gstack/browse
gus 3095f39ef5 security: remove .svg from load-html extension allowlist
SVG files can contain inline <script> tags, event handlers (onload,
onclick), and <foreignObject> elements. When loaded via setContent(),
JavaScript executes in an about:blank context with full fetch() access
to localhost — including the gstack server itself.

Attack vector: a malicious SVG placed in a project directory (via git
clone, npm package, or download) gets loaded by the AI agent through
load-html. The SVG's JavaScript modifies the DOM to inject prompt
injection payloads that the agent reads on subsequent text/snapshot
commands.

SVG rendering is still available via `goto file://path/to/file.svg`
which goes through validateNavigationUrl + validateReadPath with
safe-dirs enforcement.
2026-05-01 11:45:13 -03:00
..
bin feat: multi-agent support — gstack works on Codex, Gemini CLI, and Cursor (v0.9.0) (#226) 2026-03-19 18:20:50 -07:00
scripts fix: ngrok Windows build + close CI error-swallowing gap (v0.18.0.1) (#1024) 2026-04-16 13:49:04 -07:00
src security: remove .svg from load-html extension allowlist 2026-05-01 11:45:13 -03:00
test security: remove .svg from load-html extension allowlist 2026-05-01 11:45:13 -03:00
PLAN-snapshot-dropdown-interactive.md fix: snapshot -i auto-detects dropdown/popover interactive elements (#845) 2026-04-05 22:57:45 -07:00
SKILL.md v1.15.0.0 feat: slim preamble + real-PTY plan-mode E2E harness (#1215) 2026-04-26 13:55:13 -07:00
SKILL.md.tmpl feat(browse): Puppeteer parity — load-html, screenshot --selector, viewport --scale, file:// (v1.1.0.0) (#1062) 2026-04-18 23:25:33 +08:00