills A tilde inside double quotes never expands, so the generated `_BRAIN_SYNC_BIN="~/..."` assignments resolved to a literal ./~ path and the Artifacts Sync + telemetry-finalize blocks silently no-op'd in every skill that carried them (regression of #785). The preamble resolvers now emit $HOME-based paths; all generated SKILL.md files regenerate identically from the fixed templates, and a static tripwire fails the suite if a quoted-tilde assignment ever reappears in generated output. Fixes #1656, #1715. Contributed by @jawadakram20 (PR #2333). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(gen-skill-docs): stop the catalog trim chopping descriptions at embedded periods The description-trim regex treated the first period as end-of-sentence, so skill descriptions with embedded periods (e.g. file extensions, version numbers) truncated mid-thought in the generated catalog — the discovery surface every host loads. Trim now respects the full first sentence; diagram's description regenerates to its intended text. Contributed by @sneakygriff (PR #2171). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(preamble): update_check:false gates the prose, not just the binary Setting update_check:false stopped the update-check BINARY from running, but every skill preamble still shipped the upgrade-handling instruction prose unconditionally — burning tokens on instructions that could never fire and confusing agents into probing for upgrades anyway. The resolver now suppresses the upgrade-flow prose when the config disables checks. Fixes #2001. Contributed by @jc0d35 (PR #2022). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(browse): sidebar Terminal — drop the duplicate WS subprotocol header, stop doubling CJK IME input The terminal client passed the auth token as the WS subprotocol AND echoed it in a second header, which some Chromium builds reject; and composition events double-sent CJK input (each IME commit arrived once from the composition handler and once from the data handler). One auth path, one input path; also fixes the terminal-agent test that failed on clean main. Contributed by @mindsurf0176 (PR #2515). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(setup): -h/--help prints usage instead of running the installer Asking setup for help RAN the full installer — Playwright download and all. Standard help flags now short-circuit to usage. Contributed by @saen-ai (PR #1219). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(hosts): Codex-generated skills reference AGENTS.md, not CLAUDE.md Codex reads AGENTS.md, but its generated skills still told agents to read CLAUDE.md in 8 places — instructions Codex hosts cannot follow. The host config now maps the memory-file name per host; all three ship goldens refreshed from the regenerated output. Contributed by @exGeni (PR #1996). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(retro,ship): count tracked files for the test-file metric, not the working tree The test-file count ran find over the working tree, sweeping untracked build output — a Rails repo reported 623 test files when git tracks 17 (37x), skewing retro narratives and ship dashboards. Count via git ls-files instead; includes the one-line Python-glob widening so non-JS repos stop undercounting. Fixes #2307, #1999. Contributed by @joshRpowell (PR #2308). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(land-and-deploy,gen): auto-merge diagnosis + CRLF-stable generation Two small hardenings: land-and-deploy Step 4 no longer misdiagnoses a failed `gh pr merge --auto` as a permissions problem when the real cause is the merge-method mismatch the command names; and gen-skill-docs normalizes CRLF at the template entry point so Windows checkouts with autocrlf produce byte-identical generated output to CI instead of silently skipping the \n-anchored transforms. Contributed by @Jmeg8r (PR #2437) and @1ncludeSteven (PR #1051). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(land-and-deploy): stop greedy sed from eating the URL scheme in deploy-config parsing The deploy-config bootstrap parsed "Production URL: https://x.com" with sed 's/.*: *//', which cuts at the LAST colon — the one in "https:" — yielding "//x.com". Cut at the first ": " instead (s/^[^:]*: *//). Resolver only; the generated land-and-deploy/SKILL.md regenerates from this source in the docs lane. Contributed by @briascoi (PRs #2555/#2493). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(artifacts-init): honor the provider CLI's git_protocol instead of forcing SSH gstack-artifacts-init unconditionally rewrote the push remote to SSH and hard-failed setup for users whose gh/glab auth is HTTPS-only. Now: - provider-created remotes follow `gh config get git_protocol` / `glab config get git_protocol` (HTTPS when unset — the gh default) - explicit/existing/manual remotes keep their given protocol; unknown URL forms (local bare paths, file://, self-hosted) pass through - new --push-protocol auto|https|ssh flag overrides the inference - the unreachable-remote error names the actual protocol and points at --push-protocol instead of assuming a missing SSH key Closes #1348. Contributed by @time-attack (PR #2225). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(browse): skip the .gitignore append when git already ignores .gstack/ ensureStateDir appended ".gstack/" to a tracked .gitignore even when git already ignored the directory via global excludes, .git/info/exclude, or a parent .gitignore — dirtying the working tree on every daemon start. Run `git check-ignore -q -- .gstack/` first and return early when git says it's covered; git-missing/not-a-repo/timeout all fall through to the existing text-check append (the safe default). Closes #2385. Contributed by @gregario (PR #2430). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(browse): guard browser.process() in resolveDisconnectCause `.process()` only exists on browsers Playwright launched itself; a browser from connectOverCDP() (or a test stub) has no such method, so the blind call threw "browser?.process is not a function" inside the disconnect handler and took down the daemon. Type-check the method before calling it and treat the no-method case as no process handle. Closes #2085. Contributed by @elan2002 (PR #2434). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(lib): narrow the override injection denylist to instruction-shaped phrases The /override[:\s]/i pattern flagged any prose containing "override " or "override:" — CLI flags (--port-override -1), tfvars notes, and plain "you can override the default region" all tripped the injection guard. Require an instruction-shaped continuation: "override (all)? previous | prior | above | the rules/instructions/system prompt". Genuine attempts like "Override: ignore all previous instructions" still block via the ignore-previous pattern. Closes #2401, #1934. Contributed by @Masashi-Ono0611 (PR #2424); same fix independently by @JonasFocus (PR #1940). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(redact): stop the E.164 phone pattern flagging compact timestamps Bare 14-digit runs like 20260727202423 (YYYYMMDDHHMMSS backup/log stamps) matched the phone regex and produced MEDIUM PII findings. Reject a separator-free 14-digit span whose fields parse as a plausible date-time; real numbers carry a + or spacing, so phone coverage is unchanged. Contributed by @abkrim (PR #2428). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(design): create the OpenAI key file owner-only, closing the write-then-chmod race saveApiKey wrote ~/.gstack/openai.json at the default umask and tightened to 0600 afterwards, leaving the API key briefly world-readable between write and chmod (CWE-377/367). Pass mode 0o600 at create; the trailing chmodSync stays as a backstop to tighten a pre-existing loose file. Contributed by @bunlongheng (PR #2468). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(config): make gstack-config key validation locale-independent POSIX bracket ranges like a-z follow the active collation order; under GNU grep with tr_TR.UTF-8 the range excludes the ASCII letter i, so every key containing i (skill_prefix, explain_level, ...) was rejected as invalid. Pin both get/set validators to LC_ALL=C, with a source-level tripwire test since macOS BSD grep doesn't reproduce the bug. Closes #2494. Contributed by @Math1987 (PR #2506). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(resolvers): stop env-var hosts from doubling $HOME in the binary fallback path The browse/design/make-pdf setup resolvers built the fallback binary path as "$HOME" + dir.replace(/^~/, ''), which is only correct for ~-rooted dirs. Env-var hosts carry an absolute $GSTACK_* dir, so the generated fallback became $HOME$GSTACK_.../browse — a path that never exists. New toShellPath() in scripts/resolvers/types.ts expands ~ to $HOME and passes absolute env-var dirs through untouched; all five call sites route through it. Claude-host generated output is byte-identical, so no SKILL.md regeneration is needed here. Closes #2055. Contributed by @simjak (PR #2056). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(settings-hook): respect CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR when resolving settings.json gstack-settings-hook hardcoded $HOME/.claude/settings.json, so users running Claude Code with a relocated CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR had hooks written to a config file Claude never reads. Resolve ${CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR:-$HOME/.claude} first; the explicit GSTACK_SETTINGS_FILE override still wins. Partial #349. Contributed by @andrefogelman (PR #2239). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(browse): dispatch a change event after fill for change-only validators Playwright's Locator.fill() dispatches `input` but never `change`, so frameworks that validate on change (AngularJS ng-change, debounced strength/match checks) never saw the filled value — correct in the DOM, failing the framework's own validation. `browse fill` now dispatches `change` after the fill. Failing-first regression test with a change-only password-match fixture included. Contributed by @intelliot (PR #2475). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(safety): unknown question-preference source exits the documented 2, not 1 The --write user-origin gate documents exit 2 as "rejected, do not retry" (profile poisoning defense), but a source outside both the allowed and the explicitly-rejected lists fell through to exit 1 — the generic validation code callers treat as retryable. Unknown sources now exit 2 with the same do-not-retry rejection message as the known non-user-originated ones. Closes #2390. Contributed by @gregario (PR #2429). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(pr-title): stop duplicating the version prefix on bare-version titles A title that was nothing but a version ("v1.2.3" — the form ship uses for version-only bumps) matched neither the "v<NEW_VERSION> " literal case nor the trailing-space strip regex, fell through to the prepend path, and came out as "v1.2.3.4 v1.2.3" — which pr-title-sync.yml then wrote back via gh pr edit. Handle the bare form in both the no-change case and the prefix-strip regex, and emit a bare new version when nothing follows. Closes #1886. Contributed by @jbetala7 (PR #1887). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(build): escape literal braces in the bun:sqlite stub regex Perl >= 5.26 treats an unescaped literal `{` in a pattern as fatal ("Unescaped left brace in regex is illegal"), so build-node-server.sh died at the bun:sqlite stub substitution on modern perl. Escape both braces; the replacement output is unchanged. Closes #2300. Contributed by @nuga0718 (PR #2111). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(config): preserve spaces in gstack-config values get/list read values with awk '{print $2}' | tr -d '[:space:]', which truncated any value containing spaces ("/Users/x/Conductor Workspaces" came back as "/Users/x/Conductor") and set wrote the unfiltered raw value on the append path. New read_config_value() strips only the "key:" prefix and trailing whitespace (cut-style parse), and set appends the same newline-stripped value the in-place edit path uses. Closes #1782. Contributed by @jbetala7 (PR #1783). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(browse): recover a late-healthy detached daemon instead of a false "Server failed to start" startServer spawns the daemon detached + unref'd, then polls health for a fixed budget. On a loaded machine the budget can elapse in the gap between the loop's last tick and the daemon becoming ready — the CLI reported "Server failed to start within Ns" while the very next `browse status` showed a healthy server. Add a final readState()+isServerHealthy() re-check before the timeout throw, and make the budget env-overridable via BROWSE_START_TIMEOUT (BROWSE_* tunable convention). Structural + behavioral tests pin both invariants. Closes #1846. Contributed by @harjothkhara (PR #1847). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(browse): daemon resilience on loaded machines — Bun conn errors, stop/restart flush, startup + git-root budgets Four load-sensitivity fixes in the daemon lifecycle: - sendCommand only recognized Node's ECONNREFUSED/ECONNRESET; the compiled CLI runs on Bun, which reports 'ConnectionRefused'/'ConnectionClosed' ("Unable to connect..."), so daemon crashes leaked the raw error and exited 1 instead of entering the busy-check/restart path. Match both. - stop/restart called shutdown() inline, which exits before the HTTP response flushes — the CLI saw a dropped socket (and would now crash-retry a fresh daemon just to stop it). Defer shutdown ~100ms so the 200 lands first. - Non-CI POSIX startup budget raised 8s -> 15s (cold Chromium measured ~5.7s at load avg 10; load 12+ blew the old budget while the detached daemon was still booting). - getGitRoot's 2s git rev-parse timeout returned null under load (6.3s spikes measured), scattering state files across cwds into split-brain daemons. Raise to 8s, still bounded. Contributed by @mplatts (PR #1732). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(telemetry): ingest keeps error_message/failed_step instead of dropping them The telemetry_events columns exist and bin/gstack-telemetry-log already sends error_message + failed_step, but the Supabase ingest function dropped both fields on insert — every error report arrived with no message and no failing step. Map them through with the same bounded-length sanitization as error_class (500/100 chars). The completion-status resolver now also passes --error-message/--failed-step in the generated skill telemetry block, with instructions to leave them empty on success. Resolver only for the template side; generated SKILL.md files regenerate from this source in the docs lane. Contributed by @sunnnybala (PR #769). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(browse): surface non-EEXIST errors in acquireServerLock instead of masking them acquireServerLock caught every open failure as if the lock were held: EACCES/EROFS/ENOENT surfaced as phantom "another process holds the lock" (null return, no diagnostics), and a failed stale-lock read or unlink was swallowed the same way. Each failure class now logs a coded, pathed diagnostic: non-EEXIST open errors, holder-PID read errors (ENOENT retries the acquire — the holder released between open and read), and stale-lock unlink errors. Four-case unit test included. Closes #1084. Contributed by @jbetala7 (PR #1725); same fix independently by @JiayuuWang (PR #1097). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(paths): shell-quote gstack-paths output so eval round-trips values gstack-paths emitted bare KEY=VALUE lines, so the documented eval "$(gstack-paths)" re-parsed the values: backslashes were eaten as escapes (Windows $TMP C:\Users\... became C:Users...) and a space word-split the assignment, leaving the variable empty. Emit each value with printf %q so eval round-trips byte-for-byte; plain POSIX paths are unchanged. Round-trip regression tests cover backslashes, spaces, and embedded quotes. Closes #2374. Contributed by @fangearhq-boop (PR #2376); same fix independently by @yannickspiess (PR #1580). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * security(browse): drop .svg from the load-html extension allowlist SVG is a script-capable format (inline <script>, event handlers, foreign objects), so allowing it through load-html's HTML allowlist let a local .svg execute script in the browse session context. The allowlist is now .html/.htm/.xhtml only; regression test asserts .svg is rejected. Contributed by @garagon (PR #1153). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(benchmark): validate --timeout-ms as a positive integer gstack-model-benchmark fed --timeout-ms straight through parseInt, so "abc" became NaN and "0"/"-1" passed through — a NaN or non-positive timeout silently disables the per-provider watchdog. Reject anything that isn't a positive (optionally +-prefixed) safe integer with a clear error and exit 1. Closes #1726. Contributed by @jbetala7 (PR #1727). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore(fixtures): clean terminology in the security-bench replay fixture Two spots in browse/test/fixtures/security-bench-haiku-responses.json referred to real-world HVAC project naming; replace with the generic "mechanical services" wording. Fixture stays valid JSON; replay tests unchanged. Contributed by @apex-system (PR #2131). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * ci: cancel superseded actionlint and skill-docs runs actionlint.yml and skill-docs.yml trigger on both push and pull_request with no concurrency group, so every push to an active branch left the previous (now-obsolete) runs queued or running — twice per commit on same-repo PR branches. Add the same cancel-in-progress concurrency groups the heavier workflows already use, plus a free static tripwire test that fails CI if a push+pull_request workflow ever ships again without cancel-in-progress. Contributed by @jbetala7 (PR #2053). