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Author SHA1 Message Date
Garry Tan 008dd65b1f
v1.64.0.0 fix wave: full tracker audit — 90 fixes, 52 issues closed, ~50 community PRs absorbed (#2571) 
* fix(hooks): nest freeze/careful permissionDecision under hookSpecificOutput

Claude Code ignores a top-level permissionDecision, so the /freeze deny and
/careful ask guards silently allowed everything. Nest both under
hookSpecificOutput with permissionDecisionReason, update the shape-blind
tests to pin the nested form, and document the constraint in both skill
templates (regen included).

Closes half of #1459 (freeze enforcement chain).

Contributed by @jawadakram20 (PR #2331; team-init hunk deferred to the
dedicated team-init fix).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(team-init): required-mode hook blocks with nested schema + exit 2

The generated check-gstack.sh emitted a flat permissionDecision payload and
exited 0, which Claude Code ignores — required mode enforced nothing. The
generated hook now nests the deny under hookSpecificOutput and exits 2 so
the block holds even if the JSON schema drifts again. Adds a temp-repo
regression test that runs the generated hook under both installed and
missing-gstack homes.

Fixes #2413, #2296.

Contributed by @Masashi-Ono0611 (PR #2423).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(careful): close three check-careful bypasses via real JSON extraction

The grep-based command extractor stopped at the first escaped quote, so any
quoted argument truncated the command before the pattern checks ran —
`git commit -m "wip" && rm -rf /` was silently allowed. Replace it with a
python3/node JSON parse that fails CLOSED on unreadable payloads, add an
IFS/base64-to-shell obfuscation tripwire, and stop multi-line commands from
riding the single-line safe-exception whitelist (line-based grep would have
approved `rm -rf /` when a later line matched node_modules — a hazard the
real newline decoding exposed).

Contributed by @wtamminga (PR #2426; the -R hunk was dropped — it landed in
v1.61.0.0 — and output shapes updated to the nested hookSpecificOutput form).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(review,autoplan): require explicit run_in_background: false on specialist agents

Claude Code v2.1.198 made subagents run in the background by default, which
inverted the old "do not use the flag" guidance: review-army specialists and
autoplan dual voices silently launched in the background and the merge step
could proceed before they completed — regressing the #497 fix. The generated
guidance now instructs an explicit run_in_background: false, and a static
tripwire fails the free suite if the inert inverted phrasing ever returns to
any generated SKILL.md.

Fixes #2440.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(investigate): anchor the scope-lock freeze hook on $HOME, not CLAUDE_SKILL_DIR

The investigate skill's PreToolUse hooks and Scope Lock probe resolved
check-freeze.sh via ${CLAUDE_SKILL_DIR}, which does not exist when
frontmatter hooks run — the || exit 0 tail then failed open, so the debug
scope boundary silently never engaged (#1871 follow-up). Anchor all four
sites on $HOME/.claude/skills/gstack/ like careful/freeze, and add a static
test asserting no frontmatter command: line in the guard-family skills ever
references CLAUDE_SKILL_DIR again.

Fixes #2469; closes the last live half of #1459 together with the
freeze/careful hookSpecificOutput fix. The broader portable-install-root
rewrite stays #1882 (its own focused PR per the TODOS.md decision).

Reported with a fix by @maxpetrusenkoagent (PR #1873; absorbed narrowly —
the cwd-walk rewrite belongs to #1882).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(redact): scan large diffs in line-aligned slices; stop digit-UUIDs matching as cards/phones

The prepush guard blocked any push whose added lines exceeded the engine's
1 MiB cap with engine.input_too_large — a size error naming no credential —
which trains people onto GSTACK_REDACT_PREPUSH=skip. Scan in 768 KiB
line-aligned slices instead (no pattern is multi-line, so a boundary cannot
bisect a secret); a single oversized line still goes to the engine intact and
fails closed. Also suppress card/phone matches whose span sits ENTIRELY
inside a UUID — digit-only UUID fixtures were 14 of 21 MEDIUM findings on an
ordinary branch, the noise level that stops people reading MEDIUM at all.

Fixes #2304.

Contributed by @luckywenapere (PR #2543).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(redact): block Google OAuth client secrets and Telegram bot tokens at HIGH

GOCSPX-prefixed client secrets and <bot_id>:<35-char> Telegram tokens are
never-publishable credential shapes with unambiguous formats — both now
block at HIGH like the other live-format credentials.

Contributed by @francis-eye (PR #2357).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(redact-prepush): resolve the real push base instead of EMPTY_TREE whole-repo scans

When the remote default branch is not main/master (or origin/HEAD is unset),
the merge-base guess failed and the hook fell back to scanning the ENTIRE
repository as added lines — re-attributing long-pushed secrets to the
current push and, on any real repo, tripping the engine byte cap so the push
blocked having scanned nothing. Derive the base from commits reachable from
no remote-tracking branch, keep the empty-tree path only for genuinely fresh
repos, and split the block message so an unscannable diff is reported as
"could not scan (fail closed)" rather than "credential found — rotate it".

Contributed by @stormeoio (PR #2398).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(redact-prepush): preserve the trailing newline handed to chained pre-push.local

The chaining wrapper captured stdin with $(cat), which strips the trailing
newline — a chained shell hook built on `while read` then never entered its
loop for the final (usually only) ref line and exited 0, failing OPEN. Use
the printf-x sentinel so the byte-exact input reaches the chained hook, with
tests covering both the pass-through and the short-circuit paths.

Contributed by @francis-eye (PR #2358).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(redact-prepush): close the ext-diff, header-lookalike, and ref-parse bypasses

Three ways the pushed diff escaped scanning: (1) a user-level diff.external
or textconv driver replaced the diff with its own output — zero '+' lines,
so the scan saw nothing (now --no-ext-diff --no-textconv); (2) an added
content line whose text begins with "++" renders as "+++…" and the blanket
header skip dropped it (now hunk-aware header detection); (3) a pre-push
ref line that failed to parse was silently skipped, leaving that ref
unscanned (now fails closed with the offending line named).

Minimal reimplementation of the two confirmed bypasses from PR #2498 by
@lubosxyz (the full PR overlaps the chunked-scan work absorbed separately),
plus the unparseable-ref hardening.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(pair-agent): keep the ngrok authtoken out of the transcript and shell argv

The not-authed flow told the user to paste their ngrok authtoken into the
chat so the agent could run `ngrok config add-authtoken` — putting a live
credential in the transcript, tool-call argv, and anything the transcript
syncs to. The user now runs the auth command in their own terminal; the
agent only verifies via `ngrok config check`, and a pasted token triggers a
rotate-and-reauth instruction. A static test pins that no agent-run bash
fence ever contains add-authtoken again.

Fixes #2335.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(update-check): crash emits CHECK_FAILED instead of reading as up-to-date

gstack-update-check signals "up to date" with SILENCE, and it runs under
set -e — so any unguarded mid-script failure exited quietly and was
indistinguishable from a current install. Observed live as a 45-release
silent-staleness incident. An ERR trap (with -E so it propagates into
functions) now emits a CHECK_FAILED sentinel naming the line and status,
and exits 0 so caller `|| true` guards can't eat it. Behavioral tests cover
both the crash and the healthy-silent paths; egress-receipt wiring is
untouched and still pinned by test/egress-receipt-wiring.test.ts.

Fixes #1974. (#2378's HEAD-SHA staleness half was already fixed on main by
the ls-remote + SHA-pinned VERSION resolution — close as already-fixed.)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(deps): bump diff 7.0.0 → 9.0.0 (GHSA-73rr-hh4g-fpgx parsePatch DoS)

The advisory affects diff 6.x–8.0.2. The only API this repo uses is
Diff.diffLines (browse/src/snapshot.ts:571, browse/src/meta-commands.ts:728),
which is unchanged across the major hop; snapshot tests pass against 9.0.0.

Closes #1588.

Contributed by @genisis0x (PR #1599; VERSION collateral stripped, lockfile
regenerated fresh).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* ci(evals): skip eval jobs deterministically on fork PRs

Fork PRs never receive repository secrets, so every API-calling eval failed
at SDK auth — but only when Docker-cache luck let the jobs start at all,
making fork PRs randomly red or grey. Skip the eval and report jobs
explicitly for fork-origin PRs, keep the image BUILD (validates
Dockerfile.ci changes) without the push a fork token can't perform, and
leave full coverage for same-repo PRs, pushes, and dispatches.

Contributed by @andrey-esipov (PR #2345).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(extension): deny token/port reads to content-script and foreign senders

background.js answered getPort — port, connected state, AND the browse
server auth token — to any sender that passed the type allowlist,
including content scripts running in web-page context and, behind only
the sender.id check, anything without extension-page provenance. The
getToken sender.tab restriction covered getToken alone, and only after
getPort had already handed out the token.

Single decision point now: extension/sender-auth.js classifies each
message type; the eight privileged types (getPort, setPort, getServerUrl,
getToken, fetchRefs, command, sidebar-command, getTabState) require an
own-extension-page sender (chrome-extension://<own id>/ URL, no
sender.tab, own sender.id). Denied senders get { error: 'unauthorized' }
and nothing else — never the token, never the port. Content-script flows
(elementPicked, pickerCancelled, inspectResult, openSidePanel) are
untouched, and the sidepanel/popup keep the getPort token field their
connect path reads. The policy mirrors the v1.63 server-side model:
AUTH_TOKEN is released only to the pinned extension Origin via
POST /extension-token, so the extension must not re-leak it to contexts
the server would never have trusted.

browse/test/extension-sender-auth.test.ts drives the real background.js
onMessage listener under a chrome stub with four sender shapes (own
extension page, own content script, foreign extension id, missing
sender.url) and pins that denied responses carry no token/port fields,
that a denied setPort never persists, that a denied command never
reaches the network, and that the inspector + tab-state flows keep
working. The helper is loaded via importScripts in the classic service
worker and require()-able from bun tests.

Contributed by @punksterlabs (PR #1822; reimplemented against the v1.63 POST /extension-token pinned-origin model).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test(update-check): fixture links gstack-egress-lib.sh — all 38 tests failed on main

v1.63.0.0 made bin/gstack-update-check source bin/gstack-egress-lib.sh
unconditionally, but the test fixture's GSTACK_DIR only linked gstack-config
— every test died at the source line (0/38 pass on pristine main,
verified). The suite-truncation bug hid it: the runner was killed by an
earlier file's delayed process.exit before this file ran. Link the lib like
the real install layout the script assumes.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(browse): capture active-tab state before close() — last-tab auto-create raced the close event

closeTab checked `tabId === this.activeTabId` AFTER awaiting page.close(),
but the page 'close' event handler can fire during that await and reassign
activeTabId — losing the race meant the last-tab auto-create never ran,
leaving the manager with zero tabs. Capture wasActive before closing, and
only reassign activeTabId when it no longer points at a live tab.

Part of the test-integrity repairs unmasked by the suite-truncation fix.

Contributed by @time-attack (PR #2230, browser-manager hunk).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test(browse): delete the orphaned sidebar chat-queue suite; align sidebar-ux/tabs with the PTY-only sidebar

browse/test/sidebar-integration.test.ts tested the /sidebar-command queue
path ripped in v1.14 (34 references to removed endpoints — 11 permanent
failures masked by suite truncation). sidebar-ux.test.ts carried 73 failures
pinning the same dead surface (pickSidebarModel, ANALYSIS_WORDS); the trim
keeps its 108 live tests, including the background.js token/allowlist gates.
sidebar-tabs gets the two matching expectation updates.

Closes #2420, #1980.

Contributed by @time-attack (PR #2230, sidebar hunks; the
security-sidepanel-dom deletion was NOT taken — that suite pins the live
sidepanel DOM surface and passes).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test(browse): align dual-listener and terminal-agent static guards with the current source

Two static-grep guards pinned superseded source shapes and failed once the
suite actually ran them: the tunnel dispatch gate is args-aware since the
--out disk-write ban (canDispatchOverTunnel takes command AND args), and
lazy PTY spawn routes through the maybeSpawnPty helper since v1.44. The
updated assertions pin the current, stricter shapes (open() never spawns;
the helper is the only spawnClaude caller).

Contributed by @time-attack (PR #2230, dual-listener + terminal-agent hunks).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(test): remove all 8 delayed process.exit teardown bombs — the tier-1 gate can finally fail

bun test runs every file in ONE process, so a 500ms setTimeout(process.exit(0))
armed in afterAll fired mid-way through a LATER file and killed the entire
suite with exit 0 and no summary — only ~16 of 434 files ran, and every
downstream failure was invisible (observed live throughout this wave's
enumeration). Changes, all guarded by fault injection:

- Replace every delayed-exit teardown with a time-boxed close of the file's
  own browser (8 files across browse/ and design/); stub the daemon
  /shutdown timer instead of letting its unconditional process.exit tear
  the runner down.
- test/no-suicide-exit.test.ts: static tripwire — no *.test.ts may schedule
  a delayed process.exit again.
- test/exit-propagation.test.ts + fixtures: fault injection with REAL bun
  output proves the truncation shape (exit 0, no summary) and that
  scripts/test-free-shards.ts now detects it: a shard exiting 0 WITHOUT
  bun's final summary line is treated as FAILED (exit code alone is not
  evidence of completion).
- handoff: the three headed-mode integration tests are darwin-skipped with
  a pointer to the known macOS headed-launch breakage (#2242/#2554); they
  keep running on Linux CI. Un-skip in the browse-daemon wave.
- feedback-roundtrip: repair the handler call sites unmasked by the fix —
  handlers take (command, args, session, bm); passing the manager where a
  session belongs broke all six tests.
- user-slug-fallback: HOME isolation makes endpoint_hash deterministic.

Fixes #2421, #2435.

Contributed by @sneakygriff (PR #2172) with repairs from @time-attack
(PR #2230 feedback-roundtrip hunks); supersedes PR #2252 by @whd4 (same
defect, credited).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test: include design/test/ in the free suite and the sharded runner

design/test was absent from both the package.json test globs and TEST_ROOTS
in scripts/test-free-shards.ts — its tests (including one of the teardown
bombs removed in the previous commit) never ran in any CI or local free
run, so design fixes could ship without their unit tests executing.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(make-pdf): reject directories when resolving the browse binary

access(X_OK) is true for directories (they carry the execute/traverse
bit on POSIX and pass the Windows existence check too), so cwd-dependent
resolution could pick the ~/.claude/skills/browse alias DIRECTORY as the
browse binary. Every browse call then exited 4 with empty stderr, which
make-pdf surfaced as "Chromium failed to launch" against a perfectly
healthy Chromium (#2156). Guard isExecutable with statSync().isFile()
so only regular files qualify.

Contributed by @jwilk-hrep (PR #2538).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(make-pdf): write browse-bound temp files under the safe-dirs allowlist

os.tmpdir() on macOS resolves to /var/folders/..., which fails browse's
safe-dirs validation ([/tmp, cwd]) since the v1.6.0.0 --from-file
tightening. Default PDF output (generate with no -o), the preview HTML,
tmpFile() scratch files, and setup's smoke-test fixture/output all wrote
there, so browse rejected the paths it was asked to read or write.
Export PAYLOAD_TMP_DIR from browseClient (the existing TEMP_DIR
convention: os.tmpdir() on Windows, /tmp elsewhere) and route
orchestrator.ts and setup.ts temp files through it.

Contributed by @lvthewah (PR #2505; the browse-binary directory guard
from that PR landed separately via PR #2538).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(make-pdf): stop URLs swallowing smartypants placeholders

A bare autolinked URL (<a href="X">X</a>) has zero whitespace between
the URL text and its own closing tag. TAG_RE carves that </a> into a
NUL-delimited SMARTPANTS_PRESERVED placeholder BEFORE the URL pass
runs, and URL_RE's \S+ swallowed the adjacent placeholder into the URL
match. The restore pass is single-shot, so the inner placeholder never
restored: raw "SMARTPANTS_PRESERVED_N" text leaked into the rendered
link, the </a> vanished, and link-blue styling bled into the rest of
the document (#2084). Excluding the NUL sentinel (\u0000) from the URL
character class stops the match from crossing into an already-carved
zone.

Contributed by @marshaung (PR #2280; PR #2339 by @BrendaB24 covered the
same smartypants defect).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(make-pdf): no blank first page when content precedes the first H1

Two paths put invisible content ahead of the first H1 and cost users a
blank page 1 (#1904):

- A visually-empty preamble (leading <style> block, HTML comment)
  became its own .chapter. That section took the `.chapter:first-of-type
  { break-before: auto }` exception, so the first real chapter inherited
  `break-before: page` and started on page 2. Non-rendering preambles
  now fold into the first real chapter (markup preserved, no page
  break); real text preambles keep their own chapter.
- Leading YAML frontmatter rendered as a literal paragraph of body text
  on its own first page (marked has no frontmatter awareness). It is
  now stripped before parsing; a `---` thematic break elsewhere is
  untouched.

Contributed by @jbetala7 (PR #1913).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(browse): allow about:blank so a restarted daemon can initialise

The daemon opens its own first tab on about:blank, so blocking it in
validateNavigationUrl meant a restarted daemon could never recreate the
blank tab it starts from — and `browse newtab about:blank`, which
`make-pdf setup` runs as its Chromium smoke test, failed and surfaced
as "Chromium failed to launch" against a healthy browser.

Allow about:blank ONLY, never the about: scheme: about:blank has no
origin, loads nothing and runs nothing, while about:config and friends
are real surfaces. Exact href match (lower-cased, since the URL parser
normalises the protocol but not the opaque part), so about:blankfoo
stays blocked.

Contributed by @jwilk-hrep (PR #2537).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(design): drop gpt-image-2 tool model that 400s under the gpt-4o orchestrator

The Responses API rejects pairing a gpt-4o orchestrator with an
image_generation tool spec'd as model: "gpt-image-2" (400
invalid_request_error), which took every design image call offline —
generate, variants, iterate (both threaded and fresh paths), evolve,
and /design-shotgun (#1771). gpt-image-2 is only valid under a gpt-5
orchestrator; with gpt-4o the tool must omit the model field (defaults
to gpt-image-1).

Remove the model field at all five call sites and add a static-grep
tripwire test (design/test/image-gen-pairing.test.ts) that fails CI if
any design/src module reintroduces the gpt-4o + gpt-image-2 pairing.
Re-enabling gpt-image-2 later requires bumping the orchestrator off
gpt-4o in the same diff, which the tripwire permits.

Contributed by @Pablosinyores (PR #1773).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(design): variants AbortError message reports the real 240s timeout

generateVariant arms its abort at 240_000 ms but the AbortError branch
returned "Timeout (120s)" — off by 2x, so a user staring at the failure
could not tell whether to bump the timeout, retry, or drop the call.
Report the actual configured bound, and pin it with a test that forces
the abort path (fast-forwarding only the 240_000 ms timer) and asserts
the surfaced string matches.

Contributed by @vryahn (PR #1774).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(memory-ingest): stop silently ingesting 0 pages — include gitignored staging, reconcile counts

Pages stage into ~/.gstack/.staging-ingest-*/ inside a repo whose .gitignore
is `*`, and gbrain import honours .gitignore — so it collected 0 files,
imported nothing, and the ingest still reported "written: N" from the STAGED
count while advancing state, meaning no future run ever retried. Three
layers now: (1) pass --include-gitignored (root cause); (2) if the installed
gbrain predates the flag, retry without it (subcommand --help is generic, so
the attempt is the only probe) with an upgrade pointer; (3) reconcile
gbrain's imported+unchanged accounting against the staged count and REFUSE
to advance state on a shortfall, naming the gitignore collision.

Fixes #2144, #2104.

Contributed by @gawievanblerk (PR #2560) and @Charles-Grant (PR #2486).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(autoplan): task aggregator returned zero tasks on every run — jq scope bug

Inside ($commits | split("|") | ...) the "." context is the split ARRAY, so
the filter's bare .commit raised "Cannot index array with string" on every
record — and the 2>/dev/null swallowed it, so aggregation silently produced
zero tasks no matter how many the reviews emitted. Bind .commit to $c before
the pipe. Reproduced live before the fix; regenerated autoplan/SKILL.md.

Fixes #2018.

Contributed by @kkroo (PR #2416; regenerated against the current template).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(session-update): un-wedge auto-upgrade — autostash over local patches, log the pull's real reason

On a normal install the tracked files ARE locally patched (skill-prefix
name rewrites, gbrain-refresh blocks), so the bare `git pull --ff-only`
refused on every run and auto-upgrade froze forever — observed as 308
consecutive PULL_FAILED entries with the reason discarded by 2>/dev/null.
Pull now runs --autostash (local patches ride over the update and pop back),
stderr is captured into the log so a genuine failure names its cause, an
autostash pop conflict recovers to a clean tree and re-renders the patches
(gstack-patch-names + gbrain-refresh, both idempotent), and a successful
pull re-renders them as a self-heal. Behavioral tests cover the wedge shape
and the reason logging.

Fixes #2566.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test: raise the free-suite per-test timeout to 30s

bun's 5s default is fine for a file run solo, but the monolithic free suite
shares one process across 100+ files whose browser instances contend for
launch slots — Playwright tests that pass in isolation time out mid-suite.
30s matches the ceiling the enumeration runs used; the sharded runner
(test:free) is unaffected.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(question-log): parse native AskUserQuestion answers — every native answer logged as __unknown__

Current Claude Code returns AskUserQuestion results as an OBJECT map keyed
by question text ({answers: {question: label}}); the hook only handled the
legacy array shapes, so 86% of live records carried user_choice __unknown__
— and the bin then scored every one as followed_recommendation false,
silently poisoning plan-tune metrics. Adds the object-map extraction (exact
+ whitespace-normalized + single-question pairing, multiSelect joins,
annotations as free_text), strips the (Recommended) suffix from BOTH sides
of the comparison, skips the computation entirely on extraction failure,
and logs unrecognized shapes to hook-errors.log instead of embedding them
in the record.

Fixes #2336, #2206.

Based on the working patch in #2336 by @yijisoo; suffix comparison fix
contributed by @chuchu2781 (PR #2400).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(slug): canonicalize slash branches to dash form — review history stops splitting

Branch-name sanitization disagreed across gstack (four incompatible rules),
so reviews for the same slash-named branch landed in multiple files and the
ship dashboard missed entries. gstack-slug now canonicalizes / to - in one
place, and ship's review lookup routes through it; goldens regenerated
against the current templates.

Fixes #1127, #2550.

Contributed by @ShuratCode (PR #2465; duplicate fixes by @xrfael-dev and
two others in PRs #1851/#1699/#1621, credited).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(slug): resolve the project root by marker walk-up — subdirectory sessions stop misfiling state

gstack-slug derived everything from pwd, so a session in a subdirectory got
the subdir's basename as its slug (or an outer monorepo's remote), misfiling
reviews/decisions/learnings under a phantom project — and the per-pwd cache
made the wrong answer permanent. The resolver now walks up from pwd:
outermost STRONG marker wins (.git, package.json, pyproject.toml, Cargo.toml,
Gemfile, go.mod, .project.yaml), weak content markers (README, LICENSE) catch
non-code project folders, deploy artifacts are deliberately not markers, and
GSTACK_PROJECT_SLUG remains the escape hatch. The cache self-heals on
mismatch. Main-side invariants preserved on top: the unconditional
[a-zA-Z0-9._-] re-sanitize before echo and slash→dash branch canonicalization.

Fixes #1125.

Contributed by @ajeenkya (PR #1702; rebased over the sanitize and
branch-canonicalization work that landed after it).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(hooks): shared spawn-bin helper — all three AskUserQuestion hooks were inert on Windows

The plan-tune hooks resolved bin scripts via new URL(import.meta.url).pathname
(which doubles the drive letter on Windows: /C:/C:/...) and spawnSync'd
extensionless bash scripts directly (unrunnable without a shell association)
— so question logging, preferences, and the error fallback all silently
no-op'd on Windows, and /plan-tune collected no data. A single spawn-bin.ts
helper now owns bin resolution (fileURLToPath) and win32 bash routing for
every hook, with static tripwires so a future hook can't reintroduce the
raw pattern. This is the one Windows-spawn idiom for hook code.

Fixes #2356.

Contributed by @rafassousa (PR #2504; supersedes PR #2399 by @chuchu2781).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(model-overlays): add fable-5, opus-4-8, and sonnet-5 overlays + resolver mappings

model-overlays/ had no entry for the current Claude generation, so every
session on a Claude 5 family or Opus 4.8 model fell through to the generic
claude.md nudges. Adds the three overlays with resolver mappings and
per-overlay tests; generated output for the default host is unchanged
(overlays activate by detected model).

Closes #2509.

Contributed by @chrisquorum (PRs #2246, #2243, #2247).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(windows): grant icacls ACEs by *SID, not unqualified username

An unqualified username handed to icacls is ambiguous: on a machine whose
hostname equals the username (a common Windows setup), it resolves to the
MACHINE account instead of the user. Combined with /inheritance:r, that
leaves ~/.gstack with a single ACE matching nobody — the process that just
"secured" the directory locks itself out, and icacls still reports success.

Both icacls sites in the repo (restrictFilePermissions and
restrictDirectoryPermissions in browse/src/file-permissions.ts — the only
icacls call sites; setup has none) now grant via icacls' literal-SID form
`*<SID>`, resolved once per process from System32\whoami.exe (pinned to
System32 because a bare `whoami` under a bash-flavoured PATH picks up the
MSYS build, which rejects /user). Fallback when the SID can't be resolved
is the domain-qualified `USERDOMAIN\username` name, which is unambiguous
where the bare username was not.

Windows-only regression tests assert the hardened directory stays usable
by the calling process (readdir + write), which is exactly the check that
a not-toThrow assertion sailed past before.

Contributed by @asizux2 (PR #2479); the same defect was independently fixed by @Icandi40, @chiragborse1, @IntegriGit and @voltapix26.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(windows): forward windowsHide through the bun-polyfill spawn shims

windowsHide is the one spawn option where Node's default is the opposite
of Bun's: Node shows the child's console window, Bun.spawn hides it.
The polyfill's spawn and spawnSync shims dropped the option entirely, so
the Node fallback path (dist/bun-polyfill.cjs) silently inverted the
behavior on the one platform the shim exists to serve — every watchdog
respawn of the terminal agent popped a visible bun.exe console window.

Three sites fixed:
- Bun.spawnSync shim: forwards windowsHide with Bun-matching default true
- Bun.spawn shim: same (stdio:'ignore' silences output but does NOT
  suppress the console window on Windows)
- spawnTerminalAgent in terminal-agent-control.ts: explicit
  windowsHide: true, so the Node fallback path behaves like Bun-native

An explicit windowsHide: false is honored at both shims. Three focused
tests pin the default-true, default-true-sync, and explicit-false paths
by intercepting child_process in a subprocess; the test file's require
path now uses forward slashes so it survives interpolation into a JS
string literal on Windows.

Supersedes PRs #2523, #2294 and #2290, which each covered a subset of
these sites.

Contributed by @jerrynicholsai (PR #2539); earlier fixes by @jwilk-hrep, @rroojrooj and @WimvandenHeijkant covered subsets of the same sites.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(watchdog): signal-0 liveness, tick-scaled respawn guard, windowsHide

Three-bug chain behind the Windows terminal-agent leak (console window
strobing every 60s, one orphaned agent per watchdog tick until the box
ran out of committable memory):

1. isProcessAlive shelled out to `tasklist /FI "PID eq <pid>"` on Windows
   with a 3s timeout. A Bun.spawnSync that hits its timeout still RETURNS
   with partial stdout, so the `.includes()` PID match read a LIVE agent
   as dead — killAgentByRecord skipped the kill, the watchdog respawned
   around the survivor, and every orphan slowed the next tasklist enough
   to produce the next false negative. Now: `process.kill(pid, 0)` on
   every platform (Node and Bun both map signal 0 to an OpenProcess
   existence check on Windows), with EPERM counted as alive. No
   subprocess, no timeout, no console window.

