gstack/browse/src/terminal-agent.ts

1012 lines
42 KiB
TypeScript

/**
* Terminal Agent — PTY-backed Claude Code terminal for the gstack browser
* sidebar. Translates the phoenix gbrowser PTY (cmd/gbd/terminal.go) into
* Bun, with a few changes informed by codex's outside-voice review:
*
* - Lives in a separate non-compiled bun process from sidebar-agent.ts so
* a bug in WS framing or PTY cleanup can't take down the chat path.
* - Binds 127.0.0.1 only — never on the dual-listener tunnel surface.
* - Origin validation on the WS upgrade is REQUIRED (not defense-in-depth)
* because a localhost shell WS is a real cross-site WebSocket-hijacking
* target.
* - Cookie-based auth via /internal/grant from the parent server, not a
* token in /health.
* - Lazy spawn: claude PTY is not spawned until the WS receives its first
* data frame. Sidebar opens that never type don't burn a claude session.
* - PTY dies with WS close (one PTY per WS). v1.1 may add session
* survival; for v1 we match phoenix's lifecycle.
*
* The PTY uses Bun's `terminal:` spawn option (verified at impl time on
* Bun 1.3.10): pass cols/rows + a data callback; write input via
* `proc.terminal.write(buf)`; resize via `proc.terminal.resize(cols, rows)`.
*/
import * as fs from 'fs';
import * as path from 'path';
import * as crypto from 'crypto';
import { writeSecureFile, mkdirSecure } from './file-permissions';
import { safeUnlink } from './error-handling';
import { writeAgentRecord, clearAgentRecord } from './terminal-agent-control';
const STATE_FILE = process.env.BROWSE_STATE_FILE || path.join(process.env.HOME || '/tmp', '.gstack', 'browse.json');
const PORT_FILE = path.join(path.dirname(STATE_FILE), 'terminal-port');
const BROWSE_SERVER_PORT = parseInt(process.env.BROWSE_SERVER_PORT || '0', 10);
const EXTENSION_ID = process.env.BROWSE_EXTENSION_ID || ''; // optional: tighten Origin check
const INTERNAL_TOKEN = crypto.randomBytes(32).toString('base64url'); // shared with parent server via env at spawn
/**
* Per-boot generation identifier. Loopback /internal/* callers include
* `X-Browse-Gen: <CURRENT_GEN>` so a slow agent the watchdog respawned
* around can't service a stale grant from the prior generation. Absent
* header means "legacy caller" and is accepted (backward compat); a
* present-but-mismatched header returns 409 stale generation.
*/
const CURRENT_GEN = crypto.randomBytes(16).toString('base64url');
// In-memory attach-token registry. Parent posts /internal/grant after
// /pty-session; we validate WS upgrades against this map.
//
// v1.44+: each token is bound to a v1.44 sessionId (the stable, non-secret
// identifier from browse/src/pty-session-lease.ts). The token grants ONE
// attach for ONE session — re-attach within the lease window comes through
// /pty-session/reattach, which mints a fresh token for the same sessionId.
//
// Legacy callers can still pass `{token}` without sessionId (the value
// stays null and the WS upgrade still works); those callers don't get
// re-attach because there's no stable identifier to match against.
const validTokens = new Map<string, string | null>(); // token → sessionId
/**
* Reverse index for re-attach lookups: sessionId → live PtySession.
* Populated when a WS first attaches with a known sessionId; cleared when
* the session is disposed or the lease expires. Used by:
* - /ws upgrade: if the incoming attachToken maps to a sessionId that
* already has a live session, REPLACE its ws ref instead of spawning.
* - /internal/restart: enumerate by sessionId, dispose that one session.
*
* Kept separate from the WeakMap<ws,PtySession> so re-attach can find the
* session by id even after the original ws has gone.
*/
const sessionsById = new Map<string, PtySession>();
// Active PTY session per WS. One terminal per connection. Codex finding #4:
// uncaught handlers below catch bugs in framing/cleanup so they don't kill
// the listener loop.
process.on('uncaughtException', (err) => {
console.error('[terminal-agent] uncaughtException:', err);
});
process.on('unhandledRejection', (reason) => {
console.error('[terminal-agent] unhandledRejection:', reason);
});
export interface PtySession {
proc: any | null; // Bun.Subprocess once spawned
cols: number;
rows: number;
cookie: string;
/**
* Current attached websocket. Swapped on re-attach (Commit 3): when a new
* WS upgrade matches this session's sessionId, the old liveWs is gone
* and the new ws takes its place. The PTY on-data callback closes over
* `session`, not the original `ws`, so it always writes to the current
* liveWs (or skips the write when detached and liveWs is null).
*/
liveWs: any | null;
/**
* v1.44+ stable session identifier (from pty-session-lease). Null for
* legacy /internal/grant callers that didn't pass one. Used for
* targeted /internal/restart and Commit 3 re-attach lookups.