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(make-pdf): correct CJK rendering — NUL sentinel hardening, SC-first fonts, CJK quote context Three CJK fixes in the PDF pipeline: - smartypants strips stray input NULs up front so document text can never forge the U+0000 placeholder sentinel and leak a preserved-zone marker into the output. - The CJK font stack led with Japanese families, so Simplified-Chinese text rendered han glyphs with JP variants. Lead with PingFang SC / Heiti SC / Noto Sans CJK SC / Source Han Sans SC before the JP fallbacks. - Quote-smartening only recognized ASCII openers as "start of quote" context; the fullwidth colon and CJK brackets now count, so quotes after them curl the right way. Contributed by @rssprivacy-commits (PR #2012). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs: regenerate skill output for the quick-win resolver changes Regen for the deploy-config URL-scheme fix (utility resolver), telemetry completion-status resolver, and $HOME-doubling binary-resolver fix; ship goldens refreshed to match. Generated-output-only commit. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(slug): cached identity is sticky — heal ONLY the provable subdir-cache bug shape The walk-up rewrite recomputed the slug on every run and "healed" the cache toward the fresh value, which broke the #2212 continuity contract: a project that used gstack before adopting a git remote would be silently renamed to the remote-derived slug, orphaning everything under ~/.gstack/projects/. Cached identity now wins, with one precise exception: when the cached value equals THIS pwd's basename while the walk-up proves pwd is not the project root, the entry came from the pre-walk-up subdirectory bug (#1125) and is recomputed. All four slug contracts pass together (repo-mode #2212, walk-up #1125, sanitize, user-slug). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(claude): stop false-blocking macOS keychain subscription auth in host detection The /claude skill's auth probe only recognized env-var/API-key auth, so macOS subscription installs (keychain-backed, where `claude -p` works fine) were told they had no auth. Detection now uses host invocation. Fixes #1890. Contributed by @xing-qnex (PR #2411); PR #2548 by @shawnacalia covered the keychain case. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(setup): Ubuntu 26.04 Playwright platform detect + silence the codesign false alarm Two small setup papercuts: the Playwright platform probe now recognizes Ubuntu 26.04 instead of falling to the generic-Linux path, and macOS installs stop warning about a codesign "failure" that was actually the expected unsigned-adhoc path (the real signature check already gates binary launch). Contributed by @nuga0718 (PR #2113) and @lucascaro (PR #1758). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(skills): land-and-deploy squash readback, next-version paths, embed-flags quoting Three template one-liners: land-and-deploy reads the squash-merge result from the merge commit instead of the stale branch tip; review/landing-report /land-and-deploy templates call bin/gstack-next-version via its installed path instead of a bare repo-relative one; setup-gbrain quotes GBRAIN_EMBED_FLAGS so zsh word-splitting stops silently dropping voyage-code-3 flags. Regenerated output included. Contributed by @stormeoio (PR #2011), @rjmurillo (PR #1820) and @trevorhstandridge (PR #1817). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * release: v1.64.0.0 — fix wave CHANGELOG, VERSION, deferred-wave TODOs Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * test: refresh ship goldens for the telemetry error-field resolver output Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * test(redact-prepush): assemble the fake AWS key at runtime — the literal blocked our own push The hook's fixtures carried a live-format AKIA literal, and the repo's own pre-push scanner (hardened in this wave) correctly blocked pushing it. The placeholder-suppressed docs key would defeat the detection tests, so the fixtures now concatenate the key at runtime: tests still exercise real detection, and the pushed diff never contains a scannable credential shape. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(slug): terminate the marker walk-up on dirname's fixed point — hung every bin on Windows Under git-bash on Windows a mixed-form path walks C:/Users -> C: -> . -> . forever: dirname's fixed point there is never "/", so the walk-up loop spun and every bin that evals gstack-slug (learnings-log first among them) hung until spawn timeout. Caught by windows-free-tests CI on the wave PR. Break on the fixed point itself with a depth cap for exotic forms; regression tests drive the extracted function with hostile path shapes under a hard timeout. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-08-14 22:02:07 -07:00
t	279fda4dc5	fix(browse): case-insensitive exfiltration-domain blocklist matching ... urlBlocklistFilter compared URLs against the exfiltration blocklist with case-sensitive substring checks, so an uppercased sink (https://WEBHOOK.SITE/x) bypassed the guard and reached the scoped browser agent. Normalize the page URL and extracted content URLs to lowercase before comparing, and make URL extraction scheme-insensitive so HTTPS:// links are still caught. Fixes #2190 Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-10 14:39:32 -07:00
Garry Tan	ea51b45e08	v1.38.1.0 fix wave: surrogate-safe page captures (#1440), Implementation Tasks across review skills (#1454), root-level artifact patterns (#1452) (#1504) ... * fix(browse): sanitize lone Unicode surrogates at commandResult chokepoint + /batch envelope (#1440) Page captures with mixed-script Unicode round-trip cleanly to the Claude API. Two new utilities in browse/src/sanitize.ts: stripLoneSurrogates for raw UTF-16 strings, stripLoneSurrogateEscapes for \uXXXX JSON escape text. sanitizeBody picks the right pass based on cr.json. buildCommandResponse is extracted from handleCommand (now exported) and applies sanitization before new Response(). /batch was bypassing this chokepoint via direct JSON.stringify, so it sanitizes each cr.result before pushing AND wraps the envelope with stripLoneSurrogateEscapes. Defense in depth wraps at getCleanText, getCleanTextWithStripping, html, accessibility, and snapshot.ts return points so downstream consumers (datamarking, envelope wrapping) see sanitized text before the response is built. 25 new unit tests across sanitize.test.ts and build-command-response.test.ts. content-security.test.ts updated to accept either pre- or post-sanitize form of the snapshot scoped branch (source-level regression check). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: bug fix wave v1.36.0.0 — Implementation Tasks, allowlist patterns, surrogate-safe page captures (#1440 #1452 #1454) Three filed issues land together: #1440 — Page captures from real-world HTML hit 'API Error 400: no low surrogate in string'. Sanitizers + buildCommandResponse extraction shipped in the prior commit; this commit adds the migration script that patches existing brain-allowlist/privacy-map/gitattributes installs and the supporting tests. #1452 — Federation sync was silently skipping root-level design and test-plan docs. bin/gstack-artifacts-init adds two patterns to all three managed blocks (.brain-allowlist, .brain-privacy-map.json, .gitattributes). Idempotent migration v1.36.0.0.sh repairs existing installs in place via jq (preserves JSON validity) — no commit + push from the migration. #1454 — All four review skills (CEO/design/eng/DX) emit an Implementation Tasks markdown section AND write a jq-built JSONL artifact per phase. /autoplan reads all four files, scopes by current branch + 5-commit window, dedupes on exact (component, sorted(files), title), and renders an aggregated list in the Final Approval Gate. New tests: - browse/test/sanitize.test.ts (18 cases) - browse/test/build-command-response.test.ts (7 cases) - test/artifacts-init-migration.test.ts (7 cases) VERSION → 1.36.0.0. Skips the v1.34.x slot taken by 'gstack consumable as submodule' and the v1.35.0.0 slot taken by /document-generate. #1428 was shipped separately by v1.34.2.0 with a different approach; follow-up #1503 filed for the bare-path filesystem boundary concern surfaced during our analysis. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore: bump to v1.38.1.0 VERSION + package.json + CHANGELOG header + migration filename + test reference all consistently at v1.38.1.0. Migration renamed: gstack-upgrade/migrations/v1.38.0.0.sh -> v1.38.1.0.sh. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-05-14 21:46:50 -07:00