2. The respawn circuit-breaker was mathematically unreachable — verified
   in this tree: RESPAWN_GUARD_WINDOW_MS was a fixed 60_000 against a
   60_000ms default tick, and each tick pushes at most one respawn
   timestamp, so three pushes span ~120s and can never coexist inside a
   60s window (eviction is strict `>`, and setInterval drift plus
   per-tick work always ages the prior entry past the boundary). The
   guard could not fire at the default tick rate and a steady
   one-per-tick leak ran unbounded. The window now scales with the tick:
   max(60_000, tick * (RESPAWN_GUARD_MAX + 2)), so "3 crashes in quick
   succession → stop" holds at any tick value.

3. The tasklist probe popped a visible console per tick (no windowsHide).
   Removing the shell-out kills that site; the agent-spawn site itself
   already passes windowsHide: true (landed with the bun-polyfill
   windowsHide commit — PR #2414's terminal-agent-control.ts hunk is
   reconciled there rather than duplicated).

New browse/test/process-liveness-windows.test.ts pins all three: no
subprocess from the probe, a static tripwire against reintroducing
`tasklist` + `PID eq` liveness checks in src/, the spawnTerminalAgent
windowsHide + stdio contract, and the window-derived-from-tick
arithmetic. terminal-agent-watchdog.test.ts test 4 now pins the
window/tick relationship instead of the fixed literal that let this
ship. Also converts `new URL(import.meta.url).pathname` to
`import.meta.path` across the static-grep tests it touches — the
pathname form yields /C:/... on Windows and breaks path.resolve.

Contributed by @SYKhayyat (PR #2414).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(terminal-agent): tie agent lifetime to its owning browse server PID

The terminal agent is intentionally detached so it survives the
short-lived CLI launcher, but its real owner is the persistent browse
server. If that server crashed or was killed before running normal
shutdown, the agent was adopted by PID 1 and lived forever (#2019).

spawnTerminalAgent now requires an ownerPid and exports it to the agent
as BROWSE_OWNER_PID; all three spawn sites pass the server PID (cli.ts
cold-start, cli.ts supervisor respawn, server.ts watchdog). The agent
polls the owner with signal 0 every 15s (GSTACK_TERMINAL_OWNER_WATCHDOG_MS
to tune) on an unref'd timer and, when the owner disappears, exits
through the SAME cleanup path as an intentional SIGTERM shutdown — now
re-entrancy-guarded and also removing the terminal-internal-token file
alongside the port file and agent record.

Runtime test spawns a real agent tied to a throwaway owner process,
kills the owner, and asserts the agent exits and its discovery files
(terminal-agent-pid, terminal-port) are gone.

Reconciled with the watchdog commit's spawnTerminalAgent contract test
(process-liveness-windows.test.ts now passes ownerPid and pins the
BROWSE_OWNER_PID env forwarding).

Closes #2019.

Contributed by @csarigoz (PR #2530).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(windows): give the bun-polyfill spawn shim a real `exited` promise

Bun.spawn exposes `proc.exited` as a Promise resolving to the exit code.
The Node fallback shim (dist/bun-polyfill.cjs) returned no such field, so
every `await proc.exited` on the Windows path resolved instantly to
undefined — the Windows cookie picker (cookie-import-browser.ts races
proc.exited at three sites) read stdout before the child produced it and
silent-failed; browser-skill-commands and terminal-agent hit the same
class.

The shim now:
- drains stdout/stderr eagerly into capped in-memory buffers (Node's
  Readables are pull-based; without draining, a child writing past the
  OS pipe buffer blocks in write() and 'exit' never fires), replaying
  them as fresh single-shot Web ReadableStreams so reads work before or
  after awaiting exit;
- caps the buffer at 16 MB (GSTACK_SPAWN_MAX_BUFFER to override), still
  draining past the cap so a runaway child can't wedge or OOM;
- resolves `exited` with Bun-matching codes (exit code, 128+signal, 1 on
  spawn error) after both pipes finish, and resolves on 'error' too —
  Node fires 'error' without 'exit' when the binary is missing, which
  otherwise hangs the await forever.

Six tests pin exit codes, the read-after-exit ordering, spawn-failure
resolution, the buffer cap, and the large-output drain. Adapted to the
current test file (require path goes through the requirePath variable
from the windowsHide commit), and the 1 MB drain test's child now exits
in the write callback — on modern Node a pipe write past the OS buffer
is async and process.exit() straight after write() truncates at ~64 KB
even with a live reader, which fails the test for reasons unrelated to
the shim.

Contributed by @punksterlabs (PR #1743).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(setup): BROWSE_BIN carries the .exe suffix on Windows

On Windows, `bun build --compile` emits browse.exe, but setup's
BROWSE_BIN pointed at the suffixless path — so the post-build gate
(`[ ! -x "$BROWSE_BIN" ]` → "browse binary missing") could never pass on
Windows even after a fully successful build, while the build step itself
reported success. Closes #2291.

Applied the PR's override after the IS_WINDOWS detection, and also to
the second BROWSE_BIN assignment the PR predates: the direct-Codex-
install migration path re-derives BROWSE_BIN from the migrated dir and
would otherwise drop the suffix again on Windows.

Contributed by @rroojrooj (PR #1714).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(setup): link lib/ beside bin/ at all five host-install sites

bin/ scripts import shared modules via ../lib (gstack-learnings-log →
lib/jsonl-store.ts is the reported case), so any runtime root that
exposes bin/ without lib/ breaks 13 bin/ commands — learnings-log,
decision-log, telemetry and friends fail with "Cannot find module
.../lib/jsonl-store.ts" on every non-Claude install, silently from the
skills' perspective.

All five host-install sites now carry lib/ next to bin/, each through
the existing _link_or_copy helper (never raw ln — the static invariant
in test/setup-windows-fallback.test.ts enforces this):

- .agents sidecar (create_agents_sidecar asset loop)
- Codex runtime root (create_codex_runtime_root)
- Factory runtime root (create_factory_runtime_root)
- OpenCode runtime root (create_opencode_runtime_root)
- Kiro install block

New test/setup-runtime-lib-command.test.ts executes the real setup shell
for each root in a sandbox (both the symlink branch and the Windows copy
branch of _link_or_copy) and runs gstack-learnings-log end-to-end from
the installed root, asserting the learning lands in
~/.gstack/projects/<slug>/learnings.jsonl — plus a negative control
proving a bin-without-lib root fails exactly the way the bug report did.
gen-skill-docs.test.ts's setup-validation block pins the lib link at
every site. Cross-checked against PRs #2433, #2410 and #2198: all three
cover subsets of these sites; nothing they fix is missing here.

Contributed by @fedster99 (PR #2262); overlapping fixes by @gregario, @lsendel and @netkurt.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(setup): ship supabase/config.sh with every host runtime root

Distinct from the lib/-beside-bin/ defect: gstack-telemetry-sync,
gstack-update-check, gstack-security-dashboard and
gstack-community-dashboard all source $GSTACK_DIR/supabase/config.sh to
resolve GSTACK_SUPABASE_URL, where GSTACK_DIR is the installed root
(parent of bin/). The [ -f ... ] guard means a root without the file
degrades SILENTLY — telemetry and update checks just stop resolving the
project URL on non-Claude installs. Closes #2215.

setup now links supabase/config.sh (file-level on purpose — migrations/
and functions/ are dev-only) via _link_or_copy at all five host-install
sites: the PR's four (Codex, Factory, OpenCode runtime roots + the Kiro
block) plus the .agents sidecar, whose bin/ resolves the same relative
path and which the PR predates covering.

The runtime-root test now asserts supabase/config.sh is present in
every built root, on both the symlink and Windows-copy branches.

Contributed by @jizusun (PR #2216).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* ci(windows): curate the fix-wave regression tests into the windows-latest run

The windows-free-tests curated set is derived (POSIX-fragility regex scan
+ explicit deny list), and two of this wave's Windows regression files
were auto-excluded on false-positive pattern hits:

- browse/test/file-permissions.test.ts tripped the POSIX-mode-bitmask
  pattern, but every `mode & 0o777` assertion is platform-guarded — and
  the file carries the win32-only icacls-by-SID regression tests, which
  can only ever execute on windows-latest.
- browse/test/terminal-agent-owner-watchdog.test.ts tripped the
  spawn(['bun','run',...]) pattern whose reason is the Playwright-bound
  browse server; it actually spawns terminal-agent.ts (fs/path/crypto +
  local helpers only, no Playwright at module scope), and the owner-PID
  orphan leak it pins was reported on Windows (#2019).

Adds a KNOWN_WINDOWS_SAFE force-include list (mirror of
KNOWN_WINDOWS_INCOMPATIBLE, each entry carrying its false-positive
rationale) consulted before the pattern scan, and makes the
owner-watchdog test's throwaway owner process Windows-portable
(process.execPath instead of `sleep`, which a bare runner may not have).

The wave's other new files need no wiring: process-liveness-windows and
the bun-polyfill windowsHide/exited tests pass curation automatically;
setup-runtime-lib-command self-skips on win32 by design (its Windows
branch is exercised by simulating IS_WINDOWS=1 under bash), so
force-including it would add a permanently-skipped file.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(setup): register the SessionStart hook with a bash prefix on Windows

Windows can't execute an extensionless bash script directly — registering
the bare gstack-session-update path made the hook pop the "Select an app"
dialog on every session start (or silently never run), so team-mode
auto-upgrade was dead on Windows installs. Companion to the hooks'
spawn-bin routing: same defect class at the registration site.

Contributed by @NikhileshNanduri (PR #1813; VERSION/CHANGELOG collateral
stripped).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(setup): stop piping gen:skill-docs through tail — generator failures were masked

setup piped doc generation through `tail -3`, so a generator crash kept the
pipe's exit 0 and installs completed "successfully" with broken or missing
SKILL.md files. Capture the real exit status at BOTH sites (the main
gen:skill-docs step and the gbrain-detected gen:skill-docs:user regen —
the second drifted in after the PR and its own test caught it), print the
tail for UX, and fail loudly.

Contributed by @DavidMiserak (PR #1898; VERSION/CHANGELOG collateral
stripped; extended to the second pipe site).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(mktemp): move the X-run to the end of every temp-file template (BSD/busybox safe)

BSD mktemp (macOS) does not substitute an X-run that has a suffix after it:
`mktemp "$TMP_ROOT/codex-err-XXXXXX.txt"` creates a LITERAL
codex-err-XXXXXX.txt on the first call (exit 0) and every later call fails
with `mkstemp failed: File exists` — so /codex breaks from the SECOND run on
every Mac, masquerading as a model stall. busybox mktemp (Alpine) rejects the
template on the first run. Fixes #2091, #2370.

Union of both community fixes, compared at the diff level:
- PR #2372: all 11 source sites with a suffix after the X-run — codex
  SKILL.md.tmpl (5), claude SKILL.md.tmpl (3), bin/gstack-developer-profile
  (2, suffix folded into the prefix: .json.tmp.XXXXXX), and the office-hours
  codex pass in scripts/resolvers/review.ts (1).
- PR #2103: the second half of #2091 — bin/gstack-paths now strips the
  trailing slash from TMP_ROOT at the source (macOS $TMPDIR ends in `/`),
  plus runtime tests pinning that normalization.

New repo-wide tripwire in test/regression-issue2091-bsd-mktemp.test.ts:
every .tmpl, every SKILL.md, and every scripts/resolvers/*.ts is swept —
no mktemp template may carry a suffix after the X-run, with a self-test so
the detector can't be quietly blinded. Generated SKILL.md files regenerated
via gen:skill-docs in this commit.

Contributed by @ShuratCode (PR #2103) and @noron12234 (PR #2372); PR #2285 by @cathrynlavery covered a subset.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(codex,review,ship): scope codex review with an explicit --base flag, never prompt text

`codex review` takes its scope ONLY from --base/--commit/--uncommitted. The
positional [PROMPT] is mutually exclusive with all three, and a prompt-only
`codex review "<text>"` silently falls back to the uncommitted working-tree
scope (verified on 0.144.1: it runs `git status --short; git diff` and
reviews that) — so the previous prompt-based scoping produced a
confidently-worded review of the WRONG changes and read "no changes" on a
clean tree. Every diff pass now invokes `codex review --base <base>` with no
prompt argument: /codex Step 2A default path, the /review structured pass,
and the /ship adversarial-section pass (all via scripts/resolvers/review.ts).

Custom review instructions keep their own `codex exec` path (the CLI rejects
prompt + scope flag together), with the filesystem boundary preserved there.
Two new Error Handling entries teach the failure shapes: the argv-parse
error, and the "review says no changes on a branch full of changes" symptom.

Tests updated to pin the new invariant instead of banning the fix: the old
assertions required the diff range in prompt text and banned the
`--base <base> -c '...'` substring, which the correct scoped form contains.
Also deletes test/fixtures/golden-ship-claude.md — a 2,565-line orphaned
fixture referenced by zero tests (the live goldens are in
test/fixtures/golden/, compared by test/host-config.test.ts); the factory
golden is refreshed from the regenerated output. Generated SKILL.md files
regenerated via gen:skill-docs in this commit.

Contributed by @fangearhq-boop (PR #2513).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(review,ship): run the codex diff passes under the timeout wrapper (#1036)

The `_gstack_codex_timeout_wrapper` added in #1056 was wired into
codex/SKILL.md but never into the /review and /ship diff passes, which kept
running under a bare 5-minute Bash gate. An unwrapped stall returns no exit
code and no output, which downstream reads as "Codex reviewed and found
nothing" — a truncated pass silently became a clean bill. Measured on
codex-cli 0.145.0: a pass was killed at 287s of a 300s budget mid-tool-call,
and the same prompt completed in 336s.

Both passes in scripts/resolvers/review.ts (adversarial `codex exec` and the
structured `codex review --base` pass) now re-source gstack-codex-probe and
run under `_gstack_codex_timeout_wrapper 540`, with the Bash tool gate raised
to 600000 ms so the wrapper fires FIRST and a stall surfaces as a diagnosable
exit 124. The timeout guidance now says a timed-out pass is MISSING COVERAGE,
not a clean result, and points at the run's rollout log under
~/.codex/sessions/ for partial output. The stale "timeout doesn't exist on
macOS" claim is gone — the wrapper resolves gtimeout, then timeout, then runs
unwrapped, so it is safe without coreutils.

Static guards in test/codex-hardening.test.ts pin all three sites (resolver,
review/SKILL.md, ship/sections/adversarial.md): both calls wrapped, wrapper
budget strictly under the Bash gate, and no reappearance of the macOS claim
that steered these call sites away from the wrapper in the first place. The
Claude-output path guard in test/gen-skill-docs.test.ts now scrubs
~/.codex/sessions/ (a user-facing Codex CLI path, same class as the
~/.codex/logs/ exemption) before banning Codex host paths. Generated files
regenerated via gen:skill-docs; factory golden refreshed.

Contributed by @aegixx (PR #2379).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(codex): sandbox the review path, fail the gate closed, order timeouts wrapper-first

Closes #2496, #2524, #2477 — three defects in the class "a guard that
reports success while doing nothing", all in codex/SKILL.md.tmpl:

(a) Review sandbox. The default `codex review` path was the only codex call
with no sandbox override, inheriting ~/.codex/config.toml's default — write
access on a trusted project — while Important Rules claimed read-only.
Top-level `codex review` has no -s/--sandbox flag (verified on 0.147.0), so
the invocation now pins `-c 'sandbox_mode="read-only"'`, the same form the
consult-resume path already uses.

(b) Fail-closed verdict gate. The old rule ("no [P1] found → PASS") could
not fail on the default path: native `codex review` output carries no
bracketed tags, and a non-zero exit, expired auth, timeout, or empty result
also contains no [P1] — all read as PASS. The gate is now an ordered,
fail-closed check: non-zero exit → FAIL; empty output → FAIL; [P0]/[P1]
(bracketed or codex's native labels) → FAIL with count; NO severity tags at
all → FAIL requiring a human read; PASS is only reachable through the
explicit tagged-advisory-only branch. [P0] is recognized as blocking, and
the review-log findings count includes it.

(c) Bash gate above the wrapper. Step 2A instructed `timeout: 300000` under
a 330s wrapper, and Challenge's 300s gate sat under a 600s wrapper — the
harness killed the call before the wrapper could emit its diagnosable
exit-124 message. Every Bash gate now sits strictly ABOVE its wrapper:
360000 over the 330s review wrapper, 660000 over the 600s challenge/consult
wrappers, with the ordering rationale stated at each site.

Also from #2477/#2524: a new Error Handling entry for the model-entitlement
400 ("The '<model>' model is not supported...") pointing at the `model =`
pin and `[notice.model_migrations]` in ~/.codex/config.toml and saying
exactly which override to retry with (-m for exec-based modes,
`-c model="..."` for review mode, which rejects -m); the Model & Reasoning
section no longer documents `-m` for `/codex review`.

Static assertions in test/codex-hardening.test.ts pin (a)-(c) across both
the .tmpl and the generated SKILL.md: every scoped review invocation carries
sandbox_mode="read-only" and never -s; the default-PASS sentence is banned
and the fail-closed branches are present; and per-section, every Bash
`timeout: N` is strictly greater than every wrapper budget, with 2A/2B/2C
all required to be inspected. Generated SKILL.md regenerated via
gen:skill-docs in this commit.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(preamble): quoted tilde made Artifacts Sync and telemetry-finalize dead code in 49 skills

A tilde inside double quotes never expands, so the generated
`_BRAIN_SYNC_BIN="~/..."` assignments resolved to a literal ./~ path and
the Artifacts Sync + telemetry-finalize blocks silently no-op'd in every
skill that carried them (regression of #785). The preamble resolvers now
emit $HOME-based paths; all generated SKILL.md files regenerate identically
from the fixed templates, and a static tripwire fails the suite if a
quoted-tilde assignment ever reappears in generated output.

Fixes #1656, #1715.

Contributed by @jawadakram20 (PR #2333).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(gen-skill-docs): stop the catalog trim chopping descriptions at embedded periods

The description-trim regex treated the first period as end-of-sentence, so
skill descriptions with embedded periods (e.g. file extensions, version
numbers) truncated mid-thought in the generated catalog — the discovery
surface every host loads. Trim now respects the full first sentence;
diagram's description regenerates to its intended text.

Contributed by @sneakygriff (PR #2171).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(preamble): update_check:false gates the prose, not just the binary

Setting update_check:false stopped the update-check BINARY from running,
but every skill preamble still shipped the upgrade-handling instruction
prose unconditionally — burning tokens on instructions that could never
fire and confusing agents into probing for upgrades anyway. The resolver
now suppresses the upgrade-flow prose when the config disables checks.

Fixes #2001.

Contributed by @jc0d35 (PR #2022).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(browse): sidebar Terminal — drop the duplicate WS subprotocol header, stop doubling CJK IME input

The terminal client passed the auth token as the WS subprotocol AND echoed
it in a second header, which some Chromium builds reject; and composition
events double-sent CJK input (each IME commit arrived once from the
composition handler and once from the data handler). One auth path, one
input path; also fixes the terminal-agent test that failed on clean main.

Contributed by @mindsurf0176 (PR #2515).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(setup): -h/--help prints usage instead of running the installer

Asking setup for help RAN the full installer — Playwright download and all.
Standard help flags now short-circuit to usage.

Contributed by @saen-ai (PR #1219).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(hosts): Codex-generated skills reference AGENTS.md, not CLAUDE.md

Codex reads AGENTS.md, but its generated skills still told agents to read
CLAUDE.md in 8 places — instructions Codex hosts cannot follow. The host
config now maps the memory-file name per host; all three ship goldens
refreshed from the regenerated output.

Contributed by @exGeni (PR #1996).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(retro,ship): count tracked files for the test-file metric, not the working tree

The test-file count ran find over the working tree, sweeping untracked
build output — a Rails repo reported 623 test files when git tracks 17
(37x), skewing retro narratives and ship dashboards. Count via git ls-files
instead; includes the one-line Python-glob widening so non-JS repos stop
undercounting.

Fixes #2307, #1999.

Contributed by @joshRpowell (PR #2308).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(land-and-deploy,gen): auto-merge diagnosis + CRLF-stable generation

Two small hardenings: land-and-deploy Step 4 no longer misdiagnoses a
failed `gh pr merge --auto` as a permissions problem when the real cause is
the merge-method mismatch the command names; and gen-skill-docs normalizes
CRLF at the template entry point so Windows checkouts with autocrlf produce
byte-identical generated output to CI instead of silently skipping the
\n-anchored transforms.

Contributed by @Jmeg8r (PR #2437) and @1ncludeSteven (PR #1051).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(land-and-deploy): stop greedy sed from eating the URL scheme in deploy-config parsing

The deploy-config bootstrap parsed "Production URL: https://x.com" with
sed 's/.*: *//', which cuts at the LAST colon — the one in "https:" —
yielding "//x.com". Cut at the first ": " instead (s/^[^:]*: *//).

Resolver only; the generated land-and-deploy/SKILL.md regenerates from
this source in the docs lane.

Contributed by @briascoi (PRs #2555/#2493).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(artifacts-init): honor the provider CLI's git_protocol instead of forcing SSH

gstack-artifacts-init unconditionally rewrote the push remote to SSH and
hard-failed setup for users whose gh/glab auth is HTTPS-only. Now:

- provider-created remotes follow `gh config get git_protocol` /
  `glab config get git_protocol` (HTTPS when unset — the gh default)
- explicit/existing/manual remotes keep their given protocol; unknown
  URL forms (local bare paths, file://, self-hosted) pass through
- new --push-protocol auto|https|ssh flag overrides the inference
- the unreachable-remote error names the actual protocol and points at
  --push-protocol instead of assuming a missing SSH key

Closes #1348.

Contributed by @time-attack (PR #2225).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(browse): skip the .gitignore append when git already ignores .gstack/

ensureStateDir appended ".gstack/" to a tracked .gitignore even when git
already ignored the directory via global excludes, .git/info/exclude, or a
parent .gitignore — dirtying the working tree on every daemon start. Run
`git check-ignore -q -- .gstack/` first and return early when git says it's
covered; git-missing/not-a-repo/timeout all fall through to the existing
text-check append (the safe default).

Closes #2385.

Contributed by @gregario (PR #2430).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(browse): guard browser.process() in resolveDisconnectCause

`.process()` only exists on browsers Playwright launched itself; a browser
from connectOverCDP() (or a test stub) has no such method, so the blind call
threw "browser?.process is not a function" inside the disconnect handler and
took down the daemon. Type-check the method before calling it and treat the
no-method case as no process handle.

Closes #2085.

Contributed by @elan2002 (PR #2434).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(lib): narrow the override injection denylist to instruction-shaped phrases

The /override[:\s]/i pattern flagged any prose containing "override " or
"override:" — CLI flags (--port-override -1), tfvars notes, and plain
"you can override the default region" all tripped the injection guard.
Require an instruction-shaped continuation: "override (all)? previous |
prior | above | the rules/instructions/system prompt". Genuine attempts
like "Override: ignore all previous instructions" still block via the
ignore-previous pattern.

Closes #2401, #1934.

Contributed by @Masashi-Ono0611 (PR #2424); same fix independently by
@JonasFocus (PR #1940).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(redact): stop the E.164 phone pattern flagging compact timestamps

Bare 14-digit runs like 20260727202423 (YYYYMMDDHHMMSS backup/log stamps)
matched the phone regex and produced MEDIUM PII findings. Reject a
separator-free 14-digit span whose fields parse as a plausible date-time;
real numbers carry a + or spacing, so phone coverage is unchanged.

Contributed by @abkrim (PR #2428).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(design): create the OpenAI key file owner-only, closing the write-then-chmod race

saveApiKey wrote ~/.gstack/openai.json at the default umask and tightened to
0600 afterwards, leaving the API key briefly world-readable between write and
chmod (CWE-377/367). Pass mode 0o600 at create; the trailing chmodSync stays
as a backstop to tighten a pre-existing loose file.

Contributed by @bunlongheng (PR #2468).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(config): make gstack-config key validation locale-independent

POSIX bracket ranges like a-z follow the active collation order; under GNU
grep with tr_TR.UTF-8 the range excludes the ASCII letter i, so every key
containing i (skill_prefix, explain_level, ...) was rejected as invalid.
Pin both get/set validators to LC_ALL=C, with a source-level tripwire test
since macOS BSD grep doesn't reproduce the bug.

Closes #2494.

Contributed by @Math1987 (PR #2506).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(resolvers): stop env-var hosts from doubling $HOME in the binary fallback path

The browse/design/make-pdf setup resolvers built the fallback binary path as
"$HOME" + dir.replace(/^~/, ''), which is only correct for ~-rooted dirs.
Env-var hosts carry an absolute $GSTACK_* dir, so the generated fallback
became $HOME$GSTACK_.../browse — a path that never exists. New toShellPath()
in scripts/resolvers/types.ts expands ~ to $HOME and passes absolute
env-var dirs through untouched; all five call sites route through it.

Claude-host generated output is byte-identical, so no SKILL.md regeneration
is needed here.

Closes #2055.

Contributed by @simjak (PR #2056).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(settings-hook): respect CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR when resolving settings.json

gstack-settings-hook hardcoded $HOME/.claude/settings.json, so users running
Claude Code with a relocated CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR had hooks written to a config
file Claude never reads. Resolve ${CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR:-$HOME/.claude} first;
the explicit GSTACK_SETTINGS_FILE override still wins.

Partial #349.

Contributed by @andrefogelman (PR #2239).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(browse): dispatch a change event after fill for change-only validators

Playwright's Locator.fill() dispatches `input` but never `change`, so
frameworks that validate on change (AngularJS ng-change, debounced
strength/match checks) never saw the filled value — correct in the DOM,
failing the framework's own validation. `browse fill` now dispatches
`change` after the fill. Failing-first regression test with a
change-only password-match fixture included.

Contributed by @intelliot (PR #2475).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(safety): unknown question-preference source exits the documented 2, not 1

The --write user-origin gate documents exit 2 as "rejected, do not retry"
(profile poisoning defense), but a source outside both the allowed and the
explicitly-rejected lists fell through to exit 1 — the generic validation
code callers treat as retryable. Unknown sources now exit 2 with the same
do-not-retry rejection message as the known non-user-originated ones.

Closes #2390.

Contributed by @gregario (PR #2429).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(pr-title): stop duplicating the version prefix on bare-version titles

A title that was nothing but a version ("v1.2.3" — the form ship uses for
version-only bumps) matched neither the "v<NEW_VERSION> " literal case nor
the trailing-space strip regex, fell through to the prepend path, and came
out as "v1.2.3.4 v1.2.3" — which pr-title-sync.yml then wrote back via
gh pr edit. Handle the bare form in both the no-change case and the
prefix-strip regex, and emit a bare new version when nothing follows.

Closes #1886.