*/
sessionId: string | null;
spawned: boolean;
/**
* 25s server-side WS keepalive interval (v1.44+). Set in the WS `open`
* handler, cleared in `close`. We send `{type:"ping",ts}` text frames so
* NAT boxes, proxies, and Chrome's MV3 panel-suspend heuristics see the
* connection as active; the client either replies with `{type:"pong"}`
* or fires its own 25s `{type:"keepalive"}` cycle. Either path keeps
* the underlying TCP from being silently dropped.
*/
pingInterval: ReturnType<typeof setInterval> | null;
/**
* Commit 3 scrollback ring buffer. Each PTY write appends a frame; the
* total byte count is capped at RING_BUFFER_MAX_BYTES with oldest frames
* evicted first. On re-attach, the surviving frames are replayed as a
* single binary frame (prefixed with the v1.44 reset sequence) so the
* user sees their last screen of output. Frame boundaries preserve UTF-8
* + ANSI-CSI boundaries because each frame is the exact buffer that
* spawnClaude's on-data callback emitted.
*/
ringBuffer: Buffer[];
ringBufferBytes: number;
/**
* Tracks whether the PTY is currently in xterm alt-screen mode. claude's
* TUI enters alt-screen (CSI ?1049h) during tool calls and exits (CSI
* ?1049l) when returning to the main prompt. On re-attach, the replay
* prelude must re-enter alt-screen if the original PTY left it active,
* otherwise the replay renders against the main screen and the cursor
* + colors end up in the wrong place.
*/
altScreenActive: boolean;
/**
* Detach state machine (Commit 3). When the WS closes for a reason OTHER
* than the v1.44 intentional-restart code (4001), we keep the PtySession
* alive for the detach window (default 60s) so a re-attach within the
* window can resume the same PTY and replay the ring buffer. The timer
* disposes the session if no re-attach arrives in time.
*/
detached: boolean;
detachTimer: ReturnType<typeof setTimeout> | null;
}
/**
* WS keepalive interval. 25s is comfortably under the lowest common NAT
* idle timeout (typically 30-60s) and shorter than Chromium's WebSocket
* dead-peer threshold. Test-overridable via env so the v1.44 e2e tests
* can compress idle-window assertions to <1s without waiting half a
* minute per assertion.
*/
const KEEPALIVE_INTERVAL_MS = parseInt(
process.env.GSTACK_PTY_KEEPALIVE_INTERVAL_MS || '25000',
10,
);
/**
* Commit 3 scrollback ring buffer cap. 1 MB is enough for a full screen
* of dense claude output (including a recent tool result), small enough
* that a worst-case 10 detached sessions only cost ~10 MB of RSS.
* Env-overridable so e2e tests can verify eviction without writing 1 MB
* of fixture data per assertion.
*/
const RING_BUFFER_MAX_BYTES = parseInt(
process.env.GSTACK_PTY_RING_BUFFER_BYTES || `${1024 * 1024}`,
10,
);
/**
* Commit 3 detach window — how long to keep a session alive after WS
* close (with any code other than 4001 intentional-restart) so a
* re-attach can resume the same PTY. 60s is long enough to cover a
* Chrome MV3 service-worker suspend cycle, a wifi blip, or a brief
* laptop sleep; short enough that genuinely-closed sessions don't
* stack up unbounded.
*/
const DETACH_WINDOW_MS = parseInt(
process.env.GSTACK_PTY_DETACH_WINDOW_MS || '60000',
10,
);
/**
* Append a frame to a session's ring buffer, evicting oldest frames if
* the total byte count exceeds RING_BUFFER_MAX_BYTES. Eviction is at
* frame boundaries (one PTY write = one frame), so we never cut a
* multi-byte UTF-8 sequence or a partial ANSI CSI in half — claude's
* on-data callback emits coherent frames.
*
* Side effect: scans the appended chunk for alt-screen enter/exit
* sequences (CSI ?1049h / CSI ?1049l) and updates session.altScreenActive
* so the re-attach prelude knows whether to re-enter alt-screen.
*/
export function appendToRingBuffer(session: PtySession, frame: Buffer): void {
session.ringBuffer.push(frame);
session.ringBufferBytes += frame.length;
while (session.ringBufferBytes > RING_BUFFER_MAX_BYTES && session.ringBuffer.length > 1) {
const evicted = session.ringBuffer.shift()!;
session.ringBufferBytes -= evicted.length;
}
// Alt-screen tracking. Scan for the canonical xterm enter/exit pairs.
