mirror of https://github.com/garrytan/gstack.git
4 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date |
|---|---|---|---|
Garry Tan
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1d41ee3ab3
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v1.63.0.0 feat: GStack 2 fork port wave — egress receipts, context-bill, sharded gate, /health fix (#2541)
* test(helpers): shared skill-census helper with three explicit counts
physicalSkillFiles (symlinked dirs included, root router included),
authoredSkills (realpath-deduped, router excluded), registryEntries
(what ./setup registers: unique frontmatter names + _gstack-command).
One counting authority for the hermetic seeder, context-bill ground
truth, and the catalog-budget test — connect-chrome's dir symlink and
the root router otherwise produce three subtly different hand-rolled
censuses. Ported-wave foundation (C11).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(evals): stop the harness grading itself
findPreviousRun excluded only the file being written, by name, so every
suite compared against _partial-e2e.json — the current run's own
accumulator, relabelled with the current tier just before each flush.
That is why every block read '+$0.00, +0s, Stable run, no regressions.'
This harness has never been able to detect a regression, and reassuring
output that cannot fail is worse than none. In-progress runs are now
excluded by role, and a run with nothing to compare against says NO
BASELINE instead of claiming stability.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
(cherry picked from commit f3140b5245221fff7fb9411c7ec07c2ca11587b5)
* refactor(evals): shared partial-run predicate + finalized-run lookup
isPartialEval(data, filename) is the one place that decides what counts
as an in-progress accumulator (the _partial flag OR a _partial-prefixed
filename), and findLatestFinalizedRun(evalDir, tier) is the one place
that finds the newest real run — scanning the eval dir plus one level of
shards/<slug>/ subdirs, where the sharded paid runner points each
shard's collector. skill-budget-regression.test.ts's hand-rolled
findLatestRun (flag-blind: a flagged-but-renamed accumulator passed its
name check) is replaced by the shared helper.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
(cherry picked from commit b55fcf6966366fd21a8cdc46de61aab6e1b1d100)
* feat(evals): register shipped skills for hermetic PTY children
Hermetic children get a config dir that deliberately seeds no skills —
right for children that install their own, fatal for the PTY family that
TYPES /office-hours or /plan-ceo-review: claude rejects the command as
Unknown before any model turn, so the plan-family gate smokes measure
nothing. hermeticSkillsConfigDir() is a second, opt-in config dir under
the same runRoot that mirrors ./setup's registration exactly (real dir
per registry name, SKILL.md + sections/ symlinks, frontmatter-name
resolution, _gstack-command root alias), driven by the shared
skill-census so connect-chrome's dir symlink collapses the same way
setup's idempotent overwrite does.
Ported from fork commit 03c4eca2, tree walk rewritten for the upstream
layout (top-level <skill>/SKILL.md dirs, no skills/ tree). Unit tests
are new: seed shape, census parity, symlink resolution, connect-chrome
collapse, idempotence, no-API-key seed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
(cherry picked from commit 93dae6107b30ce453a07c2d342b60262bba6ce0b)
* feat(evals): seedSkills opt-in for PTY slash-command tests + tripwire
Wire ClaudePtyOptions.seedSkills through launchClaudePty: when set (and
hermetic, and no per-test CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR override), the child gets
hermeticSkillsConfigDir() so typed /skill slash commands resolve instead
of dying as Unknown command before any model turn. Opted in at the three
runPlanSkill* helpers and the four direct-launch slash-command tests
(plan-design-with-ui, plan-ceo-mode-routing, autoplan-chain,
ship-idempotency).
New static tripwire (test/pty-skill-seeding-wiring.test.ts): any test
file that sends a slash command over the PTY must route through a
runPlanSkill* helper or pass seedSkills: true — an unseeded slash-command
test spends money and measures nothing. hermetic-wiring.test.ts now
blesses the repo-tree seeding path explicitly (config dir under runRoot,
symlinks into the repo checkout, never operator ~/.claude).
The CI "Register gstack skills for PTY smoke" step keeps a keep-me note:
container cross-mount symlinks defeat the TUI scanner and HOME is not
hermeticized, so the real-file copies there must survive this change.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
(cherry picked from commit 63c52269daaffb833b3105ea9b4b99be6df8fec7)
* refactor(evals): single shared paid-test-set module
test/helpers/paid-test-set.ts is now the one definition of which test
files are paid (the exact globs package.json's test:gate expands).
scripts/test-free-shards.ts derives its free/paid exclusion from it
instead of a private regex list, dropping the dead
browse/test/security-review-fullstack.test.ts pattern (file no longer
exists). The sharded paid runner derives its enumeration from the same
module, so a file added to one list can no longer silently miss the
other.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
(cherry picked from commit a7f36479a6a1f3656452370f5883371f3cb65623)
* feat(evals): env-driven lazy eval dir + shard-aware store and tooling
Importing eval-store no longer spawns the gstack-slug subprocess: the
module-level DEFAULT_EVAL_DIR constant is now a memoized defaultEvalDir()
resolved at collector construction. Resolution order: explicit
constructor arg, then GSTACK_EVAL_DIR, then slug detection — so the
sharded paid runner can point each shard child at its own
<evalDir>/shards/<slug>/ dir with plain env, no --preload.
Runs collected under a shards/ subdir record their slug in the eval
JSON (EvalResult.shard). findPreviousRun scans one shards/<slug>/ level
and prefers same-slug priors, so each shard baselines against its own
history instead of whichever shard flushed last. eval:list,
eval:summary, and eval:compare enumerate the same one level of shard
subdirs; eval:compare's no-arg mode also stops picking an in-progress
accumulator as the after-run.
eval-watch stays flat (documented follow-up): it tails a single dir for
live progress and gains nothing from per-shard baselines until the
runner emits a merged stream.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
(cherry picked from commit e1f53f7d9c7fe6b65877d843f2e25bd2e2d12ffd)
* feat(evals): sharded paid tier runner
scripts/test-paid-shards.ts runs the gate/periodic tier one Bun process
per test file, with an EXTERNAL wall-clock timeout that SIGKILLs the
shard's detached process group and an aggregate that distinguishes
passed / failed / timed-out / never-started — partial execution can no
longer read as a pass. Bun's native --shard/--isolate covers none of
this: no process-group kill (hung claude/codex PTY grandchildren
survive in-process isolation), no never-started taxonomy, no per-shard
env. Each shard child gets GSTACK_EVAL_DIR=<evalDir>/shards/<slug>/
(slug = test filename sans extension, stable across runs) so shard
baselines compare against their own prior runs.
Output classification lives in scripts/test-strict-output.ts (strict
exit-code derivation, incremental fail-line classifier, child signal
forwarding) so the runner and any future strict bun-test wrapper share
one implementation. Enumeration derives from the shared paid-test-set
module; tier exclusion fires only on an explicit whole-file
EVALS_TIER === '<other>' guard.
package.json gains test:gate:sharded / test:periodic:sharded, and
eval:bg:gate / eval:bg:periodic now run the sharded scripts with detach
timeouts sized to the worst case (gate: 49 shards x 30min / 4 jobs ~
6.2h -> 25200s; periodic: 59 -> 28800s).
test/paid-shards.test.ts pins enumeration, tier classification, and the
kill-and-continue property with a real busy-loop shard.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
(cherry picked from commit 5e76bd5931836257f896cedfe4e93912cb759c70)
* feat(security): hash-chained egress receipt ledger (core)
Port lib/egress-receipt from the v2 fork as TypeScript: writeReceipt
(sync, fail-closed via typed EGRESS_RECEIPT_FAILED), best-effort
writeOutcome, readLedger/listReceipts/verifyLedger, GSTACK_HOME ->
GSTACK_STATE_DIR -> ~/.gstack resolution, 0600 ledger under a 0700
security dir, and an mkdir spin lock (2.5s budget) with documented
>10s-mtime stale-lock reclaim.
Changes vs the fork:
- lastRawLine tail-reads the final 4KB instead of loading the whole
ledger, so appends stay O(1) as the file grows.