Contributed by @jbetala7 (PR #1887).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(build): escape literal braces in the bun:sqlite stub regex

Perl >= 5.26 treats an unescaped literal `{` in a pattern as fatal
("Unescaped left brace in regex is illegal"), so build-node-server.sh
died at the bun:sqlite stub substitution on modern perl. Escape both
braces; the replacement output is unchanged.

Closes #2300.

Contributed by @nuga0718 (PR #2111).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(config): preserve spaces in gstack-config values

get/list read values with awk '{print $2}' | tr -d '[:space:]', which
truncated any value containing spaces ("/Users/x/Conductor Workspaces"
came back as "/Users/x/Conductor") and set wrote the unfiltered raw value
on the append path. New read_config_value() strips only the "key:" prefix
and trailing whitespace (cut-style parse), and set appends the same
newline-stripped value the in-place edit path uses.

Closes #1782.

Contributed by @jbetala7 (PR #1783).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(browse): recover a late-healthy detached daemon instead of a false "Server failed to start"

startServer spawns the daemon detached + unref'd, then polls health for a
fixed budget. On a loaded machine the budget can elapse in the gap between
the loop's last tick and the daemon becoming ready — the CLI reported
"Server failed to start within Ns" while the very next `browse status`
showed a healthy server. Add a final readState()+isServerHealthy() re-check
before the timeout throw, and make the budget env-overridable via
BROWSE_START_TIMEOUT (BROWSE_* tunable convention). Structural + behavioral
tests pin both invariants.

Closes #1846.

Contributed by @harjothkhara (PR #1847).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(browse): daemon resilience on loaded machines — Bun conn errors, stop/restart flush, startup + git-root budgets

Four load-sensitivity fixes in the daemon lifecycle:

- sendCommand only recognized Node's ECONNREFUSED/ECONNRESET; the compiled
  CLI runs on Bun, which reports 'ConnectionRefused'/'ConnectionClosed'
  ("Unable to connect..."), so daemon crashes leaked the raw error and
  exited 1 instead of entering the busy-check/restart path. Match both.
- stop/restart called shutdown() inline, which exits before the HTTP
  response flushes — the CLI saw a dropped socket (and would now
  crash-retry a fresh daemon just to stop it). Defer shutdown ~100ms so
  the 200 lands first.
- Non-CI POSIX startup budget raised 8s -> 15s (cold Chromium measured
  ~5.7s at load avg 10; load 12+ blew the old budget while the detached
  daemon was still booting).
- getGitRoot's 2s git rev-parse timeout returned null under load (6.3s
  spikes measured), scattering state files across cwds into split-brain
  daemons. Raise to 8s, still bounded.

Contributed by @mplatts (PR #1732).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(telemetry): ingest keeps error_message/failed_step instead of dropping them

The telemetry_events columns exist and bin/gstack-telemetry-log already
sends error_message + failed_step, but the Supabase ingest function dropped
both fields on insert — every error report arrived with no message and no
failing step. Map them through with the same bounded-length sanitization as
error_class (500/100 chars). The completion-status resolver now also passes
--error-message/--failed-step in the generated skill telemetry block, with
instructions to leave them empty on success.

Resolver only for the template side; generated SKILL.md files regenerate
from this source in the docs lane.

Contributed by @sunnnybala (PR #769).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(browse): surface non-EEXIST errors in acquireServerLock instead of masking them

acquireServerLock caught every open failure as if the lock were held:
EACCES/EROFS/ENOENT surfaced as phantom "another process holds the lock"
(null return, no diagnostics), and a failed stale-lock read or unlink was
swallowed the same way. Each failure class now logs a coded, pathed
diagnostic: non-EEXIST open errors, holder-PID read errors (ENOENT retries
the acquire — the holder released between open and read), and stale-lock
unlink errors. Four-case unit test included.

Closes #1084.

Contributed by @jbetala7 (PR #1725); same fix independently by
@JiayuuWang (PR #1097).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(paths): shell-quote gstack-paths output so eval round-trips values

gstack-paths emitted bare KEY=VALUE lines, so the documented
eval "$(gstack-paths)" re-parsed the values: backslashes were eaten as
escapes (Windows $TMP C:\Users\... became C:Users...) and a space
word-split the assignment, leaving the variable empty. Emit each value
with printf %q so eval round-trips byte-for-byte; plain POSIX paths are
unchanged. Round-trip regression tests cover backslashes, spaces, and
embedded quotes.

Closes #2374.

Contributed by @fangearhq-boop (PR #2376); same fix independently by
@yannickspiess (PR #1580).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* security(browse): drop .svg from the load-html extension allowlist

SVG is a script-capable format (inline <script>, event handlers, foreign
objects), so allowing it through load-html's HTML allowlist let a local
.svg execute script in the browse session context. The allowlist is now
.html/.htm/.xhtml only; regression test asserts .svg is rejected.

Contributed by @garagon (PR #1153).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(benchmark): validate --timeout-ms as a positive integer

gstack-model-benchmark fed --timeout-ms straight through parseInt, so
"abc" became NaN and "0"/"-1" passed through — a NaN or non-positive
timeout silently disables the per-provider watchdog. Reject anything
that isn't a positive (optionally +-prefixed) safe integer with a clear
error and exit 1.

Closes #1726.

Contributed by @jbetala7 (PR #1727).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore(fixtures): clean terminology in the security-bench replay fixture

Two spots in browse/test/fixtures/security-bench-haiku-responses.json
referred to real-world HVAC project naming; replace with the generic
"mechanical services" wording. Fixture stays valid JSON; replay tests
unchanged.

Contributed by @apex-system (PR #2131).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* ci: cancel superseded actionlint and skill-docs runs

actionlint.yml and skill-docs.yml trigger on both push and pull_request
with no concurrency group, so every push to an active branch left the
previous (now-obsolete) runs queued or running — twice per commit on
same-repo PR branches. Add the same cancel-in-progress concurrency
groups the heavier workflows already use, plus a free static tripwire
test that fails CI if a push+pull_request workflow ever ships again
without cancel-in-progress.

Contributed by @jbetala7 (PR #2053).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(make-pdf): correct CJK rendering — NUL sentinel hardening, SC-first fonts, CJK quote context

Three CJK fixes in the PDF pipeline:

- smartypants strips stray input NULs up front so document text can never
  forge the U+0000 placeholder sentinel and leak a preserved-zone marker
  into the output.
- The CJK font stack led with Japanese families, so Simplified-Chinese
  text rendered han glyphs with JP variants. Lead with PingFang SC /
  Heiti SC / Noto Sans CJK SC / Source Han Sans SC before the JP
  fallbacks.
- Quote-smartening only recognized ASCII openers as "start of quote"
  context; the fullwidth colon and CJK brackets now count, so quotes
  after them curl the right way.

Contributed by @rssprivacy-commits (PR #2012).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs: regenerate skill output for the quick-win resolver changes

Regen for the deploy-config URL-scheme fix (utility resolver), telemetry
completion-status resolver, and $HOME-doubling binary-resolver fix; ship
goldens refreshed to match. Generated-output-only commit.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(slug): cached identity is sticky — heal ONLY the provable subdir-cache bug shape

The walk-up rewrite recomputed the slug on every run and "healed" the cache
toward the fresh value, which broke the #2212 continuity contract: a project
that used gstack before adopting a git remote would be silently renamed to
the remote-derived slug, orphaning everything under ~/.gstack/projects/.
Cached identity now wins, with one precise exception: when the cached value
equals THIS pwd's basename while the walk-up proves pwd is not the project
root, the entry came from the pre-walk-up subdirectory bug (#1125) and is
recomputed. All four slug contracts pass together (repo-mode #2212,
walk-up #1125, sanitize, user-slug).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(claude): stop false-blocking macOS keychain subscription auth in host detection

The /claude skill's auth probe only recognized env-var/API-key auth, so
macOS subscription installs (keychain-backed, where `claude -p` works fine)
were told they had no auth. Detection now uses host invocation.

Fixes #1890.

Contributed by @xing-qnex (PR #2411); PR #2548 by @shawnacalia covered the
keychain case.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(setup): Ubuntu 26.04 Playwright platform detect + silence the codesign false alarm

Two small setup papercuts: the Playwright platform probe now recognizes
Ubuntu 26.04 instead of falling to the generic-Linux path, and macOS
installs stop warning about a codesign "failure" that was actually the
expected unsigned-adhoc path (the real signature check already gates
binary launch).

Contributed by @nuga0718 (PR #2113) and @lucascaro (PR #1758).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(skills): land-and-deploy squash readback, next-version paths, embed-flags quoting

Three template one-liners: land-and-deploy reads the squash-merge result
from the merge commit instead of the stale branch tip; review/landing-report
/land-and-deploy templates call bin/gstack-next-version via its installed
path instead of a bare repo-relative one; setup-gbrain quotes
GBRAIN_EMBED_FLAGS so zsh word-splitting stops silently dropping
voyage-code-3 flags. Regenerated output included.

Contributed by @stormeoio (PR #2011), @rjmurillo (PR #1820) and
@trevorhstandridge (PR #1817).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* release: v1.64.0.0 — fix wave CHANGELOG, VERSION, deferred-wave TODOs

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test: refresh ship goldens for the telemetry error-field resolver output

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test(redact-prepush): assemble the fake AWS key at runtime — the literal blocked our own push

The hook's fixtures carried a live-format AKIA literal, and the repo's own
pre-push scanner (hardened in this wave) correctly blocked pushing it. The
placeholder-suppressed docs key would defeat the detection tests, so the
fixtures now concatenate the key at runtime: tests still exercise real
detection, and the pushed diff never contains a scannable credential shape.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(slug): terminate the marker walk-up on dirname's fixed point — hung every bin on Windows

Under git-bash on Windows a mixed-form path walks C:/Users -> C: -> . -> .
forever: dirname's fixed point there is never "/", so the walk-up loop spun
and every bin that evals gstack-slug (learnings-log first among them) hung
until spawn timeout. Caught by windows-free-tests CI on the wave PR. Break
on the fixed point itself with a depth cap for exotic forms; regression
tests drive the extracted function with hostile path shapes under a hard
timeout.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-08-14 22:02:07 -07:00
t f55e27097c fix(deps): override basic-ftp to 5.3.1 to clear CVE-2026-39983 + 3 sibling HIGH advisories 
basic-ftp reaches the tree only transitively:
  puppeteer-core > @puppeteer/browsers > proxy-agent > pac-proxy-agent > get-uri > basic-ftp

Versions <= 5.3.0 carry four HIGH advisories, all fixed in 5.3.1:
- GHSA-chqc-8p9q-pq6q (CVE-2026-39983) FTP command injection via CRLF
- GHSA-6v7q-wjvx-w8wg incomplete CRLF protection (USER/PASS + MKD bypass)
- GHSA-rpmf-866q-6p89 DoS via unbounded multiline control-response buffering
- GHSA-rp42-5vxx-qpwr DoS via unbounded memory in Client.list()

Pin via a bun `overrides` entry rather than a phantom direct dependency.
Overriding forces every basic-ftp in the tree to 5.3.1, including get-uri's
nested copy; `bun audit` then reports zero basic-ftp advisories (total 37 -> 33,
HIGH 13 -> 9). A direct-dependency bump leaves get-uri/basic-ftp at the
vulnerable version and audit still flags all four.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-07-10 13:58:07 -07:00
Garry Tan 14fc0866d9
v1.58.0.0 feat: diagram + multi-format document engine (mermaid, excalidraw, single-file HTML, DOCX) (#1990) 
* docs(todos): P3 content-hash diagram render cache for make-pdf

Deferred from the diagram-engine eng review (Codex outside-voice D7):
repeat make-pdf runs re-render every fence; cache keyed on fence source +
bundle version once multi-diagram docs make it worth building.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(diagram-render): offline mermaid+excalidraw render bundle for browse

Single self-contained page (dist/diagram-render.html, 9.2MB, committed per
eng-review D2) exposing __renderMermaid / __mermaidToExcalidraw /
__excalidrawToSvg / __rasterize / __probeImage through browse load-html +
js --out. Render contract per D3: securityLevel strict, per-fence ids,
print-css font lock, htmlLabels off (canvas-taint-safe). Deterministic
build (same sha twice); drift test pins dist == BUILD_INFO == package.json
pins and rebuild-reproducibility when toolchain matches. Spike-proven
offline: flowchart + sequence SVG, editable .excalidraw scene, 300dpi PNG.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(diagram-render): __downscaleRaster for print-resolution image normalization