// We do this on every append (not just on attach) so the state is
// correct even if many frames have flowed since the last attach.
const ascii = frame.toString('latin1'); // single-byte view is enough — the codes are 7-bit ASCII
// Use lastIndexOf so trailing state wins when both appear in one frame
// (e.g., a quick tool-call open+close inside one render pass).
const enterIdx = ascii.lastIndexOf('\x1b[?1049h');
const exitIdx = ascii.lastIndexOf('\x1b[?1049l');
if (enterIdx >= 0 && enterIdx > exitIdx) session.altScreenActive = true;
else if (exitIdx >= 0 && exitIdx > enterIdx) session.altScreenActive = false;
}
/**
* Build the re-attach replay payload: server-side reset prelude + the
* accumulated ring buffer. The client side writes RIS (`\x1bc`) to xterm
* BEFORE feeding this payload in, so the layout is:
*
* 1. Client: `\x1bc` (RIS — full reset, clears pre-blip xterm content)
* 2. Server: `\x1b[!p` (DECSTR soft reset — re-defaults char attributes)
* 3. Server: optional `\x1b[?1049h` if we were in alt-screen at detach
* 4. Server: ring buffer contents, in append order
*
* The client coordinates the order by waiting for a `{type:"reattach-begin"}`
* text frame before treating the next binary frame as replay. That separation
* is what lets us prepend reset codes without clobbering the live stream
* that resumes immediately after.
*/
export function buildReplayPayload(session: PtySession): Buffer {
const parts: Buffer[] = [];
parts.push(Buffer.from('\x1b[!p'));
if (session.altScreenActive) parts.push(Buffer.from('\x1b[?1049h'));
for (const frame of session.ringBuffer) parts.push(frame);
return Buffer.concat(parts);
}
const sessions = new WeakMap<any, PtySession>(); // ws -> session
/** Find claude on PATH. */
function findClaude(): string | null {
// Test-only override. Lets the integration tests spawn /bin/bash instead
// of requiring claude to be installed on every CI runner. NEVER read in
// production (sidebar UI). Documented in browse/test/terminal-agent-integration.test.ts.
const override = process.env.BROWSE_TERMINAL_BINARY;
if (override && fs.existsSync(override)) return override;
// Bun.which is sync and respects PATH. Falls back to a small list of
// common install locations if PATH is stripped (e.g., launched from
// Conductor with a minimal env).
const which = (Bun as any).which?.('claude');
if (which) return which;
const candidates = [
'/opt/homebrew/bin/claude',
'/usr/local/bin/claude',
`${process.env.HOME}/.local/bin/claude`,
`${process.env.HOME}/.bun/bin/claude`,
`${process.env.HOME}/.npm-global/bin/claude`,
];
for (const c of candidates) {
try { fs.accessSync(c, fs.constants.X_OK); return c; } catch {}
}
return null;
}
/** Probe + persist claude availability for the bootstrap card. */
function writeClaudeAvailable(): void {
const stateDir = path.dirname(STATE_FILE);
try { mkdirSecure(stateDir); } catch {}
const found = findClaude();
const status = {
available: !!found,
path: found || undefined,
install_url: 'https://docs.anthropic.com/en/docs/claude-code',
checked_at: new Date().toISOString(),
};
const target = path.join(stateDir, 'claude-available.json');
const tmp = path.join(stateDir, `.tmp-claude-${process.pid}`);
try {
writeSecureFile(tmp, JSON.stringify(status, null, 2));
fs.renameSync(tmp, target);
} catch {
safeUnlink(tmp);
}
}
/**
* System-prompt hint passed to claude via --append-system-prompt. Tells
* claude what tab-awareness affordances exist in this session so it
* doesn't have to discover them by trial. The user can override anything
* here just by saying so — system prompt is a soft hint, not a contract.
*
* Two paths claude has:
* 1. Read live state from <stateDir>/tabs.json + active-tab.json
* (updated continuously by the gstack browser extension).
* 2. Run $B tab, $B tabs, $B tab-each <command> to act on tabs. The
* tab-each helper fans a single command across every open tab and
* returns per-tab results as JSON.
*/
function buildTabAwarenessHint(stateDir: string): string {
const tabsFile = path.join(stateDir, 'tabs.json');
const activeFile = path.join(stateDir, 'active-tab.json');
return [
'You are running inside the gstack browser sidebar with live access to the user\'s browser tabs.',
'',
'Tab state files (kept fresh automatically by the extension):',
` ${tabsFile} — all open tabs (id, url, title, active, pinned)`,
` ${activeFile} — the currently active tab`,
'Read these any time the user asks about "tabs", "the current page", or anything multi-tab. Do NOT shell out to $B tabs just to learn what\'s open — read the file.',
'',
'Tab manipulation commands (via $B):',
' $B tab <id> — switch to a tab',
' $B newtab [url] — open a new tab',
' $B closetab [id] — close a tab (current if no id)',
' $B tab-each <command> — fan out a command across every tab; returns JSON results',
'',
'When the user asks for multi-tab work, prefer $B tab-each. Examples:',
' $B tab-each snapshot -i — grab a snapshot from every tab',
' $B tab-each text — pull clean text from every tab',
' $B tab-each title — list every tab\'s title',
'',
'You\'re in a real terminal with a real PTY — slash commands, /resume, ANSI colors all work as in a normal claude session.',
].join('\n');
}
/** Spawn claude in a PTY. Returns null if claude not on PATH. */
function spawnClaude(cols: number, rows: number, onData: (chunk: Buffer) => void) {
const claudePath = findClaude();
if (!claudePath) return null;
// Match phoenix env so claude knows which browse server to talk to and
// doesn't try to autostart its own. BROWSE_HEADED=1 keeps the existing
// headed-mode browser; BROWSE_NO_AUTOSTART prevents claude's gstack
// tooling from racing to spawn another server.