- WARN-at-size: past 25MB writeReceipt emits one self-explanatory
stderr warning per process (what the ledger is, how to inspect it,
rotation TODO); verifyLedger gains a sizeWarning field. Rotation
TODO carries the chain-genesis sketch (new generation's first record
embeds the prior file's tail hash).
bin/gstack-egress-receipt is a bun script bridging shell callers:
write|outcome subcommands, exit 3 + EGRESS_RECEIPT_FAILED on stderr on
failure; --no-payload records sha256:null for git-class ops.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
(cherry picked from commit 619726a3d77d987a2e50151a5727b3faaaf5fc6a)
* chore(bin): delete dead brain-consumer/reader scripts
bin/gstack-brain-consumer and bin/gstack-brain-reader are byte-identical
dead scripts that POST the repo URL + a Bearer token to a /ingest-repo
endpoint gbrain removed (docs/gbrain-sync.md already documents the
removal in past tense). No live references remain; CHANGELOG mentions
are historical.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
(cherry picked from commit 254ddc69fc5a0270fcc973e36b6a81766d835d2d)
* feat(security): shared shell receipt helpers
bin/gstack-egress-lib.sh (sourced library, gstack-gbrain-lib.sh
precedent) provides _receipted_curl and _receipted_git: write the
egress receipt BEFORE the send via gstack-egress-receipt, hand curl the
SAME payload file via --data-binary @file so the receipt hash matches
the wire bytes exactly, then append a best-effort outcome. Per-call
fail policy: 'closed' refuses the send (return 3, problem/cause/fix
message on stderr) and 'open' warns and proceeds. Payload temp files
are consumed immediately per call — no EXIT traps, since callers like
gstack-telemetry-sync own their own EXIT trap and a sourced trap would
clobber it.
Tested end-to-end against a local Bun.serve listener: receipt sha256
equals the sha256 of the bytes the listener received, fail-closed
refusal never touches the network and carries the problem/cause/fix
stderr shape, fail-open warns and proceeds.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
(cherry picked from commit 6d067dce2d4c8815dec98be551763c85a3671357)
* feat(security): receipt core shell sinks
Wire the three core bash egress sinks through gstack-egress-lib.sh:
- gstack-telemetry-sync: the batch POST now writes the payload to a
temp file, receipts those exact bytes fail-closed, and hands curl the
SAME file. On refusal nothing is sent and the cursor does not
advance, so the batch stays buffered for the next run. The HTTP
status is recorded as the receipt outcome.
- gstack-update-check: fail-open receipts (warn + proceed) on the
Supabase ping POST, both VERSION curls (via a local
_receipted_version_fetch helper that skips non-network schemes), and
git ls-remote. The ping receipt is written inside the backgrounded
subshell, so it can never block the script's exit.
- gstack-brain-sync: fail-closed git-class receipts. The push receipt
is written BEFORE the commit consumes the queue, so a refused receipt
leaves the queue intact and the next run retries the whole drain
(pinned by a new queue-intact-on-refusal test, including the
problem/cause/fix refusal message shape). The retry-path fetch and
retry push carry their own fail-closed receipts.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
(cherry picked from commit 3c60f699acceaf1c92a218874711e05fc17dca5d)
* feat(security): receipt TS module sinks + tunnel
writeReceipt (fail-closed, sha256:null — a subprocess or SDK owns the
wire bytes) before every TS-module network-bearing operation:
- bin/gstack-gbrain-sync.ts: before the gbrain code walk that ships
repo content to the user's gbrain DB (may be remote Postgres). A
refused receipt fails the stage with status refused-egress-receipt.
- bin/gstack-memory-ingest.ts: before the gbrain batch import of
transcript pages. A refused receipt returns a system_error verdict
without spawning the import.
- browse/src/server.ts: before both ngrok.forward call sites (start-up
BROWSE_TUNNEL=1 path and the /tunnel/start endpoint). A receipt
failure lands in the existing catch that tears the tunnel listener
back down and refuses the start.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
(cherry picked from commit 5677d618a48fcd0ae2b068bf868781d90f809cb5)
* feat(design): receipted fetch for OpenAI calls
design/src/receipted-fetch.ts wraps every api.openai.com call: a
content-free egress receipt (sink design-openai, sha256 of the JSON
body — hash only, never the body) is written BEFORE the send. Polarity
is FAIL-OPEN: user-facing generation must not die because an audit log
hiccuped, so a receipt failure warns on stderr and the call proceeds.
Streams pass through untouched (response bodies returned as-is;
non-string request bodies receipted as sha256:null rather than drained
to hash).
All ten call sites converted with per-command payload classes:
generate, variants (injected fetchFn passes through), iterate (both
threaded and fresh paths), evolve (image + screenshot analysis), check,
diff, design-to-code, memory.
Unit-tested with injected fetch: receipt-before-send ordering, stream
passthrough, and fail-open on an unwritable ledger.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
(cherry picked from commit c0e5ff6639414ac2fd98e8ac3affb51401746b55)
* feat(security): receipt admin scripts + user git-ops (zero exceptions)
Wire the remaining shell egress through gstack-egress-lib.sh:
- gstack-gbrain-mcp-verify: both JSON-RPC probe POSTs (initialize +
tools/list) receipted fail-closed via payload files (hash == wire
bytes). A refused receipt lands in the NETWORK class — no send.
- gstack-security-dashboard / gstack-community-dashboard: the
community-pulse GETs receipted fail-open (read-only stats must not
break over an audit hiccup).
- gstack-gbrain-supabase-provision: api_call receipted fail-closed.
Each retry attempt hands the helper a fresh copy of the body file
(the helper consumes its payload). The receipt hashes the request
body only — the PAT never reaches the ledger or any log. Refusal
exits 8 without retrying.
- git-class sha256:null receipts, fail-open: gstack-artifacts-init
(ls-remote, initial push, fetch/pull recovery, retry push),
gstack-brain-restore (staging clone, existing-repo fetch),
gstack-session-update (self-update pull).
gstack-team-init needs no wiring: every git clone in it is inside an
echoed instruction string, not an executed command.
The lib now self-locates with shell builtins only (no dirname), so
sourcing works under the whitelist-PATH test harnesses.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
(cherry picked from commit b8c5e2055b21ab72878b3e46f8047782ee65a11c)
* test(security): egress wiring tripwire + polarity contract
Static-grep tripwire pinning the egress-receipt wiring (threat model in
the header: the ledger is forensic observability of ATTEMPTED egress,
not an exfiltration control):
- Per-sink assertions: every wired TS module imports egress-receipt and
calls writeReceipt; every wired shell sink sources
gstack-egress-lib.sh with each network op under a receipt;
ngrok-proximity check for server.ts; every design api.openai.com call
routes through receiptedFetch.
- Absence assertions: the dead brain-consumer/reader scripts stay
deleted (lstat, so a dangling symlink also fails).
- Polarity table pinned as data (fail-closed: brain-sync,
memory-ingest, gbrain-sync, telemetry-sync, ngrok, mcp-verify,
supabase-provision; fail-open: design-openai, update-check,
dashboards, git-class user ops, context-bill --exact) plus per-file
polarity spot-checks.
- NEW-SINK SCANNER with zero KNOWN_UNWIRED: sweeps bin/, lib/,
scripts/, design/src, browse/src for curl, absolute-URL fetch(, and
git remote ops (never local rev-parse/get-url; heredoc bodies and
message strings excluded) and requires every hit to be receipted or
in a REASONED exemption list where each entry carries its why.
Preamble-generated skill prose documented out-of-scope in the header.
- Shebang tripwire: no bin/gstack-* file may carry a node shebang.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
(cherry picked from commit ff69ceeafaf9c017d539b6ad77ff8f95b680b979)
* feat(cli): gstack-egress reader
bin/gstack-egress (bun) — the auditor's view of the receipts ledger:
- list: one row per receipt (what gstack ATTEMPTED to send), with
--since/--host/--sink filters and --json.
- verify: recompute the hash chain; exit 3 on tamper naming the first
broken line; prints the sizeWarning when the ledger passes 25MB.
- grants: what CAN leave, built on the upstream config keys only
(telemetry, artifacts_sync_mode, redact_repo_visibility,
redact_prepush_hook via gstack-config get) — each grant names its
file, key, and the exact revoke command.