Garry Tan	54d4cde773	security: tunnel dual-listener + SSRF + envelope + path wave (v1.6.0.0) (#1137) ... * refactor(security): loosen /connect rate limit from 3/min to 300/min Setup keys are 24 random bytes (unbruteforceable), so a tight rate limit does not meaningfully prevent key guessing. It exists only to cap bandwidth, CPU, and log-flood damage from someone who discovered the ngrok URL. A legitimate pair-agent session hits /connect once; 300/min is 60x that pattern and never hit accidentally. 3/min caused pairing to fail on any retry flow (network blip, second paired client) with no upside. Per-IP tracking was considered and rejected — adds a bounded Map + LRU for defense already adequate at the global layer. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(security): add tunnel-denial-log module for attack visibility Append-only log of tunnel-surface auth denials to ~/.gstack/security/attempts.jsonl. Gives operators visibility into who is probing tunneled daemons so the next security wave can be driven by real attack data instead of speculation. Design notes: - Async via fs.promises.appendFile. Never appendFileSync — blocking the event loop on every denial during a flood is what an attacker wants (prior learning: sync-audit-log-io, 10/10 confidence). - In-process rate cap at 60 writes/minute globally. Excess denials are counted in memory but not written to disk — prevents disk DoS. - Writes to the same ~/.gstack/security/attempts.jsonl used by the prompt-injection attempt log. File rotation is handled by the existing security pipeline (10MB, 5 generations). No consumers in this commit; wired up in the dual-listener refactor that follows. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(security): dual-listener tunnel architecture The /health endpoint leaked AUTH_TOKEN to any caller that hit the ngrok URL (spoofing chrome-extension:// origin, or catching headed mode). Surfaced by @garagon in PR #1026; the original fix was header-inference on the single port. Codex's outside-voice review during /plan-ceo-review called that approach brittle (ngrok header behavior could change, local proxies would false-positive), and pushed for the structural fix. This is that fix. Stop making /health a root-token bootstrap endpoint on any surface the tunnel can reach. The server now binds two HTTP listeners when a tunnel is active. The local listener (extension, CLI, sidebar) stays on 127.0.0.1 and is never exposed to ngrok. ngrok forwards only to the tunnel listener, which serves only /connect (unauth, rate-limited) and /command with a locked allowlist of browser-driving commands. Security property comes from physical port separation, not from header inference — a tunnel caller cannot reach /health or /cookie-picker or /inspector because they live on a different TCP socket. What this commit adds to browse/src/server.ts: * Surface type ('local' | 'tunnel') and TUNNEL_PATHS + TUNNEL_COMMANDS allowlists near the top of the file. * makeFetchHandler(surface) factory replacing the single fetch arrow; closure-captures the surface so the filter that runs before route dispatch knows which socket accepted the request. * Tunnel filter at dispatch entry: 404s anything not on TUNNEL_PATHS, 403s root-token bearers with a clear pairing hint, 401s non-/connect requests that lack a scoped token. Every denial is logged via logTunnelDenial (from tunnel-denial-log). * GET /connect alive probe (unauth on both surfaces) so /pair and /tunnel/start can detect dead ngrok tunnels without reaching /health — /health is no longer tunnel-reachable. * Lazy tunnel listener lifecycle. /tunnel/start binds a dedicated Bun.serve on an ephemeral port, points ngrok.forward at THAT port (not the local port), hard-fails on bind error (no local fallback), tears down cleanly on ngrok failure. BROWSE_TUNNEL=1 startup uses the same pattern. * closeTunnel() helper — single teardown path for both the ngrok listener and the tunnel Bun.serve listener. * resolveNgrokAuthtoken() helper — shared authtoken lookup across /tunnel/start and BROWSE_TUNNEL=1 startup (was duplicated). * TUNNEL_COMMANDS check in /command dispatch: on the tunnel surface, commands outside the allowlist return 403 with a list of allowed commands as a hint. * Probe paths in /pair and /tunnel/start migrated from /health to GET /connect — the only unauth path reachable on the tunnel surface under the new architecture. Test updates in browse/test/server-auth.test.ts: * /pair liveness-verify test: assert via closeTunnel() helper instead of the inline `tunnelActive = false; tunnelUrl = null` lines that the helper subsumes. * /tunnel/start cached-tunnel test: same closeTunnel() adaptation. Credit Derived from PR #1026 by @garagon — thanks for flagging the critical bug that drove the architectural rewrite. The per-request isTunneledRequest approach from #1026 is superseded by physical port separation here; the underlying report remains the root cause for the entire v1.6.0.0 wave. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * test(security): add source-level guards for dual-listener architecture 23 source-level assertions that keep future contributors from silently widening the tunnel surface during a routine refactor. Covers: * Surface type + tunnelServer state variable shape * TUNNEL_PATHS is a closed set of /connect, /command, /sidebar-chat (and NOT /health, /welcome, /cookie-picker, /inspector/*, /pair, /token, /refs, /activity/stream, /tunnel/{start,stop}) * TUNNEL_COMMANDS includes browser-driving ops only (and NOT launch-browser, tunnel-start, token-mint, cookie-import, etc.) * makeFetchHandler(surface) factory exists and is wired to both listeners with the correct surface parameter * Tunnel filter runs BEFORE any route dispatch, with 404/403/401 responses and logged denials for each reason * GET /connect returns {alive: true} unauth * /command dispatch enforces TUNNEL_COMMANDS on tunnel surface * closeTunnel() helper tears down ngrok + Bun.serve listener * /tunnel/start binds on ephemeral port, points ngrok at TUNNEL_PORT (not local port), hard-fails on bind error (no fallback), probes cached tunnel via GET /connect (not /health), tears down on ngrok.forward failure * BROWSE_TUNNEL=1 startup uses the dual-listener pattern * logTunnelDenial wired for all three denial reasons * /connect rate limit is 300/min, not 3/min All 23 tests pass. Behavioral integration tests (spawn subprocess, real network) live in the E2E suite that lands later in this wave. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * security: gate download + scrape through validateNavigationUrl (SSRF) The `goto` command was correctly wired through validateNavigationUrl, but `download` and `scrape` called page.request.fetch(url, ...) directly. A caller with the default write scope could hit the /command endpoint and ask the daemon to fetch http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/ (AWS IMDSv1) or the GCP/Azure/internal equivalents. The response body comes back as base64 or lands on disk where GET /file serves it. Fix: call validateNavigationUrl(url) immediately before each page.request.fetch() call site in download and in the scrape loop. Same blocklist that already protects `goto`: file://, javascript:, data:, chrome://, cloud metadata (IPv4 all encodings, IPv6 ULA, metadata.*.internal). Tests: extend browse/test/url-validation.test.ts with a source-level guard that walks every `await page.request.fetch(` call site and asserts a validateNavigationUrl call precedes it within the same branch. Regression trips before code review if a future refactor drops the gate. * security: route splitForScoped through envelope sentinel escape The scoped-token snapshot path in snapshot.ts built its untrusted block by pushing the raw accessibility-tree lines between the literal `═══ BEGIN UNTRUSTED WEB CONTENT ═══` / `═══ END UNTRUSTED WEB CONTENT ═══` sentinels. The full-page wrap path in content-security.ts already applied a zero-width-space escape on those exact strings to prevent sentinel injection, but the scoped path skipped it. Net effect: a page whose rendered text contains the literal sentinel can close the envelope early from inside untrusted content and forge a fake "trusted" block for the LLM. That includes fabricating interactive `@eN` references the agent will act on. Fix: * Extract the zero-width-space escape into a named, exported helper `escapeEnvelopeSentinels(content)` in content-security.ts. * Have `wrapUntrustedPageContent` call it (behavior unchanged on that path — same bytes out). * Import the helper in snapshot.ts and map it over `untrustedLines` in the `splitForScoped` branch before pushing the BEGIN sentinel. Tests: add a describe block in content-security.test.ts that covers * `escapeEnvelopeSentinels` defuses BEGIN and END markers; * `escapeEnvelopeSentinels` leaves normal text untouched; * `wrapUntrustedPageContent` still emits exactly one real envelope pair when hostile content contains forged sentinels; * snapshot.ts imports the helper; * the scoped-snapshot branch calls `escapeEnvelopeSentinels` before pushing the BEGIN sentinel (source-level regression — if a future refactor reorders this, the test trips). * security: extend hidden-element detection to all DOM-reading channels The Confusion Protocol envelope wrap (`wrapUntrustedPageContent`) covers every scoped PAGE_CONTENT_COMMAND, but the hidden-element ARIA-injection detection layer only ran for `text`. Other DOM-reading channels (html, links, forms, accessibility, attrs, data, media, ux-audit) returned their output through the envelope with no hidden- content filter, so a page serving a display:none div that instructs the agent to disregard prior system messages, or an aria-label that claims to put the LLM in admin mode, leaked the injection payload on any non-text channel. The envelope alone does not mitigate this, and the page itself never rendered the hostile content to the human operator. Fix: * New export `DOM_CONTENT_COMMANDS` in commands.ts — the subset of PAGE_CONTENT_COMMANDS that derives its output from the live DOM. Console and dialog stay out; they read separate runtime state. * server.ts runs `markHiddenElements` + `cleanupHiddenMarkers` for every scoped command in this set. `text` keeps its existing `getCleanTextWithStripping` path (hidden elements physically stripped before the read). All other channels keep their output format but emit flagged elements as CONTENT WARNINGS on the envelope, so the LLM sees what it would otherwise have consumed silently. * Hidden-element descriptions merge into `combinedWarnings` alongside content-filter warnings before the wrap call. Tests: new describe block in content-security.test.ts covering * `DOM_CONTENT_COMMANDS` export shape and channel membership; * dispatch gates on `DOM_CONTENT_COMMANDS.has(command)`, not the literal `text` string; * hiddenContentWarnings plumbs into `combinedWarnings` and reaches wrapUntrustedPageContent; * DOM_CONTENT_COMMANDS is a strict subset of PAGE_CONTENT_COMMANDS. Existing datamarking, envelope wrap, centralized-wrapping, and chain security suites stay green (52 pass, 0 fail). * security: validate --from-file payload paths for parity with direct paths The direct `load-html <file>` path runs every caller-supplied file path through validateReadPath() so reads stay confined to SAFE_DIRECTORIES (cwd, TEMP_DIR). The `load-html --from-file <payload.json>` shortcut and its sibling `pdf --from-file <payload.json>` skipped that check and went straight to fs.readFileSync(). An MCP caller that picks the payload path (or any caller whose payload argument is reachable from attacker-influenced text) could use --from-file as a read-anywhere escape hatch for the safe-dirs policy. Fix: call validateReadPath(path.resolve(payloadPath)) before readFileSync at both sites. Error surface mirrors the direct-path branch so ops and agent errors stay consistent. Test coverage in browse/test/from-file-path-validation.test.ts: - source-level: validateReadPath precedes readFileSync in the load-html --from-file branch (write-commands.ts) and the pdf --from-file parser (meta-commands.ts) - error-message parity: both sites reference SAFE_DIRECTORIES Related security audit pattern: R3 F002 (validateNavigationUrl gap on download/scrape) and R3 F008 (markHiddenElements gap on 10 DOM commands) were the same shape — a defense that existed on the primary code path but not its shortcut sibling. This PR closes the same class of gap on the --from-file shortcuts. * fix(design): escape url.origin when injecting into served HTML serve.ts injected url.origin into a single-quoted JS string in the response body. A local request with a crafted Host header (e.g. Host: "evil'-alert(1)-'x") would break out of the string and execute JS in the 127.0.0.1:<port> origin opened by the design board. Low severity — bound to localhost, requires a local attacker — but no reason not to escape. Fix: JSON.stringify(url.origin) produces a properly quoted, escaped JS string literal in one call. Also includes Prettier reformatting (single→double quotes, trailing commas, line wrapping) applied by the repo's PostToolUse formatter hook. Security change is the one line in the HTML injection; everything else is whitespace/style. * fix(scripts): drop shell:true from slop-diff npx invocations spawnSync('npx', [...], { shell: true }) invokes /bin/sh -c with the args concatenated, subjecting them to shell parsing (word splitting, glob expansion, metacharacter interpretation). No user input reaches these calls today, so not exploitable — but the posture is wrong: npx + shell args should be direct. Fix: scope shell:true to process.platform === 'win32' where npx is actually a .cmd requiring the shell. POSIX runs the npx binary directly with array-form args. Also includes Prettier reformatting (single→double quotes, trailing commas, line wrapping) applied by the repo's PostToolUse formatter hook. Security-relevant change is just the two shell:true -> shell: process.platform === 'win32' lines; everything else is whitespace/style. * security(E3): gate GSTACK_SLUG on /welcome path traversal The /welcome handler interpolates GSTACK_SLUG directly into the filesystem path used to locate the project-local welcome page. Without validation, a slug like "../../etc/passwd" would resolve to ~/.gstack/projects/../../etc/passwd/designs/welcome-page-20260331/finalized.html — classic path traversal. Not exploitable today: GSTACK_SLUG is set by the gstack CLI at daemon launch, and an attacker would already need local env-var access to poison it. But the gate is one regex (^[a-z0-9_-]+$), and a defense-in-depth pass costs us nothing when the cost of being wrong is arbitrary file read via /welcome. Fall back to the safe 'unknown' literal when the slug fails validation — same fallback the code already uses when GSTACK_SLUG is unset. No behavior change for legitimate slugs (they all match the regex). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * security(N1): replace ?token= SSE auth with HttpOnly session cookie Activity stream and inspector events SSE endpoints accepted the root AUTH_TOKEN via `?token=` query param (EventSource can't send Authorization headers). URLs leak to browser history, referer headers, server logs, crash reports, and refactoring accidents. Codex flagged this during the /plan-ceo-review outside voice pass. New auth model: the extension calls POST /sse-session with a Bearer token and receives a view-only session cookie (HttpOnly, SameSite=Strict, 30-min TTL). EventSource is opened with `withCredentials: true` so the browser sends the cookie back on the SSE connection. The ?token= query param is GONE — no more URL-borne secrets. Scope isolation (prior learning cookie-picker-auth-isolation, 10/10 confidence): the SSE session cookie grants access to /activity/stream and /inspector/events ONLY. The token is never valid against /command, /token, or any mutating endpoint. A leaked cookie can watch activity; it cannot execute browser commands. Components * browse/src/sse-session-cookie.ts — registry: mint/validate/extract/ build-cookie. 256-bit tokens, 30-min TTL, lazy expiry pruning, no imports from token-registry (scope isolation enforced by module boundary). * browse/src/server.ts — POST /sse-session mint endpoint (requires Bearer). /activity/stream and /inspector/events now accept Bearer OR the session cookie, and reject ?token= query param. * extension/sidepanel.js — ensureSseSessionCookie() bootstrap call, EventSource opened with withCredentials:true on both SSE endpoints. Tested via the source guards; behavioral test is the E2E pairing flow that lands later in the wave. * browse/test/sse-session-cookie.test.ts — 20 unit tests covering mint entropy, TTL enforcement, cookie flag invariants, cookie parsing from multi-cookie headers, and scope-isolation contract guard (module must not import token-registry). * browse/test/server-auth.test.ts — existing /activity/stream auth test updated to assert the new cookie-based gate and the absence of the ?token= query param. Cookie flag choices: * HttpOnly: token not readable from page JS (mitigates XSS exfiltration). * SameSite=Strict: cookie not sent on cross-site requests (mitigates CSRF). Fine for SSE because the extension connects to 127.0.0.1 directly. * Path=/: cookie scoped to the whole origin. * Max-Age=1800: 30 minutes, matches TTL. Extension re-mints on reconnect when daemon restarts. * Secure NOT set: daemon binds to 127.0.0.1 over plain HTTP. Adding Secure would block the browser from ever sending the cookie back. Add Secure when gstack ships over HTTPS. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * security(N2): document Windows v20 ABE elevation path on CDP port The existing comment around the cookie-import-browser --remote-debugging-port launch claimed "threat model: no worse than baseline." That's wrong on Windows with App-Bound Encryption v20. A same-user local process that opens the cookie SQLite DB directly CANNOT decrypt v20 values (DPAPI context is bound to the browser process). The CDP port lets them bypass that: connect to the debug port, call Network.getAllCookies inside Chrome, walk away with decrypted v20 cookies. The correct fix is to switch from TCP --remote-debugging-port to --remote-debugging-pipe so the CDP transport is a stdio pipe, not a socket. That requires restructuring the CDP WebSocket client in this module and Playwright doesn't expose the pipe transport out of the box. Non-trivial, deferred from the v1.6.0.0 wave. This commit updates the comment to correctly describe the threat and points at the tracking issue. No code change to the launch itself. Follow-up: #1136. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs(E2): document dual-listener tunnel architecture in ARCHITECTURE.md Adds an explicit per-endpoint disposition table to the Security model section, covering the v1.6.0.0 dual-listener refactor. Every HTTP endpoint now has a documented local-vs-tunnel answer. Future audits (and future contributors wondering "is it safe to add X to the tunnel surface?") can read this instead of reverse-engineering server.ts. Also documents: * Why physical port separation beats per-request header inference (ngrok behavior drift, local proxies can forge headers, etc.) * Tunnel surface denial logging → ~/.gstack/security/attempts.jsonl * SSE session cookie model (gstack_sse, 30-min TTL, stream-scope only, module-boundary-enforced scope isolation) * N2 non-goal for Windows v20 ABE via CDP port (tracking #1136) No code changes. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * test(E1): end-to-end pair-agent flow against a spawned daemon Spawns the browse daemon as a subprocess with BROWSE_HEADLESS_SKIP=1 so the HTTP layer runs without a real browser. Exercises: * GET /health — token delivery for chrome-extension origin, withheld otherwise (the F1 + PR #1026 invariant) * GET /connect — alive probe returns {alive:true} unauth * POST /pair — root Bearer required (403 without), returns setup_key * POST /connect — setup_key exchange mints a distinct scoped token * POST /command — 401 without auth * POST /sse-session — Bearer required, Set-Cookie has HttpOnly + SameSite=Strict (the N1 invariant) * GET /activity/stream — 401 without auth * GET /activity/stream?token= — 401 (the old ?token= query param is REJECTED, which is the whole point of N1) * GET /welcome — serves HTML, does not leak /etc/passwd content under the default 'unknown' slug (E3 regex gate) 12 behavioral tests, ~220ms end-to-end, no network dependencies, no ngrok, no real browser. This is the receipt for the wave's central 'pair-agent still works + the security boundary holds' claim. Tunnel-port binding (/tunnel/start) is deliberately NOT exercised here — it requires an ngrok authtoken and live network. The dual-listener route allowlist is covered by source-level guards in dual-listener.test.ts; behavioral tunnel testing belongs in a separate paid-evals harness. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * release(v1.6.0.0): bump VERSION + CHANGELOG for security wave Architectural bump, not patch: dual-listener HTTP refactor changes the daemon's tunnel-exposure model. See CHANGELOG for the full release summary (~950 words) covering the five root causes this wave closes: 1. /health token leak over ngrok (F1 + E3 + test infra) 2. /cookie-picker + /inspector exposed over the tunnel (F1) 3. ?token=<ROOT> in SSE URLs leaking to logs/referer/history (N1) 4. /welcome GSTACK_SLUG path traversal (E3) 5. Windows v20 ABE elevation via CDP port (N2 — documented non-goal, tracked as #1136) Plus the base PRs: SSRF gate (#1029), envelope sentinel escape (#1031), DOM-channel hidden-element coverage (#1032), --from-file path validation (#1103), and 2 commits from #1073 (@theqazi). VERSION + package.json bumped to 1.6.0.0. CHANGELOG entry covers credits (@garagon, @Hybirdss, @HMAKT99, @theqazi), review lineage (CEO → Codex outside voice → Eng), and the non-goal tracking issue. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: pre-landing review findings (4 auto-fixes) Addresses 4 findings from the Claude adversarial subagent on the v1.6.0.0 security wave diff. No user-visible behavior change; all are defense-in-depth hardening of newly-introduced code. 1. GET /connect rate-limited (was POST-only) [HIGH conf 8/10] Attacker discovering the ngrok URL could probe unlimited GETs for daemon enumeration. Now shares the global /connect counter. 2. ngrok listener leak on tunnel startup failure [MEDIUM conf 8/10] If ngrok.forward() resolved but tunnelListener.url() or the state-file write threw, the Bun listener was torn down but the ngrok session was leaked. Fixed in BOTH /tunnel/start and BROWSE_TUNNEL=1 startup paths. 3. GSTACK_SKILL_ROOT path-traversal gate [MEDIUM conf 8/10] Symmetric with E3's GSTACK_SLUG regex gate — reject values containing '..' before interpolating into the welcome-page path. 4. SSE session registry pruning [LOW conf 7/10] pruneExpired() only checked 10 entries per mint call. Now runs on every validate too, checks 20 entries, with a hard 10k cap as backstop. Prevents registry growth under sustained extension reconnect pressure. Tests remain green (56/56 in sse-session-cookie + dual-listener + pair-agent-e2e suites). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs: update project documentation for v1.6.0.0 Reflect the dual-listener tunnel architecture, SSE session cookies, SSRF guards, and Windows v20 ABE non-goal across the three docs users actually read for remote-agent and browser auth context: - docs/REMOTE_BROWSER_ACCESS.md: rewrote Architecture diagram for dual listeners, fixed /connect rate limit (3/min → 300/min), removed stale "/health requires no auth" (now 404 on tunnel), added SSE cookie auth, expanded Security Model with tunnel allowlist, SSRF guards, /welcome path traversal defense, and the Windows v20 ABE tracking note. - BROWSER.md: added dual-listener paragraph to Authentication and linked to ARCHITECTURE.md endpoint table. Replaced the stale ?token= SSE auth note with the HttpOnly gstack_sse cookie flow. - CLAUDE.md: added Transport-layer security section above the sidebar prompt-injection stack so contributors editing server.ts, sse-session-cookie.ts, or tunnel-denial-log.ts see the load-bearing module boundaries before touching them. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(make-pdf): write --from-file payload to /tmp, not os.tmpdir() make-pdf's browseClient wrote its --from-file payload to os.tmpdir(), which is /var/folders/... on macOS. v1.6.0.0's PR #1103 cherry-pick tightened browse load-html --from-file to validate against the safe-dirs allowlist ([TEMP_DIR, cwd] where TEMP_DIR is '/tmp' on macOS/Linux, os.tmpdir() on Windows). This closed a CLI/API parity gap but broke make-pdf on macOS because /var/folders/... is outside the allowlist. Fix: mirror browse's TEMP_DIR convention — use '/tmp' on non-Windows, os.tmpdir() on Windows. The make-pdf-gate CI failure on macOS-latest (run 72440797490) is caused by exactly this: the payload file was rejected by validateReadPath. Verified locally: the combined-gate e2e test now passes after rebuilding make-pdf/dist/pdf. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(sidebar): killAgent resets per-tab state; align tests with current agent event format Two pre-existing bugs surfaced while running the full e2e suite on the sec-wave branch. Both pre-date v1.6.0.0 (same failures on main at e23ff280) but blocked the ship verification, so fixing now. ### Bug 1: killAgent leaked stale per-tab state `killAgent()` reset the legacy globals (agentProcess, agentStatus, etc.) but never touched the per-tab `tabAgents` Map. Meanwhile `/sidebar-command` routes on `tabState.status` from that Map, not the legacy globals. Consequence: after a kill (including the implicit kill in `/sidebar-session/new`), the next /sidebar-command on the same tab saw `tabState.status === 'processing'` and fell into the queue branch, silently NOT spawning an agent. Integration tests that called resetState between cases all failed with empty queues. Fix: when targetTabId is supplied, reset that one tab's state; when called without a tab (session-new, full kill), reset ALL tab states. Matches the semantic boundary already used for the cancel-file write. ### Bug 2: sidebar-integration tests drifted from current event format `agent events appear in /sidebar-chat` posted the raw Claude streaming format (`{type: 'assistant', message: {content: [...]}}`) but `processAgentEvent` in server.ts only handles the simplified types that sidebar-agent.ts pre-processes into (text, text_delta, tool_use, result, agent_error, security_event). The architecture moved pre-processing into sidebar-agent.ts at some point and this test never got updated. Fixed by sending the pre-processed `{type: 'text', text: '...'}` format — which is actually what the server sees in production. Also removed the `entry.prompt` URL-containment check in the queue-write test. The URL is carried on entry.pageUrl (metadata) by design: the system prompt tells Claude to run `browse url` to fetch the actual page rather than trust any URL in the prompt body. That's the URL-based prompt-injection defense. The prompt SHOULD NOT contain the URL, so the test assertion was wrong for the current security posture. ### Verification - `bun test browse/test/sidebar-integration.test.ts` → 13/13 pass (was 6/13 on both main and branch before this commit) - Full `bun run test` → exit 0, zero fail markers - No behavior change for production sidebar flows: killAgent was already supposed to return the agent to idle; it just wasn't fully doing so. Per-tab reset now matches the documented semantics. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: gus <gustavoraularagon@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Mohammed Qazi <10266060+theqazi@users.noreply.github.com>	2026-04-21 21:58:27 -07:00