const env: Record<string, string> = {
...process.env as any,
BROWSE_PORT: String(BROWSE_SERVER_PORT),
BROWSE_STATE_FILE: STATE_FILE,
BROWSE_NO_AUTOSTART: '1',
BROWSE_HEADED: '1',
TERM: 'xterm-256color',
COLORTERM: 'truecolor',
};
// --append-system-prompt is the right injection surface (per `claude --help`):
// it gets appended to the model's system prompt, so claude treats this as
// contextual guidance, not a user message. Don't use a leading PTY write
// for this — that would show up as if the user typed the hint, polluting
// the visible transcript.
const stateDir = path.dirname(STATE_FILE);
const tabHint = buildTabAwarenessHint(stateDir);
const proc = (Bun as any).spawn([claudePath, '--append-system-prompt', tabHint], {
terminal: {
rows,
cols,
data(_terminal: any, chunk: Buffer) { onData(chunk); },
},
env,
});
return proc;
}
/** Cleanup a PTY session: SIGINT, then SIGKILL after 3s. */
function disposeSession(session: PtySession): void {
try { session.proc?.terminal?.close?.(); } catch {}
if (session.proc?.pid) {
try { session.proc.kill?.('SIGINT'); } catch {}
setTimeout(() => {
try {
if (session.proc && !session.proc.killed) session.proc.kill?.('SIGKILL');
} catch {}
}, 3000);
}
session.proc = null;
session.spawned = false;
}
/**
* Build the HTTP server. Two routes:
* POST /internal/grant — parent server pushes a fresh cookie token
* GET /ws — extension upgrades to WebSocket (PTY transport)
*
* Everything else returns 404. The listener binds 127.0.0.1 only.
*/
/**
* Validate a loopback /internal/* request. Returns null when the request
* is allowed; otherwise returns the Response to send back. Centralizes
* bearer auth + the v1.44 X-Browse-Gen generation check so adding a new
* /internal/* route is a one-liner.
*/
function checkInternalAuth(req: Request): Response | null {
const auth = req.headers.get('authorization');
if (auth !== `Bearer ${INTERNAL_TOKEN}`) {
return new Response('forbidden', { status: 403 });
}
const headerGen = req.headers.get('x-browse-gen');
if (headerGen && headerGen !== CURRENT_GEN) {
return new Response('stale generation', { status: 409 });
}
return null;
}
/**
* Wrap a JSON-bodied /internal/* handler with the standard bearer-auth +
* generation-check + json-parse + error-response boilerplate. The handler
* `fn` is called with the parsed body; whatever it returns is JSON-stringified
* into a 200 Response, or the handler can return a Response directly to
* customize status / headers. Throwing from `fn` collapses to a 400 "bad".
*
* Centralizing the dance kills the copy-paste pattern of bearer + gen check
* + req.json().then(...).catch(...) that every /internal/* route needs.
* New routes become a single call to internalHandler.
*/
async function internalHandler<T>(
req: Request,
fn: (body: any) => T | Promise<T> | Response | Promise<Response>,
): Promise<Response> {
const denied = checkInternalAuth(req);
if (denied) return denied;
let body: any;
try {
body = await req.json();
} catch {
return new Response('bad', { status: 400 });
}
try {
const result = await fn(body);
if (result instanceof Response) return result;
if (result === undefined || result === null) return new Response('ok');
return new Response(JSON.stringify(result), {
status: 200,
headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
});
} catch {
return new Response('bad', { status: 400 });
}
}
/**
* Spawn the claude PTY for a session if it hasn't been spawned yet.
* Used by both the legacy binary-frame spawn trigger and the v1.44 explicit
* `{type:"start"}` text-frame trigger. Idempotent on `session.spawned`.
*
* Returns true if claude is now running, false if spawn failed (e.g. claude
* binary not on PATH). On failure, the caller is expected to have already
* surfaced the error to the client (or will via the next frame).
*/
function maybeSpawnPty(ws: any, session: PtySession): boolean {
if (session.spawned) return true;
session.spawned = true;
let leftover = Buffer.alloc(0);
const proc = spawnClaude(session.cols, session.rows, (chunk) => {
const combined = Buffer.concat([leftover, Buffer.from(chunk)]);
// UTF-8 boundary detection (issue #1272). Look back at most 3 bytes
// for the start of an incomplete multibyte sequence and defer it.
let safeEnd = combined.length;
for (let i = combined.length - 1; i >= Math.max(0, combined.length - 3); i--) {
const b = combined[i];
if ((b & 0x80) === 0) { safeEnd = i + 1; break; }
if ((b & 0xC0) === 0x80) continue;
const expected = (b & 0xE0) === 0xC0 ? 2 : (b & 0xF0) === 0xE0 ? 3 : 4;
safeEnd = (combined.length - i >= expected) ? combined.length : i;
break;
}
const flush = combined.slice(0, safeEnd);
leftover = combined.slice(safeEnd);
if (flush.length) {
// Always record into the ring buffer (Commit 3) so re-attach can
// replay. session.liveWs is what changes across re-attaches — we
// close over `session`, not the original `ws`, so the write always
// goes to whichever ws is currently attached (or is skipped when
// detached and liveWs is null).