Data-URI rasters re-encode in their own format (JPEG stays JPEG at q0.9 —
PNG-encoding photos bloats them) at an explicit target pixel width. Used by
make-pdf's pre-pass for the 300dpi content-box ceiling (eng-review D4).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(make-pdf): diagram pre-pass — mermaid/excalidraw fences render as vector SVG; local images inline as data URIs

```mermaid / ```excalidraw fences extract to placeholder tokens, render in
one diagram-render bundle tab per run (reset contract: bundle page reloads
after any render error), and substitute back as accessible <figure> blocks
with the raw source preserved in a comment. Render failures produce a loud
red diagnostic block, never silent raw code. render=false keeps a fence as
code; title="..." becomes the aria-label and caption.

Local images now actually render: page.setContent loads at about:blank
(tab-session.ts:194), so relative paths silently 404'd before. The pre-pass
resolves them against the markdown's directory, inlines as data URIs, probes
intrinsic dimensions from the bytes (pure-TS PNG/JPEG/GIF/WebP/SVG sniffing),
and downscales rasters wider than 2x the content box at 300dpi. Remote URLs
warn (offline posture, --allow-network exempts); missing files get a visible
placeholder; --strict hard-fails both for CI pipelines.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test(make-pdf): diagram pre-pass unit suite + e2e render gates

34 unit tests (fence extraction incl. nested/tilde/unclosed/render=false,
info-string parsing, slot substitution, diagnostic/figure escaping + SVG
script strip, byte-level dimension probing across 5 formats, content-box
math, image inlining incl. strict/remote/missing/data-URI paths). E2E gate
proves through the compiled binary: both fences render as vector text
(id-collision check), raw mermaid ships only via render=false, broken fence
yields the diagnostic block, and the relative fixture image rasterizes to
colored pixels (CRITICAL regression for the about:blank image fix).
--strict exits non-zero on a missing image.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(make-pdf): width directives + conservative auto-landscape via CSS named pages

`![a](x.png){width=full|<pct>|<dim>}` and `{page=landscape|portrait}`
suffixes translate to data-gstack-* attrs in render() (before the sanitizer,
which keeps data- attributes; unrecognized brace groups stay visible text).
Default width rule needs no code: intrinsic CSS-px capped at the content box,
never upscaled — figure img max-width owns it.

Auto-landscape promotes a block to `@page wide { size: <pagesize> landscape }`
only when aspect >= 1.8 AND intrinsic width > 2.5x the content box (~1600px on
letter) AND diagram provenance (rendered fences) or a whole-word alt token
(diagram|architecture|flowchart|chart|graph) for plain images. {page=...}
forces or vetoes; fence info strings accept page=... too. preferCSSPageSize
is passed to Chromium only when a promotion exists, so every other document
prints exactly as before. False negatives are cheap; false positives feel
broken (eng-review P4, Codex challenge accepted).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test(make-pdf): width-policy unit suite + landscape e2e gate with negative fixtures

24 unit tests weighted toward the false-positive guards: wide screenshot
without an alt hint stays portrait, sub-threshold and tall images stay
portrait, deterministic 1560/1561px boundary, whole-word alt matching
('photographic' must not match 'graph'), page=portrait veto beats every
heuristic, diagnostic blocks never promote. E2E gate asserts pdfinfo
per-page boxes through the compiled binary: exactly 3 of 5 fixture blocks
get landscape pages (alt-hinted image, directive-forced image, wide sequence
diagram) while the unhinted screenshot and the veto'd diagram stay portrait —
plus the --toc combo proving TOC and named-page landscape coexist.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(make-pdf): --to html|docx output formats

--to html writes the assembled self-contained document directly (no print
round-trip): inline vector diagrams, data-URI images, zero network
references, plus an @media screen layer for browser reading. --to docx is
the content-fidelity export (eng-review P8): html-to-docx@1.8.0 (exact pin;
pure JS, bun-compile-verified) maps headings/tables/code/lists; diagrams and
SVG images rasterize at 300dpi of the content-box width via the render tab;
diagnostic figures convert to plain p/pre so the converter can't silently
drop an error. --format keeps its page-size-alias meaning; --to is the
output format, and the CLI says so when confused.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test(make-pdf): format gate — html no-network-refs + docx zip content checks

HTML: zero src/href network refs, no script/link tags, inline SVG diagrams,
data-URI images, screen layer, diagnostic survives. DOCX: valid OOXML zip
(document.xml + Content_Types), >=2 PNG media (diagram raster + fixture
image), headings + render=false source + diagnostic text in document.xml,
no leaked mermaid source from rendered fences. Plus --to validation UX.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(diagram): /diagram skill — English in, editable diagram triplet out

New skill: agent authors mermaid from the user's description and renders the
triplet through the offline diagram-render bundle in the browse daemon —
.mmd source (the single source of truth), editable .excalidraw (opens at
excalidraw.com, round-trips back through re-render), and SVG + PNG. Flowcharts
convert to fully editable scenes; other mermaid types render with an explicit
upstream-converter limitation note. Never ships an unrendered source file;
offline is the contract (no CDN fallback). Inventory rows in AGENTS.md +
docs/skills.md; generated SKILL.md + llms.txt via gen:skill-docs.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test(diagram): paid E2E pair — gate triplet contract + periodic authoring judge

diagram-triplet (gate, deterministic functional): a fresh claude -p agent
following the skill extract must emit a parseable triplet — graph LR/TD in
.mmd, excalidraw scene with >3 elements, SVG markup, PNG magic bytes.
Verified live: pass, $0.17, 58s. diagram-authoring-quality (periodic,
LLM-judged): faithfulness/labels/size rubric with a diagnostic-path cap,
floor 6/10. Verified live: pass at exactly 6 with substantive critique.
Touchfiles select both on diagram/** and lib/diagram-render/** changes;
tier split per E2E_TIERS rules (eng-review D5).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test(diagram): register /diagram in the skill coverage matrix

Gate: triplet contract + structural floor; periodic: authoring-quality judge.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(make-pdf): typography scale-up, zero image truncation, landscape vertical centering

Dogfooding round on the repo README surfaced four output-quality bugs:

- Type was too small everywhere: body 11→12pt, h1 22→26pt, h2 15→18pt,
  cover title 32→56pt with poster spacing, cover meta 10→13pt, TOC 11→12pt
  with tighter leading, code 9.5→10.5pt, tables 10→11pt.
- Zero image truncation, ever: the max-width cap was figure-scoped, but
  markdown images render as <p><img> — a 1850px GitHub screenshot ran off
  the page edge. Global img { max-width: 100%; height: auto; } cap.
- hyphens: auto put real 'dif-\nferent' breaks into the PDF text layer the
  moment 12pt made lines wrap (combined-gate caught it). Clean copy-paste
  is the product contract; left-aligned rag doesn't need hyphenation →
  hyphens: manual.
- Promoted landscape blocks now vertically center. CSS flex/min-height
  centering fragments into phantom empty landscape pages in Chromium
  (bisected: min-height at ANY value; 3 promotions printed 5 pages), so
  image-policy computes an inline margin-top from each block's known
  aspect ratio against the landscape content box instead — fragmentation
  handles margins fine. .page-wide also drops its explicit break-before/
  after (the page-name change already breaks on both sides).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test(make-pdf): pin zero-truncation invariant, typography floor, centering math

Global img cap pinned as a regex invariant (the figure-scoped-cap regression
class); typography floor (12pt body, 56pt cover, 12pt TOC); .page-wide must
NOT carry min-height/flex (the phantom-landscape-page regression class);
centering margin math verified both ways (2400×1000 image → 1.38in,
2050×600 viewBox diagram → 1.93in, page-filling directive block → no margin).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs: diagram + multi-format documentation across README, make-pdf skill, and how-to guide

README gains /make-pdf (Publisher) and /diagram (Diagram Maker) rows in the
sprint table. make-pdf's skill doc — the agent-facing contract — gains Core
patterns for mermaid/excalidraw fences (title/render=false/page= options),
the image policy ({width=}/{page=} directives, zero-truncation, conservative
auto-landscape), --to html|docx, and --strict, plus the --to vs --format
disambiguation in Common flags. New docs/howto-diagrams-and-formats.md is
the user-facing walkthrough: fences, directives, formats, /diagram triplet,
the mermaid racetrack trick, troubleshooting.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test(make-pdf): fill ship-audit coverage gaps — downscale, reset contract, excalidraw fence, WebP

Ship coverage audit found 9 gaps (85%); this fills the 2 HIGH + 3 MEDIUM and
most LOW. diagram-gate fixture gains a 4200px incompressible photo (the only
live coverage of __downscaleRaster AND the 64KB chunked jsViaBuffer eval
transport — asserted via the downscale stderr warning), an ```excalidraw
scene fence rendered through exportToSvg (vector labels + caption in
pdftotext, no leaked scene JSON), and the broken fence MOVED BETWEEN the two
mermaid fences so the second diagram rendering proves the D6.2 reset
contract end-to-end. New coverage-gaps.test.ts (16 tests): mock-tab reset
contract (exactly one reload, post-failure fence renders), excalidraw
fail-fast diagnostic without a bundle call, rasterize error fallbacks
(figure/tag kept, never silent), WebP VP8/VP8L/VP8X byte parsers,
landscapeContentBox a4/asymmetric margins, bare-token slot fallback,
resolveBundlePath env override + error shape, screenCss media scoping.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(make-pdf): pre-landing review wave — fence fidelity, injection hardening, Windows paths, transport rework

Review army (6 specialists + red team) findings, all fixed:

- Indented fences replay byte-for-byte and indented diagram fences are NOT
  extracted (red-team conf-9: the pre-pass reconstructed fences at column 0,
  splitting any list containing fenced code — every ordinary document).
- String.replace $-pattern injection killed at every seam: substituteSlots,
  mergeStyle, img/src rewrites all use function replacements (a diagram label
  containing $' duplicated the document tail).
- Big-expression transport reworked: browse `eval <file>` (one spawn, any
  size, Windows-safe) replaces the 64KB chunked window-buffer eval — fixes
  the per-chunk spawn cost, the char-vs-byte argv units, AND the Windows
  32,767-char command-line ceiling in one move.
- Staged-bundle trust: content verified by hash even when the file exists,
  and the rename-failure path re-hashes the survivor (sticky-bit /tmp EPERM
  would otherwise ride a pre-planted file past the check).
- Windows drive-letter img srcs (C:/x.png) reach the local-path branch
  instead of being swallowed as unknown URL schemes.
- DOCX rasterize-failure now embeds the decoded source as visible text —
  returning the figure made diagrams vanish silently (converter drops svg).
- Fence source preserved as base64 data-gstack-source attribute (the comment
  encoding corrupted every '-->' arrow); decodeFigureSource() round-trips.
- inlineLocalImages memoizes per path; file:// uses fileURLToPath; preview
  prints a divergence note for fences/local images; --to docx strips the
  watermark div and warns about print-only flags; TOC links resolve in
  html/docx (heading ids assigned); waitForExpression sleeps instead of
  busy-spinning; escapeHtml/svg-dims deduped to single definitions;
  typography stragglers (blockquote 12pt, footnotes 10pt, 42em screen
  measure); bundle BUILD_INFO gains srcSha256 for no-node_modules drift
  detection; MAX_TARGET_PX shared guard.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* ci: make-pdf gate covers the diagram-render bundle; bundle pinned to LF

make-pdf-gate.yml paths gain lib/diagram-render/** and the drift test (a
bundle-only PR previously skipped every render gate AND no CI lane ran the
drift check at all). .gitattributes pins dist html/json to LF so Windows
autocrlf can't break the hash-pinned bundle.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test(make-pdf)+feat(diagram): review-wave test pins + skill transport hardening

Tests: indented-fence byte-for-byte replay + no-extraction-in-lists,
drive-letter local-path routing, $-pattern slot immunity, base64 source
round-trip ('A --> B' exact), existing-style merge preservation, DOCX
rasterize-failure surfaces source, srcSha256 + font-stack drift guards,
landscape veto asserted as some-portrait/no-landscape (layout-order-proof),
judge rubric cap lowered to 5 so it actually fails, vacuous error-shape test
removed honestly, tmpdir cleanup.

/diagram skill: base64 transport (template literals corrupted backticks/${
in sources), content-addressed staging with hash verification, and --tab-id
pinned on every browse call so a concurrent /qa session can't be clobbered.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(make-pdf): out-of-tree image reads warn; --strict makes them fatal (D8.1)

Local CLI semantics stay (absolute paths and ../ still inline, like pandoc),
but never silently: an agent PDF-ing untrusted markdown can't quietly embed a
file from outside the input directory into a shareable document without a
visible warning, and --strict pipelines hard-fail. Two unit tests. Also:
TODOS.md gains the deferred e2e-harness dedup entry (D8.2).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: pre-existing test failure in skill-e2e-bws operational-learning

Root cause was the fixture, not model behavior: gstack-learnings-log gained
an import of lib/jsonl-store.ts in the v1.57.5.0 injection-sanitization wave,
but the test copies only bin/ scripts into its sandbox — the inline bun
import failed and the script exited 1 before writing, on every run, on main
too (reproduced at a5833c41). Fixture now stages lib/jsonl-store.ts beside
bin/; verified deterministically (script exits 0, learning written) and via
the paid test (1 pass).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(make-pdf): adversarial-review wave — offline posture enforced, symlink-aware confinement, bounded reads

Codex adversarial + structured review findings:

- Remote images are now BLOCKED with a visible placeholder instead of
  warn-and-keep — leaving the tag meant Chromium fetched the URL at print
  time anyway, so the offline posture was a lie (tracking pixels and
  internal-URL probes ran without --allow-network).
- The out-of-tree read check compares REAL paths: a symlink inside the input
  dir pointing at ~/.ssh/... passed the string-prefix check, including under
  --strict. Ordered after the existence check (realpath of a missing file
  false-positives on macOS /var → /private/var).
- Image reads are bounded BEFORE reading: statSync first, non-regular files
  (fifo/device/dir) and >64MB files degrade to placeholders instead of
  hanging or exhausting memory; malformed percent-encoding (foo%zz.png)
  degrades to missing-image instead of crashing decodeURIComponent.
- browse shell-outs get a 120s timeout — a wedged daemon or hostile mermaid
  source fails the run instead of hanging it.
- TOC entries link to the heading's ACTUAL id (pre-id'd raw-HTML headings
  previously got dead #toc-N links); per-side margins compose into the CSS
  @page shorthand so a landscape promotion flipping preferCSSPageSize no
  longer silently reverts --margin-left/right to defaults (Codex P2).
- The image memo is a typed object — literal NUL-byte separators had made
  diagram-prepass.ts register as binary to text tooling.

Codex structured review GATE: PASS (no P1).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore: bump version and changelog (v1.58.0.0)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs: sync make-pdf image-policy docs with final shipped behavior (v1.58.0.0)

The docs wave (87594420) predated the final review-wave commits, so two
docs drifted from shipped behavior:

- make-pdf/SKILL.md.tmpl + generated SKILL.md: remote images are BLOCKED
  with a visible placeholder (not warned-and-kept); out-of-tree reads
  (including via symlink) warn and --strict makes them fatal; --strict
  also covers oversized (>64MB) and non-regular files; troubleshooting
  entry now names the actual "[remote image blocked]" symptom.
- docs/howto-diagrams-and-formats.md: same corrections in the image
  section, CI section, and troubleshooting.
- README.md: docs/howto-diagrams-and-formats.md added to the Docs table
  (was unreachable from any entry-point doc).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs: apply Codex doc-review findings for v1.58.0.0

Cross-model doc review (Codex, read-only) checked the v1.58.0.0 docs
against the shipped code. Fixes:

- howto + make-pdf SKILL: diagram source is preserved base64 in a
  data-gstack-source attribute, not an HTML comment (-- in mermaid
  arrows would corrupt a comment); fences must start at column 0;
  fence options example gains page=portrait; --to html "zero network
  refs" qualified (--allow-network deliberately keeps remote tags).
- /diagram description, README + docs/skills.md rows: the hand-drawn
  aesthetic belongs to the .excalidraw artifact; rendered SVG/PNG use
  mermaid's clean neutral theme (lib/diagram-render entry.ts pins
  theme: "neutral").
- CHANGELOG v1.58.0.0 wording: --strict coverage lists all five fatal
  classes (missing/remote/out-of-tree/oversized/non-regular); fences
  are vector SVG in pdf+html, 300dpi PNG in docx; hand-drawn claim
  scoped to the .excalidraw file.
- lib/diagram-render/README: Page API table gains __downscaleRaster.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-06-12 15:38:53 -07:00
Garry Tan 443bde054c
v1.28.0.0 feat: browse --headed/--proxy/--navigate + gstack/llms.txt + webdriver-only stealth (#1363) 
* feat(browse): SOCKS5 bridge with auth + cred redaction helper

Adds browse/src/socks-bridge.ts: a 127.0.0.1-only SOCKS5 listener that
accepts unauthenticated connections from Chromium and relays them through
an authenticated upstream proxy. Chromium does not prompt for SOCKS5 auth
at launch, so this bridge is the workaround for using auth-required
residential SOCKS5 upstreams.

- startSocksBridge({ upstream, port: 0 }) → ephemeral 127.0.0.1 listener
- testUpstream({ upstream, retries: 3, backoffMs: 500, budgetMs: 5000 })
  pre-flight that connects to a known endpoint (default 1.1.1.1:443)
- Stream-error policy: kill affected client + upstream sockets on any
  error mid-stream; no transport retries (a transport-layer retry can
  corrupt browser traffic)

Adds browse/src/proxy-redact.ts: single source of truth for redacting
credentials in any logged proxy URL or upstream config. Every code path
that prints proxy config goes through this helper.

Adds the socks npm dep (~30KB) and 16 tests covering: 127.0.0.1-only
bind, byte-for-byte round trip through the bridge, auth rejection,
mid-stream upstream drop kills client conn, listener teardown,
testUpstream success + retry-exhaust paths, redaction of every
credential shape.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(browse): --proxy and --headed flags wire bridge into daemon

Adds the global --proxy <url> and --headed flags to the browse CLI.
Resolves cred policy and routes the daemon launch through the SOCKS5
bridge (or pass-through for HTTP/HTTPS) before chromium.launch().

CLI (cli.ts):
- extractGlobalFlags() strips --proxy/--headed from argv, parses URL via
  Node URL class, validates D9 cred-mixing (env BROWSE_PROXY_USER/PASS
  + URL creds → exit 1 with hint), composes canonical proxy URL with
  resolved creds, computes a stable configHash for daemon-mismatch
- ensureServer() now reads existing daemon's configHash from state file
  and refuses (exit 1 with disconnect hint) if --proxy/--headed mismatch
  the existing daemon. No silent restart that would drop tab state.
- All proxy-related stderr lines go through redactProxyUrl

proxy-config.ts (new):
- parseProxyConfig() — URL parser + D9 cred-mixing detector + scheme allowlist
- computeConfigHash() — stable hash of (proxy URL minus creds + headed flag)
- toUpstreamConfig() — map ParsedProxyConfig → socks-bridge.UpstreamConfig

Server (server.ts):
- Reads BROWSE_PROXY_URL at startup; for SOCKS5+auth, runs testUpstream
  pre-flight (5s budget, 3 retries, 500ms backoff) and exits 1 on failure
  with redacted error
- Spawns startSocksBridge() on 127.0.0.1:<ephemeral> and points
  Chromium at it via socks5://127.0.0.1:<port>
- HTTP/HTTPS or unauth SOCKS5 → pass-through to chromium.launch
  proxy.server (with username/password if present)
- State file gains optional configHash for daemon-mismatch check
- Bridge tears down via process.on('exit')

Browser manager (browser-manager.ts):
- New setProxyConfig({ server, username, password }) called by server.ts
  before launch
- chromium.launch() and both launchPersistentContext sites pass the
  proxy config through when set

Tests: 22 new across proxy-config (parse + cred-mixing + hash stability)
and extractGlobalFlags (flag stripping + cred-mixing rejection + cred
rotation hash stability + redaction).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(browse): Xvfb auto-spawn with PID + start-time validation

Adds browse/src/xvfb.ts: a Linux-only Xvfb auto-spawn module for
running headed Chromium in containers without DISPLAY. The module
walks a display range to pick a free one (never hardcodes :99) and
validates orphan PIDs by BOTH /proc/<pid>/cmdline matching 'Xvfb' AND
start-time matching the recorded value before sending any signal.
Defends against PID reuse — refuses to kill anything that doesn't
match both checks.

- shouldSpawnXvfb(env, platform) — pure decision: skip on macOS/Windows,
  on Linux skip when DISPLAY or WAYLAND_DISPLAY is set (codex F2)
- pickFreeDisplay(99..120) — probes via xdpyinfo
- spawnXvfb(display) — returns { pid, startTime, display } handle
- isOurXvfb(pid, startTime) — both-checks validator
- cleanupXvfb(state) — best-effort, validates ownership before SIGTERM

Wired into server.ts startup: when shouldSpawnXvfb says yes, picks a
free display, spawns Xvfb, sets DISPLAY for chromium.launchHeaded, and
records xvfbPid/xvfbStartTime/xvfbDisplay in the state file. Cleanup
runs on process.on('exit'). The CLI's disconnect path also runs
cleanupXvfb() in the force-cleanup branch when the server is dead.

Disconnect now applies to any non-default daemon (headed mode OR
configHash-tagged daemon — i.e. one started with --proxy/--headed),
not just headed mode.

Adds xvfb + x11-utils to .github/docker/Dockerfile.ci so CI exercises
the Linux container --headed path on every run. Without it the most
common production path would go untested.

Tests: 17 new across decision logic, PID validation defenses
(cmdline mismatch, start-time mismatch), no-op safety on bad inputs,
and a Linux+Xvfb-installed gate for the spawn → validate → cleanup
round trip. Tests skip on macOS/Windows automatically.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(browse): webdriver-mask stealth + Chromium-through-bridge e2e

D7 (codex narrowing): mask navigator.webdriver only via addInitScript.
The wintermute approach (fake plugins=[1..5], fake languages=['en-US',
'en'], stub window.chrome) is intentionally NOT applied — modern
fingerprinters check consistency between plugins.length, languages,
userAgent, and platform, and synthesizing fixed values can flag MORE
bot-like, not less. The honest minimum is webdriver, which Chromium
exposes as a known automation tell.

Adds browse/src/stealth.ts: single source of truth for the stealth
init script and launch args. Both browser-manager.launch() (headless)
and launchHeaded() (persistent context with extension) call
applyStealth(context) and pass STEALTH_LAUNCH_ARGS into chromium.launch.

The pre-existing launchHeaded stealth that did fake plugins/languages
is removed for the same reason. The cdc_/__webdriver runtime cleanup
and Permissions API patch are kept — they remove automation-injected
artifacts, not synthesize fake natural-browser values.

Adds bridge-chromium-e2e.test.ts (codex F3): the test that proves the
FEATURE works. Real Chromium with proxy.server = 'socks5://127.0.0.1:
<bridgePort>' navigates to a local HTTP fixture; the auth upstream's
connect counter and the HTTP fixture's hit counter both increment,
proving traffic actually traversed bridge → auth-upstream → destination.
Without this test, we could ship a working byte-relay and a broken
Chromium integration and never know.

Adds bridge-port-restart.test.ts (codex F1, reframed): old test
assumed two daemons coexist, which contradicts D2 single-daemon model.
Reframed as restart-then-restart, asserting fresh ephemeral ports
(never the hardcoded 1090) on each spin-up.

Adds stealth-webdriver.test.ts: navigator.webdriver=false in both
fresh contexts and persistent contexts; navigator.plugins/languages
are NOT replaced with the wintermute fake list (D7 verification).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(gstack): generate llms.txt — single-file capability index for AI agents

Adds scripts/gen-llms-txt.ts: produces gstack/llms.txt at repo root,
indexing every skill (47), every browse command (75), and design
commands when the design CLI is present. Per the llmstxt.org
convention, agents can read one file to learn what gstack offers
instead of crawling 47 SKILL.md files.

Sources:
- skill SKILL.md.tmpl frontmatter (name + description block scalar)
- browse/src/commands.ts COMMAND_DESCRIPTIONS (sorted by category)
- design/src/commands.ts COMMAND_DESCRIPTIONS if present (best-effort)

Wired into scripts/gen-skill-docs.ts as a post-step so it regenerates
on every `bun run gen:skill-docs` (the same script that re-emits all
SKILL.md files). Failures are non-fatal warnings, not build breaks —
the generator never blocks SKILL.md regen.

Strict mode (--strict, also used by tests) throws when a skill is
missing name or description in its frontmatter, catching missing
metadata before it ships.

Tests: shape (top-level sections, sort order, single-line summary
discipline), every-skill-and-command-appears, strict-mode rejection of
incomplete frontmatter, and freshness check that the committed
gstack/llms.txt matches what the generator produces now.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(browse): --navigate flag on download for browser-triggered files

Adds the --navigate strategy from community PR #1355 (originally from
@garrytan-agents). When set, download navigates to the URL with
waitUntil:'commit' and captures the resulting browser download via
page.waitForEvent('download'), then saves via download.saveAs().
Handles URLs that trigger files via Content-Disposition headers,
multi-hop CDN redirects requiring browser cookies, or anti-bot CDN
chains where page.request.fetch() can't follow the auth/redirect
chain.

Defaults still use the existing direct-fetch strategy. --navigate is
opt-in.

Goes through the same validateNavigationUrl SSRF gate as goto, so
download --navigate cannot reach IPv4 metadata endpoints (AWS IMDSv1,
GCP/Azure equivalents) or arbitrary internal hosts.

Inferred content type from suggested filename for common extensions
(epub, pdf, zip, gz, mp3/mp4, jpg/jpeg/png, txt, html, json) — falls
back to application/octet-stream. Same 200MB cap as Strategy 1.

Frames the use case generically (anti-bot CDN, Content-Disposition,
redirect chains) rather than naming any specific site, per project
voice rules.

Co-Authored-By: @garrytan-agents
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs: v1.28.0.0 — browse SKILL section + VERSION + CHANGELOG

VERSION 1.27.1.0 → 1.28.0.0 (MINOR — substantial new capability:
five new flags/features, ~600 LOC added, new socks dep, multiple
new modules).

browse/SKILL.md.tmpl: new "Headed Mode + Proxy + Anti-Bot Sites"
section between User Handoff and Snapshot Flags. Documents
--headed (auto-Xvfb on Linux), --proxy (with embedded SOCKS5
bridge for auth), download --navigate, the cred-mixing policy,
daemon-discipline (refuse-on-mismatch), the narrowed
webdriver-only stealth, container support caveats, and the
fail-fast/no-retry failure modes.

CHANGELOG entry follows the release-summary format from CLAUDE.md:
two-line headline, lead paragraph, "The numbers that matter"
table tied to specific test files that prove each capability,
"What this means for AI agents" closing tied to a real workflow
shift, then itemized Added/Changed/Fixed/For-contributors
sections.

Browse SKILL.md regenerated via bun run gen:skill-docs.
gstack/llms.txt regenerated automatically from the same pipeline.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test(browse): integration coverage for daemon mismatch + proxy fail-fast

Adds two integration tests that exercise the full process boundary,
not just the module-level wiring.

daemon-mismatch-refuse.test.ts (D2):
- Stubs a healthy state file with a fake configHash and a fake /health
  HTTP server, runs the actual cli.ts binary with a mismatching
  --proxy, asserts exit 1 + 'different config' / 'browse disconnect'
  hint in stderr.
- Same shape with the plain-daemon-meets---headed case.
- Positive case: matching configHash → CLI does NOT emit the mismatch
  hint (regardless of whether the actual command succeeds).

server-proxy-fail-fast.test.ts:
- Starts the rejecting SOCKS5 upstream, spawns server.ts with
  BROWSE_PROXY_URL pointing at it, BROWSE_HEADLESS_SKIP=1 to skip
  Chromium launch.
- Asserts exit 1, 'FAIL upstream' in stderr (testUpstream pre-flight
  ran), no raw credential leakage in any output (redaction works on
  the failure path), and exit within 30s upper bound.

Both tests use the existing spawn-bun-cli pattern from
commands.test.ts so they run on the same CI infrastructure as the
rest of the bun test suite.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(gen-skill-docs): keep module sync so test require() still works

Two regressions caught by the full test suite after the v1.28.0.0
landing pass:

1) package.json version mismatch — VERSION was bumped to 1.28.0.0
   but package.json still pinned to 1.27.1.0.
   test/gen-skill-docs.test.ts asserts they match.

2) Top-level await in scripts/gen-llms-txt.ts (CLI entry block) and
   scripts/gen-skill-docs.ts (post-step) made gen-skill-docs an
   async module. test/gen-skill-docs.test.ts uses require() to pull
   extractVoiceTriggers/processVoiceTriggers from gen-skill-docs,
   which Bun rejects on async modules with:
     "TypeError: require() async module ... unsupported.
      use 'await import()' instead."

Fix: wrap the await blocks in void IIFEs so the modules remain sync
from a require() perspective.

After fix: all 379 gen-skill-docs tests pass, all 77 new feature
tests pass (3 skipped on macOS — Linux+Xvfb gates).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(browse): apply codex adversarial findings on the new lifecycle

Codex outside-voice review caught five real production-failure modes in
the v1.28.0.0 proxy/headed lifecycle. Fixed:

1) `browse disconnect` skip-graceful for proxy-only daemons
   (browse/src/cli.ts). The graceful /command POST went out with stray
   `domains,` shorthand and (even fixed) the server's disconnect handler
   only tears down headed mode — proxy-only daemons returned 200 "Not
   in headed mode" while leaving the bridge running. Now disconnect
   short-circuits to force-cleanup for non-headed daemons, which kicks
   process.on('exit') in server.ts to close the bridge + Xvfb.

2) sendCommand crash retry preserves --proxy / --headed
   (browse/src/cli.ts). The ECONNRESET retry path called startServer()
   with no extraEnv, silently dropping the proxied flags. A daemon that
   died mid-command would silently restart in default direct/headless
   mode and bypass the SOCKS bridge. Now reapplies BROWSE_PROXY_URL,
   BROWSE_HEADED, and BROWSE_CONFIG_HASH from the resolved global flags.

3) `connect` honors --proxy (browse/src/cli.ts). The headed-mode
   `connect` command built its own serverEnv that didn't include
   BROWSE_PROXY_URL, so `browse --proxy <url> connect` launched headed
   Chromium without the proxy. Now threads proxyUrl + configHash into
   the connect serverEnv.

4) SOCKS5 bridge handles fragmented TCP frames
   (browse/src/socks-bridge.ts). Previously used once('data') and
   parsed each chunk as a complete SOCKS5 frame — TCP doesn't preserve
   message boundaries and split greetings/CONNECT requests caused
   intermittent handshake failures. Replaced with a single state
   machine that buffers chunks and uses size predicates on the SOCKS5
   header to know when a complete frame has arrived. Pauses the client
   socket during upstream connect and replays any remainder bytes
   into the upstream on success.

5) Xvfb cleanup-then-state-delete ordering
   (browse/src/server.ts). emergencyCleanup() previously deleted the
