The Confusion Protocol envelope wrap (`wrapUntrustedPageContent`)
covers every scoped PAGE_CONTENT_COMMAND, but the hidden-element
ARIA-injection detection layer only ran for `text`. Other DOM-reading
channels (html, links, forms, accessibility, attrs, data, media,
ux-audit) returned their output through the envelope with no hidden-
content filter, so a page serving a display:none div that instructs
the agent to disregard prior system messages, or an aria-label that
claims to put the LLM in admin mode, leaked the injection payload on
any non-text channel. The envelope alone does not mitigate this, and
the page itself never rendered the hostile content to the human
operator.
Fix:
* New export `DOM_CONTENT_COMMANDS` in commands.ts — the subset of
PAGE_CONTENT_COMMANDS that derives its output from the live DOM.
Console and dialog stay out; they read separate runtime state.
* server.ts runs `markHiddenElements` + `cleanupHiddenMarkers` for
every scoped command in this set. `text` keeps its existing
`getCleanTextWithStripping` path (hidden elements physically
stripped before the read). All other channels keep their output
format but emit flagged elements as CONTENT WARNINGS on the
envelope, so the LLM sees what it would otherwise have consumed
silently.
* Hidden-element descriptions merge into `combinedWarnings`
alongside content-filter warnings before the wrap call.
Tests: new describe block in content-security.test.ts covering
* `DOM_CONTENT_COMMANDS` export shape and channel membership;
* dispatch gates on `DOM_CONTENT_COMMANDS.has(command)`, not the
literal `text` string;
* hiddenContentWarnings plumbs into `combinedWarnings` and reaches
wrapUntrustedPageContent;
* DOM_CONTENT_COMMANDS is a strict subset of PAGE_CONTENT_COMMANDS.
Existing datamarking, envelope wrap, centralized-wrapping, and chain
security suites stay green (52 pass, 0 fail).
1372a4f631