appendToRingBuffer(session, flush);
if (session.liveWs) {
try { session.liveWs.sendBinary(flush); } catch {}
}
}
});
if (!proc) {
try {
ws.send(JSON.stringify({
type: 'error',
code: 'CLAUDE_NOT_FOUND',
message: 'claude CLI not on PATH. Install: https://docs.anthropic.com/en/docs/claude-code',
}));
ws.close(4404, 'claude not found');
} catch {}
return false;
}
session.proc = proc;
proc.exited?.then?.(() => {
try { session.liveWs?.close(1000, 'pty exited'); } catch {}
});
return true;
}
function buildServer() {
return Bun.serve({
hostname: '127.0.0.1',
port: 0,
idleTimeout: 0, // PTY connections are long-lived; default idleTimeout would kill them
fetch(req, server) {
const url = new URL(req.url);
// /internal/grant — loopback-only handshake from parent server.
// v1.44+: accepts `{token, sessionId?}`. The sessionId binding lets
// the agent route re-attach attempts (same sessionId, fresh token)
// back to the same PtySession. Legacy callers passing just `{token}`
// still work — sessionId becomes null and re-attach is unavailable
// for that grant.
if (url.pathname === '/internal/grant' && req.method === 'POST') {
return internalHandler(req, (body) => {
if (typeof body?.token === 'string' && body.token.length > 16) {
const sid = typeof body?.sessionId === 'string' && body.sessionId.length > 0
? body.sessionId
: null;
validTokens.set(body.token, sid);
}
});
}
// /internal/revoke — drop a token (called on WS close or bootstrap reload)
if (url.pathname === '/internal/revoke' && req.method === 'POST') {
return internalHandler(req, (body) => {
if (typeof body?.token === 'string') validTokens.delete(body.token);
});
}
// /internal/restart — dispose the PtySession for a specific sessionId.
// Scoped to one caller (not enumerate-all). Server.ts /pty-restart
// posts here with the caller's sessionId; we kill ONLY that PTY,
// leaving any other live sidebar tabs untouched. Codex T2 of the
// eng review caught this gap — pre-spec the route would have
// disposed all sessions.
if (url.pathname === '/internal/restart' && req.method === 'POST') {
return internalHandler(req, (body) => {
const sid = typeof body?.sessionId === 'string' ? body.sessionId : null;
if (!sid) return { killed: 0 };
const session = sessionsById.get(sid);
if (!session) return { killed: 0 };
// Cancel any pending detach timer before disposal — otherwise it
// would fire later against an already-disposed session.
if (session.detachTimer) {
clearTimeout(session.detachTimer);
session.detachTimer = null;
}
disposeSession(session);
sessionsById.delete(sid);
return { killed: 1 };
});
}
// /internal/healthz — liveness probe used by the v1.44 watchdog.
// Returns this agent's pid + gen + active session count without
// touching claude binary lookup (which can fail for non-process
// reasons and isn't a useful liveness signal). GET — no body to parse,
// so it stays on the bare checkInternalAuth gate.
if (url.pathname === '/internal/healthz' && req.method === 'GET') {
const denied = checkInternalAuth(req);
if (denied) return denied;
return new Response(JSON.stringify({
pid: process.pid,
gen: CURRENT_GEN,
sessions: validTokens.size,
}), { status: 200, headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' } });
}
// /claude-available — bootstrap card hits this when user clicks "I installed it".
if (url.pathname === '/claude-available' && req.method === 'GET') {
writeClaudeAvailable();
const found = findClaude();
return new Response(JSON.stringify({ available: !!found, path: found }), {
status: 200,
headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
});
}
// /ws — WebSocket upgrade. CRITICAL gates:
// (1) Origin must be chrome-extension://<id>. Cross-site WS hijacking
// defense — required, not optional.
// (2) Token must be in validTokens. We accept the token via two
// transports for compatibility:
// - Sec-WebSocket-Protocol (preferred for browsers — the only
// auth header settable from the browser WebSocket API)
// - Cookie gstack_pty (works for non-browser callers and
// same-port browser callers; doesn't survive the cross-port
// jump from server.ts:34567 to the agent's random port
// when SameSite=Strict is set)
// Either path works; both verify against the same in-memory
// validTokens Set, populated by the parent server's
// authenticated /pty-session → /internal/grant chain.
if (url.pathname === '/ws') {
const origin = req.headers.get('origin') || '';
const isExtensionOrigin = origin.startsWith('chrome-extension://');
if (!isExtensionOrigin) {
return new Response('forbidden origin', { status: 403 });
}
if (EXTENSION_ID && origin !== `chrome-extension://${EXTENSION_ID}`) {
return new Response('forbidden origin', { status: 403 });
}
// Try Sec-WebSocket-Protocol first. Format: a single token, possibly
// with a `gstack-pty.` prefix (which we strip). Browsers send a
// comma-separated list when multiple were requested; we pick the
// first that matches a known token.
const protoHeader = req.headers.get('sec-websocket-protocol') || '';
let token: string | null = null;
let acceptedProtocol: string | null = null;
for (const raw of protoHeader.split(',').map(s => s.trim()).filter(Boolean)) {
const candidate = raw.startsWith('gstack-pty.') ? raw.slice('gstack-pty.'.length) : raw;
if (validTokens.has(candidate)) {
token = candidate;
acceptedProtocol = raw;
break;
}
}
// Fallback: Cookie gstack_pty (legacy / non-browser callers).
if (!token) {
const cookieHeader = req.headers.get('cookie') || '';
for (const part of cookieHeader.split(';')) {
const [name, ...rest] = part.trim().split('=');
if (name === 'gstack_pty') {
const candidate = rest.join('=') || null;
if (candidate && validTokens.has(candidate)) {
token = candidate;
}
break;
}
}
}
if (!token) {
return new Response('unauthorized', { status: 401 });
}
// v1.44+: surface the token's sessionId binding to the upgraded ws.
// open() reads it via ws.data and registers the session in
// sessionsById so /internal/restart and (Commit 3) re-attach
// lookups can find it.
const sessionId = validTokens.get(token) ?? null;
const upgraded = server.upgrade(req, {
data: { cookie: token, sessionId },
// Echo the protocol back so the browser accepts the upgrade.
// Required when the client sends Sec-WebSocket-Protocol — the
// server MUST select one of the offered protocols, otherwise
// the browser closes the connection immediately.
...(acceptedProtocol ? { headers: { 'Sec-WebSocket-Protocol': acceptedProtocol } } : {}),
});
return upgraded ? undefined : new Response('upgrade failed', { status: 500 });
}
return new Response('not found', { status: 404 });
},
websocket: {
/**
* Spawn the claude PTY for `session` if it hasn't been spawned yet.
* Called from both message paths: the legacy binary-frame trigger
* (any keystroke) AND the v1.44 explicit `{type:"start"}` trigger
* (forceRestart sends this on every fresh WS to get an eager prompt
* without requiring the user to type). Idempotent — a second call
* after `spawned: true` is a no-op.
*/
open(ws) {
const sessionId = (ws.data as any)?.sessionId ?? null;
const cookie = (ws.data as any)?.cookie || '';
// Commit 3 re-attach: if this sessionId already has a detached
// PtySession in sessionsById, REPLACE its liveWs ref and replay
// the ring buffer. The PTY process is unchanged — claude keeps
// running through the wifi blip / panel-suspend cycle.
if (sessionId) {
const existing = sessionsById.get(sessionId);
if (existing) {
if (existing.detachTimer) {
clearTimeout(existing.detachTimer);
existing.detachTimer = null;
}
existing.detached = false;
existing.liveWs = ws;
existing.cookie = cookie;
// Re-bind the WS-keyed map so resize/close/message handlers
// can still find this session via the new ws.
sessions.set(ws, existing);
// Restart keepalive on the new ws.
if (existing.pingInterval) clearInterval(existing.pingInterval);
existing.pingInterval = setInterval(() => {
try { ws.send(JSON.stringify({ type: 'ping', ts: Date.now() })); } catch {}
}, KEEPALIVE_INTERVAL_MS);
// Tell the client to prep its xterm (write RIS) before the
// replay binary arrives. Order matters — the binary frame
// immediately after this text frame IS the replay.
try { ws.send(JSON.stringify({ type: 'reattach-begin', sessionId })); } catch {}
try { ws.sendBinary(buildReplayPayload(existing)); } catch {}
return;
}
}
const session: PtySession = {
proc: null,
cols: 80,
rows: 24,
cookie,
liveWs: ws,
sessionId,
spawned: false,
pingInterval: null,
ringBuffer: [],
ringBufferBytes: 0,
altScreenActive: false,
detached: false,
detachTimer: null,
};
session.pingInterval = setInterval(() => {
try {
ws.send(JSON.stringify({ type: 'ping', ts: Date.now() }));
} catch {
// ws likely closed mid-tick; close handler clears the interval.
}
}, KEEPALIVE_INTERVAL_MS);
sessions.set(ws, session);
// Index by sessionId for /internal/restart + Commit 3 re-attach.
if (sessionId) sessionsById.set(sessionId, session);
},
message(ws, raw) {
let session = sessions.get(ws);
if (!session) {
// Fallback for any path where open() didn't fire (shouldn't happen
// in Bun.serve but keeps the spawn path safe). No keepalive on
// this branch — open() is the supported entry point.
session = {
proc: null,
cols: 80,
rows: 24,
cookie: (ws.data as any)?.cookie || '',
liveWs: ws,
sessionId: (ws.data as any)?.sessionId ?? null,
spawned: false,
pingInterval: null,
ringBuffer: [],
ringBufferBytes: 0,
altScreenActive: false,
detached: false,
detachTimer: null,
};
sessions.set(ws, session);
if (session.sessionId) sessionsById.set(session.sessionId, session);
}
// Text frames are control messages: {type: "resize", cols, rows},
// {type: "tabSwitch", tabId, url, title}, {type: "tabState", ...},
// or v1.44 keepalive frames: {type: "pong", ts}, {type: "keepalive"}.
// Binary frames are raw input bytes destined for the PTY stdin.
if (typeof raw === 'string') {
let msg: any;
try { msg = JSON.parse(raw); } catch { return; }
if (msg?.type === 'resize') {
const cols = Math.max(2, Math.floor(Number(msg.cols) || 80));
const rows = Math.max(2, Math.floor(Number(msg.rows) || 24));
session.cols = cols;
session.rows = rows;
try { session.proc?.terminal?.resize?.(cols, rows); } catch {}
return;
}
if (msg?.type === 'tabSwitch') {
handleTabSwitch(msg);
return;
}
if (msg?.type === 'tabState') {
handleTabState(msg);
return;
}
if (msg?.type === 'pong' || msg?.type === 'keepalive' || msg?.type === 'ping') {
// Keepalive frames — accepted and silently dropped. The mere
// fact that the WS carried this frame is the liveness signal;
// there's no application-level state to update at this layer.
// `ping` is acknowledged here too in case the client (or a
// future agent peer) mirrors our server-side ping shape.
return;
}
if (msg?.type === 'start') {
// v1.44 explicit spawn trigger. forceRestart sends this
// immediately on every fresh WS so claude boots without the
// user having to type a keystroke (pre-v1.44, the lazy-binary
// spawn made restart look stuck until the user typed). No-op
// if already spawned.
maybeSpawnPty(ws, session);
return;
}
// Unknown text frame — ignore.
return;
}
// Binary input. Lazy-spawn claude on the first byte if `start`
// wasn't sent first. Both paths land in the same maybeSpawnPty
// helper for behavior parity.
if (!session.spawned) {
if (!maybeSpawnPty(ws, session)) return;
}
try {
// raw is a Uint8Array; Bun.Terminal.write accepts string|Buffer.
// Convert to Buffer for safety.
session.proc?.terminal?.write?.(Buffer.from(raw as Uint8Array));
} catch (err) {
console.error('[terminal-agent] terminal.write failed:', err);
}
},
close(ws, code, _reason) {
const session = sessions.get(ws);
if (!session) return;
// Always drop the WS-keyed map entry and the per-attach
// attachToken — the attach grant was single-use.
sessions.delete(ws);
if (session.cookie) validTokens.delete(session.cookie);
// Keepalive lives with the WS — every attach starts a fresh one.
if (session.pingInterval) {
clearInterval(session.pingInterval);
session.pingInterval = null;
}
// Commit 3 detach state machine. If the close was intentional
// (code 4001 = restart, 4404 = no-claude error), dispose
// immediately — there's no value in keeping the PTY alive.
// Otherwise enter the detach window: claude keeps running, the
// ring buffer keeps accumulating, and a re-attach with the same
// sessionId within DETACH_WINDOW_MS picks back up. If the timer
// fires without a re-attach, the session is disposed normally.
//
// Sessions without a sessionId (legacy single-shot grants) can't
// re-attach by definition — fall through to immediate dispose.
const intentional = code === 4001 || code === 4404 || code === 1000;
if (intentional || !session.sessionId) {
disposeSession(session);
if (session.sessionId) sessionsById.delete(session.sessionId);
return;
}
// Mark detached and start the disposal timer. The session stays
// in sessionsById so the next /ws upgrade with the same
// sessionId can find and reattach to it.
session.detached = true;
session.liveWs = null;
session.detachTimer = setTimeout(() => {
if (!session.detached) return; // re-attached in the meantime
disposeSession(session);
if (session.sessionId) sessionsById.delete(session.sessionId);
}, DETACH_WINDOW_MS);
// setTimeout returns a Bun Timer; unref so the detach window
// doesn't keep the process alive past natural shutdown.
(session.detachTimer as any)?.unref?.();
},
},
});
}
/**
* Tab-switch helper: write the active tab to a state file (claude reads it)
* and notify the parent server so its activeTabId stays synced. Skips
* chrome:// and chrome-extension:// internal pages.
*/
/**
* Live tab snapshot. Writes <stateDir>/tabs.json (full list) and updates
* <stateDir>/active-tab.json (current active). claude can read these any
* time without invoking $B tabs — saves a round-trip when the model just
* needs to check the landscape before deciding what to do.
*/
function handleTabState(msg: {
active?: { tabId?: number; url?: string; title?: string } | null;
tabs?: Array<{ tabId?: number; url?: string; title?: string; active?: boolean; windowId?: number; pinned?: boolean; audible?: boolean }>;
reason?: string;
}): void {
const stateDir = path.dirname(STATE_FILE);
try { mkdirSecure(stateDir); } catch {}
// tabs.json — full list
if (Array.isArray(msg.tabs)) {
const payload = {
updatedAt: new Date().toISOString(),
reason: msg.reason || 'unknown',
tabs: msg.tabs.map(t => ({
tabId: t.tabId ?? null,
url: t.url || '',
title: t.title || '',
active: !!t.active,
windowId: t.windowId ?? null,
pinned: !!t.pinned,
audible: !!t.audible,
})),
};
const target = path.join(stateDir, 'tabs.json');
const tmp = path.join(stateDir, `.tmp-tabs-${process.pid}`);
try {
writeSecureFile(tmp, JSON.stringify(payload, null, 2));
fs.renameSync(tmp, target);
} catch {
safeUnlink(tmp);
}
}
// active-tab.json — single active tab. Skip chrome-internal pages so
// claude doesn't see chrome:// or chrome-extension:// URLs as
// "current target."
const active = msg.active;
if (active && active.url && !active.url.startsWith('chrome://') && !active.url.startsWith('chrome-extension://')) {
const ctxFile = path.join(stateDir, 'active-tab.json');
const tmp = path.join(stateDir, `.tmp-tab-${process.pid}`);
try {
writeSecureFile(tmp, JSON.stringify({
tabId: active.tabId ?? null,
url: active.url,
title: active.title ?? '',
}));
fs.renameSync(tmp, ctxFile);
} catch {
safeUnlink(tmp);
}
}
}
function handleTabSwitch(msg: { tabId?: number; url?: string; title?: string }): void {
const url = msg.url || '';
if (!url || url.startsWith('chrome://') || url.startsWith('chrome-extension://')) return;
const stateDir = path.dirname(STATE_FILE);
const ctxFile = path.join(stateDir, 'active-tab.json');
const tmp = path.join(stateDir, `.tmp-tab-${process.pid}`);
try {
writeSecureFile(tmp, JSON.stringify({
tabId: msg.tabId ?? null,
url,
title: msg.title ?? '',
}));
fs.renameSync(tmp, ctxFile);
} catch {
safeUnlink(tmp);
}
// Best-effort sync to parent server so its activeTabId tracking matches.
// No await; this is fire-and-forget.
if (BROWSE_SERVER_PORT > 0) {
fetch(`http://127.0.0.1:${BROWSE_SERVER_PORT}/command`, {
method: 'POST',
headers: {
'Content-Type': 'application/json',
'Authorization': `Bearer ${readBrowseToken()}`,
},
body: JSON.stringify({
command: 'tab',
args: [String(msg.tabId ?? ''), '--no-focus'],
}),
}).catch(() => {});
}
}
function readBrowseToken(): string {
try {
const raw = fs.readFileSync(STATE_FILE, 'utf-8');
const j = JSON.parse(raw);
return j.token || '';
} catch { return ''; }
}
// Boot.
function main() {
writeClaudeAvailable();
const server = buildServer();
const port = (server as any).port || (server as any).address?.port;
if (!port) {
console.error('[terminal-agent] failed to bind: no port');
process.exit(1);
}
// Write port file atomically so the parent server can pick it up.
const dir = path.dirname(PORT_FILE);
try { mkdirSecure(dir); } catch {}
const tmp = `${PORT_FILE}.tmp-${process.pid}`;
writeSecureFile(tmp, String(port));
fs.renameSync(tmp, PORT_FILE);
// Write identity-based agent record (pid + per-boot gen). Replaces the
// v1.43- `pkill -f terminal-agent\.ts` regex teardown that could kill
// sibling gstack sessions. Callers (cli.ts spawn site, server.ts
// shutdown, the v1.44 watchdog) now route through killAgentByRecord in
// terminal-agent-control.ts.
writeAgentRecord(dir, { pid: process.pid, gen: CURRENT_GEN, startedAt: Date.now() });
// Hand the parent the internal token so it can call /internal/grant.
// Parent learns INTERNAL_TOKEN via env (TERMINAL_AGENT_INTERNAL_TOKEN below).
// We just print it on stdout for the supervising process to pick up if it's
// not already in env. Defense against env races at spawn time.
console.log(`[terminal-agent] listening on 127.0.0.1:${port} pid=${process.pid} gen=${CURRENT_GEN}`);
// Cleanup port file + agent record on exit.
const cleanup = () => {
safeUnlink(PORT_FILE);
clearAgentRecord(dir);
process.exit(0);
};
process.on('SIGTERM', cleanup);
process.on('SIGINT', cleanup);
}
// Export the internal token so cli.ts can pass the SAME value to the parent
// server via env. Parent reads BROWSE_TERMINAL_INTERNAL_TOKEN and uses it
// for /internal/grant calls.
//
// In practice, the agent generates INTERNAL_TOKEN once at boot and writes it
// to a state file the parent reads. This avoids env-passing races. See main().
const INTERNAL_TOKEN_FILE = path.join(path.dirname(STATE_FILE), 'terminal-internal-token');
try {
mkdirSecure(path.dirname(INTERNAL_TOKEN_FILE));
writeSecureFile(INTERNAL_TOKEN_FILE, INTERNAL_TOKEN);
} catch {}
main();