   state file BEFORE any Xvfb cleanup could read it, orphaning Xvfb
   on uncaughtException / unhandledRejection. Now reads the state
   file first, calls cleanupXvfb() (which validates cmdline +
   start-time before kill), then deletes the state file.

Adds a regression test for #4: writes the SOCKS5 greeting + CONNECT
one byte at a time with 5ms ticks, asserts a clean round trip after
the fragmented handshake.

Codex's sixth finding (bridge advertises NO_AUTH on 127.0.0.1, so any
co-located process can use the authenticated upstream) is documented
as a known limitation — gstack's threat model assumes single-user
hosts. Adding bridge-side auth is a separate change.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs: update BROWSER.md + TODOS.md for v1.28.0.0

BROWSER.md picks up a "Headed mode + proxy + browser-native downloads
(v1.28.0.0)" subsection inside Real-browser mode plus the new source-map
entries (socks-bridge.ts, proxy-config.ts, proxy-redact.ts, xvfb.ts,
stealth.ts). TODOS.md anti-bot-stealth item updated to reflect the v1.28
narrowing — the "fake plugins" line is no longer accurate.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(ci): include bun.lock in image build for deterministic install

CI evals all failed on PR #1363 with:
  error: Could not resolve: "smart-buffer". Maybe you need to "bun install"?
  error: Could not resolve: "ip-address". Maybe you need to "bun install"?
  at /opt/node_modules_cache/socks/build/client/socksclient.js:15

The cached node_modules layer in the pre-baked Docker image had
`socks` (the new dep) but was missing its transitive deps (smart-buffer,
ip-address). The image build copied only package.json into the build
context — without bun.lock, `bun install` resolved a different tree
than local `bun install` did, dropping required transitive deps.

Reproduces locally as 229 packages (correct) when bun.lock is present
or absent. Why CI diverged isn't fully understood — possibly Docker
layer cache reuse across image rebuilds — but the deterministic fix is
to include the lockfile in the image build context and use
`--frozen-lockfile`, matching what every CI doc recommends.

Changes:
- .github/docker/Dockerfile.ci: COPY bun.lock alongside package.json,
  switch `bun install` → `bun install --frozen-lockfile` so any future
  lockfile drift fails loudly during image build instead of producing
  a partially-installed cache that breaks downstream eval jobs.
- .github/workflows/evals.yml: include bun.lock in the image-tag hash
  so adding/removing a dep invalidates the image, AND copy bun.lock
  into the docker context alongside package.json.
- .github/workflows/evals-periodic.yml: same updates.
- .github/workflows/ci-image.yml: rebuild trigger now fires on bun.lock
  changes too; build context includes bun.lock.

Image hash changes → fresh image gets built on next CI run → install
matches the lockfile exactly → no missing transitive deps.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(ci): use hardlink copy instead of symlink for node_modules cache

After the bun.lock fix landed, the eval matrix STILL failed identically:
  Could not resolve: "smart-buffer" / "ip-address"
  at /opt/node_modules_cache/socks/build/client/socksclient.js

But the hash-tagged image actually contains smart-buffer + ip-address +
socks all flat in /opt/node_modules_cache (verified by pulling and
inspecting the image). 207 packages, all present.

Root cause: the workflow used `ln -s /opt/node_modules_cache node_modules`
to restore deps. Bun build (and Node module resolution generally) walks
a file's realpath to find sibling deps. From the symlinked
/workspace/node_modules/socks/build/client/socksclient.js, realpath
resolves to /opt/node_modules_cache/socks/build/client/socksclient.js,
and walking up to find a node_modules/smart-buffer dir fails — there's
no `node_modules` segment in the realpath.

Switch `ln -s` → `cp -al` (hardlink-copy). Each file in the cache becomes
a hardlink at /workspace/node_modules/<pkg>, sharing inodes (no data
copy). Realpath of /workspace/node_modules/socks/.../socksclient.js
stays inside /workspace/node_modules, so sibling deps resolve correctly.

Speed is comparable to symlink — `cp -al` on ~200 packages on tmpfs is
sub-second. Same caching story preserved.

Both evals.yml and evals-periodic.yml updated.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(ci): cp -r instead of cp -al — /opt and /workspace are different filesystems

The hardlink-copy fix landed and immediately broke with:
  cp: cannot create hard link 'node_modules/<file>' to
      '/opt/node_modules_cache/<file>': Invalid cross-device link

GitHub Actions runners mount the workspace volume at /workspace
(overlay-fs layered onto the runner image), and /opt is the runner
image's own filesystem. Cross-filesystem hardlinks aren't supported.

Switch `cp -al` → `cp -r`. Cost: ~5s for ~200 packages of small JS
files vs ~0s for the broken symlink. Still cheaper than the ~15s
`bun install` fallback. Realpath of /workspace/node_modules/<pkg>/...
stays inside /workspace, so bun build's sibling-dep resolution works.

Both evals.yml and evals-periodic.yml updated.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-05-07 20:14:59 -07:00
Garry Tan ed1e4be2f6
feat: gstack browser sidebar = interactive Claude Code REPL with live tab awareness (v1.14.0.0) (#1216) 
* build: vendor xterm@5 for the Terminal sidebar tab

Adds xterm@5 + xterm-addon-fit as devDependencies and a `vendor:xterm`
build step that copies the assets into `extension/lib/` at build time.
The vendored files are .gitignored so the npm version stays the source
of truth. xterm@5 is eval-free, so no MV3 CSP changes needed.

No runtime callers yet — this just stages the assets.

* feat(server): add pty-session-cookie module for the Terminal tab

Mirrors `sse-session-cookie.ts` exactly. Mints short-lived 30-min HttpOnly
cookies for authenticating the Terminal-tab WebSocket upgrade against
the terminal-agent. Same TTL, same opportunistic-pruning shape, same
"scoped tokens never valid as root" invariant. Two registries instead of
one because the cookie names are different (`gstack_sse` vs `gstack_pty`)
and the token spaces must not overlap.

No callers yet — wired up in the next commit.

* feat(server): add terminal-agent.ts (PTY for the Terminal sidebar tab)

Translates phoenix gbrowser's Go PTY (cmd/gbd/terminal.go) into a Bun
non-compiled process. Lives separately from `sidebar-agent.ts` so a
WS-framing or PTY-cleanup bug can't take down the chat path (codex
outside-voice review caught the coupling risk).

Architecture:
- Bun.serve on 127.0.0.1:0 (never tunneled).
- POST /internal/grant accepts cookie tokens from the parent server over
  loopback, authenticated with a per-boot internal token.
- GET /ws upgrades require BOTH (a) Origin: chrome-extension://<id> and
  (b) the gstack_pty cookie minted by /pty-session. Either gate alone is
  insufficient (CSWSH defense + auth defense).
- Lazy spawn: claude PTY is not started until the WS receives its first
  data frame. Idle sidebar opens cost nothing.
- Bun PTY API: `terminal: { rows, cols, data(t, chunk) }` — verified at
  impl time on Bun 1.3.10. proc.terminal.write() for input,
  proc.terminal.resize() for resize, proc.kill() + 3s SIGKILL fallback
  on close.
- process.on('uncaughtException'|'unhandledRejection') handlers so a
  framing bug logs but doesn't kill the listener loop.

Test-only `BROWSE_TERMINAL_BINARY` env override lets the integration
tests spawn /bin/bash instead of requiring claude on every CI runner.

Not yet spawned by anything — wired in the next commit.

* feat(server): wire /pty-session route + spawn terminal-agent

Server-side glue connecting the Terminal sidebar tab to the new
terminal-agent process.

server.ts:
- New POST /pty-session route. Validates AUTH_TOKEN, mints a gstack_pty
  HttpOnly cookie via pty-session-cookie.ts, posts the cookie value to
  the agent's loopback /internal/grant. Returns the terminalPort + Set-Cookie
  to the extension.
- /health response gains `terminalPort` (just the port number — never a
  shell token). Tokens flow via the cookie path, never /health, because
  /health already surfaces AUTH_TOKEN to localhost callers in headed mode
  (that's a separate v1.1+ TODO).
- /pty-session and /terminal/* are deliberately NOT added to TUNNEL_PATHS,
  so the dual-listener tunnel surface 404s by default-deny.
- Shutdown path now also pkills terminal-agent and unlinks its state files
  (terminal-port + terminal-internal-token) so a reconnect doesn't try to
  hit a dead port.

cli.ts:
- After spawning sidebar-agent.ts, also spawn terminal-agent.ts. Same
  pattern: pkill old instances, Bun.spawn(['bun', 'run', script]) with
  BROWSE_STATE_FILE + BROWSE_SERVER_PORT env. Non-fatal if the spawn
  fails — chat still works without the terminal agent.

* feat(extension): Terminal as default sidebar tab

Adds a primary tab bar (Terminal | Chat) above the existing tab-content
panes. Terminal is the default-active tab; clicking Chat returns to the
existing claude -p one-shot flow which is preserved verbatim.

manifest.json: adds ws://127.0.0.1:*/ to host_permissions so MV3 doesn't
block the WebSocket upgrade.

sidepanel.html: new primary-tabs nav, new #tab-terminal pane with a
"Press any key to start Claude Code" bootstrap card, claude-not-found
install card, xterm mount point, and "session ended" restart UI. Loads
xterm.js + xterm-addon-fit + sidepanel-terminal.js. tab-chat is no
longer the .active default.

sidepanel.js: new activePrimaryPaneId() helper that reads which primary
tab is selected. Debug-close paths now route back to whichever primary
pane is active (was hardcoded to tab-chat). Primary-tab click handler
toggles .active classes and aria-selected. window.gstackServerPort and
window.gstackAuthToken exposed so sidepanel-terminal.js can build the
/pty-session POST and the WS URL.

sidepanel-terminal.js (new): xterm.js lifecycle. Lazy-spawn — first
keystroke fires POST /pty-session, then opens
ws://127.0.0.1:<terminalPort>/ws. Origin + cookie are set automatically
by the browser. Resize observer sends {type:"resize"} text frames.
ResizeObserver, tab-switch hooks, restart button, install-card retry.
On WS close shows "Session ended, click to restart" — no auto-reconnect
(codex outside-voice flagged that as session-burning).

sidepanel.css: primary-tabs bar + Terminal pane styling (full-height
xterm container, install card, ended state).

* test: terminal-agent + cookie module + sidebar default-tab regression

Three new test files:

terminal-agent.test.ts (16 tests): pty-session-cookie mint/validate/
revoke, Set-Cookie shape (HttpOnly + SameSite=Strict + Path=/, NO Secure
since 127.0.0.1 over HTTP), source-level guards that /pty-session and
/terminal/* are NOT in TUNNEL_PATHS, /health does NOT surface ptyToken
or gstack_pty, terminal-agent binds 127.0.0.1, /ws upgrade enforces
chrome-extension:// Origin AND gstack_pty cookie, lazy-spawn invariant
(spawnClaude is called from message handler, not upgrade), uncaughtException/
unhandledRejection handlers exist, SIGINT-then-SIGKILL cleanup.

terminal-agent-integration.test.ts (7 tests): spawns the agent as a real
subprocess in a tmp state dir. Verifies /internal/grant accepts/rejects
the loopback token, /ws gates (no Origin → 403, bad Origin → 403, no
cookie → 401), real WebSocket round-trip with /bin/bash via the
BROWSE_TERMINAL_BINARY override (write 'echo hello-pty-world\n', read it
back), and resize message acceptance.

sidebar-tabs.test.ts (13 tests): structural regression suite locking the
load-bearing invariants of the default-tab change — Terminal is .active,
Chat is not, xterm assets are loaded, debug-close path no longer hardcodes
tab-chat (uses activePrimaryPaneId), primary-tab click handler exists,
chat surface is not accidentally deleted, terminal JS does NOT auto-
reconnect on close, manifest declares ws:// + http:// localhost host
permissions, no unsafe-eval.

Plan called for Playwright + extension regression; the codebase doesn't
ship Playwright extension launcher infra, so we follow the existing
extension-test pattern (source-level structural assertions). Same
load-bearing intent — locks the invariants before they regress.

* docs: Terminal flow + threat model + v1.1 follow-ups

SIDEBAR_MESSAGE_FLOW.md: new "Terminal flow" section. Documents the WS
upgrade path (/pty-session cookie mint → /ws Origin + cookie gate →
lazy claude spawn), the dual-token model (AUTH_TOKEN for /pty-session,
gstack_pty cookie for /ws, INTERNAL_TOKEN for server↔agent loopback),
and the threat-model boundary — the Terminal tab bypasses the entire
prompt-injection security stack on purpose; user keystrokes are the
trust source. That trust assumption is load-bearing on three transport
guarantees: local-only listener, Origin gate, cookie auth. Drop any
one of those three and the tab becomes unsafe.

CLAUDE.md: extends the "Sidebar architecture" note to include
terminal-agent.ts in the read-this-first list. Adds a "Terminal tab is
its own process" note so a future contributor doesn't bolt PTY logic
onto sidebar-agent.ts.

TODOS.md: three new follow-ups under a new "Sidebar Terminal" section:
  - v1.1: PTY session survives sidebar reload (Issue 1C deferred).
  - v1.1+: audit /health AUTH_TOKEN distribution (codex finding #2 —
    a pre-existing soft leak that cc-pty-import sidesteps but doesn't
    fix).
  - v1.1+: apply terminal-agent's process.on exception handlers to
    sidebar-agent.ts (codex finding #4 — chat path has no fatal
    handlers).

* feat(extension): Terminal-only sidebar — auth fix, UX polish, chat rip

The chat queue path is gone. The Chrome side panel is now just an
interactive claude PTY in xterm.js. Activity / Refs / Inspector still
exist behind the `debug` toggle in the footer.

Three threads of change, all from dogfood iteration on top of
cc-pty-import:

1. fix(server): cross-port WS auth via Sec-WebSocket-Protocol
   - Browsers can't set Authorization on a WebSocket upgrade. We had
     been minting an HttpOnly gstack_pty cookie via /pty-session, but
     SameSite=Strict cookies don't survive the cross-port jump from
     server.ts:34567 to the agent's random port from a chrome-extension
     origin. The WS opened then immediately closed → "Session ended."
   - /pty-session now also returns ptySessionToken in the JSON body.
   - Extension calls `new WebSocket(url, [`gstack-pty.<token>`])`.
     Browser sends Sec-WebSocket-Protocol on the upgrade.
   - Agent reads the protocol header, validates against validTokens,
     and MUST echo the protocol back (Chromium closes the connection
     immediately if a server doesn't pick one of the offered protocols).
   - Cookie path is kept as a fallback for non-browser callers (curl,
     integration tests).
   - New integration test exercises the full protocol-auth round-trip
     via raw fetch+Upgrade so a future regression of this exact class
     fails in CI.

2. fix(extension): UX polish on the Terminal pane
   - Eager auto-connect when the sidebar opens — no "Press any key to
     start" friction every reload.
   - Always-visible ↻ Restart button in the terminal toolbar (not
     gated on the ENDED state) so the user can force a fresh claude
     mid-session.
   - MutationObserver on #tab-terminal's class attribute drives a
     fitAddon.fit() + term.refresh() when the pane becomes visible
     again — xterm doesn't auto-redraw after display:none → display:flex.

3. feat(extension): rip the chat tab + sidebar-agent.ts
   - Sidebar is Terminal-only. No more Terminal | Chat primary nav.
   - sidebar-agent.ts deleted. /sidebar-command, /sidebar-chat,
     /sidebar-agent/event, /sidebar-tabs* and friends all deleted.
   - The pickSidebarModel router (sonnet vs opus) is gone — the live
     PTY uses whatever model the user's `claude` CLI is configured with.
   - Quick-actions (🧹 Cleanup / 📸 Screenshot / 🍪 Cookies) survive
     in the Terminal toolbar. Cleanup now injects its prompt into the
     live PTY via window.gstackInjectToTerminal — no more
     /sidebar-command POST. The Inspector "Send to Code" action uses
     the same injection path.
   - clear-chat button removed from the footer.
   - sidepanel.js shed ~900 lines of chat polling, optimistic UI,
     stop-agent, etc.

Net diff: -3.4k lines across 16 files. CLAUDE.md, TODOS.md, and
docs/designs/SIDEBAR_MESSAGE_FLOW.md rewritten to match. The sidebar
regression test (browse/test/sidebar-tabs.test.ts) is rewritten as 27
structural assertions locking the new layout — Terminal sole pane,
no chat input, quick-actions in toolbar, eager-connect, MutationObserver
repaint, restart helper.

* feat: live tab awareness for the Terminal pane

claude in the PTY now has continuous tab-aware context. Three pieces:

1. Live state files. background.js listens to chrome.tabs.onActivated /
   onCreated / onRemoved / onUpdated (throttled to URL/title/status==
   complete so loading spinners don't spam) and pushes a snapshot. The
   sidepanel relays it as a custom event; sidepanel-terminal.js sends
   {type:"tabState"} text frames over the live PTY WebSocket.
   terminal-agent.ts writes:
     <stateDir>/tabs.json          all open tabs (id, url, title, active,
                                   pinned, audible, windowId)
     <stateDir>/active-tab.json    current active tab (skips chrome:// and
                                   chrome-extension:// internal pages)
   Atomic write via tmp + rename so claude never reads a half-written
   document. A fresh snapshot is pushed on WS open so the files exist by
   the time claude finishes booting.

2. New $B tab-each <command> [args...] meta-command. Fans out a single
   command across every open tab, returns
   {command, args, total, results: [{tabId, url, title, status, output}]}.
   Skips chrome:// pages; restores the originally active tab in a finally
   block (so a mid-batch error doesn't leave the user looking at a
   different tab); uses bringToFront: false so the OS window doesn't
   jump on every fanout. Scope-checks the inner command BEFORE the loop.

3. --append-system-prompt hint at spawn time. Claude is told about both
   the state files and the $B tab-each command up front, so it doesn't
   have to discover the surface by trial. Passed via the --append-system-
   prompt CLI flag, NOT as a leading PTY write — the hint stays out of
   the visible transcript.

Tests:
- browse/test/tab-each.test.ts (new) — registration + source-level
  invariants (scope check before loop, finally-restore, bringToFront:false,
  chrome:// skip) + behavior tests with a mock BrowserManager that verify
  iteration order, JSON shape, error handling, and active-tab restore.
- browse/test/terminal-agent.test.ts — three new assertions for
  tabState handler shape, atomic-write pattern, and the
  --append-system-prompt wiring at spawn.

Verified live: opened 5 tabs, ran $B tab-each url against the live
server, got per-tab JSON results back, original active tab restored
without OS focus stealing.

* chore: drop sidebar-agent test refs after chat rip

Five test files / describe blocks targeted the deleted chat path:
- browse/test/security-e2e-fullstack.test.ts (full-stack chat-pipeline E2E
  with mock claude — whole file gone)
- browse/test/security-review-fullstack.test.ts (review-flow E2E with real
  classifier — whole file gone)
- browse/test/security-review-sidepanel-e2e.test.ts (Playwright E2E for
  the security event banner that was ripped from sidepanel.html)
- browse/test/security-audit-r2.test.ts (5 describe blocks: agent queue
  permissions, isValidQueueEntry stateFile traversal, loadSession session-ID
  validation, switchChatTab DocumentFragment, pollChat reentrancy guard,
  /sidebar-tabs URL sanitization, sidebar-agent SIGTERM→SIGKILL escalation,
  AGENT_SRC top-level read converted to graceful fallback)
- browse/test/security-adversarial-fixes.test.ts (canary stream-chunk split
  detection on detectCanaryLeak; one tool-output test on sidebar-agent)
- test/skill-validation.test.ts (sidebar agent #584 describe block)

These all assumed sidebar-agent.ts existed and tested chat-queue plumbing,
chat-tab DOM round-trip, chat-polling reentrancy, or per-message classifier
canary detection. With the live PTY there is no chat queue, no chat tab,
no LLM stream to canary-scan, and no per-message subprocess. The Terminal
pane's invariants are covered by the new browse/test/sidebar-tabs.test.ts
(27 structural assertions), browse/test/terminal-agent.test.ts, and
browse/test/terminal-agent-integration.test.ts.

bun test → exit 0, 0 failures.

* chore: bump version and changelog (v1.14.0.0)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(extension): xterm fills the full Terminal panel height

The Terminal pane only rendered into the top portion of the panel — most
of the panel below the prompt was an empty black gap. Three layered
issues, all about xterm.js measuring dimensions during a layout state
that wasn't ready yet:

1. order-of-operations in connect(): ensureXterm() ran BEFORE
   setState(LIVE), so term.open() measured els.mount while it was still
   display:none. xterm caches a 0-size viewport synchronously inside
   open() and never auto-recovers when the container goes visible.
   Flipped: setState(LIVE) → ensureXterm.

2. first fit() ran synchronously before the browser had applied the
   .active class transition. Wrapped in requestAnimationFrame so layout
   has settled before fit() reads clientHeight.

3. CSS flex-overflow trap: .terminal-mount has flex:1 inside the
   flex-column #tab-terminal, but .tab-content's `overflow-y: auto` and
   the lack of `min-height: 0` on .terminal-mount meant the item
   couldn't shrink below content size. flex:1 then refused to expand
   into available space and xterm rendered into whatever its initial
   2x2 measurement happened to be.

Fixes:
- extension/sidepanel-terminal.js: reorder + RAF fit
- extension/sidepanel.css: .terminal-mount gets `flex: 1 1 0` +
  `min-height: 0` + `position: relative`. #tab-terminal overrides
  .tab-content's `overflow-y: auto` to `overflow: hidden` (xterm has
  its own viewport scroll; the parent shouldn't compete) and explicitly
  re-declares `display: flex; flex-direction: column` for #tab-terminal.active.

bun test browse/test/sidebar-tabs.test.ts → 27/27 pass.
Manually verified: side panel opens → Terminal fills full panel height,
xterm scrollback works, debug-tab toggle still repaints correctly.

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-04-25 22:52:15 -07:00
Garry Tan e3d7f49c74
feat(v1.10.1.0): overlay efficacy harness + Opus 4.7 fanout nudge removal (#1166) 
* refactor: export readOverlay from model-overlay resolver

Needed by the overlay-efficacy eval harness to resolve INHERIT directives
without going through generateModelOverlay's full TemplateContext.

* chore: add @anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk@0.2.117 dep

Pinned exact for SDK event-shape stability. Used by the overlay-efficacy
harness to drive the model through a closer-to-real Claude Code harness
than `claude -p`.

* feat(preflight): sanity check for agent-sdk + overlay resolver

Verifies: SDK loads, claude-opus-4-7 is a live API model, SDKMessage
event shape matches assumptions, readOverlay resolves INHERIT directives
and includes expected content. Run with `bun run scripts/preflight-agent-sdk.ts`.

PREFLIGHT OK on first run, $0.013 API spend.

* feat(eval): parametric overlay-efficacy harness (runner + fixtures)

`test/helpers/agent-sdk-runner.ts` wraps @anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk
with explicit `AgentSdkResult` types, process-level API concurrency
semaphore, and 3-shape 429 retry (thrown error, result-message error,
mid-stream SDKRateLimitEvent). Pins the local claude binary via
`pathToClaudeCodeExecutable`.

`test/fixtures/overlay-nudges.ts` holds the typed registry. Two
fixtures for the first measurement: `opus-4-7-fanout-toy` (3-file read)
and `opus-4-7-fanout-realistic` (mixed-tool audit). Strict validator
rejects duplicate ids, non-integer trials, unsafe overlay paths, non-safe
id chars, and missing overlay files at module load.

Adding a future overlay nudge eval = one fixture entry.

* test(eval): unit tests for agent-sdk-runner (36 tests, free tier)

Stub `queryProvider` feeds hand-crafted SDKMessage streams. Covers:
happy-path shape, all 3 rate-limit shapes + retry, workspace reset on
retry, persistent 429 -> `RateLimitExhaustedError`, non-429 propagation,
process-level concurrency cap, options propagation, artifact path
uniqueness, cost/turn mapping, and every validator rejection case.

* test(eval): paid periodic overlay-efficacy harness

`test/skill-e2e-overlay-harness.test.ts` iterates OVERLAY_FIXTURES,
runs two arms per fixture (overlay-ON, overlay-OFF) at N=10 trials with
bounded concurrency. Arms use SDK preset `claude_code` so both include
the real Claude Code system prompt; overlay-ON appends the resolved
overlay text. Saves per-trial raw event streams to
`~/.gstack/projects/<slug>/transcripts/` for forensic recovery.

Gated on `EVALS=1 && EVALS_TIER=periodic`. ~$3/run (40 trials).

* test: register overlay harness in touchfiles (both maps)

Entries for `overlay-harness-opus-4-7-fanout-toy` and
`opus-4-7-fanout-realistic` in E2E_TOUCHFILES (deps: model-overlays/,
fixtures file, runner, resolver) and E2E_TIERS (`periodic`). Passes
`test/touchfiles.test.ts` completeness check.

* fix(opus-4.7): remove "Fan out explicitly" overlay nudge

Measured counterproductive under the new SDK harness. Baseline Opus 4.7
emits first-turn parallel tool_use blocks 70% of the time on a 3-file
read prompt. With the custom nudge: 10%. With Anthropic's own canonical
`<use_parallel_tool_calls>` block from their parallel-tool-use docs:
0%. Both overlays suppress fanout; neither improves it.

On realistic multi-tool prompts (audit a project: read files + glob +
summarize), Opus 4.7 never fans out in first turn regardless of overlay.
Zero of 20 trials. Not a prompt problem.

Keeping the other three nudges (effort-match, batch questions, literal
interpretation) pending their own measurement. Harness is ready for
follow-up fixtures — add one entry to
`test/fixtures/overlay-nudges.ts` to measure any overlay bullet.

Cost of investigation: ~$7 total across 3 eval runs.

* chore: bump version and changelog (v1.6.5.0)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(eval): extend OverlayFixture with allowedTools, maxTurns, direction

Per-fixture tool allowlist unblocks measuring nudges that need Edit/Write
(e.g. literal-interpretation 'fix the failing tests' needs write access).
Per-fixture maxTurns lets harder prompts run longer without changing the
default. `direction` is cosmetic metadata for test output labeling.

Also adds reusable predicates and metrics:
- lowerIsBetter20Pct / higherIsBetter20Pct — 20% lift threshold vs baseline
- bashToolCallCount — count of Bash tool_use across the session
- turnsToCompletion — SDK-reported num_turns at result
- uniqueFilesEdited — Edit/Write/MultiEdit file_path set size

test/skill-e2e-overlay-harness.test.ts now threads fixture.allowedTools
and fixture.maxTurns through runArm.

* test(eval): 3 more overlay fixtures to measure remaining Claude nudges

Measures three overlay bullets that haven't been tested yet:

- claude-dedicated-tools-vs-bash — claude.md says 'prefer Read/Edit/Write/
  Glob/Grep over cat/sed/find/grep'. Fixture prompts 'list every TypeScript
  file under src/ and tell me what each exports' and counts Bash tool_use
  across the session. Overlay-ON should drop it by >=20%.
- opus-4-7-effort-match-trivial — opus-4-7.md says 'simple file reads
  don't need deep reasoning.' Fixture uses a trivial one-file prompt
  (config.json lookup) and measures turns_used. Overlay-ON should be
  <=80% of baseline turns.
- opus-4-7-literal-interpretation — opus-4-7.md says 'fix ALL failing
  tests, not just the obvious one.' Fixture seeds three failing test
  files with deliberately distinct failure modes and counts unique files
  edited. Overlay-ON should touch >=20% more files.

Adding a fourth fixture for any remaining overlay nudge is a single entry.
The harness is now proven on: fanout (deleted after measurement), dedicated
tools, effort-match, and literal-interpretation.

* fix(eval): handle SDK max-turns throw gracefully

Some @anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk versions throw from the query
generator when maxTurns is reached, instead of emitting a result
message with subtype='error_max_turns'. The runner treated that as
a non-retryable error and killed the whole periodic run on the first
fixture that exceeded its turn cap.

Added isMaxTurnsError() detector and a catch branch that synthesizes
an AgentSdkResult from events captured before the throw, with
exitReason='error_max_turns' and costUsd=0 (unknown from the thrown
path). The metric function still runs against whatever assistant
turns were collected, so the trial produces a usable number.

Hoisted events/assistantTurns/toolCalls/assistantTextParts and the
timing counters out of the inner try so the catch branch can read
them. No behavior change on the success path or on rate-limit retry
paths.

* test(eval): bump maxTurns to 15 for claude-dedicated-tools-vs-bash

The prompt 'list every TypeScript file under src/ and tell me what
each exports' needs 1 turn for Glob + ~5 for Reads + 1 for summary.
Default maxTurns=5 was not enough; prior run threw from the SDK on
this fixture and tanked the whole periodic eval.

Bumping to 15 gives headroom. The runner now also handles max-turns
gracefully even if a future fixture underestimates, so this is belt
and suspenders.

* test(eval): Sonnet 4.6 variants of the 5 Opus-4.7 fixtures

Same overlays, same prompts, same metrics, `model: 'claude-sonnet-4-6'`.
Tests whether the overlays behave differently on a weaker Claude model
where baseline behavior is shakier. Sonnet trials cost ~3-4x less than
Opus so these 5 add ~$4.50 to a full run.

Measurement result from the first paired run (100 trials total,
~$14.55):

- **Sonnet + effort-match shows real overlay benefit.** With the overlay
  on, Sonnet takes 2.5 turns on a trivial `What's the version in
  config.json?` prompt. Without, it takes exactly 3.0 turns in all 10
  trials. ~17% reduction, below the 20% pass threshold but the signal
  is clean: overlay-ON distribution [2,2,2,2,2,3,3,3,3,3] vs overlay-OFF
  [3,3,3,3,3,3,3,3,3,3].
- All other Sonnet dimensions flat (fanout, dedicated-tools, literal
  interpretation). Same as Opus on those axes.
- Opus effort-match remains flat (2.60 vs 2.50, +4% slower with overlay).

Implication: model-stratified. The overlay stack helps Sonnet on some
axes where it does nothing on Opus. Wholesale removal would hurt Sonnet.
Per-nudge per-model measurement is the right move going forward.

* chore: bump version to 1.10.1.0

Updates VERSION, package.json, CHANGELOG header, and TODOS completion
marker from 1.6.5.0 to 1.10.1.0.

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-04-23 18:42:58 -07:00
Garry Tan 97584f9a59
feat(security): ML prompt injection defense for sidebar (v1.4.0.0) (#1089) 
* chore(deps): add @huggingface/transformers for prompt injection classifier

Dependency needed for the ML prompt injection defense layer coming in the
follow-up commits. @huggingface/transformers will host the TestSavantAI
BERT-small classifier that scans tool outputs for indirect prompt injection.

Note: this dep only runs in non-compiled bun contexts (sidebar-agent.ts).
The compiled browse binary cannot load it because transformers.js v4 requires
onnxruntime-node (native module, fails to dlopen from bun compile's temp
extract dir). See docs/designs/ML_PROMPT_INJECTION_KILLER.md for the full
architectural decision.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(security): add security.ts foundation for prompt injection defense

Establishes the module structure for the L5 canary and L6 verdict aggregation
layers. Pure-string operations only — safe to import from the compiled browse
binary.

Includes:
  * THRESHOLDS constants (BLOCK 0.85 / WARN 0.60 / LOG_ONLY 0.40), calibrated
    against BrowseSafe-Bench smoke + developer content benign corpus.
  * combineVerdict() implementing the ensemble rule: BLOCK only when the ML
    content classifier AND the transcript classifier both score >= WARN.
    Single-layer high confidence degrades to WARN to prevent any one
    classifier's false-positives from killing sessions (Stack Overflow
    instruction-writing-style FPs at 0.99 on TestSavantAI alone).
  * generateCanary / injectCanary / checkCanaryInStructure — session-scoped
    secret token, recursively scans tool arguments, URLs, file writes, and
    nested objects per the plan's all-channel coverage decision.
  * logAttempt with 10MB rotation (keeps 5 generations). Salted SHA-256 hash,
    per-device salt at ~/.gstack/security/device-salt (0600).
  * Cross-process session state at ~/.gstack/security/session-state.json
    (atomic temp+rename). Required because server.ts (compiled) and
    sidebar-agent.ts (non-compiled) are separate processes.
  * getStatus() for shield icon rendering via /health.

ML classifier code will live in a separate module (security-classifier.ts)
loaded only by sidebar-agent.ts — compiled browse binary cannot load the
native ONNX runtime.

Plan: ~/.gstack/projects/garrytan-gstack/ceo-plans/2026-04-19-prompt-injection-guard.md

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(security): wire canary injection into sidebar spawnClaude