CLI smoke tests spawn the real bin against a temp GSTACK_HOME,
including a broken-chain fixture asserting exit 3.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
(cherry picked from commit 9e24eca0f1069fea2ea69e7df4e9b256e93d59a3)
* feat(cli): context-bill — token bill-of-materials (stripped port)
lib/context-bill.ts, ported from the v2 fork and STRIPPED to the tiers
this repo's skills can exercise: ALWAYS-ON (per-skill frontmatter bytes
with dead-key and foreign-host-file flags), EAGER (SKILL.md + any
forced 'for every invocation' references), on-disk totals, --diff,
--budget, and --exact with the calibration table. The fork's
CONDITIONAL/TRANSITIVE/LAZY/FAST-PATH parsers understand only its
dispatcher layout and were dropped; the tier fields stay in the report
shape (empty/zero/null) so re-adding a parser is additive.
TOKEN_DIVISORS and their provenance docblock kept; --help notes
recalibration via --exact's calibration block.
Three upstream fixes over the fork:
(a) findSkillDirs treats the walk ROOT as a container — the repo root's
router SKILL.md is billed AND its children are walked (the fork
short-circuited and billed one skill); walkMd skips node_modules
and dot-directories.
(b) installed-tree layout: subdirs that are their own repo checkout
(a gstack/ clone inside ~/.claude/skills, detected by .git) are
skipped, and directory symlinks (connect-chrome) are followed with
a container-recursion cycle guard.
(c) ROUTER_KEYS widened to the upstream frontmatter contract {name,
description, version, allowed-tools, triggers, preamble-tier}.
--exact writes an egress receipt (sink context-bill-exact, host
api.anthropic.com) BEFORE any count_tokens POST; if the receipt cannot
be written the run degrades to the offline estimate with a warning —
nothing is sent unrecorded. bin/gstack-context-bill is the bun shim.
Tests: fixture-tree ledgers, the three fixes, --diff/--budget exit
codes, --exact with injected fetch (envelope subtraction, receipt
ordering, fail-open degradation), CLI smoke test, and ground truth
against THIS repo via test/helpers/skill-census.ts.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
(cherry picked from commit 675c19876b87ec927b555f5f64c7f93130b3de90)
* test(catalog): aggregate discovery-surface budget with ratchet protocol
Every host loads every skill's frontmatter name + description at
discovery, every session. applyCatalogTrim in scripts/gen-skill-docs.ts
shapes each description and the 160KB per-file warn covers body size,
but nothing capped the aggregate frontmatter — the catalog could grow
one reasonable-looking description at a time. This test is that
enforcement layer.
Measures the catalog via test/helpers/skill-census.ts authoredSkills
(symlink-deduped, root router counted separately as the _gstack-command
alias line item): 53 skills + router = 4,420 bytes = 1,105
token-equivalents today, asserted <= 1,150 (~4% headroom). Per-skill
sub-cap of 260 bytes (largest today: design-consultation at 229), plus
a non-empty-description check.
Failure messages are self-service ratchets: they print the new total,
the delta, and the update protocol (bump the constant AND the
derivation comment in the same commit; trim instead of grow for
existing descriptions). Parser handles folded block scalars
(description: >-) for fork parity; import-free by design so it
survives generator refactors.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
(cherry picked from commit c106fb36f768181b80c257e5cff1cde4f435f9c0)
* fix(browse): extension token bootstrap moves to pinned-origin POST; /health carries no token
GET /health is now liveness/status only in every mode — both token
carve-outs (headed-mode disjunct AND chrome-extension:// Origin
disjunct) are removed. Token bootstrap is POST /extension-token on the
local listener: the Origin header must be exactly
chrome-extension://<GSTACK_EXTENSION_ID> and the Host header's hostname
must parse to 127.0.0.1 or localhost (parsed via new URL, never literal
equality — Host arrives as '127.0.0.1:34567'). Wrong origin/host → 403
with no detail. The tunnel surface 404s the endpoint (not in
TUNNEL_PATHS, verified by test).
The extension ID is pinned by a new "key" field (RSA public key) in
extension/manifest.json; browse/scripts/extension-id.ts reproduces the
ID derivation (first 16 bytes of SHA-256 of the DER public key, hex
mapped 0-9a-f → a-p). The private key is not committed anywhere —
unpacked/baked-in loads only need the public key.
Extension side: background.js bootstraps and refreshes the token via
POST /extension-token (403 → disconnected state); sidepanel.js direct
connect path does the same; sidepanel-terminal.js's dead /health token
fallback (read AUTH_TOKEN/authToken keys the server never sent,
hardcoded port) is replaced with the window.gstackAuthToken path.
MIGRATION NOTE: the manifest key pins the extension ID, so existing
installs' side-panel local state (saved port, snoozes) resets once —
explained in-product via a one-time notice (flag
gstack_id_migrated_v162). After upgrading the server, restart the
browser so the old service worker stops polling for a token GET /health
no longer serves.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
(cherry picked from commit e9a0b6847a2d17fe6656a4686b4efd0c8380eb09)
* docs: correct stale compiled-binaries claim; file three egress/eval follow-ups
CLAUDE.md's compiled-binaries section claimed browse/dist binaries are
tracked by git and appear as modified in git status — false since
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Garry Tan
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8f3701b761
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v1.16.0.0 feat: tunnel allowlist 17→26 + canDispatchOverTunnel pure function (#1253)
* feat: extend tunnel allowlist to 26 commands + extract canDispatchOverTunnel
Adds newtab, tabs, back, forward, reload, snapshot, fill, url, closetab to
TUNNEL_COMMANDS (matching what cli.ts and REMOTE_BROWSER_ACCESS.md already
documented). Each new command is bounded by the existing per-tab ownership
check at server.ts:613-624 — scoped tokens default to tabPolicy: 'own-only'
so paired agents still can't operate on tabs they don't own.
Refactors the inline gate check at server.ts:1771-1783 into a pure exported
function canDispatchOverTunnel(command). Same behavior as the inline check;
the difference is unit-testability without HTTP.
Adds BROWSE_TUNNEL_LOCAL_ONLY=1 test-mode flag that binds the second Bun.serve
listener with makeFetchHandler('tunnel') on 127.0.0.1 — no ngrok needed.
Production tunnel still requires BROWSE_TUNNEL=1 + valid NGROK_AUTHTOKEN.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* test: source-level guards + pure-function unit test + dual-listener behavioral eval
Three layers of regression coverage for the tunnel allowlist:
1. dual-listener.test.ts: replaces must-include/must-exclude with exact-set
equality on the 26-command literal (the prior intersection-only style let
new commands sneak into the source without test updates). Adds a regex
assertion that the `command !== 'newtab'` ownership exemption at
server.ts:613 still exists — catches refactors that re-introduce the
catch-22 from the other side. Updates the /command handler test to look
for canDispatchOverTunnel(body?.command) instead of the inline check.
2. tunnel-gate-unit.test.ts (new): 53 expects covering all 26 allowed,
20 blocked, null/undefined/empty/non-string defensive handling, and alias
canonicalization (e.g. 'set-content' resolves to 'load-html' which is
correctly rejected since 'load-html' isn't tunnel-allowed).
3. pair-agent-tunnel-eval.test.ts (new): 4 behavioral tests that spawn the
daemon under BROWSE_HEADLESS_SKIP=1 BROWSE_TUNNEL_LOCAL_ONLY=1, bind both
listeners on 127.0.0.1, mint a scoped token via /pair → /connect, and
assert: (a) newtab over tunnel passes the gate; (b) pair over tunnel
403s with disallowed_command:pair AND writes a denial-log entry;
(c) pair over local does NOT trigger the tunnel gate (proves the gate
is surface-scoped); (d) regression for the catch-22 — newtab + goto on
the resulting tab does not 403 with "Tab not owned by your agent".
