gstack/browse/src/session-cookie-store.ts

125 lines
4.0 KiB
TypeScript

/**
* Factory for expiring session-cookie registries.
*
* pty-session-cookie.ts and sse-session-cookie.ts were byte-identical modulo
* the cookie name — a security-critical parser/TTL/prune implementation that
* had to be fixed in two places (and a third hand-rolled copy of the cookie
* parse had already diverged in terminal-agent.ts). One implementation now;
* the two modules are thin instantiations that keep their names and their
* distinct threat-model docstrings.
*
* Deliberately NOT unified here: pty-session-lease.ts — that's a different
* contract (sessionId/secret separation, refresh, env-overridable TTL).
*
* SECURITY INVARIANT: this module must never import token-registry — cookie
* session tokens must not be valid as scoped tokens (the
* cookie-picker-auth-isolation pattern). Pinned by sse-session-cookie.test.ts.
*/
import * as crypto from 'crypto';
interface Session {
createdAt: number;
expiresAt: number;
}
export interface SessionCookieStore {
mint(): { token: string; expiresAt: number };
validate(token: string | null | undefined): boolean;
revoke(token: string | null | undefined): void;
extract(req: Request): string | null;
buildSetCookie(token: string): string;
/** Test-only reset. */
__reset(): void;
}
export function createSessionCookieStore(opts: {
cookieName: string;
ttlMs: number;
maxSessions?: number;
}): SessionCookieStore {
const { cookieName, ttlMs } = opts;
const maxSessions = opts.maxSessions ?? 10_000;
const sessions = new Map<string, Session>();
function pruneExpired(now: number): void {
// Opportunistic cleanup: check up to 20 entries per call so we don't
// stall on a massive registry. O(1) amortized. Runs on every mint AND
// on every validate so a steady reconnect flow can't outpace it.
let checked = 0;
for (const [token, session] of sessions) {
if (checked++ >= 20) break;
if (session.expiresAt <= now) sessions.delete(token);
}
// Hard cap as a backstop — if something still gets past opportunistic
// cleanup (e.g., all unexpired but registry enormous), drop the oldest.
while (sessions.size > maxSessions) {
const first = sessions.keys().next().value;
if (!first) break;
sessions.delete(first);
}
}
return {
mint() {
// 32 random bytes → 43-char URL-safe base64 (no padding). 256 bits.
const token = crypto.randomBytes(32).toString('base64url');
const now = Date.now();
const expiresAt = now + ttlMs;
sessions.set(token, { createdAt: now, expiresAt });
pruneExpired(now);
return { token, expiresAt };
},
validate(token) {
if (!token) return false;
const s = sessions.get(token);
if (!s) {
pruneExpired(Date.now());
return false;
}
if (Date.now() > s.expiresAt) {
sessions.delete(token);
pruneExpired(Date.now());
return false;
}
return true;
},
revoke(token) {
if (!token) return;
sessions.delete(token);
},
extract(req) {
const cookieHeader = req.headers.get('cookie');
if (!cookieHeader) return null;
for (const part of cookieHeader.split(';')) {
const [name, ...valueParts] = part.trim().split('=');
if (name === cookieName) {
return valueParts.join('=') || null;
}
}
return null;
},
/**
* Set-Cookie value:
* - HttpOnly: not readable from JS (mitigates XSS exfiltration).
* - SameSite=Strict: not sent on cross-site requests (mitigates
* CSRF/CSWSH).
* - Path=/: scope to the whole origin.
* - Max-Age matches the TTL.
* Secure is intentionally omitted: the daemon binds 127.0.0.1 over plain
* HTTP; Secure would prevent the browser from ever sending it back.
*/
buildSetCookie(token) {
const maxAge = Math.floor(ttlMs / 1000);
return `${cookieName}=${token}; HttpOnly; SameSite=Strict; Path=/; Max-Age=${maxAge}`;
},
__reset() {
sessions.clear();
},
};
}