fix(image_gen): confine generation source images to the terminal backend

image_generate and video_generate forwarded model-supplied local paths to
provider plugins, which read them off the HOST filesystem regardless of
terminal backend — inconsistent with the confinement boundary vision/video
analysis enforce (GHSA-gpxw-6wxv-w3qq), and broken for sandbox-only files.

New dispatch-layer chokepoint (_confine_source_images): under a non-local
backend, path-like image_url / reference_image_urls resolve through
tools.image_source (media-cache host reads, bounded in-sandbox exec-read,
lazy env bring-up, credential guard, 50MB cap) and reach every provider as
data: URLs — which all backends already accept. URLs/data: pass through;
local backend is a no-op. xai_video_edit/extend already require public
HTTPS URLs, so no change needed there.
This commit is contained in:
Teknium 2026-08-08 04:07:26 -07:00
parent 90badaa284
commit 2a743e5f43
4 changed files with 228 additions and 0 deletions

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@ -0,0 +1,132 @@
"""Tests for the generation-tool source-image confinement chokepoint.
Under a non-local terminal backend, model-supplied local paths passed to
image_generate / video_generate must resolve through the sandbox-aware media
resolver (tools.image_source) and reach providers as data: URLs the same
boundary vision/video analysis enforce. URLs pass through untouched and the
local backend is a no-op.
"""
import base64
import json
import pytest
import tools.image_generation_tool as igt
PNG = base64.b64decode(
"iVBORw0KGgoAAAANSUhEUgAAAAEAAAABCAYAAAAfFcSJAAAADUlEQVR42mNk"
"+M9QDwADhgGAWjR9awAAAABJRU5ErkJggg=="
)
@pytest.fixture(autouse=True)
def _no_real_sandbox(monkeypatch):
import tools.terminal_tool as tt
monkeypatch.setattr(tt, "ensure_task_env", lambda *a, **k: None)
class TestConfineSourceImages:
def test_local_backend_is_passthrough(self, monkeypatch):
monkeypatch.setenv("TERMINAL_ENV", "local")
url, refs, err = igt._confine_source_images(
"/some/host/pic.png", ["/other/ref.png"], "t1")
assert url == "/some/host/pic.png"
assert refs == ["/other/ref.png"]
assert err is None
def test_urls_pass_through_under_sandbox(self, monkeypatch, tmp_path):
monkeypatch.setenv("TERMINAL_ENV", "docker")
monkeypatch.setenv("HERMES_HOME", str(tmp_path / "h"))
url, refs, err = igt._confine_source_images(
"https://x/y.png", [""], "t1")
assert url == "https://x/y.png"
assert refs == [""]
assert err is None
def test_path_resolves_to_data_url_under_sandbox(self, monkeypatch, tmp_path):
"""A path under docker resolves through the sandbox exec-read and
arrives as a data: URL carrying the CONTAINER's bytes."""
from types import SimpleNamespace
monkeypatch.setenv("TERMINAL_ENV", "docker")
monkeypatch.setenv("HERMES_HOME", str(tmp_path / "h"))
import tools.image_source as isrc
b64 = base64.b64encode(PNG).decode()
monkeypatch.setattr(
isrc, "_get_active_env",
lambda tid: SimpleNamespace(
execute=lambda cmd, **kw: {"returncode": 0, "output": b64}),
)
url, refs, err = igt._confine_source_images(
"/workspace/pic.png", None, "t1")
assert err is None
assert url.startswith("data:image/png;base64,")
assert base64.b64decode(url.split(",", 1)[1]) == PNG
assert refs is None
def test_unreadable_path_returns_error_payload(self, monkeypatch, tmp_path):
"""No sandbox env + non-cache path -> structured error, not a host read."""
monkeypatch.setenv("TERMINAL_ENV", "docker")
monkeypatch.setenv("HERMES_HOME", str(tmp_path / "h"))
import tools.image_source as isrc
monkeypatch.setattr(isrc, "_get_active_env", lambda tid: None)
secret = tmp_path / "id_rsa"
secret.write_bytes(b"HOST-PRIVATE-KEY")
url, refs, err = igt._confine_source_images(str(secret), None, "t1")
assert err is not None
payload = json.loads(err)
assert payload["success"] is False
assert "Could not read source image" in payload["error"]
# The host secret's bytes never left the chokepoint.
assert "HOST-PRIVATE-KEY" not in err
def test_handler_rejects_before_provider_dispatch(self, monkeypatch, tmp_path):
"""_handle_image_generate returns the confinement error without ever
reaching plugin/FAL dispatch."""
monkeypatch.setenv("TERMINAL_ENV", "ssh")
monkeypatch.setenv("HERMES_HOME", str(tmp_path / "h"))
import tools.image_source as isrc
monkeypatch.setattr(isrc, "_get_active_env", lambda tid: None)
dispatched = []
monkeypatch.setattr(
igt, "_dispatch_to_plugin_provider",
lambda *a, **k: dispatched.append(1) or None)
out = igt._handle_image_generate(
{"prompt": "edit it", "image_url": str(tmp_path / "nope.png")},
task_id="t1",
)
payload = json.loads(out)
assert payload["success"] is False
assert dispatched == []
def test_video_generate_uses_same_chokepoint(self, monkeypatch, tmp_path):
"""video_generate's handler routes its image sources through the
shared confinement helper too."""
import tools.video_generation_tool as vgt
monkeypatch.setenv("TERMINAL_ENV", "docker")
monkeypatch.setenv("HERMES_HOME", str(tmp_path / "h"))
import tools.image_source as isrc
monkeypatch.setattr(isrc, "_get_active_env", lambda tid: None)
out = vgt._handle_video_generate(
{"prompt": "animate", "image_url": str(tmp_path / "nope.png")},
task_id="t1",
)
payload = json.loads(out)
assert payload["success"] is False
assert "Could not read source image" in payload["error"]

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@ -1498,6 +1498,48 @@ def _maybe_route_managed_krea(
return json.dumps(result)
def _confine_source_images(
image_url, reference_image_urls, task_id, *, permitted: tuple = ("image",)
):
"""Route path-like source images through the sandbox-aware resolver.
Under a non-local terminal backend (ssh/docker/), model-supplied local
paths are resolved via ``tools.image_source`` (in-sandbox exec-read,
media-cache host reads, credential guard, lazy env bring-up) and converted
to ``data:`` URLs before any provider sees them so generation tools obey
the same confinement boundary as vision/video analysis, and sandbox-only
files actually work as edit sources. URLs and data: URLs pass through
untouched; the local backend is a no-op (providers keep their host reads).
Returns ``(image_url, reference_image_urls, error_json_or_None)``.
"""
backend = (os.getenv("TERMINAL_ENV") or "local").strip().lower()
if backend in ("", "local"):
return image_url, reference_image_urls, None
from model_tools import _run_async
from tools.image_source import ImageResolutionError, resolve_local_source_to_data_url
try:
if isinstance(image_url, str) and image_url.strip():
image_url = _run_async(resolve_local_source_to_data_url(
image_url, task_id, permitted=permitted))
if isinstance(reference_image_urls, (list, tuple)):
reference_image_urls = [
_run_async(resolve_local_source_to_data_url(ref, task_id, permitted=permitted))
if isinstance(ref, str) else ref
for ref in list(reference_image_urls)
]
except ImageResolutionError as exc:
return image_url, reference_image_urls, json.dumps({
"success": False,
"image": None,
"error": f"Could not read source image: {exc}",
"error_type": type(exc).__name__,
})
return image_url, reference_image_urls, None
def _handle_image_generate(args, **kw):
prompt = args.get("prompt", "")
if not prompt:
@ -1507,6 +1549,15 @@ def _handle_image_generate(args, **kw):
reference_image_urls = args.get("reference_image_urls")
task_id = kw.get("task_id")
# Terminal-backend confinement chokepoint: convert path-like sources to
# data: URLs via the shared resolver BEFORE any provider dispatch, so
# every backend (plugin, managed Krea, in-tree FAL) gets the same
# sandbox-confined bytes.
image_url, reference_image_urls, confine_error = _confine_source_images(
image_url, reference_image_urls, task_id)
if confine_error is not None:
return confine_error
# Route to a plugin-registered provider if one is active (and it's
# not the in-tree FAL path). When ``image_gen.provider == "krea"`` this
# already reaches the Krea plugin's managed gateway path.

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@ -440,3 +440,37 @@ def _detect_video_mime(data: bytes, src: str) -> Optional[str]:
if len(data) > 12 and data[4:8] == b"ftyp":
return "video/mp4"
return None
async def resolve_local_source_to_data_url(
src: str, task_id: Optional[str], *, permitted: tuple = ("image",)
) -> str:
"""Convert a path-like media source into a ``data:`` URL via the resolver.
Generation tools (image_generate / video_generate) forward model-supplied
source images to provider plugins, which historically read local paths off
the HOST filesystem regardless of terminal backend. Under a non-local
backend that is both broken (the file usually lives in the sandbox, so the
host read misses) and inconsistent with the confinement model vision/video
analysis enforce (GHSA-gpxw-6wxv-w3qq): the sandbox boundary should govern
every model-supplied path.
This helper is the dispatch-layer chokepoint: URL-shaped sources
(http/https/data) pass through untouched; anything path-like resolves
through :func:`resolve_image_source` media-cache host reads, bounded
in-sandbox exec-read, lazy env bring-up, credential guard, ingest cap
and comes back as a ``data:`` URL every provider already accepts.
Callers apply this only under a non-local terminal backend: on the local
backend providers keep their existing host-side reads (chosen posture,
zero behavior change).
"""
s = (src or "").strip()
if not s or s.lower().startswith(("http://", "https://", "data:")):
return src
resolved = await resolve_image_source(
s, ResolveContext(task_id=task_id), permitted=permitted
)
encoded = base64.b64encode(resolved.data).decode("ascii")
mime = resolved.mime or "application/octet-stream"
return f"data:{mime};base64,{encoded}"

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@ -311,6 +311,17 @@ def _handle_video_generate(args: Dict[str, Any], **_kw: Any) -> str:
prompt = (args.get("prompt") or "").strip()
image_url = (args.get("image_url") or "").strip() or None
reference_image_urls = _normalize_reference_images(args.get("reference_image_urls"))
task_id = _kw.get("task_id")
# Terminal-backend confinement chokepoint (mirrors image_generate): under
# a non-local backend, path-like source images resolve through the shared
# sandbox-aware resolver and reach providers as data: URLs.
from tools.image_generation_tool import _confine_source_images
image_url, reference_image_urls, confine_error = _confine_source_images(
image_url, reference_image_urls, task_id)
if confine_error is not None:
return confine_error
duration = _coerce_int(args.get("duration"))
aspect_ratio = (args.get("aspect_ratio") or DEFAULT_ASPECT_RATIO).strip() or DEFAULT_ASPECT_RATIO
resolution = (args.get("resolution") or DEFAULT_RESOLUTION).strip() or DEFAULT_RESOLUTION