gstack/browse/src
gus 693eadf6f3
security: validate --from-file payload paths for parity with direct paths
The direct `load-html <file>` path runs every caller-supplied file path
through validateReadPath() so reads stay confined to SAFE_DIRECTORIES
(cwd, TEMP_DIR). The `load-html --from-file <payload.json>` shortcut
and its sibling `pdf --from-file <payload.json>` skipped that check and
went straight to fs.readFileSync(). An MCP caller that picks the
payload path (or any caller whose payload argument is reachable from
attacker-influenced text) could use --from-file as a read-anywhere
escape hatch for the safe-dirs policy.

Fix: call validateReadPath(path.resolve(payloadPath)) before readFileSync
at both sites. Error surface mirrors the direct-path branch so ops and
agent errors stay consistent.

Test coverage in browse/test/from-file-path-validation.test.ts:
  - source-level: validateReadPath precedes readFileSync in the load-html
    --from-file branch (write-commands.ts) and the pdf --from-file parser
    (meta-commands.ts)
  - error-message parity: both sites reference SAFE_DIRECTORIES

Related security audit pattern: R3 F002 (validateNavigationUrl gap on
download/scrape) and R3 F008 (markHiddenElements gap on 10 DOM commands)
were the same shape — a defense that existed on the primary code path
but not its shortcut sibling. This PR closes the same class of gap on
the --from-file shortcuts.
2026-04-21 20:35:13 -07:00
..
activity.ts feat: content security — 4-layer prompt injection defense for pair-agent (#815) 2026-04-06 14:41:06 -07:00
audit.ts feat(browse): Puppeteer parity — load-html, screenshot --selector, viewport --scale, file:// (v1.1.0.0) (#1062) 2026-04-18 23:25:33 +08:00
browser-manager.ts feat(browse): Puppeteer parity — load-html, screenshot --selector, viewport --scale, file:// (v1.1.0.0) (#1062) 2026-04-18 23:25:33 +08:00
buffers.ts feat: Phase 3.5 — cookie import, QA testing, team retro (v0.3.1) (#29) 2026-03-13 00:31:41 -07:00
bun-polyfill.cjs fix: Windows support — Node.js server fallback for Playwright (#255) 2026-03-20 12:22:11 -07:00
cdp-inspector.ts refactor: AI slop reduction with cross-model quality review (v0.16.3.0) (#941) 2026-04-10 17:13:15 -10:00
cli.ts feat(v1.4.0.0): /make-pdf — markdown to publication-quality PDFs (#1086) 2026-04-20 13:20:30 +08:00
commands.ts security: extend hidden-element detection to all DOM-reading channels 2026-04-21 20:34:27 -07:00
config.ts fix: security wave 3 — 12 fixes, 7 contributors (v0.16.4.0) (#988) 2026-04-13 07:49:37 -10:00
content-security.ts security: route splitForScoped through envelope sentinel escape 2026-04-21 20:33:57 -07:00
cookie-import-browser.ts community wave: 6 PRs + hardening (v0.18.1.0) (#1028) 2026-04-17 00:45:13 -07:00
cookie-picker-routes.ts community wave: 6 PRs + hardening (v0.18.1.0) (#1028) 2026-04-17 00:45:13 -07:00
cookie-picker-ui.ts fix: cookie picker auth token leak (v0.15.17.0) (#904) 2026-04-08 10:10:13 -07:00
error-handling.ts refactor: AI slop reduction with cross-model quality review (v0.16.3.0) (#941) 2026-04-10 17:13:15 -10:00
find-browse.ts feat: multi-agent support — gstack works on Codex, Gemini CLI, and Cursor (v0.9.0) (#226) 2026-03-19 18:20:50 -07:00
media-extract.ts feat: browser data platform for AI agents (v0.16.0.0) (#907) 2026-04-08 00:41:55 -07:00
meta-commands.ts security: validate --from-file payload paths for parity with direct paths 2026-04-21 20:35:13 -07:00
network-capture.ts feat: browser data platform for AI agents (v0.16.0.0) (#907) 2026-04-08 00:41:55 -07:00
path-security.ts fix: security wave 3 — 12 fixes, 7 contributors (v0.16.4.0) (#988) 2026-04-13 07:49:37 -10:00
platform.ts fix: Windows support — Node.js server fallback for Playwright (#255) 2026-03-20 12:22:11 -07:00
read-commands.ts fix: security wave 3 — 12 fixes, 7 contributors (v0.16.4.0) (#988) 2026-04-13 07:49:37 -10:00
security-bunnative.ts feat(security): ML prompt injection defense for sidebar (v1.4.0.0) (#1089) 2026-04-20 22:18:37 +08:00
security-classifier.ts feat(security): ML prompt injection defense for sidebar (v1.4.0.0) (#1089) 2026-04-20 22:18:37 +08:00
security.ts feat(security): ML prompt injection defense for sidebar (v1.4.0.0) (#1089) 2026-04-20 22:18:37 +08:00
server.ts security: extend hidden-element detection to all DOM-reading channels 2026-04-21 20:34:27 -07:00
sidebar-agent.ts feat(security): ML prompt injection defense for sidebar (v1.4.0.0) (#1089) 2026-04-20 22:18:37 +08:00
sidebar-utils.ts fix: sidebar agent uses real tab URL instead of stale Playwright URL (v0.12.6.0) (#544) 2026-03-26 22:07:03 -06:00
snapshot.ts security: route splitForScoped through envelope sentinel escape 2026-04-21 20:33:57 -07:00
tab-session.ts feat(browse): Puppeteer parity — load-html, screenshot --selector, viewport --scale, file:// (v1.1.0.0) (#1062) 2026-04-18 23:25:33 +08:00
token-registry.ts refactor(security): loosen /connect rate limit from 3/min to 300/min 2026-04-21 20:31:03 -07:00
tunnel-denial-log.ts feat(security): add tunnel-denial-log module for attack visibility 2026-04-21 20:31:14 -07:00
url-validation.ts feat(browse): Puppeteer parity — load-html, screenshot --selector, viewport --scale, file:// (v1.1.0.0) (#1062) 2026-04-18 23:25:33 +08:00
welcome.html feat: GStack Browser — double-click AI browser with anti-bot stealth (#695) 2026-04-04 10:17:05 -07:00
write-commands.ts security: validate --from-file payload paths for parity with direct paths 2026-04-21 20:35:13 -07:00