All four tests run free under bun test (no API spend, no ngrok).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* docs: bump tunnel allowlist count 17 -> 26 in CLAUDE.md and REMOTE_BROWSER_ACCESS.md
Both docs already named the 9 new commands as remote-accessible (the operator
guide's per-command sections at lines 86-119 and 168, plus cli.ts:546-586's
instruction blocks). The allowlist count was the only place the drift was
visible. Also corrected REMOTE_BROWSER_ACCESS.md's denied-commands list:
'eval' is in the allowlist, not the denied list — prior doc was wrong.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* chore: bump version and changelog (v1.21.0.0)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* chore: re-version v1.21.0.0 -> v1.16.0.0 (lowest unclaimed slot)
The previous bump landed at v1.21.0.0 because gstack-next-version
advances past the highest claimed slot (v1.20.0.0 from #1252) rather
than picking the lowest unclaimed. v1.16-v1.18 are unclaimed and
v1.16.0.0 preserves monotonic version ordering on main once #1234
(v1.17), #1233 (v1.19), and #1252 (v1.20) merge after us.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(ci): version-gate enforces collisions, allows lower-but-unclaimed slots
The gate was rejecting any PR VERSION below the util's next-slot
recommendation, even when the lower slot was unclaimed. This blocked
PRs that legitimately want to land at an unclaimed slot below the queue
max — which is what /ship should pick when the goal is monotonic version
ordering on main (lower-numbered PRs landing first preserves order; the
util's "advance past max claimed" semantics only optimizes for fresh
runs picking unique slots, not for queue ordering on merge).
New gate logic:
1. Hard-fail if PR VERSION <= base VERSION (no actual bump).
2. Hard-fail if PR VERSION exactly matches another open PR's VERSION
(real collision).
3. Pass otherwise. If the PR is below the util's suggestion, emit an
informational ::notice:: explaining the slot is unclaimed.
The util's output stays informational — it tells fresh /ship runs what
the next-up slot should be, but the gate only blocks actual conflicts.
This is a strict relaxation: every PR that passed the old gate also
passes the new one.
Confirmed by dry-run against the current queue (4 open PRs claiming
1.17.0.0, 1.19.0.0, 1.21.1.0, 1.22.0.0):
- v1.16.0.0 → pass with informational notice (unclaimed)
- v1.17.0.0 → fail (collision with #1234)
- v1.15.0.0 → fail (no bump from base)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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|
Garry Tan
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54d4cde773
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security: tunnel dual-listener + SSRF + envelope + path wave (v1.6.0.0) (#1137)
* refactor(security): loosen /connect rate limit from 3/min to 300/min
Setup keys are 24 random bytes (unbruteforceable), so a tight rate limit
does not meaningfully prevent key guessing. It exists only to cap
bandwidth, CPU, and log-flood damage from someone who discovered the
ngrok URL. A legitimate pair-agent session hits /connect once; 300/min
is 60x that pattern and never hit accidentally.
3/min caused pairing to fail on any retry flow (network blip, second
paired client) with no upside. Per-IP tracking was considered and
rejected — adds a bounded Map + LRU for defense already adequate at the
global layer.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(security): add tunnel-denial-log module for attack visibility
Append-only log of tunnel-surface auth denials to
~/.gstack/security/attempts.jsonl. Gives operators visibility into who
is probing tunneled daemons so the next security wave can be driven by
real attack data instead of speculation.
Design notes:
- Async via fs.promises.appendFile. Never appendFileSync — blocking the
event loop on every denial during a flood is what an attacker wants
(prior learning: sync-audit-log-io, 10/10 confidence).
- In-process rate cap at 60 writes/minute globally. Excess denials are
counted in memory but not written to disk — prevents disk DoS.
- Writes to the same ~/.gstack/security/attempts.jsonl used by the
prompt-injection attempt log. File rotation is handled by the existing
security pipeline (10MB, 5 generations).
No consumers in this commit; wired up in the dual-listener refactor that
follows.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(security): dual-listener tunnel architecture
The /health endpoint leaked AUTH_TOKEN to any caller that hit the ngrok
URL (spoofing chrome-extension:// origin, or catching headed mode).
Surfaced by @garagon in PR #1026; the original fix was header-inference
on the single port. Codex's outside-voice review during /plan-ceo-review
called that approach brittle (ngrok header behavior could change, local
proxies would false-positive), and pushed for the structural fix.
This is that fix. Stop making /health a root-token bootstrap endpoint on
any surface the tunnel can reach. The server now binds two HTTP
listeners when a tunnel is active. The local listener (extension, CLI,
sidebar) stays on 127.0.0.1 and is never exposed to ngrok. ngrok
forwards only to the tunnel listener, which serves only /connect
(unauth, rate-limited) and /command with a locked allowlist of
browser-driving commands. Security property comes from physical port
separation, not from header inference — a tunnel caller cannot reach
/health or /cookie-picker or /inspector because they live on a
different TCP socket.
What this commit adds to browse/src/server.ts:
* Surface type ('local' | 'tunnel') and TUNNEL_PATHS +
TUNNEL_COMMANDS allowlists near the top of the file.
* makeFetchHandler(surface) factory replacing the single fetch arrow;
closure-captures the surface so the filter that runs before route
dispatch knows which socket accepted the request.
* Tunnel filter at dispatch entry: 404s anything not on TUNNEL_PATHS,
403s root-token bearers with a clear pairing hint, 401s non-/connect
requests that lack a scoped token. Every denial is logged via
logTunnelDenial (from tunnel-denial-log).
* GET /connect alive probe (unauth on both surfaces) so /pair and
/tunnel/start can detect dead ngrok tunnels without reaching
/health — /health is no longer tunnel-reachable.
* Lazy tunnel listener lifecycle. /tunnel/start binds a dedicated
Bun.serve on an ephemeral port, points ngrok.forward at THAT port
(not the local port), hard-fails on bind error (no local fallback),
tears down cleanly on ngrok failure. BROWSE_TUNNEL=1 startup uses
the same pattern.
* closeTunnel() helper — single teardown path for both the ngrok
listener and the tunnel Bun.serve listener.
* resolveNgrokAuthtoken() helper — shared authtoken lookup across
/tunnel/start and BROWSE_TUNNEL=1 startup (was duplicated).
* TUNNEL_COMMANDS check in /command dispatch: on the tunnel surface,
commands outside the allowlist return 403 with a list of allowed
commands as a hint.
* Probe paths in /pair and /tunnel/start migrated from /health to
GET /connect — the only unauth path reachable on the tunnel surface
under the new architecture.
Test updates in browse/test/server-auth.test.ts:
* /pair liveness-verify test: assert via closeTunnel() helper instead
of the inline `tunnelActive = false; tunnelUrl = null` lines that
the helper subsumes.
* /tunnel/start cached-tunnel test: same closeTunnel() adaptation.
Credit
Derived from PR #1026 by @garagon — thanks for flagging the critical
bug that drove the architectural rewrite. The per-request
isTunneledRequest approach from #1026 is superseded by physical port
separation here; the underlying report remains the root cause for the
entire v1.6.0.0 wave.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* test(security): add source-level guards for dual-listener architecture
23 source-level assertions that keep future contributors from silently
widening the tunnel surface during a routine refactor. Covers:
* Surface type + tunnelServer state variable shape
* TUNNEL_PATHS is a closed set of /connect, /command, /sidebar-chat
(and NOT /health, /welcome, /cookie-picker, /inspector/*, /pair,
/token, /refs, /activity/stream, /tunnel/{start,stop})
* TUNNEL_COMMANDS includes browser-driving ops only (and NOT
launch-browser, tunnel-start, token-mint, cookie-import, etc.)
* makeFetchHandler(surface) factory exists and is wired to both
listeners with the correct surface parameter
* Tunnel filter runs BEFORE any route dispatch, with 404/403/401
responses and logged denials for each reason
* GET /connect returns {alive: true} unauth
* /command dispatch enforces TUNNEL_COMMANDS on tunnel surface
* closeTunnel() helper tears down ngrok + Bun.serve listener
* /tunnel/start binds on ephemeral port, points ngrok at TUNNEL_PORT
(not local port), hard-fails on bind error (no fallback), probes
cached tunnel via GET /connect (not /health), tears down on
ngrok.forward failure
* BROWSE_TUNNEL=1 startup uses the dual-listener pattern
* logTunnelDenial wired for all three denial reasons
* /connect rate limit is 300/min, not 3/min
All 23 tests pass. Behavioral integration tests (spawn subprocess, real
network) live in the E2E suite that lands later in this wave.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* security: gate download + scrape through validateNavigationUrl (SSRF)
The `goto` command was correctly wired through validateNavigationUrl,
but `download` and `scrape` called page.request.fetch(url, ...) directly.