Garry Tan	8ca950f6f1	feat: content security — 4-layer prompt injection defense for pair-agent (#815) ... * feat: token registry for multi-agent browser access Per-agent scoped tokens with read/write/admin/meta command categories, domain glob restrictions, rate limiting, expiry, and revocation. Setup key exchange for the /pair-agent ceremony (5-min one-time key → 24h session token). Idempotent exchange handles tunnel drops. 39 tests. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: integrate token registry + scoped auth into browse server Server changes for multi-agent browser access: - /connect endpoint: setup key exchange for /pair-agent ceremony - /token endpoint: root-only minting of scoped sub-tokens - /token/:clientId DELETE: revoke agent tokens - /agents endpoint: list connected agents (root-only) - /health: strips root token when tunnel is active (P0 security fix) - /command: scope/rate/domain checks via token registry before dispatch - Idle timer skips shutdown when tunnel is active Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: ngrok tunnel integration + @ngrok/ngrok dependency BROWSE_TUNNEL=1 env var starts an ngrok tunnel after Bun.serve(). Reads NGROK_AUTHTOKEN from env or ~/.gstack/ngrok.env. Reads NGROK_DOMAIN for dedicated domain (stable URL). Updates state file with tunnel URL. Feasibility spike confirmed: SDK works in compiled Bun binary. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: tab isolation for multi-agent browser access Add per-tab ownership tracking to BrowserManager. Scoped agents must create their own tab via newtab before writing. Unowned tabs (pre-existing, user-opened) are root-only for writes. Read access always allowed. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: tab enforcement + POST /pair endpoint + activity attribution Server-side tab ownership check blocks scoped agents from writing to unowned tabs. Special-case newtab records ownership for scoped tokens. POST /pair endpoint creates setup keys for the pairing ceremony. Activity events now include clientId for attribution. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: pair-agent CLI command + instruction block generator One command to pair a remote agent: $B pair-agent. Creates a setup key via POST /pair, prints a copy-pasteable instruction block with curl commands. Smart tunnel fallback (tunnel URL > auto-start > localhost). Flags: --for HOST, --local HOST, --admin, --client NAME. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * test: tab isolation + instruction block generator tests 14 tests covering tab ownership lifecycle (access checks, unowned tabs, transferTab) and instruction block generator (scopes, URLs, admin flag, troubleshooting section). Fix server-auth test that used fragile sliceBetween boundaries broken by new endpoints. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore: bump version and changelog (v0.15.9.0) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: CSO security fixes — token leak, domain bypass, input validation 1. Remove root token from /health endpoint entirely (CSO #1 CRITICAL). Origin header is spoofable. Extension reads from ~/.gstack/.auth.json. 2. Add domain check for newtab URL (CSO #5). Previously only goto was checked, allowing domain-restricted agents to bypass via newtab. 3. Validate scope values, rateLimit, expiresSeconds in createToken() (CSO #4). Rejects invalid scopes and negative values. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: /pair-agent skill — syntactic sugar for browser sharing Users remember /pair-agent, not $B pair-agent. The skill walks through agent selection (OpenClaw, Hermes, Codex, Cursor, generic), local vs remote setup, tunnel configuration, and includes platform-specific notes for each agent type. Wraps the CLI command with context. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs: remote browser access reference for paired agents Full API reference, snapshot→@ref pattern, scopes, tab isolation, error codes, ngrok setup, and same-machine shortcuts. The instruction block points here for deeper reading. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: improved instruction block with snapshot→@ref pattern The paste-into-agent instruction block now teaches the snapshot→@ref workflow (the most powerful browsing pattern), shows the server URL prominently, and uses clearer formatting. Tests updated to match. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: smart ngrok detection + auto-tunnel in pair-agent The pair-agent command now checks ngrok's native config (not just ~/.gstack/ngrok.env) and auto-starts the tunnel when ngrok is available. The skill template walks users through ngrok install and auth if not set up, instead of just printing a dead localhost URL. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: on-demand tunnel start via POST /tunnel/start pair-agent now auto-starts the ngrok tunnel without restarting the server. New POST /tunnel/start endpoint reads authtoken from env, ~/.gstack/ngrok.env, or ngrok's native config. CLI detects ngrok availability and calls the endpoint automatically. Zero manual steps when ngrok is installed and authed. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: pair-agent skill must output the instruction block verbatim Added CRITICAL instruction: the agent MUST output the full instruction block so the user can copy it. Previously the agent could summarize over it, leaving the user with nothing to paste. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: scoped tokens rejected on /command — auth gate ordering bug The blanket validateAuth() gate (root-only) sat above the /command endpoint, rejecting all scoped tokens with 401 before they reached getTokenInfo(). Moved /command above the gate so both root and scoped tokens are accepted. This was the bug Wintermute hit. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: pair-agent auto-launches headed mode before pairing When pair-agent detects headless mode, it auto-switches to headed (visible Chromium window) so the user can watch what the remote agent does. Use --headless to skip this. Fixed compiled binary path resolution (process.execPath, not process.argv[1] which is virtual /$bunfs/ in Bun compiled binaries). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * test: comprehensive tests for auth ordering, tunnel, ngrok, headed mode 16 new tests covering: - /command sits above blanket auth gate (Wintermute bug) - /command uses getTokenInfo not validateAuth - /tunnel/start requires root, checks native ngrok config, returns already_active - /pair creates setup keys not session tokens - Tab ownership checked before command dispatch - Activity events include clientId - Instruction block teaches snapshot→@ref pattern - pair-agent auto-headed mode, process.execPath, --headless skip - isNgrokAvailable checks all 3 sources (gstack env, env var, native config) - handlePairAgent calls /tunnel/start not server restart Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: chain scope bypass + /health info leak when tunneled 1. Chain command now pre-validates ALL subcommand scopes before executing any. A read+meta token can no longer escalate to admin via chain (eval, js, cookies were dispatched without scope checks). tokenInfo flows through handleMetaCommand into the chain handler. Rejects entire chain if any subcommand fails. 2. /health strips sensitive fields (currentUrl, agent.currentMessage, session) when tunnel is active. Only operational metadata (status, mode, uptime, tabs) exposed to the internet. Previously anyone reaching the ngrok URL could surveil browsing activity. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs: tout /pair-agent as headline feature in CHANGELOG + README Lead with what it does for the user: type /pair-agent, paste into your other agent, done. First time AI agents from different companies can coordinate through a shared browser with real security boundaries. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs: expand /pair-agent, /design-shotgun, /design-html in README Each skill gets a real narrative paragraph explaining the workflow, not just a table cell. design-shotgun: visual exploration with taste memory. design-html: production HTML with Pretext computed layout. pair-agent: cross-vendor AI agent coordination through shared browser. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor: split handleCommand into handleCommandInternal + HTTP wrapper Chain subcommands now route through handleCommandInternal for full security enforcement (scope, domain, tab ownership, rate limiting, content wrapping). Adds recursion guard for nested chains, rate-limit exemption for chain subcommands, and activity event suppression (1 event per chain, not per sub). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: add content-security.ts with datamarking, envelope, and filter hooks Four-layer prompt injection defense for pair-agent browser sharing: - Datamarking: session-scoped watermark for text exfiltration detection - Content envelope: trust boundary wrapping with ZWSP marker escaping - Content filter hooks: extensible filter pipeline with warn/block modes - Built-in URL blocklist: requestbin, pipedream, webhook.site, etc. BROWSE_CONTENT_FILTER env var controls mode: off|warn|block (default: warn) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: centralize content wrapping in handleCommandInternal response path Single wrapping location replaces fragmented per-handler wrapping: - Scoped tokens: content filters + datamarking + enhanced envelope - Root tokens: existing basic wrapping (backward compat) - Chain subcommands exempt from top-level wrapping (wrapped individually) - Adds 'attrs' to PAGE_CONTENT_COMMANDS (ARIA value exposure defense) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: hidden element stripping for scoped token text extraction Detects CSS-hidden elements (opacity, font-size, off-screen, same-color, clip-path) and ARIA label injection patterns. Marks elements with data-gstack-hidden, extracts text from a clean clone (no DOM mutation), then removes markers. Only active for scoped tokens on text command. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: snapshot split output format for scoped tokens Scoped tokens get a split snapshot: trusted @refs section (for click/fill) separated from untrusted web content in an envelope. Ref names truncated to 50 chars in trusted section. Root tokens unchanged (backward compat). Resume command also uses split format for scoped tokens. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: add SECURITY section to pair-agent instruction block Instructs remote agents to treat content inside untrusted envelopes as potentially malicious. Lists common injection phrases to watch for. Directs agents to only use @refs from the trusted INTERACTIVE ELEMENTS section, not from page content. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * test: add 4 prompt injection test fixtures - injection-visible.html: visible injection in product review text - injection-hidden.html: 7 CSS hiding techniques + ARIA injection + false positive - injection-social.html: social engineering in legitimate-looking content - injection-combined.html: all attack types + envelope escape attempt Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * test: comprehensive content security tests (47 tests) Covers all 4 defense layers: - Datamarking: marker format, session consistency, text-only application - Content envelope: wrapping, ZWSP marker escaping, filter warnings - Content filter hooks: URL blocklist, custom filters, warn/block modes - Instruction block: SECURITY section content, ordering, generation - Centralized wrapping: source-level verification of integration - Chain security: recursion guard, rate-limit exemption, activity suppression - Hidden element stripping: 7 CSS techniques, ARIA injection, false positives - Snapshot split format: scoped vs root output, resume integration Also fixes: visibility:hidden detection, case-insensitive ARIA pattern matching. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: pair-agent skill compliance + fix all 16 pre-existing test failures Root cause: pair-agent was added without completing the gen-skill-docs compliance checklist. All 16 failures traced back to this. Fixes: - Sync package.json version to VERSION (0.15.9.0) - Add "(gstack)" to pair-agent description for discoverability - Add pair-agent to Codex path exception (legitimately documents ~/.codex/) - Add CLI_COMMANDS (status, pair-agent, tunnel) to skill parser allowlist - Regenerate SKILL.md for all hosts (claude, codex, factory, kiro, etc.) - Update golden file baselines for ship skill - Fix relink tests: pass GSTACK_INSTALL_DIR to auto-relink calls so they use the fast mock install instead of scanning real ~/.claude/skills/gstack Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore: bump version and changelog (v0.15.12.0) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: E2E exit reason precedence + worktree prune race condition Two fixes for E2E test reliability: 1. session-runner.ts: error_max_turns was misclassified as error_api because is_error flag was checked before subtype. Now known subtypes like error_max_turns are preserved even when is_error is set. The is_error override only applies when subtype=success (API failure). 2. worktree.ts: pruneStale() now skips worktrees < 1 hour old to avoid deleting worktrees from concurrent test runs still in progress. Previously any second test execution would kill the first's worktrees. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: restore token in /health for localhost extension auth The CSO security fix stripped the token from /health to prevent leaking when tunneled. But the extension needs it to authenticate on localhost. Now returns token only when not tunneled (safe: localhost-only path). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * test: verify /health token is localhost-only, never served through tunnel Updated tests to match the restored token behavior: - Test 1: token assignment exists AND is inside the !tunnelActive guard - Test 1b: tunnel branch (else block) does not contain AUTH_TOKEN Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs: add security rationale for token in /health on localhost Explains why this is an accepted risk (no escalation over file-based token access), CORS protection, and tunnel guard. Prevents future CSO scans from stripping it without providing an alternative auth path. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: verify tunnel is alive before returning URL to pair-agent Root cause: when ngrok dies externally (pkill, crash, timeout), the server still reports tunnelActive=true with a dead URL. pair-agent prints an instruction block pointing at a dead tunnel. The remote agent gets "endpoint offline" and the user has to manually restart everything. Three-layer fix: - Server /pair endpoint: probes tunnel URL before returning it. If dead, resets tunnelActive/tunnelUrl and returns null (triggers CLI restart). - Server /tunnel/start: probes cached tunnel before returning already_active. If dead, falls through to restart ngrok automatically. - CLI pair-agent: double-checks tunnel URL from server before printing instruction block. Falls through to auto-start on failure. 4 regression tests verify all three probe points + CLI verification. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: add POST /batch endpoint for multi-command batching Remote agents controlling GStack Browser through a tunnel pay 2-5s of latency per HTTP round-trip. A typical "navigate and read" takes 4 sequential commands = 10-20 seconds. The /batch endpoint collapses N commands into a single HTTP round-trip, cutting a 20-tab crawl from ~60s to ~5s. Sequential execution through the full security pipeline (scope, domain, tab ownership, content wrapping). Rate limiting counts the batch as 1 request. Activity events emitted at batch level, not per-command. Max 50 commands per batch. Nested batches rejected. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * test: add source-level security tests for /batch endpoint 8 tests verifying: auth gate placement, scoped token support, max command limit, nested batch rejection, rate limiting bypass, batch-level activity events, command field validation, and tabId passthrough. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: correct CHANGELOG date from 2026-04-06 to 2026-04-05 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor: consolidate Hermes into generic HTTP option in pair-agent Hermes doesn't have a host-specific config — it uses the same generic curl instructions as any other agent. Removing the dedicated option simplifies the menu and eliminates a misleading distinction. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore: bump VERSION to 0.15.14.0, add CHANGELOG entry for batch endpoint Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore: regenerate pair-agent/SKILL.md after main merge Vendoring deprecation section from main's template wasn't reflected in the generated file. Fixes check-freshness CI. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor: checkTabAccess uses options object, add own-only tab policy Refactors checkTabAccess(tabId, clientId, isWrite) to use an options object { isWrite?, ownOnly? }. Adds tabPolicy === 'own-only' support in the server command dispatch — scoped tokens with this policy are restricted to their own tabs for all commands, not just writes. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: add --domain flag to pair-agent CLI for domain restrictions Allows passing --domain to pair-agent to restrict the remote agent's navigation to specific domains (comma-separated). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * revert: remove batch commands CHANGELOG entry and VERSION bump The batch endpoint work belongs on the browser-batch-multitab branch (port-louis), not this branch. Reverting VERSION to 0.15.14.0. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: adopt main's headed-mode /health token serving Our merge kept the old !tunnelActive guard which conflicted with main's security-audit-r2 tests that require no currentUrl/currentMessage in /health. Adopts main's approach: serve token conditionally based on headed mode or chrome-extension origin. Updates server-auth tests. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: improve snapshot flags docs completeness for LLM judge Adds $B placeholder explanation, explicit syntax line, and detailed flag behavior (-d depth values, -s CSS selector syntax, -D unified diff format and baseline persistence, -a screenshot vs text output relationship). Fixes snapshot flags reference LLM eval scoring completeness < 4. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-04-06 14:41:06 -07:00