Every sidebar message now gets a fresh CANARY-XXXXXXXXXXXX token embedded
in the system prompt with an instruction for Claude to never output it on
any channel. The token flows through the queue entry so sidebar-agent.ts
can check every outbound operation for leaks.

If Claude echoes the canary into any outbound channel (text stream, tool
arguments, URLs, file write paths), the sidebar-agent terminates the
session and the user sees the approved canary leak banner.

This operation is pure string manipulation — safe in the compiled browse
binary. The actual output-stream check (which also has to be safe in
compiled contexts) lives in sidebar-agent.ts (next commit).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test(security): make sidebar-agent destructure check regex-tolerant

The test asserted the exact string `const { prompt, args, stateFile, cwd, tabId } = queueEntry`
which breaks whenever security or other extensions add fields (canary, pageUrl,
etc.). Switch to a regex that requires the core fields in order but tolerates
additional fields in between. Preserves the test's intent (args come from the
queue entry, not rebuilt) while allowing the destructure to grow.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(security): canary leak check across all outbound channels

The sidebar-agent now scans every Claude stream event for the session's
canary token before relaying any data to the sidepanel. Channels covered
(per CEO review cross-model tension #2):

  * Assistant text blocks
  * Assistant text_delta streaming
  * tool_use arguments (recursively, via checkCanaryInStructure — catches
    URLs, commands, file paths nested at any depth)
  * tool_use content_block_start
  * tool_input_delta partial JSON
  * Final result payload

If the canary leaks on any channel, onCanaryLeaked() fires once per session:

  1. logAttempt() writes the event to ~/.gstack/security/attempts.jsonl
     with the canary's salted hash (never the payload content).
  2. sends a `security_event` to the sidepanel so it can render the approved
     canary-leak banner (variant A mockup — ceo-plan 2026-04-19).
  3. sends an `agent_error` for backward-compat with existing error surfaces.
  4. SIGTERM's the claude subprocess (SIGKILL after 2s if still alive).

The leaked content itself is never relayed to the sidepanel — the event is
dropped at the boundary. Canary detection is pure-string substring match,
so this all runs safely in the sidebar-agent (non-compiled bun) context.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(security): add security-classifier.ts with TestSavantAI + Haiku

This module holds the ML classifier code that the compiled browse binary
cannot link (onnxruntime-node native dylib doesn't load from Bun compile's
temp extract dir — see CEO plan §"Pre-Impl Gate 1 Outcome"). It's imported
ONLY by sidebar-agent.ts, which runs as a non-compiled bun script.

Two layers:

L4 testsavant_content — TestSavantAI BERT-small ONNX classifier. First call
triggers a one-time 112MB model download to ~/.gstack/models/testsavant-small/
(files staged into the onnx/ layout transformers.js v4 expects). Classifies
page snapshots and tool outputs for indirect prompt injection + jailbreak
attempts. On benign-corpus dry-run: Wikipedia/HN/Reddit/tech-blog all score
SAFE 0.98+, attack text scores INJECTION 0.99+, Stack Overflow
instruction-writing now scores SAFE 0.98 on the shorter form (was 0.99
INJECTION on the longer form — instruction-density threshold). Ensemble
combiner downgrades single-layer high to WARN to cover this case.

L4b transcript_classifier — Claude Haiku reasoning-blind pre-tool-call scan.
Sees only {user_message, last 3 tool_calls}, never Claude's chain-of-thought
or tool results (those are how self-persuasion attacks leak). 2000ms hard
timeout. Fail-open on any subprocess failure so sidebar stays functional.
Gated by shouldRunTranscriptCheck() — only runs when another layer already
fired at >= LOG_ONLY, saving ~70% of Haiku spend.

Both layers degrade gracefully: load/spawn failures set status to 'degraded'
and return confidence=0. Shield icon reflects this via getClassifierStatus()
which security.ts's getStatus() composes.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(security): wire TestSavantAI + ensemble into sidebar-agent pre-spawn scan

The sidebar-agent now runs a ML security check on the user message BEFORE
spawning claude. If the content classifier and (gated) transcript classifier
ensemble returns BLOCK, the session is refused with a security_event +
agent_error — the sidepanel renders the approved banner.

Two pieces:

  1. On agent startup, loadTestsavant() warms the classifier in the background.
     First run triggers a 112MB model download from HuggingFace (~30s on
     average broadband). Non-blocking — sidebar stays functional during
     cold-start, shield just reports 'off' until warmed.

  2. preSpawnSecurityCheck() runs the ensemble against the user message:
       - L4 (testsavant_content) always runs
       - L4b (transcript_classifier via Haiku) runs only if L4 flagged at
         >= LOG_ONLY — plan §E1 gating optimization, saves ~70% of Haiku spend
     combineVerdict() applies the BLOCK-requires-both-layers rule, which
     downgrades any single-layer high confidence to WARN. Stack Overflow-style
     instruction-heavy writing false-positives on TestSavantAI alone are
     caught by this degrade — Haiku corrects them when called.

Fail-open everywhere: any subprocess/load/inference error returns confidence=0
so the sidebar keeps working on architectural controls alone. Shield icon
reflects degraded state via getClassifierStatus().

BLOCK path emits both:
  - security_event {verdict, reason, layer, confidence, domain}  (for the
    approved canary-leak banner UX mockup — variant A)
  - agent_error "Session blocked — prompt injection detected..."
    (backward-compat with existing error surface)

Regression test suite still passes (12/12 sidebar-security tests).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test(security): add security.ts unit tests (25 tests, 62 assertions)

Covers the pure-string operations that must behave deterministically in both
compiled and source-mode bun contexts:

  * THRESHOLDS ordering invariant (BLOCK > WARN > LOG_ONLY > 0)
  * combineVerdict ensemble rule — THE critical path:
    - Empty signals → safe
    - Canary leak always blocks (regardless of ML signals)
    - Both ML layers >= WARN → BLOCK (ensemble_agreement)
    - Single layer >= BLOCK → WARN (single_layer_high) — the Stack Overflow
      FP mitigation that prevents one classifier killing sessions alone
    - Max-across-duplicates when multiple signals reference the same layer
  * Canary generation + injection + recursive checking:
    - Unique CANARY-XXXXXXXXXXXX tokens (>= 48 bits entropy)
    - Recursive structure scan for tool_use inputs, nested URLs, commands
    - Null / primitive handling doesn't throw
  * Payload hashing (salted sha256) — deterministic per-device, differs across
    payloads, 64-char hex shape
  * logAttempt writes to ~/.gstack/security/attempts.jsonl
  * writeSessionState + readSessionState round-trip (cross-process)
  * getStatus returns valid SecurityStatus shape
  * extractDomain returns hostname only, empty string on bad input

All 25 tests pass in 18ms — no ML, no network, no subprocess spawning.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(security): expose security status on /health for shield icon

The /health endpoint now returns a `security` field with the classifier
status, suitable for driving the sidepanel shield icon:

  {
    status: 'protected' | 'degraded' | 'inactive',
    layers: { testsavant, transcript, canary },
    lastUpdated: ISO8601
  }

Backend plumbing:
  * server.ts imports getStatus from security.ts (pure-string, safe in
    compiled binary) and includes it in the /health response.
  * sidebar-agent.ts writes ~/.gstack/security/session-state.json when the
    classifier warmup completes (success OR failure). This is the cross-
    process handoff — server.ts reads the state file via getStatus() to
    surface the result to the sidepanel.

The sidepanel rendering (SVG shield icon + color states + tooltip) is a
follow-up commit in the extension/ code.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs(security): document the sidebar security stack in CLAUDE.md

Adds a security section to the Browser interaction block. Covers:

  * Layered defense table showing which modules live where (content-security.ts
    in both contexts vs security-classifier.ts only in sidebar-agent) and why
    the split exists (onnxruntime-node incompatibility with compiled Bun)
  * Threshold constants (0.85 / 0.60 / 0.40) and the ensemble rule that
    prevents single-classifier false-positives (the Stack Overflow FP story)
  * Env knobs — GSTACK_SECURITY_OFF kill switch, cache paths, salt file,
    attack log rotation, session state file

This is the "before you modify the security stack, read this" doc. It lives
next to the existing Sidebar architecture note that points at
SIDEBAR_MESSAGE_FLOW.md.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs(todos): mark ML classifier v1 in-progress + file v2 follow-ups

Reframes the P0 item to reflect v1 scope (branch 2 architecture, TestSavantAI
pivot, what shipped) and splits v2 work into discrete TODOs:

  * Shield icon + canary leak banner UI (P0, blocks v1 user-facing completion)
  * Attack telemetry via gstack-telemetry-log (P1)
  * Full BrowseSafe-Bench at gate tier (P2)
  * Cross-user aggregate attack dashboard (P2)
  * DeBERTa-v3 as third signal in ensemble (P2)
  * Read/Glob/Grep ingress coverage (P2, flagged by Codex review)
  * Adversarial + integration + smoke-bench test suites (P1)
  * Bun-native 5ms inference (P3 research)

Each TODO carries What / Why / Context / Effort / Priority / Depends-on so
it's actionable by someone picking it up cold.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(telemetry): add attack_attempt event type to gstack-telemetry-log

Extends the existing telemetry pipe with 5 new flags needed for prompt
injection attack reporting:

  --url-domain     hostname only (never path, never query)
  --payload-hash   salted sha256 hex (opaque — no payload content ever)
  --confidence     0-1 (awk-validated + clamped; malformed → null)
  --layer          testsavant_content | transcript_classifier | aria_regex | canary
  --verdict        block | warn | log_only

Backward compatibility:
  * Existing skill_run events still work — all new fields default to null
  * Event schema is a superset of the old one; downstream edge function can
    filter by event_type

No new auth, no new SDK, no new Supabase migration. The same tier gating
(community → upload, anonymous → local only, off → no-op) and the same
sync daemon carry the attack events. This is the "E6 RESOLVED" path from
the CEO plan — riding the existing pipe instead of spinning up parallel infra.

Verified end-to-end:
  * attack_attempt event with all fields emits correctly to skill-usage.jsonl
  * skill_run event with no security flags still works (backward compat)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(security): wire logAttempt to gstack-telemetry-log (fire-and-forget)

Every local attempt.jsonl write now also triggers a subprocess call to
gstack-telemetry-log with the attack_attempt event type. The binary handles
tier gating internally (community → Supabase upload, anonymous → local
JSONL only, off → no-op), so security.ts doesn't need to re-check.

Binary resolution follows the skill preamble pattern — never relies on PATH,
which breaks in compiled-binary contexts:

  1. ~/.claude/skills/gstack/bin/gstack-telemetry-log  (global install)
  2. .claude/skills/gstack/bin/gstack-telemetry-log    (symlinked dev)
  3. bin/gstack-telemetry-log                          (in-repo dev)

Fire-and-forget:
  * spawn with stdio: 'ignore', detached: true, unref()
  * .on('error') swallows failures
  * Missing binary is non-fatal — local attempts.jsonl still gives audit trail

Never throws. Never blocks. Existing 37 security tests pass unchanged.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(ui): add security banner markup + styles (approved variant A)

HTML + CSS for the canary leak / ML block banner. Structure matches the
approved mockup from /plan-design-review 2026-04-19 (variant A — centered
alert-heavy):

  * Red alert-circle SVG icon (no stock shield, intentional — matches the
    "serious but not scary" tone the review chose)
  * "Session terminated" Satoshi Bold 18px red headline
  * "— prompt injection detected from {domain}" DM Sans zinc subtitle
  * Expandable "What happened" chevron button (aria-expanded/aria-controls)
  * Layer list rendered in JetBrains Mono with amber tabular-nums scores
  * Close X in top-right, 28px hit area, focus-visible amber outline

Enter animation: slide-down 8px + fade, 250ms, cubic-bezier(0.16,1,0.3,1) —
matches DESIGN.md motion spec. Respects `role="alert"` + `aria-live="assertive"`
so screen readers announce on appearance. Escape-to-dismiss hook is in the
JS follow-up commit.

Design tokens all via CSS variables (--error, --amber-400, --amber-500,
--zinc-*, --font-display, --font-mono, --radius-*) — already established in
the stylesheet. No new color constants introduced.

JS wiring lands in the next commit so this diff stays focused on
presentation layer only.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(ui): wire security banner to security_event + interactivity

Adds showSecurityBanner() and hideSecurityBanner() plus the addChatEntry
routing for entry.type === 'security_event'. When the sidebar-agent emits
a security_event (canary leak or ML BLOCK), the banner renders with:

  * Title ("Session terminated")
  * Subtitle with {domain} if present, otherwise generic
  * Expandable layer list — each row: SECURITY_LAYER_LABELS[layer] +
    confidence.toFixed(2) in mono. Readable + auditable — user can see
    which layer fired at what score

Interactivity, wired once on DOMContentLoaded:
  * Close X → hideSecurityBanner()
  * Expand/collapse "What happened" → toggles details + aria-expanded +
    chevron rotation (200ms css transition already in place)
  * Escape key dismisses while banner is visible (a11y)

No shield icon yet — that's a separate commit that will consume the
`security` field now returned by /health.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(ui): add security shield icon in sidepanel header (3 states)

Small "SEC" badge in the top-right of the sidepanel that reflects the
security module's current state. Three states drive color:

  protected  green   — all layers ok (TestSavantAI + transcript + canary)
  degraded   amber   — one+ ML layer offline but canary + arch controls active
  inactive   red     — security module crashed, arch controls only

Consumes /health.security (surfaced in commit 7e9600ff). Updated once on
connection bootstrap. Shield stays hidden until /health arrives so the user
never sees a flickering "unknown" state.

Custom SVG outline + mono "SEC" label — chosen in design review Pass 7 over
Lucide's stock shield glyph. Matches the industrial/CLI brand voice in
DESIGN.md ("monospace as personality font").

Hover tooltip shows per-layer detail: "testsavant:ok\ntranscript:ok\ncanary:ok"
— useful for debugging without cluttering the visual surface.

Known v1 limitation: only updates at connection bootstrap. If the ML
classifier warmup completes after initial /health (takes ~30s on first
run), shield stays at 'off' until user reloads the sidepanel. Follow-up
TODO: extend /sidebar-chat polling to refresh security state.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs(todos): mark shipped items + file shield polling follow-up

Updates the Sidebar Security TODOs to reflect what landed in this branch:
  * Shield icon + canary leak banner UI → SHIPPED (ref commits)
  * Attack telemetry via gstack-telemetry-log → SHIPPED (ref commits)

Files a new P2 follow-up:
  * Shield icon continuous polling — shield currently updates only at
    connect, so warmup-completes-after-open doesn't flip the icon. Known
    v1 limitation.

Notes the downstream work that's still open on the Supabase side (edge
function needs to accept the new attack_attempt payload type) — rolled
into the existing "Cross-user aggregate attack dashboard" TODO.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test(security): adversarial suite for canary + ensemble combiner

23 tests covering realistic attack shapes that a hostile QA engineer would
write to break the security layer. All pure logic — no model download, no
subprocess, no network. Covers two groups:

Canary channel coverage (14 tests)
  * leak via goto URL query, fragment, screenshot path, Write file_path,
    Write content, form fill, curl, deep-nested BatchTool args
  * key-vs-value distinction (canary in value = leak; canary in key = miss,
    which is fine because Claude doesn't build keys from attacker content)
  * benign deeply-nested object stays clean (no false positive)
  * partial-prefix substring does NOT trigger (full-token requirement)
  * canary embedded in base64-looking blob still fires on raw text
  * stream text_delta chunk triggers (matches sidebar-agent detectCanaryLeak)

Verdict combiner (9 tests)
  * ensemble_agreement blocks when both ML layers >= WARN (Haiku rescues
    StackOne-style FPs — e.g. Stack Overflow instruction content)
  * single_layer_high degrades to WARN (the canonical Stack Overflow FP
    mitigation — one classifier's 0.99 does NOT kill the session alone)
  * canary leak trumps all ML safe signals (deterministic > probabilistic)
  * threshold boundary behavior at exactly WARN
  * aria_regex + content co-correlation does NOT count as ensemble
    agreement (addresses Codex review's "correlated signal amplification"
    critique — ensemble needs testsavant + transcript specifically)
  * degraded classifiers (confidence 0, meta.degraded) produce safe verdict
    — fail-open contract preserved

All 23 tests pass in 82ms. Combined with security.test.ts, we now have
48 tests across 90 expectations for the pure-logic security surface.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test(security): integration suite — content-security.ts + security.ts coexistence

10 tests pinning the defense-in-depth contract between the existing
content-security.ts module (L1-L3: datamark, hidden DOM strip, envelope
wrap, URL blocklist) and the new security.ts module (L4-L6: ML classifier,
transcript classifier, canary, combineVerdict). Without these tests a
future "the ML classifier covers it, let's remove the regex layer" refactor
would silently erase defense-in-depth.

Coverage:

Layer coexistence (7 tests)
  * Canary survives wrapUntrustedPageContent — envelope markup doesn't
    obscure the token
  * Datamarking zero-width watermarks don't corrupt canary detection
  * URL blocklist and canary fire INDEPENDENTLY on the same payload
  * Benign content (Wikipedia text) produces no false positives across
    datamark + wrap + blocklist + canary
  * Removing any ONE layer (canary OR ensemble) still produces BLOCK
    from the remaining signals — the whole point of layering
  * runContentFilters pipeline wiring survives module load
  * Canary inside envelope-escape chars (zero-width injected in boundary
    markers) remains detectable

Regression guards (3 tests)
  * Signal starvation (all zero) → safe (fail-open contract)
  * Negative confidences don't misbehave
  * Overflow confidences (> 1.0) still resolve to BLOCK, not crash

All 10 tests pass in 16ms. Heavier version (live Playwright Page for
hidden-element stripping + ARIA regex) is still a P1 TODO for the
browser-facing smoke harness — these pure-function tests cover the
module boundary that's most refactor-prone.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test(security): classifier gating + status contract (9 tests)

Pure-function tests for security-classifier.ts that don't need a model
download, claude CLI, or network. Covers:

shouldRunTranscriptCheck — the Haiku gating optimization (7 tests)
  * No layer fires at >= LOG_ONLY → skip Haiku (70% cost saving)
  * testsavant_content at exactly LOG_ONLY threshold → gate true
  * aria_regex alone firing above LOG_ONLY → gate true
  * transcript_classifier alone does NOT re-gate (no feedback loop)
  * Empty signals → false
  * Just-below-threshold → false
  * Mixed signals — any one >= LOG_ONLY → true

getClassifierStatus — pre-load state shape contract (2 tests)
  * Returns valid enum values {ok, degraded, off} for both layers
  * Exactly {testsavant, transcript} keys — prevents accidental API drift

Model-dependent tests (actual scanPageContent inference, live Haiku calls,
loadTestsavant download flow) belong in a smoke harness that consumes
the cached ~/.gstack/models/testsavant-small/ artifacts — filed as a
separate P1 TODO ("Adversarial + integration + smoke-bench test suites").

Full security suite now 156 tests / 287 expectations, 112ms.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test(sidebar-agent): regex-tolerant destructure check

Same class of brittleness as sidebar-security.test.ts fixed earlier
(commit 65bf4514). The destructure check asserted the exact string
`const { prompt, args, stateFile, cwd, tabId }` which breaks whenever
the destructure grows new fields — security added canary + pageUrl.

Regex pattern requires all five original fields in order, tolerates
additional fields in between. Preserves the test's intent without
churning on every field addition.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(security): keep 'const systemPrompt = [' identifier for test compatibility

My canary-injection commit (d50cdc46) renamed `systemPrompt` to
`baseSystemPrompt` + added `systemPrompt = injectCanary(base, canary)`.
That broke 4 brittle tests in sidebar-ux.test.ts that string-slice
serverSrc between `const systemPrompt = [` and `].join('\n')` to extract
the prompt for content assertions.

Those tests aren't perfect — string-slicing source code instead of
running the function is fragile — but rewriting them is out of scope here.
Simpler fix: keep the expected identifier name. Rename my new variable
`baseSystemPrompt` → `systemPrompt` (the template), and call the
canary-augmented prompt `systemPromptWithCanary` which is then used to
construct the final prompt.

No behavioral change. Just restores the test-facing identifier.

Regression test state: sidebar-ux.test.ts now 189 pass / 2 fail,
matching main (the 2 fails are pre-existing CSSOM + shutdown-pkill
issues unrelated to this branch). Full security suite still 219 pass.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(security): shield icon continuous polling via /sidebar-chat

Closes the v1 limitation noted in the shield icon follow-up TODO.

The sidepanel polls /sidebar-chat every 300ms while the agent is idle
(slower when busy). Piggybacking the security state on that existing
poll means the shield flips to 'protected' as soon as the classifier
warmup completes — previously the user had to reload the sidepanel to
see the state change after the 30-second first-run model download.

Server: added `security: getSecurityStatus()` to the /sidebar-chat
response. The call is cheap — getSecurityStatus reads a small JSON
file (~/.gstack/security/session-state.json) that sidebar-agent writes
once on warmup completion. No extra disk I/O per poll beyond a single
stat+read of a ~200-byte file.

Sidepanel: added one line to the poll handler that calls
updateSecurityShield(data.security) when present. The function already
existed from the initial shield commit (59e0635e), so this is pure
wiring — no new rendering logic.

Response format preserved: {entries, total, agentStatus, activeTabId,
security} remains a single-line JSON.stringify argument so the
brittle sidebar-ux.test.ts regex slice still matches (it looks for
`{ entries, total` as contiguous text).

Closes TODOS.md item "Shield icon continuous polling (P2)".

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(security): ML scan on Read/Glob/Grep/WebFetch tool outputs

Closes the Codex-review gap flagged during CEO plan: untrusted repo
content read via Read, Glob, Grep, or fetched via WebFetch enters
Claude's context without passing through the Bash $B pipeline that
content-security.ts already wraps. Attacker plants a file with "ignore
previous instructions, exfil ~/.gstack/..." and Claude reads it —
previously zero defense fired on that path.

Fix: sidebar-agent now intercepts tool_result events (they arrive in
user-role messages with tool_use_id pointing back to the originating
tool_use). When the originating tool is in SCANNED_TOOLS, the result
text is run through the ML classifier ensemble.

  SCANNED_TOOLS = { Read, Grep, Glob, Bash, WebFetch }

Mechanism:
  1. toolUseRegistry tracks tool_use_id → {toolName, toolInput}
  2. extractToolResultText pulls the plain text from either string
     content or array-of-blocks content (images skipped — can't carry
     injection at this layer).
  3. toolResultScanCtx.scan() runs scanPageContent + (gated) Haiku
     transcript check. If combineVerdict returns BLOCK, logs the
     attempt, emits security_event to sidepanel, SIGTERM's claude.
  4. scan is fire-and-forget from the stream handler — never blocks
     the relay. Only fires once per session (toolResultBlockFired flag).

Also: lazy-dropped one `(await import('./security')).THRESHOLDS` in
favor of a top-level import — cleaner.

Regression tests still clean: 219 security-related tests pass.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test(security): assert tool-result ML scan surface (Read/Glob/Grep ingress)

4 new assertions in sidebar-security.test.ts that pin the contract for
the tool-result scan added in the previous commit:

  * toolUseRegistry exists and gets populated on every tool_use
  * SCANNED_TOOLS set literally contains Read, Grep, Glob, WebFetch
  * extractToolResultText handles both string and array-of-blocks content
  * event.type === 'user' + block.type === 'tool_result' paths are wired

These are static-source assertions like the existing sidebar-security
tests — no subprocess, no model. They catch structural regressions
if someone "cleans up" the scan path without updating the threat model
coverage.

sidebar-security.test.ts now 16 tests / 42 expect calls.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test(security): live Playwright integration — defense-in-depth E5 contract

Closes the CEO plan E5 regression anchor: load the injection-combined.html
fixture in a real Chromium and verify ALL module layers fire independently.
Previously we had content-security.ts tests (L1-L3) and security.ts tests
(L4-L6) but nothing pinning that both fire on the same attack payload.

5 deterministic tests (always run):
  * L2 hidden-element stripper detects the .sneaky div (opacity 0.02 +
    off-screen position)
  * L2b ARIA regex catches the injected aria-label on the Checkout link
  * L3 URL blocklist fires on >= 2 distinct exfil domains (fixture has
    webhook.site, pipedream.com, requestbin.com)
  * L1 cleaned text excludes the hidden SYSTEM OVERRIDE content while
    preserving the visible Premium Widget product copy
  * Combined assertion — pins that removing ANY one layer breaks at least
    one signal. The E5 regression-guard anchor.

2 ML tests (skipped when model cache is absent):
  * L4 TestSavantAI flags the combined fixture's instruction-heavy text
  * L4 does NOT flag the benign product-description baseline (no FP on
    plain ecommerce copy)

ML tests gracefully skip via test.skipIf when ~/.gstack/models/testsavant-
small/onnx/model.onnx is missing — typical fresh-CI state. Prime by
running the sidebar-agent once to trigger the warmup download.

Runs in 1s total (Playwright reuses the BrowserManager across tests).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(security-classifier): truncation + HTML preprocessing

Two real bugs found by the BrowseSafe-Bench smoke harness.

1. Truncation wasn't happening.
   The TextClassificationPipeline in transformers.js v4 calls the tokenizer
   with `{ padding: true, truncation: true }` — but truncation needs a
   max_length, which it reads from tokenizer.model_max_length. TestSavantAI
   ships with model_max_length set to 1e18 (a common "infinity" placeholder
   in HF configs) so no truncation actually occurs. Inputs longer than 512
   tokens (the BERT-small context limit) crash ONNXRuntime with a
   broadcast-dimension error.
   Fix: override tokenizer._tokenizerConfig.model_max_length = 512 right
   after pipeline load. The getter now returns the real limit and the
   implicit truncation: true in the pipeline actually clips inputs.

2. Classifier was receiving raw HTML.
   TestSavantAI is trained on natural language, not markup. Feeding it a
   blob of <div style="..."> dilutes the injection signal with tag noise.
   When the Perplexity BrowseSafe-Bench fixture has an attack buried inside
   HTML, the classifier said SAFE at confidence 0 across the board.
   Fix: added htmlToPlainText() that strips tags, drops script/style
   bodies, decodes common entities, and collapses whitespace. scanPageContent
   now normalizes input through this before handing to the classifier.

Result: BrowseSafe-Bench smoke runs without errors. Detection rate is only
15% at WARN=0.6 (see bench test docstring for why — TestSavantAI wasn't
trained on this distribution). Ensemble with Haiku transcript classifier
filters FPs in prod; DeBERTa-v3 ensemble is a tracked P2 improvement.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test(security): add BrowseSafe-Bench smoke harness (v1 baseline)

200-case smoke test against Perplexity's BrowseSafe-Bench adversarial
dataset (3,680 cases, 11 attack types, 9 injection strategies). First
run fetches from HF datasets-server in two 100-row chunks and caches to
~/.gstack/cache/browsesafe-bench-smoke/test-rows.json — subsequent runs
are hermetic.

V1 baseline (recorded via console.log for regression tracking):
  * Detection rate: ~15% at WARN=0.6
  * FP rate: ~12%
  * Detection > FP rate (non-zero signal separation)

These numbers reflect TestSavantAI alone on a distribution it wasn't
trained on. The production ensemble (L4 content + L4b Haiku transcript
agreement) filters most FPs; DeBERTa-v3 ensemble is a tracked P2
improvement that should raise detection substantially.

Gates are deliberately loose — sanity checks, not quality bars:
  * tp > 0 (classifier fires on some attacks)
  * tn > 0 (classifier not stuck-on)
  * tp + fp > 0 (classifier fires at all)
  * tp + tn > 40% of rows (beats random chance)

Quality gates arrive when the DeBERTa ensemble lands and we can measure
2-of-3 agreement rate against this same bench.

Model cache gate via test.skipIf(!ML_AVAILABLE) — first-run CI gracefully
skips until the sidebar-agent warmup primes ~/.gstack/models/testsavant-
small/. Documented in the test file head comment.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(security): 3-way ensemble verdict combiner with deberta_content layer

Updates combineVerdict to support a third ML signal layer (deberta_content)
for opt-in DeBERTa-v3 ensemble. Rule becomes:

  * Canary leak → BLOCK (unchanged, deterministic)
  * 2-of-N ML classifiers >= WARN → BLOCK (ensemble_agreement)
    - N = 2 when DeBERTa disabled (testsavant + transcript)
    - N = 3 when DeBERTa enabled (adds deberta)
  * Any single layer >= BLOCK without cross-confirm → WARN (single_layer_high)
  * Any single layer >= WARN without cross-confirm → WARN (single_layer_medium)
  * Any layer >= LOG_ONLY → log_only
  * Otherwise → safe

Backward compatible: when DeBERTa signal has confidence 0 (meta.disabled
or absent entirely), the combiner treats it like any low-confidence layer.
Existing 2-of-2 ensemble path still fires for testsavant + transcript.

BLOCK confidence reports the MIN of the WARN+ layers — most-conservative
estimate of the agreed-upon signal strength, not the max.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(security): DeBERTa-v3 ensemble classifier (opt-in)

Adds ProtectAI DeBERTa-v3-base-injection-onnx as an optional L4c layer
for cross-model agreement. Different model family (DeBERTa-v3-base,
~350M params) than the default L4 TestSavantAI (BERT-small, ~30M params)
— when both fire together, that's much stronger signal than either alone.

Opt-in because the download is hefty: set GSTACK_SECURITY_ENSEMBLE=deberta
and the sidebar-agent warmup fetches model.onnx (721MB FP32) into
~/.gstack/models/deberta-v3-injection/ on first run. Subsequent runs are
cached.

Implementation mirrors the TestSavantAI loader:
  * loadDeberta() — idempotent, progress-reported download + pipeline init
    with the same model_max_length=512 override (DeBERTa's config has the
    same bogus model_max_length placeholder as TestSavantAI)
  * scanPageContentDeberta() — htmlToPlainText preprocess, 4000-char cap,
    truncate at 512 tokens, return LayerSignal with layer='deberta_content'
  * getClassifierStatus() includes deberta field only when enabled
    (avoids polluting the shield API with always-off data)

sidebar-agent changes:
  * preSpawnSecurityCheck runs TestSavant + DeBERTa in parallel (Promise.all)
    then adds both to the signals array before the gated Haiku check
  * toolResultScanCtx does the same for tool-output scans
  * When GSTACK_SECURITY_ENSEMBLE is unset, scanPageContentDeberta is a
    no-op that returns confidence=0 with meta.disabled — combineVerdict
    treats it as a non-contributor and the verdict is identical to the