A caller with the default write scope could hit the /command endpoint
and ask the daemon to fetch http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/
(AWS IMDSv1) or the GCP/Azure/internal equivalents. The response body
comes back as base64 or lands on disk where GET /file serves it.
Fix: call validateNavigationUrl(url) immediately before each
page.request.fetch() call site in download and in the scrape loop.
Same blocklist that already protects `goto`: file://, javascript:,
data:, chrome://, cloud metadata (IPv4 all encodings, IPv6 ULA,
metadata.*.internal).
Tests: extend browse/test/url-validation.test.ts with a source-level
guard that walks every `await page.request.fetch(` call site and
asserts a validateNavigationUrl call precedes it within the same
branch. Regression trips before code review if a future refactor
drops the gate.
* security: route splitForScoped through envelope sentinel escape
The scoped-token snapshot path in snapshot.ts built its untrusted
block by pushing the raw accessibility-tree lines between the literal
`═══ BEGIN UNTRUSTED WEB CONTENT ═══` / `═══ END UNTRUSTED WEB CONTENT ═══`
sentinels. The full-page wrap path in content-security.ts already
applied a zero-width-space escape on those exact strings to prevent
sentinel injection, but the scoped path skipped it.
Net effect: a page whose rendered text contains the literal sentinel
can close the envelope early from inside untrusted content and forge
a fake "trusted" block for the LLM. That includes fabricating
interactive `@eN` references the agent will act on.
Fix:
* Extract the zero-width-space escape into a named, exported helper
`escapeEnvelopeSentinels(content)` in content-security.ts.
* Have `wrapUntrustedPageContent` call it (behavior unchanged on
that path — same bytes out).
* Import the helper in snapshot.ts and map it over `untrustedLines`
in the `splitForScoped` branch before pushing the BEGIN sentinel.
Tests: add a describe block in content-security.test.ts that covers
* `escapeEnvelopeSentinels` defuses BEGIN and END markers;
* `escapeEnvelopeSentinels` leaves normal text untouched;
* `wrapUntrustedPageContent` still emits exactly one real envelope
pair when hostile content contains forged sentinels;
* snapshot.ts imports the helper;
* the scoped-snapshot branch calls `escapeEnvelopeSentinels` before
pushing the BEGIN sentinel (source-level regression — if a future
refactor reorders this, the test trips).
* security: extend hidden-element detection to all DOM-reading channels
The Confusion Protocol envelope wrap (`wrapUntrustedPageContent`)
covers every scoped PAGE_CONTENT_COMMAND, but the hidden-element
ARIA-injection detection layer only ran for `text`. Other DOM-reading
channels (html, links, forms, accessibility, attrs, data, media,
ux-audit) returned their output through the envelope with no hidden-
content filter, so a page serving a display:none div that instructs
the agent to disregard prior system messages, or an aria-label that
claims to put the LLM in admin mode, leaked the injection payload on
any non-text channel. The envelope alone does not mitigate this, and
the page itself never rendered the hostile content to the human
operator.
Fix:
* New export `DOM_CONTENT_COMMANDS` in commands.ts — the subset of
PAGE_CONTENT_COMMANDS that derives its output from the live DOM.
Console and dialog stay out; they read separate runtime state.
* server.ts runs `markHiddenElements` + `cleanupHiddenMarkers` for
every scoped command in this set. `text` keeps its existing
`getCleanTextWithStripping` path (hidden elements physically
stripped before the read). All other channels keep their output
format but emit flagged elements as CONTENT WARNINGS on the
envelope, so the LLM sees what it would otherwise have consumed
silently.
* Hidden-element descriptions merge into `combinedWarnings`
alongside content-filter warnings before the wrap call.
Tests: new describe block in content-security.test.ts covering
* `DOM_CONTENT_COMMANDS` export shape and channel membership;
* dispatch gates on `DOM_CONTENT_COMMANDS.has(command)`, not the
literal `text` string;
* hiddenContentWarnings plumbs into `combinedWarnings` and reaches
wrapUntrustedPageContent;
* DOM_CONTENT_COMMANDS is a strict subset of PAGE_CONTENT_COMMANDS.
Existing datamarking, envelope wrap, centralized-wrapping, and chain
security suites stay green (52 pass, 0 fail).
* security: validate --from-file payload paths for parity with direct paths
The direct `load-html <file>` path runs every caller-supplied file path
through validateReadPath() so reads stay confined to SAFE_DIRECTORIES
(cwd, TEMP_DIR). The `load-html --from-file <payload.json>` shortcut
and its sibling `pdf --from-file <payload.json>` skipped that check and
went straight to fs.readFileSync(). An MCP caller that picks the
payload path (or any caller whose payload argument is reachable from
attacker-influenced text) could use --from-file as a read-anywhere
escape hatch for the safe-dirs policy.
Fix: call validateReadPath(path.resolve(payloadPath)) before readFileSync
at both sites. Error surface mirrors the direct-path branch so ops and
agent errors stay consistent.
Test coverage in browse/test/from-file-path-validation.test.ts:
- source-level: validateReadPath precedes readFileSync in the load-html
--from-file branch (write-commands.ts) and the pdf --from-file parser
(meta-commands.ts)
- error-message parity: both sites reference SAFE_DIRECTORIES
Related security audit pattern: R3 F002 (validateNavigationUrl gap on
download/scrape) and R3 F008 (markHiddenElements gap on 10 DOM commands)
were the same shape — a defense that existed on the primary code path
but not its shortcut sibling. This PR closes the same class of gap on
the --from-file shortcuts.
* fix(design): escape url.origin when injecting into served HTML
serve.ts injected url.origin into a single-quoted JS string in
the response body. A local request with a crafted Host header
(e.g. Host: "evil'-alert(1)-'x") would break out of the string
and execute JS in the 127.0.0.1:<port> origin opened by the
design board. Low severity — bound to localhost, requires a
local attacker — but no reason not to escape.
Fix: JSON.stringify(url.origin) produces a properly quoted,
escaped JS string literal in one call.
Also includes Prettier reformatting (single→double quotes,
trailing commas, line wrapping) applied by the repo's
PostToolUse formatter hook. Security change is the one line
in the HTML injection; everything else is whitespace/style.
* fix(scripts): drop shell:true from slop-diff npx invocations
spawnSync('npx', [...], { shell: true }) invokes /bin/sh -c
with the args concatenated, subjecting them to shell parsing
(word splitting, glob expansion, metacharacter interpretation).
No user input reaches these calls today, so not exploitable —
but the posture is wrong: npx + shell args should be direct.
Fix: scope shell:true to process.platform === 'win32' where
npx is actually a .cmd requiring the shell. POSIX runs the
npx binary directly with array-form args.
Also includes Prettier reformatting (single→double quotes,
trailing commas, line wrapping) applied by the repo's
PostToolUse formatter hook. Security-relevant change is just
the two shell:true -> shell: process.platform === 'win32'
lines; everything else is whitespace/style.
* security(E3): gate GSTACK_SLUG on /welcome path traversal
The /welcome handler interpolates GSTACK_SLUG directly into the filesystem
path used to locate the project-local welcome page. Without validation, a
slug like "../../etc/passwd" would resolve to
~/.gstack/projects/../../etc/passwd/designs/welcome-page-20260331/finalized.html
— classic path traversal.
Not exploitable today: GSTACK_SLUG is set by the gstack CLI at daemon launch,
and an attacker would already need local env-var access to poison it. But
the gate is one regex (^[a-z0-9_-]+$), and a defense-in-depth pass costs us
nothing when the cost of being wrong is arbitrary file read via /welcome.
Fall back to the safe 'unknown' literal when the slug fails validation —
same fallback the code already uses when GSTACK_SLUG is unset. No behavior
change for legitimate slugs (they all match the regex).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* security(N1): replace ?token= SSE auth with HttpOnly session cookie
Activity stream and inspector events SSE endpoints accepted the root
AUTH_TOKEN via `?token=` query param (EventSource can't send Authorization
headers). URLs leak to browser history, referer headers, server logs,
crash reports, and refactoring accidents. Codex flagged this during the
/plan-ceo-review outside voice pass.
