fix(config): make get_env_value scope-aware — the last scope-blind credential reader
Salvaged premise from #67065 (@webtecnica, issue #67027), reimplemented: get_env_value() read os.environ first with no secret-scope check, so a multiplexed profile turn could serve another profile's credential. Its siblings get_env_value_prefer_dotenv and gateway.config._getenv were already scope-aware. Reimplementation note: the original diff called get_secret() but fell through to os.environ on a scoped miss — re-opening the exact leak it targeted (flagged by the sweeper review). This version delegates policy fully to agent.secret_scope.get_secret (global vars pass through; scope authoritative under multiplexing; legacy environ behavior when off; UnscopedSecretError propagates fail-closed), then falls back to .env. 6 regression tests incl. the #67027 repro (envless profile + multiplexed turn -> None, not the other profile's key); sabotage-verified RED on the old implementation.
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@ -4107,10 +4107,36 @@ def reload_env() -> int:
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def get_env_value(key: str) -> Optional[str]:
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"""Get a value from ~/.hermes/.env or environment."""
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# Check environment first
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if key in os.environ:
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return os.environ[key]
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"""Get a value from ``os.environ`` or ``~/.hermes/.env``, scope-aware.
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The ``os.environ`` read routes through ``agent.secret_scope.get_secret``
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so that, under an active profile scope (multiplexed gateway turn), this
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is scope-checked rather than leaking another profile's raw ``os.environ``
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value. ``get_secret`` encodes the whole policy: global vars pass through;
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scope is authoritative under multiplexing (miss -> None, no environ
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fallthrough); when multiplexing is off it behaves exactly like the
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legacy ``os.environ`` read. Its siblings ``get_env_value_prefer_dotenv``
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and ``gateway.config._getenv`` already work this way — this was the last
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scope-blind reader of the trio (#67027).
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"""
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try:
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from agent.secret_scope import (
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UnscopedSecretError,
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get_secret as _get_secret,
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)
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except Exception:
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if key in os.environ:
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return os.environ[key]
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return load_env().get(key)
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try:
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val = _get_secret(key)
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except UnscopedSecretError:
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raise
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except Exception:
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val = os.environ.get(key)
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if val is not None:
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return val
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# Then check .env file
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env_vars = load_env()
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@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
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"""get_env_value must be scope-aware — the last scope-blind reader (#67027).
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Under a multiplexed profile turn, ``os.environ`` can hold another profile's
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value. ``get_env_value`` previously returned it before any scope check;
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its siblings (``get_env_value_prefer_dotenv``, ``gateway.config._getenv``)
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were already scope-aware. Salvaged premise from PR #67065 (@webtecnica),
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reimplemented to delegate policy fully to ``agent.secret_scope.get_secret``
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(the PR's own diff fell through to ``os.environ`` on a scoped miss,
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re-opening the leak it targeted).
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"""
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import contextlib
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import pytest
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from agent.secret_scope import (
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UnscopedSecretError,
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reset_secret_scope,
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set_multiplex_active,
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set_secret_scope,
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)
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from hermes_cli.config import get_env_value
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@contextlib.contextmanager
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def _scope(secrets, *, multiplex: bool):
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set_multiplex_active(multiplex)
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token = set_secret_scope(secrets) if secrets is not None else None
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try:
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yield
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finally:
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if token is not None:
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reset_secret_scope(token)
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set_multiplex_active(False)
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def test_scoped_value_wins_over_environ(monkeypatch):
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monkeypatch.setenv("OPENAI_API_KEY", "sk-other-profile")
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with _scope({"OPENAI_API_KEY": "sk-this-profile"}, multiplex=True):
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assert get_env_value("OPENAI_API_KEY") == "sk-this-profile"
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def test_multiplexed_scope_miss_does_not_leak_environ(monkeypatch, tmp_path):
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"""The #67027 repro: envless named profile must NOT inherit the other
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profile's credential from process environ during a multiplexed turn."""
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monkeypatch.setenv("HERMES_HOME", str(tmp_path / ".hermes"))
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monkeypatch.setenv("OPENAI_API_KEY", "sk-other-profile")
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with _scope({}, multiplex=True): # profile has no .env / empty scope
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assert get_env_value("OPENAI_API_KEY") is None
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def test_multiplex_off_scope_miss_falls_back_to_environ(monkeypatch):
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monkeypatch.setenv("OPENAI_API_KEY", "sk-from-shell")
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with _scope({}, multiplex=False):
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assert get_env_value("OPENAI_API_KEY") == "sk-from-shell"
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def test_no_scope_single_profile_behaves_like_legacy(monkeypatch):
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monkeypatch.setenv("OPENAI_API_KEY", "sk-legacy")
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with _scope(None, multiplex=False):
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assert get_env_value("OPENAI_API_KEY") == "sk-legacy"
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def test_multiplex_active_unscoped_read_fails_closed(monkeypatch):
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monkeypatch.setenv("OPENAI_API_KEY", "sk-should-not-leak")
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with _scope(None, multiplex=True):
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# No scope installed — must raise, not silently serve environ.
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with pytest.raises(UnscopedSecretError):
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get_env_value("OPENAI_API_KEY")
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def test_dotenv_fallback_still_works(monkeypatch, tmp_path):
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home = tmp_path / ".hermes"
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home.mkdir(parents=True)
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(home / ".env").write_text("MY_TEST_KEY=from-dotenv\n", encoding="utf-8")
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monkeypatch.setenv("HERMES_HOME", str(home))
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monkeypatch.delenv("MY_TEST_KEY", raising=False)
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with _scope(None, multiplex=False):
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assert get_env_value("MY_TEST_KEY") == "from-dotenv"
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