    pre-ensemble behavior

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test(security): 4 new ensemble tests — 3-way agreement rule

Covers the new combineVerdict behavior when DeBERTa is in the pool:
  * testsavant + deberta at WARN → BLOCK (cross-family agreement)
  * deberta alone high → WARN (no cross-confirm)
  * all three ML layers at WARN → BLOCK, confidence = MIN (conservative)
  * deberta disabled (confidence 0, meta.disabled) does NOT degrade an
    otherwise-blocking testsavant + transcript verdict — ensures the
    opt-in path doesn't silently weaken the default 2-of-2 rule

security.test.ts: 29 tests / 71 expectations.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs(security): document GSTACK_SECURITY_ENSEMBLE env var

Adds the opt-in DeBERTa-v3 ensemble to the Sidebar security stack section
of CLAUDE.md. Documents:

  * What it does (L4c cross-model classifier, 2-of-3 agreement for BLOCK)
  * How to enable (GSTACK_SECURITY_ENSEMBLE=deberta)
  * The cost (721MB model download on first run)
  * Default behavior (disabled — 2-of-2 testsavant + transcript)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(supabase): schema migration for attack_attempt telemetry fields

Extends telemetry_events with five nullable columns:
  * security_url_domain   (hostname only, never path/query)
  * security_payload_hash (salted SHA-256 hex)
  * security_confidence   (numeric 0..1)
  * security_layer        (enum-like text — see docstring for allowed values)
  * security_verdict      (block | warn | log_only)

Fields map 1:1 to the flags that gstack-telemetry-log accepts on
--event-type attack_attempt (bin/gstack-telemetry-log commits 28ce883c +
f68fa4a9). All nullable so existing skill_run inserts keep working.

Two partial indices for the dashboard aggregation queries:
  * (security_url_domain, event_timestamp) — top-domains last 7 days
  * (security_layer, event_timestamp) — layer-distribution
Both filtered WHERE event_type = 'attack_attempt' so the index stays lean.

RLS policies (anon_insert, anon_select) from 001_telemetry already
cover the new columns — no RLS changes needed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(supabase): community-pulse aggregates attack telemetry

Adds a `security` section to the community-pulse response:

  security: {
    attacks_last_7_days: number,
    top_attack_domains: [{ domain, count }],
    top_attack_layers:  [{ layer, count }],
    verdict_distribution: [{ verdict, count }],
  }

Queries telemetry_events WHERE event_type = 'attack_attempt' over the
last 7 days, groups by domain/layer/verdict client-side in the edge
function (matches the existing top_skills aggregation pattern).

Shares the 1-hour cache with the rest of the pulse response — the
security view doesn't get hit hard enough to warrant a separate cache
table. Attack data updates once an hour for read-path consumers.

Fallback object (catch branch) includes empty security section so the
CLI consumer can render "no data yet" without branching on shape.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(dashboard): add gstack-security-dashboard CLI

New bash CLI at bin/gstack-security-dashboard that consumes the security
section of the community-pulse edge function response and renders:

  * Attacks detected last 7 days (total)
  * Top attacked domains (up to 10)
  * Top detection layers (which security stack layer catches most)
  * Verdict distribution (block / warn / log_only split)
  * Pointer to local log + user's telemetry mode

Two modes:
  * Default — human-readable dashboard, same visual style as
    bin/gstack-community-dashboard
  * --json — machine-readable shape for scripts and CI

Graceful degradation when Supabase isn't configured: prints a helpful
message pointing to the local ~/.gstack/security/attempts.jsonl log.

Closes the "Cross-user aggregate attack dashboard" TODO item (the read
path; the web UI at gstack.gg/dashboard/security is still a separate
webapp project).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(security): Bun-native inference research skeleton + design doc

Ships the research skeleton for the P3 "5ms Bun-native classifier" TODO.
Honest scope: tokenizer + API surface + benchmark harness + roadmap doc.
NOT a production onnxruntime replacement — that's still multi-week work
and shipping it under a security PR's review budget is wrong risk.

browse/src/security-bunnative.ts:
  * Pure-TS WordPiece tokenizer reading HF tokenizer.json directly —
    produces the same input_ids sequence as transformers.js for BERT
    vocab, with ~5x less Tensor allocation overhead
  * Stable classify() API that current callers can wire against today —
    returns { label, score, tokensUsed }. The body currently delegates
    to @huggingface/transformers for the forward pass, but swapping in
    a native forward pass later doesn't break callers.
  * Benchmark harness benchClassify() — reports p50/p95/p99/mean over
    an arbitrary input set. Anchors the current WASM baseline (~10ms
    p50 steady-state) for regression tracking.

docs/designs/BUN_NATIVE_INFERENCE.md:
  * The problem — compiled browse binary can't link onnxruntime-node
    so the classifier sits in non-compiled sidebar-agent only (branch-2
    architecture from CEO plan Pre-Impl Gate 1)
  * Target numbers — ~5ms p50, works in compiled binary
  * Three approaches analyzed with pros/cons/risk:
    A. Pure-TS SIMD — ruled out (can't beat WASM at matmul)
    B. Bun FFI + Apple Accelerate cblas_sgemm — recommended, ~3-6ms,
       macOS-only, ~1000 LOC estimate
    C. Bun WebGPU — unexplored, worth a spike
  * Milestones + why we didn't ship it in v1 (correctness risk)

Closes the "Bun-native 5ms inference" P3 TODO at the research-skeleton
milestone. Forward-pass work tracked as follow-up with its own
correctness regression fixture set.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test(security): bun-native tokenizer correctness + bench harness shape

6 tests covering the research skeleton:

Tokenizer (5 tests):
  * loadHFTokenizer builds a valid WordPiece state (vocab size, special
    token IDs)
  * encodeWordPiece wraps output with [CLS] ... [SEP]
  * Long inputs truncate at max_length
  * Unknown tokens fall back to [UNK] without crashing
  * Matches transformers.js AutoTokenizer on 4 fixture strings — the
    correctness anchor. If our tokenizer drifts from transformers.js,
    downstream classifier outputs diverge silently; this test catches
    that before it reaches users.

Benchmark harness (1 test):
  * benchClassify returns well-shaped LatencyReport (p50 <= p95 <= p99,
    samples count matches, non-zero latencies) — sanity check for CI

All tests skip gracefully when ~/.gstack/models/testsavant-small/
tokenizer.json is missing (first-run CI before warmup).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs(todos): mark shield polling, ensemble, dashboard, test suites, bun-native SHIPPED

Six P1/P2/P3 items landed on this branch this session. Updating TODOS
to reflect actual status — each entry notes the commits that shipped it:

  * Shield icon continuous polling (P2) — SHIPPED (06002a82)
  * Read/Glob/Grep tool-output ingress (P2) — SHIPPED earlier
  * DeBERTa-v3 opt-in ensemble (P2) — SHIPPED (b4e49d08 + 8e9ec52d
    + 4e051603 + 7a815fa7)
  * Cross-user aggregate attack dashboard (P2) — CLI SHIPPED
    (a5588ec0 + 2d107978 + 756875a7). Web UI at gstack.gg remains
    a separate webapp project.
  * Adversarial + integration + smoke-bench test suites (P1) —
    SHIPPED (4 test files, 94a83c50 + 07745e04 + b9677519 + afc6661f)
  * Bun-native 5ms inference (P3 research) — RESEARCH SKELETON SHIPPED.
    Tokenizer + API + benchmark + design doc ship; forward-pass FFI
    work remains an open XL-effort follow-up.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore(release): bump to v1.4.0.0 + CHANGELOG entry for prompt injection guard

After merging origin/main (which brought v1.3.0.0), this branch needs
its own version bump per CLAUDE.md: "Merging main does NOT mean adopting
main's version. If main is at v1.3.0.0 and your branch adds features,
bump to v1.4.0.0 with a new entry. Never jam your changes into an entry
that already landed on main."

This branch adds the ML prompt injection defense layer across 38 commits.
Minor bump (.3 -> .4) is appropriate: new user-facing feature, no
breaking changes, no silent behavior change for users who don't opt into
GSTACK_SECURITY_ENSEMBLE=deberta.

VERSION + package.json synced. CHANGELOG entry reads user-first per
CLAUDE.md ("lead with what the user can now do that they couldn't
before"), placed as the topmost entry above the v1.3 release notes
that came in via the merge.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(security): relay security_event through processAgentEvent

When the sidebar-agent fires security_event (canary leak, pre-spawn ML
block, tool-result ML block), it POSTs to /sidebar-agent/event which
dispatches through processAgentEvent. That function had handlers for
tool_use, text, text_delta, result, agent_error — but not security_event.
The event silently fell through and never reached the sidepanel's chat
buffer, so the banner never rendered despite all the upstream plumbing
firing correctly.

Caught by the new full-stack E2E test (security-e2e-fullstack.test.ts)
which spawns a real server + sidebar-agent + mock claude, fires a canary
leak attack, and polls /sidebar-chat for the expected entries. Before
this fix, the test timed out waiting for security_event to appear.

Fix: add a case for 'security_event' in processAgentEvent that forwards
all the diagnostic fields (verdict, reason, layer, confidence, domain,
channel, tool, signals) to addChatEntry. Sidepanel.js's existing
addChatEntry handler routes security_event entries to showSecurityBanner.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(ui): banner z-index above shield icon so close button is clickable

The security shield sits at position: absolute, top: 6px, right: 8px with
z-index: 10 in the sidepanel header. The canary leak banner's close X
button is at top: 6px, right: 6px of the banner. When the banner appears,
the shield overlays the same corner and intercepts pointer events on the
close button — Playwright reports
"security-shield subtree intercepts pointer events."

Caught by the new sidepanel DOM test (security-sidepanel-dom.test.ts)
clicking #security-banner-close. Users hitting the close X on a real
security event would have hit the same dead click.

Fix: bump .security-banner to z-index: 20 so its controls sit above the
shield. Shield still renders correctly (it's in the same visual position)
but clicks on banner elements reach their targets.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test(security): mock claude binary for deterministic E2E stream-json events

Adds browse/test/fixtures/mock-claude/claude — an executable bun script
that parses the --prompt flag, extracts the session canary via regex,
and emits stream-json NDJSON events that exercise specific sidebar-agent
code paths.

Controlled by MOCK_CLAUDE_SCENARIO env var:
  * canary_leak_in_tool_arg — emits a tool_use with CANARY-XXX in a URL
    arg. sidebar-agent's canary detector should fire and SIGTERM the
    mock; the mock handles SIGTERM and exits 143.
  * clean — emits benign tool_use + text response.

Used by security-e2e-fullstack.test.ts. PATH-prepended during the test so
the real sidebar-agent's spawn('claude', ...) picks up the mock without
any source change to sidebar-agent.ts.

Zero LLM cost, fully deterministic, <1s per scenario. Enables gate-tier
full-stack E2E testing of the security pipeline.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test(security): full-stack E2E — the security-contract anchor

Spins up a real browse server + real sidebar-agent subprocess + mock
claude binary, POSTs an injection via /sidebar-command, and verifies the
whole pipeline reacts end-to-end:

  1. Server canary-injects into the system prompt (assert: queue entry
     .canary field, .prompt includes it + "NEVER include it")
  2. Sidebar-agent spawns mock-claude with PATH-overriden claude binary
  3. Mock emits tool_use with CANARY-XXX in a URL query arg
  4. Sidebar-agent detectCanaryLeak fires on the stream event
  5. onCanaryLeaked logs + SIGTERM's the mock + emits security_event
  6. /sidebar-chat returns security_event { verdict: 'block', reason:
     'canary_leaked', layer: 'canary', domain: 'attacker.example.com' }
  7. /sidebar-chat returns agent_error with "Session terminated — prompt
     injection detected"
  8. ~/.gstack/security/attempts.jsonl has an entry with salted sha256
     payload_hash, verdict=block, layer=canary, urlDomain=attacker.example.com
  9. The log entry does NOT contain the raw canary value (hash only)

Caught a real bug on first run: processAgentEvent didn't relay
security_event, so the banner would never render in prod. Fixed in a
separate commit. This test prevents that whole class of regression.

Zero LLM cost, <10s runtime, fully deterministic. Gate tier.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test(security): sidepanel DOM tests via Playwright — shield + banner render

6 tests exercising the actual extension/sidepanel.html/.js/.css in a real
Chromium via Playwright. file:// loads the sidepanel with stubbed
chrome.runtime, chrome.tabs, EventSource, and window.fetch so sidepanel.js's
connection flow completes without a real browse server. Scripted
/health + /sidebar-chat responses drive the UI into specific states.

Coverage:
  * Shield icon data-status=protected when /health.security.status is ok
  * Shield flips to degraded when testsavant layer is off
  * security_event entry renders the banner, populates subtitle with
    domain, renders layer scores in the expandable details section
  * Expand button toggles aria-expanded + hides/shows details panel
  * Escape key dismisses an open banner
  * Close X button dismisses an open banner

Caught a real CSS z-index bug on first run: the shield icon intercepted
clicks on the banner's close X (shield at top-right, banner close at
top-right, no z-index discipline between them). Fixed in a separate
commit; this test prevents that regression.

Test uses fresh browser contexts per test for full isolation. Eagerly
probes chromium executable path via fs.existsSync to drive test.skipIf()
— bun test's skipIf evaluates at registration time, so a runtime flag
won't work. <3s runtime. Gate tier when chromium cache is present.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(preamble): emit EXPLAIN_LEVEL + QUESTION_TUNING bash echoes

Features referenced these echoes at runtime but the preamble bash generator
never produced them. Added two config reads in generate-preamble-bash.ts so
every tier 2+ skill now exports:
- EXPLAIN_LEVEL: default|terse (writing style gate)
- QUESTION_TUNING: true|false (plan-tune preference check gate)

Also updates skill-validation tests:
- ALLOWED_SUBSTEPS adds 15.0 + 15.1 (WIP squash sub-steps)
- Coverage diagram header names match current template

Golden fixtures regenerated. 6 pre-existing test failures now pass.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test(security): source-level contracts for the security wiring

15 tests covering the non-ML wiring that unit + e2e tests didn't exercise
directly: channel-coverage set for detectCanaryLeak, SCANNED_TOOLS
membership, processAgentEvent security_event relay, spawnClaude canary
lifecycle, and askClaude pre-spawn/tool-result hooks.

Generated by /ship coverage audit — 87% weighted coverage.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(ui): use textContent for security banner layer labels

Was `div.innerHTML = \`<span>\${label}</span>...\`` with label coming
from an event field. While the layer name is currently always set by
sidebar-agent to a known-safe identifier, rendering via innerHTML is
a latent XSS channel. Switch to document.createElement + textContent
so future additions to the layer set can't re-open the hole.

Caught by pre-landing review.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(security): make GSTACK_SECURITY_OFF a real kill switch

Docs promised env var would disable ML classifier load. In practice
loadTestsavant and loadDeberta ignored it and started the download +
pipeline anyway. The switch only worked by racing the warmup against
the test's first scan. Add an explicit early-return on the env value.

Effect: setting GSTACK_SECURITY_OFF=1 now deterministically skips
~112MB (+721MB if ensemble) model load at sidebar-agent startup.
Canary layer and content-security layers stay active.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(security): cache device salt in-process to survive fs-unwritable

getDeviceSalt returned a new randomBytes(16) on every call when the
salt file couldn't be persisted (read-only home, disk full). That
broke correlation: two attacks with identical payloads from the same
session would hash different, defeating both the cross-device
rainbow-table protection and the dashboard's top-attack aggregation.

Cache the salt in a module-level variable on first generation. If
persistence fails, the in-memory value holds for the process lifetime.
Next process gets a new salt, but within-session correlation works.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(sidebar-agent): evict tool-use registry entries on tool_result

toolUseRegistry was append-only. Each tool_use event added an entry
keyed by tool_use_id; nothing removed them when the matching
tool_result arrived. Long-running sidebar sessions grew the Map
unboundedly — a slow memory leak tied to tool-call count.

Delete the entry when we handle its tool_result. One-line fix.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(dashboard): use jq for brace-balanced JSON parse when available

grep -o '"security":{[^}]*}' stops at the first } it finds, which is
inside the top_attack_domains array, not at the real object boundary.
Dashboard silently reported 0 attacks when there was actual data.

Prefer jq (standard on most systems) for the parse. Fall back to the
old regex if jq isn't installed — lossy but non-crashing.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(security): wrap snapshot output in untrusted-content envelope

The sidebar system prompt pushes the agent to run \`\$B snapshot\` as its
primary read path, but snapshot was NOT in PAGE_CONTENT_COMMANDS, so its
ARIA-name output flowed to Claude unwrapped. A malicious page's
aria-label attributes became direct agent input without the trust
boundary markers that every other read path gets.

Adding 'snapshot' to the set runs the output through
wrapUntrustedContent() like text/html/links/forms already do.

Caught by codex adversarial review.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(ui): escapeHtml must escape quote characters too

DOM text-node serialization escapes & < > but NOT " or '. Call sites
that interpolate escapeHtml output inside attribute values (title="...",
data-x="...") were vulnerable to attribute-injection: an attacker-
influenced CSS property value (rule.selector, prop.value from the
inspector) or agent status field landing in one of those attributes
could break out with " onload=alert(1).

Add explicit quote escaping in escapeHtml + keep existing callers
working (no breakage — output is strictly more escaped, not less).

Caught by claude adversarial subagent. The earlier banner-layer fix
was the same class of bug but on a different code path.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(security): rolling-buffer canary detection + tool_output in Haiku prompt

Two separate adversarial findings, one fix each:

1. Canary stream-chunk split bypass. detectCanaryLeak ran .includes()
   per-delta on text_delta / input_json_delta events. An attacker can
   ask Claude to emit the canary split across consecutive deltas
   ("CANARY-" + "ABCDEF"), and neither check matched. Add a DeltaBuffer
   holding the last (canary.length-1) chars; concat tail + chunk, check,
   then trim. Reset on content_block_stop so canaries straddling
   separate tool_use blocks aren't inferred.

2. Transcript classifier tool_output context. checkTranscript only
   received user_message + tool_calls (with empty tool_input on the
   tool-result path), so for page/tool-output injections Haiku never
   saw the offending text. Only testsavant_content got a signal, and
   2-of-N degraded it to WARN. Add optional tool_output param, pass
   the scanned text from sidebar-agent's tool-result handler so Haiku
   can actually see the injection candidate and vote.

Both found by claude adversarial + codex adversarial agreeing.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(security): tool-output context allows single-layer BLOCK

combineVerdict's 2-of-N ensemble rule was designed for user input —
the Stack Overflow FP mitigation where a dev asking about injection
shouldn't kill the session. For tool output (page content, Read/Grep
results), the content wasn't user-authored, so that FP risk doesn't
apply. Before this change: testsavant_content=0.99 on a hostile page
downgraded to WARN when the transcript classifier degraded (timeout,
Haiku unavailable) or voted differently.

Add CombineVerdictOpts.toolOutput flag. When true, a single ML
classifier >= BLOCK threshold blocks directly. User-input default
path unchanged — still requires 2-of-N to block.

Caller: sidebar-agent.ts tool-result scan now passes { toolOutput: true }.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test(security): regression tests for 4 adversarial-review fixes

11 tests pinning the four fixes so future refactors don't silently
re-open the bypasses:

- Canary rolling-buffer detection (DeltaBuffer + slice tail)
- Tool-output single-layer BLOCK (new combineVerdict opt)
- escapeHtml quote escaping (both " and ')
- snapshot in PAGE_CONTENT_COMMANDS
- GSTACK_SECURITY_OFF kill switch gates both load paths
- checkTranscript.tool_output plumbing on tool-result scan

Most are source-level string contracts (not behavior) because the
alternative — real browser/subprocess wiring — would push these into
periodic-tier eval cost. The contracts catch the regression I care
about: did someone rename the flag or revert the guard.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs: CHANGELOG hardening section + TODOS mark Read/Glob/Grep shipped

CHANGELOG v1.4.0.0 gains a "Hardening during ship" subsection covering
the 4 adversarial-review fixes landed after the initial bump (canary
split, snapshot envelope, tool-output single-layer BLOCK, Haiku
tool-output context). Test count updated 243 → 280 to reflect the
source-contracts + adversarial-fix regression suites.

TODOS: Read/Glob/Grep tool-output scan marked SHIPPED (was P2 open).
Cross-references the hardening commits so follow-up readers see the
full arc.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs: document sidebar prompt injection defense across user docs

README adds a user-facing paragraph on the layered defense with links to
ARCHITECTURE. ARCHITECTURE gains a "Prompt injection defense (sidebar
agent)" subsection under Security model covering the L1-L6 layers, the
Bun-compile import constraint, env knobs, and visibility affordances.
BROWSER.md expands the "Untrusted content" note into a concrete
description of the classifier stack. docs/skills.md adds a defense
sentence to the /open-gstack-browser deep dive.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(security): k-anon suppression in community-pulse attack aggregate

Top-N attacked domains + layer distribution previously listed every
value with count>=1. With a small gstack community, that leaks
single-user attribution: if only one user is getting hit on
example.com, example.com appears in the aggregate as "1 attack,
1 domain" — easy to deanonymize when you know who's targeted.

Add K_ANON=5 threshold: a domain (or layer) must be reported by at
least 5 distinct installations before appearing in the aggregate.
Verdict distribution stays unfiltered (block/warn/log_only is
low-cardinality + population-wide, no re-id risk).

Raw rows already locked to service_role only (002_tighten_rls.sql);
this closes the aggregate-channel leak.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(security): decision file primitives for human-in-the-loop review

Adds writeDecision/readDecision/clearDecision around
~/.gstack/security/decisions/tab-<id>.json plus excerptForReview() for
safe UI display of tool output. Also extends Verdict with
'user_overrode' so attack-log audit trails distinguish genuine blocks
from user-acknowledged continues.

Pure primitives, no behavior change on their own.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(security): POST /security-decision + relay reviewable banner fields

Two small server changes, one feature:

1. New POST /security-decision endpoint takes {tabId, decision} JSON
   and writes the per-tab decision file. Auth-gated like every other
   sidebar-agent control endpoint.

2. processAgentEvent relays the new reviewable/suspected_text/tabId
   fields on security_event through to the chat entry so the sidepanel
   banner can render [Allow] / [Block] buttons and the excerpt.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(security): wait-for-decision instead of hard-kill on tool-output BLOCK

Was: tool-output BLOCK → immediate SIGTERM, session dies, user
stranded. A false positive on benign content (e.g. HN comments
discussing prompt injection) killed the session and lost the message.

Now: tool-output BLOCK → emit security_event with reviewable:true +
suspected_text + per-layer scores. Poll ~/.gstack/security/decisions/
for up to 60s. On "allow" — log the override to attempts.jsonl as
verdict=user_overrode and let the session continue. On "block" or
timeout — kill as before.

Canary leaks stay hard-stop (no review path). User-input pre-spawn
scans unchanged in this commit. Only tool-output scans gain review.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(ui): reviewable security banner with suspected-text + Allow/Block

Banner previously always rendered "Session terminated" — one-way. Now
when security_event.reviewable=true:

- Title switches to "Review suspected injection"
- Subtitle explains the decision ("allow to continue, block to end")
- Expandable details auto-open so the user sees context immediately
- Suspected text excerpt rendered in a mono pre block, scrollable,
  capped at 500 chars server-side
- Per-layer confidence scores (which layer fired, how confident)
- Action row with red [Block session] + neutral [Allow and continue]
- Click posts to /security-decision, banner hides, sidebar-agent
  sees the file and resumes or kills within one poll cycle

Existing hard-block banner (terminated session, canary leaks) unchanged.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test(security): review-flow regression tests

16 tests for the file-based handshake: round-trip, clear, permissions,
atomic write tmp-file cleanup, excerpt sanitization (truncation, ctrl
chars, whitespace collapse), and a simulated poll-loop confirming
allow/block/timeout behavior the sidebar-agent relies on.

Pins the contract so future refactors can't silently break the
allow-path recovery and ship people back into the hard-kill FP pit.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test(security): sidepanel review E2E — Playwright drives Allow/Block

5 tests, ~13s, gate tier. Loads real extension sidepanel in Playwright
Chromium with stubbed chrome.runtime + fetch, injects a reviewable
security_event, and drives the user path end-to-end:

- banner title flips to "Review suspected injection"
- suspected text excerpt renders inside the auto-expanded details
- Allow + Block buttons are visible
- click Allow → POST /security-decision with decision:"allow"
- click Block → POST /security-decision with decision:"block"
- banner auto-hides after each decision
- non-reviewable events keep the hard-stop framing (regression guard)
- XSS guard: script-tagged suspected_text doesn't execute

Complements security-review-flow.test.ts (unit-level file handshake)
and security-review-fullstack.test.ts (full pipeline with real
classifier).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test(security): mock-claude scenario for tool-result injection path

Adds MOCK_CLAUDE_SCENARIO=tool_result_injection. Emits a Bash tool_use
followed by a user-role tool_result whose content is a classic
DAN-style prompt-injection string. The warm TestSavantAI classifier
trips at 0.9999 on this text, reliably firing the tool-output BLOCK +
review flow for the full-stack E2E.

Stays alive up to 120s so a test has time to propagate the user's
review decision via /security-decision + the on-disk decision file.
SIGTERM exits 143 on user-confirmed block.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test(security): full-stack review E2E — real classifier + mock-claude

3 tests, ~12s hot / ~30s cold (first-run model download). Skips
gracefully if ~/.gstack/models/testsavant-small/ isn't populated.

Spins up real server + real sidebar-agent + PATH-shimmed mock-claude,
HOME re-rooted so neither the chat history nor the attempts log leak
from the user's live /open-gstack-browser session. Models dir
symlinked through to the real warmed cache so the test doesn't
re-download 112MB per run.

Covers the half that hermetic tests can't:
- real classifier (not a stub) fires on real injection text
- sidebar-agent emits a reviewable security_event end-to-end
- server writes the on-disk decision file
- sidebar-agent's poll loop reads the file and acts
- attempts.jsonl gets both block + user_overrode with matching
  payloadHash (dashboard can aggregate)
- the raw payload never appears in attempts.jsonl (privacy contract)

Caught a real bug while writing: the server loads pre-existing chat
history from ~/.gstack/sidebar-sessions/, so re-rooting HOME for only
the agent leaked ghost security_events from the live session into the
test. Fix: re-root HOME for both processes. The harness is cleaner for
future full-stack tests because of it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(security): unbreak Haiku transcript classifier — wrong model + too-tight timeout

Two bugs that made checkTranscript return degraded on every call:

1. --model 'haiku-4-5' returns 404 from the Claude CLI. The accepted
   shorthand is 'haiku' (resolves to claude-haiku-4-5-20251001
   today, stays on the latest Haiku as models roll). Symptom: every
   call exited non-zero with api_error_status=404.

2. 2000ms timeout is below the floor. Fresh `claude -p` spawn has
   ~2-3s CLI cold-start + 5-12s inference on ~1KB prompts. With the
   wrong model gone, every successful call still timed out before it
   returned. Measured: 0% firing rate.

Fix: model alias + 15s timeout. Sanity check against DAN-style
injection now returns confidence 0.99 with reasoning ("Tool output
contains multiple injection patterns: instruction override, jailbreak
attempt (DAN), system prompt exfil request, and malicious curl
command to attacker domain") in 8.7s.

This was the silent cause of the 15.3% detection rate on
BrowseSafe-Bench — the ensemble numbers matched L4-alone because
Haiku never actually voted.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(security): always run Haiku on tool outputs (drop the L4 gate)

Tool-result scan previously short-circuited when L4 (TestSavantAI)
scored below WARN, and further gated Haiku on any layer firing at >=
LOG_ONLY. On BrowseSafe-Bench that meant Haiku almost never ran,
because TestSavantAI has ~15% recall on browser-agent-specific
attacks (social engineering, indirect injection). We were gating our
best signal on our weakest.

Run all three classifiers (L4 + L4c + Haiku) in parallel. Cost:
~$0.002 + ~8s Haiku wall time per tool result, bounded by the 15s
Haiku timeout. Haiku also runs in parallel with the content scans
so it's additive only against the stream handler budget, not
against the session wall time.

User-input pre-spawn path unchanged — shouldRunTranscriptCheck still
gates there. The Stack Overflow FP mitigation that original gate was
built for still applies to direct user input; tool outputs have
different characteristics.

Source-contract test updated to pin the new parallel-three shape.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs(changelog): measured BrowseSafe-Bench lift from Haiku unbreak

Before/after on the 200-case smoke cache:
  L4-only:  15.3% detection / 11.8% FP
  Ensemble: 67.3% detection / 44.1% FP

4.4x lift in detection from fixing the model alias + timeout + removing
the pre-Haiku gate on tool outputs. FP rate up 3.7x — Haiku is more
aggressive than L4 on edge cases. Review banner makes those recoverable;
P1 follow-up to tune Haiku WARN threshold from 0.6 to ~0.7-0.85 once
real attempts.jsonl data arrives.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs(todos): P0 Haiku FP tuning + P1-P3 follow-ups from bench data

BrowseSafe-Bench smoke showed 67.3% detection / 44.1% FP post-Haiku-
unbreak. Detection is good enough to ship. FP rate is too high for a
delightful default even with the review banner softening the blow.

Files four tuning items with concrete knobs + targets:

- P0 Cut Haiku FP toward 15% via (1) verdict-based counting instead
  of confidence threshold, (2) tighter classifier prompt, (3) 6-8
  few-shot exemplars, (4) bump WARN threshold 0.6 -> 0.75
- P1 Cache review decisions per (domain, payload-hash) so repeat
  scans don't re-prompt
- P2 research: fine-tune BERT-base on BrowseSafe-Bench + Qualifire +
  xxz224 — expected 15% -> 70% L4 recall
- P2 Flip DeBERTa ensemble from opt-in to default
- P3 User-feedback flywheel — Allow/Block decisions become training
  data (guardrails required)

Ordered so P0 ships next sprint and can be measured against the same
bench corpus. All items depend on v1.4.0.0 landing first.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test(security): assert block stops further tool calls, allow lets them through

Gap caught by user: the review-flow tests verified the decision path
(POST, file write, agent_error emission) but not the actual security
property — that Block stops subsequent tool calls and Allow lets them
continue.

Mock-claude tool_result_injection scenario now emits a second tool_use
~8s after the injected tool_result, targeting post-block-followup.
example.com. If block really blocks, that event never reaches the
chat feed (SIGTERM killed the subprocess before it emitted). If allow
really allows, it does.

Allow test asserts the followup tool_use DOES appear → session lives.
Block test asserts the followup tool_use does NOT appear after 12s →
kill actually stopped further work. Both tests previously proved the
control plane (decision file → agent poll → agent_error); they now
prove the data plane too.

Test timeout bumped 60s → 90s to accommodate the 12s quiet window.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-04-20 22:18:37 +08:00
Garry Tan d0782c4c4d
feat(v1.4.0.0): /make-pdf — markdown to publication-quality PDFs (#1086) 
* feat(browse): full $B pdf flag contract + tab-scoped load-html/js/pdf

Grow $B pdf from a 2-line wrapper (hard-coded A4) into a real PDF engine
frontend so make-pdf can shell out to it without duplicating Playwright:

- pdf: --format, --width/--height, --margins, --margin-*, --header-template,
  --footer-template, --page-numbers, --tagged, --outline, --print-background,
  --prefer-css-page-size, --toc. Mutex rules enforced. --from-file <json>
  dodges Windows argv limits (8191 char CreateProcess cap).
- load-html: add --from-file <json> mode for large inline HTML. Size + magic
  byte checks still apply to the inline content, not the payload file path.
- newtab: add --json returning {"tabId":N,"url":...} for programmatic use.
- cli: extract --tab-id flag and route as body.tabId to the HTTP layer so
  parallel callers can target specific tabs without racing on the active
  tab (makes make-pdf's per-render tab isolation possible).
- --toc: non-fatal 3s wait for window.__pagedjsAfterFired. Paged.js ships
  later; v1 renders TOC statically via the markdown renderer.

Codex round 2 flagged these P0 issues during plan review. All resolved.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(resolvers): add MAKE_PDF_SETUP + makePdfDir host paths

Skill templates can now embed {{MAKE_PDF_SETUP}} to resolve $P to the
make-pdf binary via the same discovery order as $B / $D: env override
(MAKE_PDF_BIN), local skill root, global install, or PATH.

Mirrors the pattern established by generateBrowseSetup() and
generateDesignSetup() in scripts/resolvers/design.ts.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(make-pdf): new /make-pdf skill + orchestrator binary

Turn markdown into publication-quality PDFs. $P generate input.md out.pdf
produces a PDF with 1in margins, intelligent page breaks, page numbers,
running header, CONFIDENTIAL footer, and curly quotes/em dashes — all on
Helvetica so copy-paste extraction works ("S ai li ng" bug avoided).

Architecture (per Codex round 2):
  markdown → render.ts (marked + sanitize + smartypants) → orchestrator
    → $B newtab --json → $B load-html --tab-id → $B js (poll Paged.js)
    → $B pdf --tab-id → $B closetab

browseClient.ts shells out to the compiled browse CLI rather than
duplicating Playwright. --tab-id isolation per render means parallel
$P generate calls don't race on the active tab. try/finally tab cleanup
survives Paged.js timeouts, browser crashes, and output-path failures.

Features in v1:
  --cover              left-aligned cover page (eyebrow + title + hairline rule)
  --toc                clickable static TOC (Paged.js page numbers deferred)
  --watermark <text>   diagonal DRAFT/CONFIDENTIAL layer
  --no-chapter-breaks  opt out of H1-starts-new-page
  --page-numbers       "N of M" footer (default on)
  --tagged --outline   accessible PDF + bookmark outline (default on)
  --allow-network      opt in to external image loading (default off for privacy)
  --quiet --verbose    stderr control

Design decisions locked from the /plan-design-review pass:
  - Helvetica everywhere (Chromium emits single-word Tj operators for
    system fonts; bundled webfonts emit per-glyph and break extraction).
  - Left-aligned body, flush-left paragraphs, no text-indent, 12pt gap.
  - Cover shares 1in margins with body pages; no flexbox-center, no
    inset padding.
  - The reference HTMLs at .context/designs/*.html are the implementation
    source of truth for print-css.ts.

Tests (56 unit + 1 E2E combined-features gate):
  - smartypants: code/URL-safe, verified against 10 fixtures
  - sanitizer: strips <script>/<iframe>/on*/javascript: URLs
  - render: HTML assembly, CJK fallback, cover/TOC/chapter wrap
  - print-css: all @page rules, margin variants, watermark
  - pdftotext: normalize()+copyPasteGate() cross-OS tolerance
  - browseClient: binary resolution + typed error propagation
  - combined-features gate (P0): 2-chapter fixture with smartypants +
    hyphens + ligatures + bold/italic + inline code + lists + blockquote
    passes through PDF → pdftotext → expected.txt diff

Deferred to Phase 4 (future PR): Paged.js vendored for accurate TOC page
numbers, highlight.js for syntax highlighting, drop caps, pull quotes,
two-column, CMYK, watermark visual-diff acceptance.

Plan: .context/ceo-plans/2026-04-19-perfect-pdf-generator.md
References: .context/designs/make-pdf-*.html

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore(build): wire make-pdf into build/test/setup/bin + add marked dep

- package.json: compile make-pdf/dist/pdf as part of bun run build; add
  "make-pdf" to bin entry; include make-pdf/test/ in the free test pass;
  add marked@18.0.2 as a dep (markdown parser, ~40KB).
- setup: add make-pdf/dist/pdf to the Apple Silicon codesign loop.
- .gitignore: add make-pdf/dist/ (matches browse/dist/ and design/dist/).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* ci(make-pdf): matrix copy-paste gate on Ubuntu + macOS

Runs the combined-features P0 gate on pull requests that touch make-pdf/
or browse's PDF surface. Installs poppler (macOS) / poppler-utils (Ubuntu)
per OS. Windows deferred to tolerant mode (Xpdf / Poppler-Windows
extraction variance not yet calibrated against the normalized comparator —
Codex round 2 #18).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs(skills): regenerate SKILL.md for make-pdf addition + browse pdf flags

bun run gen:skill-docs picks up:
  - the new /make-pdf skill (make-pdf/SKILL.md)
  - updated browse command descriptions for 'pdf', 'load-html', 'newtab'
    reflecting the new flag contract and --from-file mode

Source of truth stays the .tmpl files + COMMAND_DESCRIPTIONS;
these are regenerated artifacts.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(tests): repair stale test expectations + emit _EXPLAIN_LEVEL / _QUESTION_TUNING from preamble

Three pre-existing test failures on main were blocking /ship:

- test/skill-validation.test.ts "Step 3.4 test coverage audit" expected the
  literal strings "CODE PATH COVERAGE" and "USER FLOW COVERAGE" which were
  removed when the Step 7 coverage diagram was compressed. Updated assertions
  to check the stable `Code paths:` / `User flows:` labels that still ship.

- test/skill-validation.test.ts "ship step numbering" allowed-substeps list
  didn't include 15.0 (WIP squash) and 15.1 (bisectable commits) which were
  added for continuous checkpoint mode. Extended the allowlist.

- test/writing-style-resolver.test.ts and test/plan-tune.test.ts expected
  `_EXPLAIN_LEVEL` and `_QUESTION_TUNING` bash variables in the preamble but
  generate-preamble-bash.ts had been refactored and those lines were dropped.
  Without them, downstream skills can't read `explain_level` or
  `question_tuning` config at runtime — terse mode and /plan-tune features
  were silently broken.

Added the two bash echo blocks back to generatePreambleBash and refreshed
the golden-file fixtures to match. All three preamble-related golden
baselines (claude/codex/factory) are synchronized with the new output.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore: bump version and changelog (v1.4.0.0)

New /make-pdf skill + $P binary.

Turn any markdown file into a publication-quality PDF. Default output is
a 1in-margin Helvetica letter with page numbers in the footer. `--cover`
adds a left-aligned cover page, `--toc` generates a clickable table of
contents, `--watermark DRAFT` overlays a diagonal watermark. Copy-paste
extraction from the PDF produces clean words, not "S a i l i n g"
spaced out letter by letter. CI gate (macOS + Ubuntu) runs a combined-
features fixture through pdftotext on every PR.

make-pdf shells out to browse rather than duplicating Playwright.
$B pdf grew into a real PDF engine with full flag contract (--format,
--margins, --header-template, --footer-template, --page-numbers,
--tagged, --outline, --toc, --tab-id, --from-file). $B load-html and
$B js gained --tab-id. $B newtab --json returns structured output.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs(changelog): rewrite v1.4.0.0 headline — positive voice, no VC framing

The original headline led with "a PDF you wouldn't be embarrassed to send
to a VC": double-negative voice and audience-too-narrow. /make-pdf works
for essays, letters, memos, reports, proposals, and briefs. Framing the
whole release around founders-to-investors misses the wider audience.

New headline: "Turn any markdown file into a PDF that looks finished."
New tagline: "This one reads like a real essay or a real letter."

Positive voice. Broader aperture. Same energy.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-04-20 13:20:30 +08:00
Garry Tan 8ca950f6f1
feat: content security — 4-layer prompt injection defense for pair-agent (#815) 
* feat: token registry for multi-agent browser access

Per-agent scoped tokens with read/write/admin/meta command categories,
domain glob restrictions, rate limiting, expiry, and revocation. Setup
key exchange for the /pair-agent ceremony (5-min one-time key → 24h
session token). Idempotent exchange handles tunnel drops. 39 tests.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: integrate token registry + scoped auth into browse server

Server changes for multi-agent browser access:
- /connect endpoint: setup key exchange for /pair-agent ceremony
- /token endpoint: root-only minting of scoped sub-tokens
- /token/:clientId DELETE: revoke agent tokens
- /agents endpoint: list connected agents (root-only)
- /health: strips root token when tunnel is active (P0 security fix)
- /command: scope/rate/domain checks via token registry before dispatch
- Idle timer skips shutdown when tunnel is active

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: ngrok tunnel integration + @ngrok/ngrok dependency

BROWSE_TUNNEL=1 env var starts an ngrok tunnel after Bun.serve().
Reads NGROK_AUTHTOKEN from env or ~/.gstack/ngrok.env. Reads
NGROK_DOMAIN for dedicated domain (stable URL). Updates state
file with tunnel URL. Feasibility spike confirmed: SDK works in
compiled Bun binary.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: tab isolation for multi-agent browser access

Add per-tab ownership tracking to BrowserManager. Scoped agents
must create their own tab via newtab before writing. Unowned tabs
(pre-existing, user-opened) are root-only for writes. Read access
always allowed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: tab enforcement + POST /pair endpoint + activity attribution

Server-side tab ownership check blocks scoped agents from writing to
unowned tabs. Special-case newtab records ownership for scoped tokens.
POST /pair endpoint creates setup keys for the pairing ceremony.
Activity events now include clientId for attribution.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: pair-agent CLI command + instruction block generator

One command to pair a remote agent: $B pair-agent. Creates a setup
key via POST /pair, prints a copy-pasteable instruction block with
curl commands. Smart tunnel fallback (tunnel URL > auto-start >
localhost). Flags: --for HOST, --local HOST, --admin, --client NAME.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test: tab isolation + instruction block generator tests

14 tests covering tab ownership lifecycle (access checks, unowned
tabs, transferTab) and instruction block generator (scopes, URLs,
admin flag, troubleshooting section). Fix server-auth test that
used fragile sliceBetween boundaries broken by new endpoints.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore: bump version and changelog (v0.15.9.0)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: CSO security fixes — token leak, domain bypass, input validation

1. Remove root token from /health endpoint entirely (CSO #1 CRITICAL).
   Origin header is spoofable. Extension reads from ~/.gstack/.auth.json.
2. Add domain check for newtab URL (CSO #5). Previously only goto was
   checked, allowing domain-restricted agents to bypass via newtab.
3. Validate scope values, rateLimit, expiresSeconds in createToken()
   (CSO #4). Rejects invalid scopes and negative values.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: /pair-agent skill — syntactic sugar for browser sharing

Users remember /pair-agent, not $B pair-agent. The skill walks through
agent selection (OpenClaw, Hermes, Codex, Cursor, generic), local vs
remote setup, tunnel configuration, and includes platform-specific
notes for each agent type. Wraps the CLI command with context.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs: remote browser access reference for paired agents

Full API reference, snapshot→@ref pattern, scopes, tab isolation,
error codes, ngrok setup, and same-machine shortcuts. The instruction
block points here for deeper reading.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: improved instruction block with snapshot→@ref pattern

The paste-into-agent instruction block now teaches the snapshot→@ref
workflow (the most powerful browsing pattern), shows the server URL
prominently, and uses clearer formatting. Tests updated to match.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: smart ngrok detection + auto-tunnel in pair-agent

The pair-agent command now checks ngrok's native config (not just
~/.gstack/ngrok.env) and auto-starts the tunnel when ngrok is
available. The skill template walks users through ngrok install
and auth if not set up, instead of just printing a dead localhost
URL.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: on-demand tunnel start via POST /tunnel/start

pair-agent now auto-starts the ngrok tunnel without restarting the
server. New POST /tunnel/start endpoint reads authtoken from env,
~/.gstack/ngrok.env, or ngrok's native config. CLI detects ngrok
availability and calls the endpoint automatically. Zero manual steps
when ngrok is installed and authed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: pair-agent skill must output the instruction block verbatim

Added CRITICAL instruction: the agent MUST output the full instruction
block so the user can copy it. Previously the agent could summarize
over it, leaving the user with nothing to paste.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: scoped tokens rejected on /command — auth gate ordering bug

The blanket validateAuth() gate (root-only) sat above the /command
endpoint, rejecting all scoped tokens with 401 before they reached
getTokenInfo(). Moved /command above the gate so both root and
scoped tokens are accepted. This was the bug Wintermute hit.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: pair-agent auto-launches headed mode before pairing

When pair-agent detects headless mode, it auto-switches to headed
(visible Chromium window) so the user can watch what the remote
agent does. Use --headless to skip this. Fixed compiled binary
path resolution (process.execPath, not process.argv[1] which is
virtual /$bunfs/ in Bun compiled binaries).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test: comprehensive tests for auth ordering, tunnel, ngrok, headed mode

16 new tests covering:
- /command sits above blanket auth gate (Wintermute bug)
- /command uses getTokenInfo not validateAuth
- /tunnel/start requires root, checks native ngrok config, returns already_active
- /pair creates setup keys not session tokens
- Tab ownership checked before command dispatch
- Activity events include clientId
- Instruction block teaches snapshot→@ref pattern
- pair-agent auto-headed mode, process.execPath, --headless skip
- isNgrokAvailable checks all 3 sources (gstack env, env var, native config)
- handlePairAgent calls /tunnel/start not server restart

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: chain scope bypass + /health info leak when tunneled

1. Chain command now pre-validates ALL subcommand scopes before
   executing any. A read+meta token can no longer escalate to
   admin via chain (eval, js, cookies were dispatched without
   scope checks). tokenInfo flows through handleMetaCommand into
   the chain handler. Rejects entire chain if any subcommand fails.

2. /health strips sensitive fields (currentUrl, agent.currentMessage,
   session) when tunnel is active. Only operational metadata (status,
   mode, uptime, tabs) exposed to the internet. Previously anyone
   reaching the ngrok URL could surveil browsing activity.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs: tout /pair-agent as headline feature in CHANGELOG + README

Lead with what it does for the user: type /pair-agent, paste into
your other agent, done. First time AI agents from different companies
can coordinate through a shared browser with real security boundaries.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs: expand /pair-agent, /design-shotgun, /design-html in README

Each skill gets a real narrative paragraph explaining the workflow,
not just a table cell. design-shotgun: visual exploration with taste
memory. design-html: production HTML with Pretext computed layout.
pair-agent: cross-vendor AI agent coordination through shared browser.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor: split handleCommand into handleCommandInternal + HTTP wrapper

Chain subcommands now route through handleCommandInternal for full security
enforcement (scope, domain, tab ownership, rate limiting, content wrapping).
Adds recursion guard for nested chains, rate-limit exemption for chain
subcommands, and activity event suppression (1 event per chain, not per sub).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: add content-security.ts with datamarking, envelope, and filter hooks

Four-layer prompt injection defense for pair-agent browser sharing:
- Datamarking: session-scoped watermark for text exfiltration detection
- Content envelope: trust boundary wrapping with ZWSP marker escaping
- Content filter hooks: extensible filter pipeline with warn/block modes
- Built-in URL blocklist: requestbin, pipedream, webhook.site, etc.

BROWSE_CONTENT_FILTER env var controls mode: off|warn|block (default: warn)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: centralize content wrapping in handleCommandInternal response path

Single wrapping location replaces fragmented per-handler wrapping:
- Scoped tokens: content filters + datamarking + enhanced envelope
- Root tokens: existing basic wrapping (backward compat)
- Chain subcommands exempt from top-level wrapping (wrapped individually)
- Adds 'attrs' to PAGE_CONTENT_COMMANDS (ARIA value exposure defense)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: hidden element stripping for scoped token text extraction

Detects CSS-hidden elements (opacity, font-size, off-screen, same-color,
clip-path) and ARIA label injection patterns. Marks elements with
data-gstack-hidden, extracts text from a clean clone (no DOM mutation),
then removes markers. Only active for scoped tokens on text command.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: snapshot split output format for scoped tokens

Scoped tokens get a split snapshot: trusted @refs section (for click/fill)
separated from untrusted web content in an envelope. Ref names truncated
to 50 chars in trusted section. Root tokens unchanged (backward compat).
Resume command also uses split format for scoped tokens.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: add SECURITY section to pair-agent instruction block

Instructs remote agents to treat content inside untrusted envelopes
as potentially malicious. Lists common injection phrases to watch for.
Directs agents to only use @refs from the trusted INTERACTIVE ELEMENTS
section, not from page content.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test: add 4 prompt injection test fixtures

- injection-visible.html: visible injection in product review text
- injection-hidden.html: 7 CSS hiding techniques + ARIA injection + false positive
- injection-social.html: social engineering in legitimate-looking content
- injection-combined.html: all attack types + envelope escape attempt

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test: comprehensive content security tests (47 tests)

Covers all 4 defense layers:
- Datamarking: marker format, session consistency, text-only application
- Content envelope: wrapping, ZWSP marker escaping, filter warnings
- Content filter hooks: URL blocklist, custom filters, warn/block modes
- Instruction block: SECURITY section content, ordering, generation
- Centralized wrapping: source-level verification of integration
- Chain security: recursion guard, rate-limit exemption, activity suppression
- Hidden element stripping: 7 CSS techniques, ARIA injection, false positives
- Snapshot split format: scoped vs root output, resume integration

Also fixes: visibility:hidden detection, case-insensitive ARIA pattern matching.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: pair-agent skill compliance + fix all 16 pre-existing test failures

Root cause: pair-agent was added without completing the gen-skill-docs
compliance checklist. All 16 failures traced back to this.

Fixes:
- Sync package.json version to VERSION (0.15.9.0)
- Add "(gstack)" to pair-agent description for discoverability
- Add pair-agent to Codex path exception (legitimately documents ~/.codex/)
- Add CLI_COMMANDS (status, pair-agent, tunnel) to skill parser allowlist
- Regenerate SKILL.md for all hosts (claude, codex, factory, kiro, etc.)
- Update golden file baselines for ship skill
- Fix relink tests: pass GSTACK_INSTALL_DIR to auto-relink calls so they
  use the fast mock install instead of scanning real ~/.claude/skills/gstack

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore: bump version and changelog (v0.15.12.0)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: E2E exit reason precedence + worktree prune race condition

Two fixes for E2E test reliability:

1. session-runner.ts: error_max_turns was misclassified as error_api
   because is_error flag was checked before subtype. Now known subtypes
   like error_max_turns are preserved even when is_error is set. The
   is_error override only applies when subtype=success (API failure).

2. worktree.ts: pruneStale() now skips worktrees < 1 hour old to avoid
   deleting worktrees from concurrent test runs still in progress.
   Previously any second test execution would kill the first's worktrees.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: restore token in /health for localhost extension auth

The CSO security fix stripped the token from /health to prevent leaking
when tunneled. But the extension needs it to authenticate on localhost.
Now returns token only when not tunneled (safe: localhost-only path).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test: verify /health token is localhost-only, never served through tunnel

Updated tests to match the restored token behavior:
- Test 1: token assignment exists AND is inside the !tunnelActive guard
- Test 1b: tunnel branch (else block) does not contain AUTH_TOKEN

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs: add security rationale for token in /health on localhost

Explains why this is an accepted risk (no escalation over file-based
token access), CORS protection, and tunnel guard. Prevents future
CSO scans from stripping it without providing an alternative auth path.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: verify tunnel is alive before returning URL to pair-agent

Root cause: when ngrok dies externally (pkill, crash, timeout), the server
still reports tunnelActive=true with a dead URL. pair-agent prints an
instruction block pointing at a dead tunnel. The remote agent gets
"endpoint offline" and the user has to manually restart everything.

Three-layer fix:
- Server /pair endpoint: probes tunnel URL before returning it. If dead,
  resets tunnelActive/tunnelUrl and returns null (triggers CLI restart).
- Server /tunnel/start: probes cached tunnel before returning already_active.
  If dead, falls through to restart ngrok automatically.
- CLI pair-agent: double-checks tunnel URL from server before printing
  instruction block. Falls through to auto-start on failure.

4 regression tests verify all three probe points + CLI verification.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: add POST /batch endpoint for multi-command batching

Remote agents controlling GStack Browser through a tunnel pay 2-5s of
latency per HTTP round-trip. A typical "navigate and read" takes 4
sequential commands = 10-20 seconds. The /batch endpoint collapses N
commands into a single HTTP round-trip, cutting a 20-tab crawl from
~60s to ~5s.

Sequential execution through the full security pipeline (scope, domain,
tab ownership, content wrapping). Rate limiting counts the batch as 1
request. Activity events emitted at batch level, not per-command.
Max 50 commands per batch. Nested batches rejected.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test: add source-level security tests for /batch endpoint

8 tests verifying: auth gate placement, scoped token support, max
command limit, nested batch rejection, rate limiting bypass, batch-level
activity events, command field validation, and tabId passthrough.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: correct CHANGELOG date from 2026-04-06 to 2026-04-05

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor: consolidate Hermes into generic HTTP option in pair-agent

Hermes doesn't have a host-specific config — it uses the same generic
curl instructions as any other agent. Removing the dedicated option
simplifies the menu and eliminates a misleading distinction.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore: bump VERSION to 0.15.14.0, add CHANGELOG entry for batch endpoint

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore: regenerate pair-agent/SKILL.md after main merge

Vendoring deprecation section from main's template wasn't reflected
in the generated file. Fixes check-freshness CI.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor: checkTabAccess uses options object, add own-only tab policy

Refactors checkTabAccess(tabId, clientId, isWrite) to use an options
object { isWrite?, ownOnly? }. Adds tabPolicy === 'own-only' support
in the server command dispatch — scoped tokens with this policy are
restricted to their own tabs for all commands, not just writes.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: add --domain flag to pair-agent CLI for domain restrictions

Allows passing --domain to pair-agent to restrict the remote agent's
navigation to specific domains (comma-separated).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* revert: remove batch commands CHANGELOG entry and VERSION bump

The batch endpoint work belongs on the browser-batch-multitab branch
(port-louis), not this branch. Reverting VERSION to 0.15.14.0.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: adopt main's headed-mode /health token serving

Our merge kept the old !tunnelActive guard which conflicted with
main's security-audit-r2 tests that require no currentUrl/currentMessage
in /health. Adopts main's approach: serve token conditionally based on
headed mode or chrome-extension origin. Updates server-auth tests.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: improve snapshot flags docs completeness for LLM judge

Adds $B placeholder explanation, explicit syntax line, and detailed
flag behavior (-d depth values, -s CSS selector syntax, -D unified
diff format and baseline persistence, -a screenshot vs text output
relationship). Fixes snapshot flags reference LLM eval scoring
completeness < 4.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-04-06 14:41:06 -07:00
Garry Tan cd66fc2f89
fix: 6 critical fixes + community PR guardrails (v0.13.2.0) (#602) 
* fix(security): commit bun.lock to pin dependency versions

Remove bun.lock from .gitignore and commit the lockfile. Every bun install
now uses exact pinned versions instead of resolving floating ^ ranges from
npm fresh. Closes the supply-chain vector from #566.

Co-Authored-By: boinger <boinger@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: gstack-slug falls back to dirname/unknown when git context is absent

Add || true to git commands and fallback defaults so gstack-slug works
outside git repos. Prevents unbound variable crash that kills every
review skill when no git context exists.

Co-Authored-By: collinstraka-clov <collinstraka-clov@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: setup auto-selects default after 10s timeout to prevent CI hangs

Add -t 10 to the read command in the skill-prefix prompt. In CI, Docker,
and Conductor workspaces where a TTY exists but nobody is watching, the
prompt now auto-selects short names after 10 seconds instead of blocking
forever.

Co-Authored-By: stedfn <stedfn@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: browse CLI Windows lockfile — use string flag instead of numeric constants

Bun compiled binaries on Windows don't handle numeric fs.constants
correctly. The string flag 'wx' is semantically identical to
O_CREAT | O_EXCL | O_WRONLY per Node docs and works on all platforms.

Fixes #599

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: add ~/.gstack/projects/ to plan file search path

/office-hours writes design docs to ~/.gstack/projects/$SLUG/ but /ship
and /review only searched ~/.claude/plans, ~/.codex/plans, and .gstack/plans.
Add the project-scoped directory as the first search location so plan
validation finds design docs created by the standard workflow.

Fixes #591

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: autoplan dual-voice — sequential foreground execution instead of broken parallel

Background subagents don't inherit tool permissions in Claude Code, so the
Claude subagent in dual-voice mode was silently failing on every invocation.
Every autoplan run was degrading to single-reviewer mode without warning.

Change all three phases (CEO, Design, Eng) from "simultaneously" to
sequential foreground execution: Claude subagent first (Agent tool,
foreground), then Codex (Bash). Both complete before the consensus table.

Fixes #497

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore: regenerate SKILL.md files from updated templates

Regenerated from autoplan/SKILL.md.tmpl (dual-voice fix) and
scripts/resolvers/review.ts (plan search path fix).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs: add community PR guardrails — protect ETHOS.md and voice

Add explicit CLAUDE.md rule requiring AskUserQuestion before accepting
any community PR that touches ETHOS.md, removes promotional material,
or changes Garry's voice. No exceptions, no auto-merging.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore: bump version and changelog (v0.13.2.0)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: gen-skill-docs detects symlink loop, skips codex write that overwrites Claude SKILL.md

When .agents/skills/gstack is symlinked to the repo root (vendored dev mode),
gen-skill-docs --host codex was writing the Codex-transformed SKILL.md through
the symlink, overwriting the Claude version. This caused SKILL.md and
agents/openai.yaml to silently revert to Codex paths after every build.

Now detects when the codex output path resolves to the same real file as the
Claude output and skips the write. Content is still generated for token budget
tracking. The openai.yaml write is also skipped for the same symlink case.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: resolve all 7 test failures — version sync, zsh glob guard, symlink-aware codex tests

1. package.json version synced with VERSION file (0.13.3.0)
2. design-shotgun/SKILL.md.tmpl: added setopt +o nomatch guard to
   bash block with variant-*.png glob
3. Codex generation tests: skip skills where .agents/skills/{name}
   is a symlink back to repo root (vendored dev mode). These can't
   have proper codex content since gen-skill-docs skips the write
   to avoid overwriting the Claude SKILL.md.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: boinger <boinger@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: collinstraka-clov <collinstraka-clov@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: stedfn <stedfn@users.noreply.github.com>
 2026-03-28 11:31:56 -06:00