New auth model: the extension calls POST /sse-session with a Bearer token
and receives a view-only session cookie (HttpOnly, SameSite=Strict, 30-min
TTL). EventSource is opened with `withCredentials: true` so the browser
sends the cookie back on the SSE connection. The ?token= query param is
GONE — no more URL-borne secrets.
Scope isolation (prior learning cookie-picker-auth-isolation, 10/10
confidence): the SSE session cookie grants access to /activity/stream and
/inspector/events ONLY. The token is never valid against /command, /token,
or any mutating endpoint. A leaked cookie can watch activity; it cannot
execute browser commands.
Components
* browse/src/sse-session-cookie.ts — registry: mint/validate/extract/
build-cookie. 256-bit tokens, 30-min TTL, lazy expiry pruning,
no imports from token-registry (scope isolation enforced by module
boundary).
* browse/src/server.ts — POST /sse-session mint endpoint (requires
Bearer). /activity/stream and /inspector/events now accept Bearer
OR the session cookie, and reject ?token= query param.
* extension/sidepanel.js — ensureSseSessionCookie() bootstrap call,
EventSource opened with withCredentials:true on both SSE endpoints.
Tested via the source guards; behavioral test is the E2E pairing
flow that lands later in the wave.
* browse/test/sse-session-cookie.test.ts — 20 unit tests covering
mint entropy, TTL enforcement, cookie flag invariants, cookie
parsing from multi-cookie headers, and scope-isolation contract
guard (module must not import token-registry).
* browse/test/server-auth.test.ts — existing /activity/stream auth
test updated to assert the new cookie-based gate and the absence
of the ?token= query param.
Cookie flag choices:
* HttpOnly: token not readable from page JS (mitigates XSS
exfiltration).
* SameSite=Strict: cookie not sent on cross-site requests (mitigates
CSRF). Fine for SSE because the extension connects to 127.0.0.1
directly.
* Path=/: cookie scoped to the whole origin.
* Max-Age=1800: 30 minutes, matches TTL. Extension re-mints on
reconnect when daemon restarts.
* Secure NOT set: daemon binds to 127.0.0.1 over plain HTTP. Adding
Secure would block the browser from ever sending the cookie back.
Add Secure when gstack ships over HTTPS.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* security(N2): document Windows v20 ABE elevation path on CDP port
The existing comment around the cookie-import-browser --remote-debugging-port
launch claimed "threat model: no worse than baseline." That's wrong on
Windows with App-Bound Encryption v20. A same-user local process that
opens the cookie SQLite DB directly CANNOT decrypt v20 values (DPAPI
context is bound to the browser process). The CDP port lets them bypass
that: connect to the debug port, call Network.getAllCookies inside Chrome,
walk away with decrypted v20 cookies.
The correct fix is to switch from TCP --remote-debugging-port to
--remote-debugging-pipe so the CDP transport is a stdio pipe, not a
socket. That requires restructuring the CDP WebSocket client in this
module and Playwright doesn't expose the pipe transport out of the box.
Non-trivial, deferred from the v1.6.0.0 wave.
This commit updates the comment to correctly describe the threat and
points at the tracking issue. No code change to the launch itself.
Follow-up: #1136.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* docs(E2): document dual-listener tunnel architecture in ARCHITECTURE.md
Adds an explicit per-endpoint disposition table to the Security model
section, covering the v1.6.0.0 dual-listener refactor. Every HTTP
endpoint now has a documented local-vs-tunnel answer. Future audits
(and future contributors wondering "is it safe to add X to the tunnel
surface?") can read this instead of reverse-engineering server.ts.
Also documents:
* Why physical port separation beats per-request header inference
(ngrok behavior drift, local proxies can forge headers, etc.)
* Tunnel surface denial logging → ~/.gstack/security/attempts.jsonl
* SSE session cookie model (gstack_sse, 30-min TTL, stream-scope only,
module-boundary-enforced scope isolation)
* N2 non-goal for Windows v20 ABE via CDP port (tracking #1136)
No code changes.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* test(E1): end-to-end pair-agent flow against a spawned daemon
Spawns the browse daemon as a subprocess with BROWSE_HEADLESS_SKIP=1 so
the HTTP layer runs without a real browser. Exercises:
* GET /health — token delivery for chrome-extension origin, withheld
otherwise (the F1 + PR #1026 invariant)
* GET /connect — alive probe returns {alive:true} unauth
* POST /pair — root Bearer required (403 without), returns setup_key
* POST /connect — setup_key exchange mints a distinct scoped token
* POST /command — 401 without auth
* POST /sse-session — Bearer required, Set-Cookie has HttpOnly +
SameSite=Strict (the N1 invariant)
* GET /activity/stream — 401 without auth
* GET /activity/stream?token= — 401 (the old ?token= query param is
REJECTED, which is the whole point of N1)
* GET /welcome — serves HTML, does not leak /etc/passwd content under
the default 'unknown' slug (E3 regex gate)
12 behavioral tests, ~220ms end-to-end, no network dependencies, no
ngrok, no real browser. This is the receipt for the wave's central
'pair-agent still works + the security boundary holds' claim.
Tunnel-port binding (/tunnel/start) is deliberately NOT exercised here
— it requires an ngrok authtoken and live network. The dual-listener
route allowlist is covered by source-level guards in
dual-listener.test.ts; behavioral tunnel testing belongs in a separate
paid-evals harness.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* release(v1.6.0.0): bump VERSION + CHANGELOG for security wave
Architectural bump, not patch: dual-listener HTTP refactor changes the
daemon's tunnel-exposure model. See CHANGELOG for the full release
summary (~950 words) covering the five root causes this wave closes:
1. /health token leak over ngrok (F1 + E3 + test infra)
2. /cookie-picker + /inspector exposed over the tunnel (F1)
3. ?token=<ROOT> in SSE URLs leaking to logs/referer/history (N1)
4. /welcome GSTACK_SLUG path traversal (E3)
5. Windows v20 ABE elevation via CDP port (N2 — documented non-goal,
tracked as #1136)
Plus the base PRs: SSRF gate (#1029), envelope sentinel escape (#1031),
DOM-channel hidden-element coverage (#1032), --from-file path validation
(#1103), and 2 commits from #1073 (@theqazi).
VERSION + package.json bumped to 1.6.0.0. CHANGELOG entry covers
credits (@garagon, @Hybirdss, @HMAKT99, @theqazi), review lineage (CEO
→ Codex outside voice → Eng), and the non-goal tracking issue.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: pre-landing review findings (4 auto-fixes)
Addresses 4 findings from the Claude adversarial subagent on the
v1.6.0.0 security wave diff. No user-visible behavior change; all
are defense-in-depth hardening of newly-introduced code.
1. GET /connect rate-limited (was POST-only) [HIGH conf 8/10]
Attacker discovering the ngrok URL could probe unlimited GETs for
daemon enumeration. Now shares the global /connect counter.
2. ngrok listener leak on tunnel startup failure [MEDIUM conf 8/10]
If ngrok.forward() resolved but tunnelListener.url() or the
state-file write threw, the Bun listener was torn down but the
ngrok session was leaked. Fixed in BOTH /tunnel/start and
BROWSE_TUNNEL=1 startup paths.
3. GSTACK_SKILL_ROOT path-traversal gate [MEDIUM conf 8/10]
Symmetric with E3's GSTACK_SLUG regex gate — reject values
containing '..' before interpolating into the welcome-page path.
4. SSE session registry pruning [LOW conf 7/10]
pruneExpired() only checked 10 entries per mint call. Now runs
on every validate too, checks 20 entries, with a hard 10k cap as
backstop. Prevents registry growth under sustained extension
reconnect pressure.
Tests remain green (56/56 in sse-session-cookie + dual-listener +
pair-agent-e2e suites).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* docs: update project documentation for v1.6.0.0
Reflect the dual-listener tunnel architecture, SSE session cookies,
SSRF guards, and Windows v20 ABE non-goal across the three docs
users actually read for remote-agent and browser auth context:
- docs/REMOTE_BROWSER_ACCESS.md: rewrote Architecture diagram for
dual listeners, fixed /connect rate limit (3/min → 300/min),
removed stale "/health requires no auth" (now 404 on tunnel),
added SSE cookie auth, expanded Security Model with tunnel
allowlist, SSRF guards, /welcome path traversal defense, and
the Windows v20 ABE tracking note.
