mirror of https://github.com/garrytan/gstack.git
176 lines
6.4 KiB
TypeScript
176 lines
6.4 KiB
TypeScript
/**
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* Unit tests for browse/src/file-permissions.ts
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*
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* Strategy:
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* - POSIX assertions check fs.statSync.mode bits directly (cheap, reliable,
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* runs on every CI config).
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* - Windows assertions don't check ACLs (that'd require parsing icacls
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* output, which is brittle across Windows versions / locales). Instead
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* we verify the helper doesn't throw and the file ends up accessible
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* to the current user — the "doesn't crash, file still usable"
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* contract the callers rely on.
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*/
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import { afterEach, beforeEach, describe, expect, test } from 'bun:test';
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import * as fs from 'fs';
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import * as os from 'os';
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import * as path from 'path';
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import {
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restrictFilePermissions,
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restrictDirectoryPermissions,
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writeSecureFile,
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appendSecureFile,
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mkdirSecure,
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__resetWarnedForTests,
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__currentUserIcaclsPrincipalForTests,
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} from '../src/file-permissions';
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let tmpDir: string;
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beforeEach(() => {
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tmpDir = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'file-perms-'));
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__resetWarnedForTests();
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});
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afterEach(() => {
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try { fs.rmSync(tmpDir, { recursive: true, force: true }); } catch { /* best-effort */ }
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});
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describe('restrictFilePermissions', () => {
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test('on POSIX, sets file mode to 0o600', () => {
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if (process.platform === 'win32') return;
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const p = path.join(tmpDir, 'secret');
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fs.writeFileSync(p, 'token');
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fs.chmodSync(p, 0o644); // start world-readable to prove the call mutates it
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restrictFilePermissions(p);
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expect(fs.statSync(p).mode & 0o777).toBe(0o600);
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});
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test('on Windows, does not throw on an existing file', () => {
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if (process.platform !== 'win32') return;
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const p = path.join(tmpDir, 'secret');
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fs.writeFileSync(p, 'token');
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expect(() => restrictFilePermissions(p)).not.toThrow();
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// File remains readable by the caller — core contract.
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expect(fs.readFileSync(p, 'utf8')).toBe('token');
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});
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test('on Windows, does not throw when icacls fails (bad path)', () => {
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if (process.platform !== 'win32') return;
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// icacls emits an error for a nonexistent path; helper must swallow.
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expect(() => restrictFilePermissions(path.join(tmpDir, 'nonexistent'))).not.toThrow();
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});
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});
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describe('restrictDirectoryPermissions', () => {
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test('on POSIX, sets directory mode to 0o700', () => {
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if (process.platform === 'win32') return;
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const d = path.join(tmpDir, 'subdir');
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fs.mkdirSync(d, { mode: 0o755 });
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restrictDirectoryPermissions(d);
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expect(fs.statSync(d).mode & 0o777).toBe(0o700);
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});
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test('on Windows, does not throw on an existing directory', () => {
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if (process.platform !== 'win32') return;
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const d = path.join(tmpDir, 'subdir');
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fs.mkdirSync(d);
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expect(() => restrictDirectoryPermissions(d)).not.toThrow();
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});
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});
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describe('writeSecureFile', () => {
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test('writes the payload and restricts permissions atomically', () => {
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const p = path.join(tmpDir, 'data');
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writeSecureFile(p, 'hello');
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expect(fs.readFileSync(p, 'utf8')).toBe('hello');
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if (process.platform !== 'win32') {
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expect(fs.statSync(p).mode & 0o777).toBe(0o600);
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}
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});
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test('accepts Buffer payloads', () => {
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const p = path.join(tmpDir, 'buffer');
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writeSecureFile(p, Buffer.from([0xde, 0xad, 0xbe, 0xef]));
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const out = fs.readFileSync(p);
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expect(out.length).toBe(4);
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expect(out[0]).toBe(0xde);
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});
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test('overwrites existing file', () => {
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const p = path.join(tmpDir, 'existing');
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fs.writeFileSync(p, 'old', { mode: 0o644 });
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writeSecureFile(p, 'new');
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expect(fs.readFileSync(p, 'utf8')).toBe('new');
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});
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});
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describe('appendSecureFile', () => {
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test('appends to a new file and sets owner-only permissions', () => {
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const p = path.join(tmpDir, 'log');
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appendSecureFile(p, 'line1\n');
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expect(fs.readFileSync(p, 'utf8')).toBe('line1\n');
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if (process.platform !== 'win32') {
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expect(fs.statSync(p).mode & 0o777).toBe(0o600);
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}
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});
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test('appends without re-applying ACL on subsequent writes', () => {
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const p = path.join(tmpDir, 'log');
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appendSecureFile(p, 'line1\n');
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appendSecureFile(p, 'line2\n');
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expect(fs.readFileSync(p, 'utf8')).toBe('line1\nline2\n');
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});
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});
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describe('currentUserIcaclsPrincipal (regression: INT-50 domain SID collision)', () => {
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// Background: on a domain-joined Windows box that also has a *local* account
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// of the same login name, `icacls /grant lmiller:...` resolves the bare name
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// to the LOCAL account, not the domain account the process runs as. Combined
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// with `/inheritance:r`, that locks the process out of the .gstack state dir
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// it just created and the browse daemon fails to start. The fix grants to the
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// process token SID instead, which is collision-proof.
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test('on Windows, resolves to a SID literal (*S-1-5-...), not a bare username', () => {
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if (process.platform !== 'win32') return;
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const principal = __currentUserIcaclsPrincipalForTests();
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// A bare `os.userInfo().username` (the pre-fix behavior) would NOT start
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// with '*S-'. The '*'-prefixed SID is what makes the grant unambiguous.
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expect(principal.startsWith('*S-')).toBe(true);
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});
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test('off Windows, falls back to a non-empty name-based principal without throwing', () => {
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if (process.platform === 'win32') return;
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// whoami.exe /user is unavailable off-Windows; the helper must swallow the
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// spawn failure and fall back to a name-based principal rather than throw.
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let principal = '';
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expect(() => { principal = __currentUserIcaclsPrincipalForTests(); }).not.toThrow();
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expect(principal.length).toBeGreaterThan(0);
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expect(principal.startsWith('*S-')).toBe(false);
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});
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});
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describe('mkdirSecure', () => {
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test('creates directory with owner-only mode (POSIX)', () => {
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if (process.platform === 'win32') return;
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const d = path.join(tmpDir, 'nested', 'deep');
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mkdirSecure(d);
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expect(fs.statSync(d).isDirectory()).toBe(true);
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expect(fs.statSync(d).mode & 0o777).toBe(0o700);
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});
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test('is idempotent — safe to call on existing directory', () => {
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const d = path.join(tmpDir, 'dir');
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mkdirSecure(d);
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expect(() => mkdirSecure(d)).not.toThrow();
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});
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test('recursive behavior: creates intermediate directories', () => {
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const d = path.join(tmpDir, 'a', 'b', 'c');
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mkdirSecure(d);
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expect(fs.existsSync(path.join(tmpDir, 'a'))).toBe(true);
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expect(fs.existsSync(path.join(tmpDir, 'a', 'b'))).toBe(true);
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expect(fs.existsSync(d)).toBe(true);
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});
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});
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