- BROWSER.md: added dual-listener paragraph to Authentication and
linked to ARCHITECTURE.md endpoint table. Replaced the stale
?token= SSE auth note with the HttpOnly gstack_sse cookie flow.
- CLAUDE.md: added Transport-layer security section above the
sidebar prompt-injection stack so contributors editing server.ts,
sse-session-cookie.ts, or tunnel-denial-log.ts see the load-bearing
module boundaries before touching them.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(make-pdf): write --from-file payload to /tmp, not os.tmpdir()
make-pdf's browseClient wrote its --from-file payload to os.tmpdir(),
which is /var/folders/... on macOS. v1.6.0.0's PR #1103 cherry-pick
tightened browse load-html --from-file to validate against the
safe-dirs allowlist ([TEMP_DIR, cwd] where TEMP_DIR is '/tmp' on
macOS/Linux, os.tmpdir() on Windows). This closed a CLI/API parity
gap but broke make-pdf on macOS because /var/folders/... is outside
the allowlist.
Fix: mirror browse's TEMP_DIR convention — use '/tmp' on non-Windows,
os.tmpdir() on Windows. The make-pdf-gate CI failure on macOS-latest
(run 72440797490) is caused by exactly this: the payload file was
rejected by validateReadPath.
Verified locally: the combined-gate e2e test now passes after
rebuilding make-pdf/dist/pdf.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(sidebar): killAgent resets per-tab state; align tests with current agent event format
Two pre-existing bugs surfaced while running the full e2e suite on the
sec-wave branch. Both pre-date v1.6.0.0 (same failures on main at
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Garry Tan
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8ca950f6f1
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feat: content security — 4-layer prompt injection defense for pair-agent (#815)
* feat: token registry for multi-agent browser access Per-agent scoped tokens with read/write/admin/meta command categories, domain glob restrictions, rate limiting, expiry, and revocation. Setup key exchange for the /pair-agent ceremony (5-min one-time key → 24h session token). Idempotent exchange handles tunnel drops. 39 tests. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: integrate token registry + scoped auth into browse server Server changes for multi-agent browser access: - /connect endpoint: setup key exchange for /pair-agent ceremony - /token endpoint: root-only minting of scoped sub-tokens - /token/:clientId DELETE: revoke agent tokens - /agents endpoint: list connected agents (root-only) - /health: strips root token when tunnel is active (P0 security fix) - /command: scope/rate/domain checks via token registry before dispatch - Idle timer skips shutdown when tunnel is active Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: ngrok tunnel integration + @ngrok/ngrok dependency BROWSE_TUNNEL=1 env var starts an ngrok tunnel after Bun.serve(). Reads NGROK_AUTHTOKEN from env or ~/.gstack/ngrok.env. Reads NGROK_DOMAIN for dedicated domain (stable URL). Updates state file with tunnel URL. Feasibility spike confirmed: SDK works in compiled Bun binary. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: tab isolation for multi-agent browser access Add per-tab ownership tracking to BrowserManager. Scoped agents must create their own tab via newtab before writing. Unowned tabs (pre-existing, user-opened) are root-only for writes. Read access always allowed. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: tab enforcement + POST /pair endpoint + activity attribution Server-side tab ownership check blocks scoped agents from writing to unowned tabs. Special-case newtab records ownership for scoped tokens. POST /pair endpoint creates setup keys for the pairing ceremony. Activity events now include clientId for attribution. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: pair-agent CLI command + instruction block generator One command to pair a remote agent: $B pair-agent. Creates a setup key via POST /pair, prints a copy-pasteable instruction block with curl commands. Smart tunnel fallback (tunnel URL > auto-start > localhost). Flags: --for HOST, --local HOST, --admin, --client NAME. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * test: tab isolation + instruction block generator tests 14 tests covering tab ownership lifecycle (access checks, unowned tabs, transferTab) and instruction block generator (scopes, URLs, admin flag, troubleshooting section). Fix server-auth test that used fragile sliceBetween boundaries broken by new endpoints. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore: bump version and changelog (v0.15.9.0) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: CSO security fixes — token leak, domain bypass, input validation 1. Remove root token from /health endpoint entirely (CSO #1 CRITICAL). Origin header is spoofable. Extension reads from ~/.gstack/.auth.json. 2. Add domain check for newtab URL (CSO #5). Previously only goto was checked, allowing domain-restricted agents to bypass via newtab. 3. Validate scope values, rateLimit, expiresSeconds in createToken() (CSO #4). Rejects invalid scopes and negative values. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: /pair-agent skill — syntactic sugar for browser sharing Users remember /pair-agent, not $B pair-agent. The skill walks through agent selection (OpenClaw, Hermes, Codex, Cursor, generic), local vs remote setup, tunnel configuration, and includes platform-specific notes for each agent type. Wraps the CLI command with context. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs: remote browser access reference for paired agents Full API reference, snapshot→@ref pattern, scopes, tab isolation, error codes, ngrok setup, and same-machine shortcuts. The instruction block points here for deeper reading. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: improved instruction block with snapshot→@ref pattern The paste-into-agent instruction block now teaches the snapshot→@ref workflow (the most powerful browsing pattern), shows the server URL prominently, and uses clearer formatting. Tests updated to match. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: smart ngrok detection + auto-tunnel in pair-agent The pair-agent command now checks ngrok's native config (not just ~/.gstack/ngrok.env) and auto-starts the tunnel when ngrok is available. The skill template walks users through ngrok install and auth if not set up, instead of just printing a dead localhost URL. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: on-demand tunnel start via POST /tunnel/start pair-agent now auto-starts the ngrok tunnel without restarting the server. New POST /tunnel/start endpoint reads authtoken from env, ~/.gstack/ngrok.env, or ngrok's native config. CLI detects ngrok availability and calls the endpoint automatically. Zero manual steps when ngrok is installed and authed. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: pair-agent skill must output the instruction block verbatim Added CRITICAL instruction: the agent MUST output the full instruction block so the user can copy it. Previously the agent could summarize over it, leaving the user with nothing to paste. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: scoped tokens rejected on /command — auth gate ordering bug The blanket validateAuth() gate (root-only) sat above the /command endpoint, rejecting all scoped tokens with 401 before they reached getTokenInfo(). Moved /command above the gate so both root and scoped tokens are accepted. This was the bug Wintermute hit. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: pair-agent auto-launches headed mode before pairing When pair-agent detects headless mode, it auto-switches to headed (visible Chromium window) so the user can watch what the remote agent does. Use --headless to skip this. Fixed compiled binary path resolution (process.execPath, not process.argv[1] which is virtual /$bunfs/ in Bun compiled binaries). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * test: comprehensive tests for auth ordering, tunnel, ngrok, headed mode 16 new tests covering: - /command sits above blanket auth gate (Wintermute bug) - /command uses getTokenInfo not validateAuth - /tunnel/start requires root, checks native ngrok config, returns already_active - /pair creates setup keys not session tokens - Tab ownership checked before command dispatch - Activity events include clientId - Instruction block teaches snapshot→@ref pattern - pair-agent auto-headed mode, process.execPath, --headless skip - isNgrokAvailable checks all 3 sources (gstack env, env var, native config) - handlePairAgent calls /tunnel/start not server restart Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: chain scope bypass + /health info leak when tunneled 1. Chain command now pre-validates ALL subcommand scopes before executing any. A read+meta token can no longer escalate to admin via chain (eval, js, cookies were dispatched without scope checks). tokenInfo flows through handleMetaCommand into the chain handler. Rejects entire chain if any subcommand fails. 2. /health strips sensitive fields (currentUrl, agent.currentMessage, session) when tunnel is active. Only operational metadata (status, mode, uptime, tabs) exposed to the internet. Previously anyone reaching the ngrok URL could surveil browsing activity. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs: tout /pair-agent as headline feature in CHANGELOG + README Lead with what it does for the user: type /pair-agent, paste into your other agent, done. First time AI agents from different companies can coordinate through a shared browser with real security boundaries. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs: expand /pair-agent, /design-shotgun, /design-html in README Each skill gets a real narrative paragraph explaining the workflow, not just a table cell. design-shotgun: visual exploration with taste memory. design-html: production HTML with Pretext computed layout. pair-agent: cross-vendor AI agent coordination through shared browser. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor: split handleCommand into handleCommandInternal + HTTP wrapper Chain subcommands now route through handleCommandInternal for full security enforcement (scope, domain, tab ownership, rate limiting, content wrapping). Adds recursion guard for nested chains, rate-limit exemption for chain subcommands, and activity event suppression (1 event per chain, not per sub). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: add content-security.ts with datamarking, envelope, and filter hooks Four-layer prompt injection defense for pair-agent browser sharing: - Datamarking: session-scoped watermark for text exfiltration detection - Content envelope: trust boundary wrapping with ZWSP marker escaping - Content filter hooks: extensible filter pipeline with warn/block modes - Built-in URL blocklist: requestbin, pipedream, webhook.site, etc. BROWSE_CONTENT_FILTER env var controls mode: off|warn|block (default: warn) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: centralize content wrapping in handleCommandInternal response path Single wrapping location replaces fragmented per-handler wrapping: - Scoped tokens: content filters + datamarking + enhanced envelope - Root tokens: existing basic wrapping (backward compat) - Chain subcommands exempt from top-level wrapping (wrapped individually) - Adds 'attrs' to PAGE_CONTENT_COMMANDS (ARIA value exposure defense) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: hidden element stripping for scoped token text extraction Detects CSS-hidden elements (opacity, font-size, off-screen, same-color, clip-path) and ARIA label injection patterns. Marks elements with data-gstack-hidden, extracts text from a clean clone (no DOM mutation), then removes markers. Only active for scoped tokens on text command. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: snapshot split output format for scoped tokens Scoped tokens get a split snapshot: trusted @refs section (for click/fill) separated from untrusted web content in an envelope. Ref names truncated to 50 chars in trusted section. Root tokens unchanged (backward compat). Resume command also uses split format for scoped tokens. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: add SECURITY section to pair-agent instruction block Instructs remote agents to treat content inside untrusted envelopes as potentially malicious. Lists common injection phrases to watch for. Directs agents to only use @refs from the trusted INTERACTIVE ELEMENTS section, not from page content. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * test: add 4 prompt injection test fixtures - injection-visible.html: visible injection in product review text - injection-hidden.html: 7 CSS hiding techniques + ARIA injection + false positive - injection-social.html: social engineering in legitimate-looking content - injection-combined.html: all attack types + envelope escape attempt Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * test: comprehensive content security tests (47 tests) Covers all 4 defense layers: - Datamarking: marker format, session consistency, text-only application - Content envelope: wrapping, ZWSP marker escaping, filter warnings - Content filter hooks: URL blocklist, custom filters, warn/block modes - Instruction block: SECURITY section content, ordering, generation - Centralized wrapping: source-level verification of integration - Chain security: recursion guard, rate-limit exemption, activity suppression - Hidden element stripping: 7 CSS techniques, ARIA injection, false positives - Snapshot split format: scoped vs root output, resume integration Also fixes: visibility:hidden detection, case-insensitive ARIA pattern matching. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: pair-agent skill compliance + fix all 16 pre-existing test failures Root cause: pair-agent was added without completing the gen-skill-docs compliance checklist. All 16 failures traced back to this. Fixes: - Sync package.json version to VERSION (0.15.9.0) - Add "(gstack)" to pair-agent description for discoverability - Add pair-agent to Codex path exception (legitimately documents ~/.codex/) - Add CLI_COMMANDS (status, pair-agent, tunnel) to skill parser allowlist - Regenerate SKILL.md for all hosts (claude, codex, factory, kiro, etc.) - Update golden file baselines for ship skill - Fix relink tests: pass GSTACK_INSTALL_DIR to auto-relink calls so they use the fast mock install instead of scanning real ~/.claude/skills/gstack Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore: bump version and changelog (v0.15.12.0) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: E2E exit reason precedence + worktree prune race condition Two fixes for E2E test reliability: 1. session-runner.ts: error_max_turns was misclassified as error_api because is_error flag was checked before subtype. Now known subtypes like error_max_turns are preserved even when is_error is set. The is_error override only applies when subtype=success (API failure). 2. worktree.ts: pruneStale() now skips worktrees < 1 hour old to avoid deleting worktrees from concurrent test runs still in progress. Previously any second test execution would kill the first's worktrees. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: restore token in /health for localhost extension auth The CSO security fix stripped the token from /health to prevent leaking when tunneled. But the extension needs it to authenticate on localhost. Now returns token only when not tunneled (safe: localhost-only path). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * test: verify /health token is localhost-only, never served through tunnel Updated tests to match the restored token behavior: - Test 1: token assignment exists AND is inside the !tunnelActive guard - Test 1b: tunnel branch (else block) does not contain AUTH_TOKEN Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs: add security rationale for token in /health on localhost Explains why this is an accepted risk (no escalation over file-based token access), CORS protection, and tunnel guard. Prevents future CSO scans from stripping it without providing an alternative auth path. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: verify tunnel is alive before returning URL to pair-agent Root cause: when ngrok dies externally (pkill, crash, timeout), the server still reports tunnelActive=true with a dead URL. pair-agent prints an instruction block pointing at a dead tunnel. The remote agent gets "endpoint offline" and the user has to manually restart everything. Three-layer fix: - Server /pair endpoint: probes tunnel URL before returning it. If dead, resets tunnelActive/tunnelUrl and returns null (triggers CLI restart). - Server /tunnel/start: probes cached tunnel before returning already_active. If dead, falls through to restart ngrok automatically. - CLI pair-agent: double-checks tunnel URL from server before printing instruction block. Falls through to auto-start on failure. 4 regression tests verify all three probe points + CLI verification. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: add POST /batch endpoint for multi-command batching Remote agents controlling GStack Browser through a tunnel pay 2-5s of latency per HTTP round-trip. A typical "navigate and read" takes 4 sequential commands = 10-20 seconds. The /batch endpoint collapses N commands into a single HTTP round-trip, cutting a 20-tab crawl from ~60s to ~5s. Sequential execution through the full security pipeline (scope, domain, tab ownership, content wrapping). Rate limiting counts the batch as 1 request. Activity events emitted at batch level, not per-command. Max 50 commands per batch. Nested batches rejected. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * test: add source-level security tests for /batch endpoint 8 tests verifying: auth gate placement, scoped token support, max command limit, nested batch rejection, rate limiting bypass, batch-level activity events, command field validation, and tabId passthrough. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: correct CHANGELOG date from 2026-04-06 to 2026-04-05 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor: consolidate Hermes into generic HTTP option in pair-agent Hermes doesn't have a host-specific config — it uses the same generic curl instructions as any other agent. Removing the dedicated option simplifies the menu and eliminates a misleading distinction. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore: bump VERSION to 0.15.14.0, add CHANGELOG entry for batch endpoint Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore: regenerate pair-agent/SKILL.md after main merge Vendoring deprecation section from main's template wasn't reflected in the generated file. Fixes check-freshness CI. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor: checkTabAccess uses options object, add own-only tab policy Refactors checkTabAccess(tabId, clientId, isWrite) to use an options object { isWrite?, ownOnly? }. Adds tabPolicy === 'own-only' support in the server command dispatch — scoped tokens with this policy are restricted to their own tabs for all commands, not just writes. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: add --domain flag to pair-agent CLI for domain restrictions Allows passing --domain to pair-agent to restrict the remote agent's navigation to specific domains (comma-separated). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * revert: remove batch commands CHANGELOG entry and VERSION bump The batch endpoint work belongs on the browser-batch-multitab branch (port-louis), not this branch. Reverting VERSION to 0.15.14.0. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: adopt main's headed-mode /health token serving Our merge kept the old !tunnelActive guard which conflicted with main's security-audit-r2 tests that require no currentUrl/currentMessage in /health. Adopts main's approach: serve token conditionally based on headed mode or chrome-extension origin. Updates server-auth tests. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: improve snapshot flags docs completeness for LLM judge Adds $B placeholder explanation, explicit syntax line, and detailed flag behavior (-d depth values, -s CSS selector syntax, -D unified diff format and baseline persistence, -a screenshot vs text output relationship). Fixes snapshot flags reference LLM eval scoring completeness < 4. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |