cron_continuable_surface=in_channel is meant to deliver a cron brief FLAT
into a channel (thread_id=None) so a plain channel reply continues the job
via the shared-channel session. The scheduler already seeds that flat
session (_seed_cron_channel_session) but never cleared the ORIGINAL
target/origin thread_id before routing the actual delivery, so a job
scheduled from inside a Slack thread still delivered into that origin
thread — the seeded continuable session then never matched where the brief
actually landed.
Clear thread_id once in_channel_surface is finalized, before it is re-read
for route_thread_id / the standalone fallback. Scope the clear to EXACTLY
the target that gets flat-seeded — the origin-continuable target
(mirror_this_target) on a live, in_channel-capable adapter
(runtime_adapter is not None):
- fan-out / broadcast / explicit-thread targets keep their thread_id — they
are not continuable and are never seeded, so flattening them would
reroute an explicit thread and could collapse two targets into duplicate
flat sends;
- the standalone no-live-adapter path keeps the origin thread — it can
never seed the flat session, and without an adapter the D6 capability
fail-safe can't run, so flattening there would both drop the brief out of
any continuable lane and bypass D6.
This keeps the clear in lockstep with the seed condition
(in_channel_surface and mirror_this_target) and the D6 fail-safe.
mirror_this_target / origin_user_id are computed earlier using the original
thread_id to match the origin conversation.
Regression tests in TestCronContinuableSurfaceInChannel:
- a job whose origin carries a thread_id must not forward that thread_id to
the live adapter (DeliveryRouter folds target.thread_id into send
metadata), and the seeded continuable session stays flat (thread_id=None);
- with no live adapter, the standalone send falls back to the origin thread
rather than flattening.
Two follow-ups to the per-job model pin surface (#67472 / #49948 review):
- cron/scheduler.py: pass target_model=<effective job model> to
resolve_runtime_provider() on the primary path, so providers with
model-specific api_mode routing derive the mode from the model the job
actually runs (per-job pin > env > config default) instead of the stale
persisted default. The auth-fallback path already did this for its
fb_model.
- hermes_cli/web_server.py: POST /api/cron/jobs (and its sync worker) no
longer hardcodes profile="default" when the request carries no profile
param. A pool backend scoped to a named profile now resolves its own
profile via get_active_profile_name(), so pre-profileScoped desktop
clients can't write a named profile's job into ~/.hermes. Unscoped /
custom HERMES_HOME keeps the legacy default fallback.
Tests: target_model capture test on run_job; two profile-default tests on
the create endpoint.
Windows Notepad and PowerShell 5.1 Set-Content -Encoding UTF8 write a
leading UTF-8 BOM. json.load under encoding=utf-8 raises
JSONDecodeError("Unexpected UTF-8 BOM"), and load_jobs wraps that as
RuntimeError("Cron database corrupted and unrepairable"), taking down
cron CRUD/scheduler for a hand-edited jobs.json.
Read with utf-8-sig on all four independent jobs.json readers
(load_jobs primary + strict=False repair, dump _cron_summary, status
Scheduled Jobs). Write path stays plain utf-8 so the next save_jobs
heals a BOM'd file. Matches the env-class dialect (#65123).
Tests: BOM load (crash repro), bomless regression, empty store,
BOM+bare-list auto-repair, BOM+control-char strict=False arm, dump and
status CLI readers.
run_agent._dispatch_delegate_task forces background=True for every top-level
delegation, and async_delivery_supported() returns True for any session that
never binds the capability. On runners that cannot receive a completion after
their turn ends, that combination silently discards every subagent result: the
model gets a dispatch handle, ends its turn, and reports 'waiting for results'.
Two such runners never bind the capability:
* hermes -z (one-shot) prints one final response and exits. It bypasses cli.py,
so nothing drains process_registry.completion_queue (only the interactive
process_loop and the gateway watchers do).
* cron run_job clears the HERMES_SESSION_* routing keys, so a completion event
carries session_key="" — _enrich_async_delegation_routing cannot resolve it
and _inject_watch_notification drops it ("no routing metadata"). By then
run_job has already shipped the job's final response via _deliver_result;
there is no turn left to re-enter. Worse, get_current_session_key() can fall
back to the ambient os.environ HERMES_SESSION_KEY, so a cron subagent's output
can be routed into an unrelated user chat rather than merely dropped.
Add declare_stateless_channel() and bind it in both runners, routing
delegate_task to its existing inline/synchronous path — the same fallback the
stateless HTTP adapter already relies on, and the fix suggested in #63142. The
helper binds only the capability: set_session_vars() would also latch
_session_context_engaged, which a pure single-process one-shot must not trigger.
Also correct two agent-facing strings that hardcoded 'stateless HTTP API' as the
only channel without async delivery (delegate_tool, terminal_tool); they now name
the actual condition.
Repro (before): hermes -z 'Use delegate_task to spawn a subagent that replies
BANANA. Report its reply.' -> "Waiting for the subagent's response...", exit 0,
no BANANA. After: BANANA is returned in-turn.
Fixes#53027Fixes#63142
Review follow-up: tests that monkeypatch CRON_DIR/JOBS_FILE/OUTPUT_DIR (the
documented process-wide compatibility surface) were bypassed by the lazy
env fallback — 3 file-permission tests, the cross-process lock test, and
the heartbeat roundtrip regressed. _current_cron_store() now snapshots the
constants at import and honors any deliberate re-point of them ahead of
the env resolution, so the precedence is: use_cron_store() override >
patched constants > fresh HERMES_HOME > import defaults. Adds a test
pinning constants-beat-env; the late-env sentinel behavior is unchanged.
tests/cron: failure set byte-identical to unpatched main on this box
(the 5 regressions gone); 138 pass in the touched files.
Complements ec0227b43 (context-scoped cron store): the ContextVar override
is the right tool for deliberate cross-profile scoping, but with no
override active, _current_cron_store() returned the import-time constants —
so a HERMES_HOME set AFTER cron.jobs import (the filed incident: test
fixtures patching the env too late) still read/wrote the user's real
jobs.json. The fallback now resolves the active profile home fresh via
get_hermes_home() (context-local override, then env) and scopes the store
to it; when the home is unchanged since import, the exact module-level
constants are returned as before (zero change in the common path, and they
remain the documented compatibility surface). use_cron_store() still wins.
Three tests: late env repoint scopes the store; unchanged home returns the
import-time constants identically; an active use_cron_store() override
beats the env.
A fallback chain entry can name its API key via key_env (or the
api_key_env alias) per the fallback-providers docs, but only the gateway
path resolved it — TUI/desktop, cron, and CLI setup fallbacks ignored it,
so a fallback provider whose key lives in a non-standard env var never
resolved on those surfaces.
Centralize the inline-api_key-then-key_env lookup in
hermes_cli/fallback_config.resolve_entry_api_key() and use it at all four
fallback resolution sites (tui_gateway, cron scheduler, gateway runner,
CLI setup mixin); the CLI mixin also gains the base_url passthrough the
other surfaces already had.
Salvaged from PR #43861 (surgical reapply — the original branch predates
the #65264 fallback restructuring).
Only fallback resolution needs an explicit target model. Keep the primary resolver call compatible with existing callers and test doubles while retaining atomic provider/model fallback selection.
Switch provider and model together after setup-time auth failure. Serialize global auth-store merges under target-specific locks and preserve auth-to-shared lock ordering for profile OAuth refreshes.
Collapse the six per-surface copies of override-then-global resolution
(CLI startup, gateway, TUI, cron, /model switch, fallback activation)
onto one shared resolve_reasoning_config() in hermes_constants.
Also fixes the gateway resolving reasoning against config model.default
instead of the session's effective model: after a session-only /model
switch, the switched model's override now applies (gateway message paths
pass the resolved session model through _resolve_session_reasoning_config;
/reasoning status reads the session model override).
Cleanup: drop docs/PER_MODEL_REASONING.md (duplicates the website docs
page), drop the change-detector _config_version test (no bump needed —
deep-merge handles new keys), remove a stale plan-reference comment.
Adds chokepoint contract tests (13) and gateway session-effective-model
regression tests (2).
Add agent.reasoning_overrides dict to config.yaml. Users can now set
a reasoning_effort per model, overriding the global agent.reasoning_effort.
Example:
agent:
reasoning_effort: "medium" # global default
reasoning_overrides:
"openrouter/anthropic/claude-opus-4.5": "xhigh"
"openai/gpt-5": "low"
"claude-sonnet-4.6": "high" # bare model name also works
The helper is spelling-tolerant: override keys match regardless of
provider prefix or dots-vs-dashes normalization, so users can write
keys in any sensible form and they'll match.
Resolution priority:
1. Session-scoped /reasoning --session override (gateway only; unchanged)
2. Per-model override from agent.reasoning_overrides (spelling-tolerant)
3. Global agent.reasoning_effort (existing)
4. Provider default (unchanged)
Wired into:
- CLI startup (cli.py)
- Messaging gateway agent construction (gateway/run.py)
- Desktop/TUI _load_reasoning_config (tui_gateway/server.py)
- Cron job scheduler (cron/scheduler.py)
- /model mid-session switch (agent/agent_runtime_helpers.py)
+ _primary_runtime now tracks reasoning_config for correct fallback recovery
- Fallback activation (agent/chat_completion_helpers.py::try_activate_fallback)
+ Re-resolves reasoning_config for the fallback model (best-effort)
Closes#21256 (per-model reasoning_effort defaults).
Note: no hermes config set agent.reasoning_overrides.<model> support;
users edit the YAML directly. _set_nested splits on "." and would
corrupt model keys containing version dots.
Salvage of #63935. The original fix read HERMES_CRON_SESSION_DB_TIMEOUT
from a bare env var, but AGENTS.md requires non-secret behavioral
settings to live in config.yaml with an env var bridge only for
backward compatibility.
Changes:
- Add cron.session_db_timeout_seconds to DEFAULT_CONFIG (default 10s)
- Resolution order: HERMES_CRON_SESSION_DB_TIMEOUT env override →
cron.session_db_timeout_seconds in config.yaml → 10s default
(mirrors the existing script_timeout_seconds pattern)
- 0 = unlimited (opt-in for debugging, skips the bound)
- Strengthen test: assert the warning is logged on invalid env value
(caplog was taken but never asserted)
- Add test: verify config.yaml resolution path works end-to-end
Co-authored-by: LoicHmh <26006141+LoicHmh@users.noreply.github.com>
run_job() constructs SessionDB() synchronously with no timeout of its
own, unlike the agent's run_conversation call further down, which is
already bounded by HERMES_CRON_TIMEOUT. A wedged sqlite3.connect (e.g.
a stale flock from a crashed sibling process) hangs this call
indefinitely.
That hang is invisible to every existing cron safeguard because it
happens before _submit_with_guard's future exists: the finally block
that discards the job ID from _running_job_ids never runs. The job
stays wedged "running" — every later tick logs "already running —
skipping" — until the whole gateway process is restarted.
Observed in production: a cron job's worker thread was confirmed via
a live py-spy thread dump to be parked inside SessionDB.__init__'s
sqlite3.connect for 3+ days, silently skipping every scheduled fire
in between across a gateway process that otherwise stayed healthy.
Bound the SessionDB() construction with its own timeout
(HERMES_CRON_SESSION_DB_TIMEOUT, default 10s), following the same
bounded-thread-pool pattern already used elsewhere in this file (the
delivery retry path, and the agent inactivity watchdog just below).
On timeout, log at ERROR and proceed with session_db=None instead of
degrading silently to debug level, since an actual hang here is a new
condition worth surfacing.
Adds tests/cron/test_sessiondb_init_hang.py, including an end-to-end
regression proving the dispatch guard is released and a subsequent
tick can fire the same job again after a simulated hang.
Reserve API requests before their first await, include every drain-owned work type in runtime status, and pause local cron dispatch while a gateway drain is active.
get_due_jobs()'s one-shot stale-entry recovery (#38758) treated an
expired run_claim (#59229) as proof the claiming tick died, but a run
stalled on network I/O — or a laptop asleep mid-run — legitimately
outlives the TTL while very much alive. The recovery then deleted the
job record mid-flight: list showed the job gone, and when the run
finished mark_job_run() found nothing to update, so last_run_at /
last_status / last_delivery_error were never recorded.
Two guards, per the liveness signals available:
- Same process (the common single-gateway case): before removing a
dispatch-limit-reached one-shot, consult the scheduler's running set
via a lazy import; if the job is still running here it is slow, not
stale — keep the entry.
- Cross process: run_job's monitor loop now refreshes run_claim.at
every 60s while the run is alive (including under
HERMES_CRON_TIMEOUT=0, which previously blocked without polling), so
an expired claim really does mean the owner died and the TTL stays a
dead-owner detector.
Fixes#62002
Structural completion of the malformed-job freeze fixes (#61382 id-less,
#61525 non-dict schedule, #61581 bad next_run_at): wrap the per-job body
of _get_due_jobs_locked in try/except so any FUTURE malformed-field
variant degrades to skipping that one job for the tick instead of
aborting the scan before save_jobs() and freezing the whole profile's
scheduler.
Also: restore test_repeated_concurrent_runs_accumulate_completed_count
to TestMarkJobRunConcurrency (accidentally re-parented by the #61581
diff), add a containment regression test, and AUTHOR_MAP for hydracoco7.
E2E: one jobs.json carrying all five malformed shapes (drifted job_id,
missing id, null schedule, garbage next_run_at, non-string last_run_at)
plus a healthy sibling — single tick contains all five, sibling fires,
repairs persist, second tick stable. 670 cron tests green.
One bad next_run_at value in jobs.json aborts the due-jobs scan with
ValueError from fromisoformat, before any save_jobs, so siblings lose
progress (fast-forwards etc).
Early normalization in _get_due_jobs_locked + defensive parses in
compute_next_run / _recoverable_oneshot_run_at.
Added test_bad_next_run_at_does_not_crash_or_block_sibling_jobs.
A job record in jobs.json can have a non-dict 'schedule' value (null, string,
etc.) from direct edit or old writers.
In _get_due_jobs_locked:
schedule = job.get('schedule', {})
kind = schedule.get('kind')
This (and direct schedule['kind'] in compute_next_run etc.) raises and
aborts the entire due-jobs scan before save_jobs() or advancing next_run_at
for healthy jobs. Exactly the same failure mode as the id-less job P1.
Fix: normalize non-dict schedules to {} early (before any use), matching the
defense added for id-less records. Also added defensive guards in compute
functions.
Added regression test that a bad schedule does not crash and healthy sibling
is still returned.
Refs similar pattern in #61382.
A cron record authored by a direct jobs.json edit that bypassed
add_job() can lack an "id" key (older writers used "job_id"). Every
site in _get_due_jobs_locked indexes job["id"] eagerly — both the
logging helpers (job.get("name", job["id"]) evaluates the default
argument unconditionally) and the 'for rj in raw_jobs: if rj["id"] ==
job["id"]' persistence loops. A single malformed record therefore
raised KeyError mid-tick, aborting the entire scan before save_jobs()
ran. Result: healthy jobs' fast-forwarded next_run_at was computed in
memory then discarded on the exception unwind, freezing the whole
profile's scheduler in a per-minute loop (observed dormant for weeks).
Fix: normalize id-less records at the top of _get_due_jobs_locked before
anything keys off job["id"] — recover the id from a drifted "job_id"
key when present, else synthesize one via uuid4, and persist. This
repairs the whole bug class at the source rather than guarding each of
the ~12 downstream index sites.
Adds a regression test that fails with KeyError on the current code and
passes with the fix, asserting a healthy sibling job is still returned
when an id-less record shares the store.
Three fixes for the silent post-restart ticker stall:
1. _jobs_lock() bounds its cross-process flock: LOCK_NB polled against a
30s deadline instead of an unbounded LOCK_EX taken while holding the
process-wide RLock. On timeout it logs at ERROR and degrades to
in-process-only locking (the existing fallback path), so a sibling
process wedged while holding .jobs.lock can no longer freeze every
cron function - including the ticker's get_due_jobs() and thus the
heartbeat - forever with zero logging.
2. fire_claim/run_claim freshness checks are bounded on both sides
(0 <= age < ttl): a claim stamped in the future (clock/TZ skew across
a restart) was previously fresh forever, making the job permanently
unfireable and every manual run report 'already being fired'.
3. _execute_job_now distinguishes paused/disabled/missing jobs from a
genuinely held claim instead of mislabeling them all as 'already
being fired'.
Keep #60631's get_running_job_ids() snapshot + _active_cron_job_count()
(import-guarded for minimal test doubles) as the single read path, and
retarget #60612's drain tests at it. Drops the redundant
cron_jobs_in_flight() helper so there is one surface, not two.
Follow-up to the previous commit on #60432. The status-write guard
(_consume_interrupted_flag, checked right before mark_job_run) closes
the false-success bookkeeping gap, but run_one_job delivers its result
BEFORE that check: delivery happens right after run_job() returns,
mark_job_run happens at the very end. A job whose tool subprocess was
killed mid-flight can still produce a plausible-looking final_response
from the truncated output, and that response would reach the user via
_deliver_result before the interrupted flag was ever consulted --
correct status in jobs.json, wrong message already sent.
Adds _is_interrupted(), a non-destructive peek at the same
_interrupted_job_ids set (_consume_interrupted_flag stays as the
consuming, authoritative check right before the status write -- this
needed a peek instead since the flag has to still be visible there).
Checked right after save_job_output, before the deliver_content
decision: if the run looked successful but was flagged interrupted,
force success=False with an explicit interruption message. This
routes delivery through the existing _summarize_cron_failure_for_delivery
path (the same one a real failure already uses) instead of the raw
final_response, so the user gets an honest "this run was interrupted"
instead of a truncated/misleading result.
Testing: 4 new tests in tests/cron/test_shutdown_interrupt.py --
_is_interrupted peek semantics (false/true/does-not-clear, as opposed
to the consuming _consume_interrupted_flag), and the delivery-gate
test itself, which mocks run_job to return a normal-looking success
with a "plausible final response" while the job is pre-marked
interrupted, and asserts _deliver_result receives the failure summary
("This run was interrupted.") instead, with the summarizer's error
argument confirmed to mention the interruption.
Fail-then-pass: reverted cron/scheduler.py only, the 4 new tests fail
(3 on the missing _is_interrupted attribute, 1 -- the delivery-gate
test -- on _summarize_cron_failure_for_delivery never being called,
i.e. the raw response would have gone out); restored, all 16 tests in
the file pass.
Regression: tests/cron/ (683 tests) + test_cron_active_work_drain.py +
test_gateway_shutdown.py + test_shutdown_cache_cleanup.py -- 11
pre-existing failures (Unix file-permission-bit and path-tilde
assertions that don't apply on this Windows dev box), matching the
same set already established as pre-existing in the prior commit's
regression check. Zero new failures.
Continues #60432
Cron jobs run through cron/scheduler.py's own ThreadPoolExecutor via a
standalone AIAgent (run_job/run_one_job), entirely outside
GatewayRunner._running_agents -- the dict _drain_active_agents() and
every other active-work check on that class reads. A gateway shutdown
(/update, /restart, and SIGUSR1 all funnel through the same stop())
could log active_at_start=0 and immediately kill tool subprocesses
while a cron job's terminal command was still running, with no wait
and no indication anything was interrupted.
Real-world impact (from the issue): a scheduled daily briefing cron
job was in flight during /update, its tool subprocess got killed
by the unconditional shutdown cleanup, and the job was never marked
failed -- it simply never completed or delivered, with no error
surfaced anywhere. A repro with a 30-minute `sleep` cron job in flight
during /update reproduced the same pattern: subprocess killed at
+0.22s of drain (active_at_start=0), the job's agent thread continued
in-process and produced a plausible-looking final response from the
truncated tool output, and the scheduler marked the run successful.
Root cause is layered, not a single line:
1. GatewayRunner._drain_active_agents() only waits on _running_agents.
Cron work was invisible to it, so drain returned instantly whenever
the only active work was a cron job.
2. Even with visibility, the shutdown's final tool-subprocess kill
(process_registry.kill_all()) is a global, unconditional sweep with
no per-job targeting -- a long-running cron job that outlives the
drain timeout still gets its subprocess killed.
3. cron/scheduler.py had no way to detect that a job's tool subprocess
was killed out from under it mid-run; the agent thread kept going
and its eventual (often degraded but plausible-looking) response
got reported as a normal successful completion.
Fix, three parts:
- cron/scheduler.py: expose get_running_job_ids() (thread-safe
snapshot of the existing _running_job_ids set, already used to
prevent double-dispatch) so the gateway can read cron's in-flight
state without reaching into private module internals.
- gateway/run.py: GatewayRunner._active_cron_job_count() reads that
snapshot. _drain_active_agents() now waits on
(_running_agents OR active cron jobs), so a cron-only workload gets
the same bounded wait chat sessions already get instead of an
instant active_at_start=0. Shutdown drain logging gains
cron_active_at_start/cron_active_now fields alongside the existing
ones (unchanged, for compat).
- cron/scheduler.py: mark_running_jobs_interrupted(reason), called by
gateway/run.py's _kill_tool_subprocesses() right after
process_registry.kill_all(), marks every job still in
_running_job_ids at that instant as failed/interrupted via the
existing mark_job_run() -- and records the job IDs in
_interrupted_job_ids BEFORE writing, so run_one_job()'s own
eventual completion for the same run (racing in its own thread)
checks that flag and skips its normal write instead of clobbering
the interrupted status with a false "ok" produced from the
now-truncated tool output. This does not attempt to correlate a
killed PID to a specific job ID (process_registry tracks PIDs, not
job IDs) -- any job still dispatched at the moment of a forced kill
is treated as interrupted, matching the existing coarser precedent
set by _interrupt_running_agents(), which interrupts every entry in
_running_agents on a drain timeout without per-agent correlation
either.
Deliberately out of scope (flagged in the issue as a separate,
lower-priority concern): startup-time reconciliation of cron runs that
started but never reached a terminal status.
Testing:
- tests/cron/test_shutdown_interrupt.py (12 tests): get_running_job_ids
snapshot semantics, mark_running_jobs_interrupted marking/no-op/
partial-failure behavior, and -- the core race guard -- run_one_job
skipping its own last_status write (both the success path and the
exception path) when the shutdown path already marked the run
interrupted, with a control test proving ordinary un-interrupted
completions are unaffected.
- tests/gateway/test_cron_active_work_drain.py (9 tests):
_active_cron_job_count reading cron state and failing closed (0) if
the cron module is unavailable; _drain_active_agents waiting for an
in-flight cron job the same way it waits for chat sessions, timing
out if the job outruns the window, and leaving existing chat-session
drain behavior unchanged; a full runner.stop() integration test
(drain-timeout path) proving mark_running_jobs_interrupted actually
fires with the right job ID when a tool subprocess is force-killed,
plus a no-op control when nothing cron-related is in flight.
- tests/gateway/test_shutdown_cache_cleanup.py: added
_active_cron_job_count() to that file's hand-rolled _FakeGateway test
double, which stop() now calls -- without it those 8 pre-existing
tests AttributeError (caught by fail-then-pass below, not a
production bug).
Fail-then-pass: reverted gateway/run.py + cron/scheduler.py, all 21
new tests fail (fixture/attribute errors -- the feature doesn't exist
yet); restored, all 21 pass.
Regression check: ran the full plausibly-affected surface --
tests/gateway/{test_gateway_shutdown,test_restart_drain,
test_restart_notification,test_restart_redelivery_dedup,
test_restart_resume_pending,test_restart_service_detection,
test_shutdown_cache_cleanup,test_stuck_loop,test_clean_shutdown_marker,
test_external_drain_control,test_session_state_cleanup,
test_update_command,test_update_streaming}.py plus tests/cron/ (944
tests) -- against a clean upstream/main checkout and against this
branch. Diffed the two FAILED lists: identical, 20 pre-existing
failures on both sides (Windows-locale/cp1252 file-encoding issues and
Unix-permission-bit assertions that don't apply on this Windows dev
box), zero new failures, zero fixed-by-accident. The 8
test_shutdown_cache_cleanup.py failures found mid-development were
from the _FakeGateway gap above, fixed in the same commit and
confirmed clean on the final rerun (diff against baseline: exit 0).
Fixes#60432
/update and other shutdown paths only waited on gateway session agents,
so active cron tool work was killed immediately in final-cleanup while
the scheduler could still mark the job successful (#60432).
Cron jobs may store absolute paths to skills under HERMES_HOME/skills or
external_dirs, but skill_view rejects absolute names for security. Extract
the slash-command normalization into agent.skill_utils and reuse it when
cron loads job skills.
Follow-up to #59524. The one-shot running-claim stale-recovery window was a
fixed 30-min constant. Derive it from the cron inactivity timeout instead
(HERMES_CRON_TIMEOUT, the same limit the scheduler enforces per run) so the
safety valve tracks how long a run may actually go quiet:
- unset/invalid -> default 600s inactivity -> TTL 1800s (unchanged behaviour)
- positive N -> max(N * 3 headroom, 1800s floor)
- 0 (unlimited) -> no finite bound -> fall back to the 1800s constant
The fixed constant is kept as the floor + unlimited-case fallback. Resolved
once per due-scan. HERMES_CRON_TIMEOUT is a pre-existing internal env var
(already read by cron/scheduler.py); no new config surface.
E2E: with HERMES_CRON_TIMEOUT=1200 the claim now survives to 60min where the
old fixed 1800s constant wrongly expired it at 30min mid-run. +1 derivation
test; 640/640 cron tests pass.
The +60s next_run_at advance only delayed a duplicate one-shot dispatch by
one tick — a job that outlives the 60s tick interval (the reported 2.5-min
research prompt) still re-fired on the next tick after the window expired,
so the concurrent gateway+desktop double-delivery persisted.
Replace it with a durable run_claim (at+by, mirroring fire_claim) stamped
on the one-shot under the same jobs lock get_due_jobs holds, and checked at
the top of the due-scan: a fresh claim held by an in-flight run makes every
other scheduler process skip the job for its ENTIRE run, not one tick.
mark_job_run() clears the claim on completion; a ONESHOT_RUN_CLAIM_TTL
(30 min) safety valve re-dispatches a claim left by a tick that died mid-run
so a one-shot is never wedged.
E2E: long-running one-shot no longer double-fires at +28/+61/+120/+179s;
completion clears the claim + disables the job; crash recovery re-arms past
the TTL. +3 regression tests.
When two scheduler processes (gateway + desktop) run concurrently,
both could pick up the same one-shot job from get_due_jobs() because
its next_run_at was not advanced before execution started — only
recurring jobs were advanced (L3446). This caused duplicate deliveries
and wasted token spend (#59229).
Now _get_due_jobs_locked advances a one-shot's next_run_at by 60s
before returning it as due, persisted immediately under the same
file lock. mark_job_run re-anchors next_run_at on completion, so a
tick death between advance and execution only delays the job by one
tick window — it is never lost.
Closes#59229
Completes the #59395 bug-class fix. create_job and update_job's
schedule-change path already reject past one-shots (via #59410/#59438);
this closes the two remaining doors that stored next_run_at=None for a
'once' schedule and re-created the silent ghost job:
1. update_job fallback-recompute (the safety-net that re-derives
next_run_at when it's missing on an enabled, non-paused job)
2. resume_job (resuming a paused one-shot whose time has already passed
— empirically confirmed to create a scheduled job that never fires)
The redundant update_job schedule-change hunk from the original PR was
dropped (already on main via #59438). Adds resume-reject + update-reject/
accept regression tests.
Salvaged from #59428 by isheng-eqi.
Widen the #59395 fix to the sibling site: update_job's schedule-change path
(cron/jobs.py) had the SAME unguarded compute_next_run -> next_run_at pattern,
so updating a job's schedule to a one-shot >ONESHOT_GRACE_SECONDS in the past
would re-create the ghost job (next_run_at=None, state='scheduled', never fires)
that create_job now rejects. Apply the identical guard on update (raise before
any disk write, so the original job is left intact), with regression tests for
the reject + future-accept cases.
Also surface ONESHOT_GRACE_SECONDS in the raised ValueError (not just the
warning log) so a caller knows how far in the past is too far. Message from the
competing PR #59410 by @isheng-eqi.
Co-authored-by: isheng-eqi <265044697+isheng-eqi@users.noreply.github.com>
Defense-in-depth alongside the interpreter-shutdown guard: run_job closed
the cron agent's async resources (agent.close + cleanup_stale_async_clients)
in its finally block BEFORE run_one_job called _deliver_result, so a live
delivery could race a torn-down async client. run_job now accepts an optional
defer_agent_teardown holder; when set it hands the live agent back instead of
closing it, and run_one_job tears it down (via the extracted _teardown_cron_agent
helper) only AFTER delivery — in a finally so a failed run never leaks. Default
path (holder=None) is unchanged, so every existing caller keeps inline teardown.
Reorder approach based on #58777 by @LavyaTandel; reworked to keep a single
delivery site in run_one_job and add regression coverage.
Co-authored-by: LavyaTandel <lavya@loom.local>
A cron tick can fire while the gateway is tearing down (SIGTERM from
`hermes update` / `hermes gateway stop` / systemd restart, or an OOM-kill).
Once the interpreter is finalizing, `concurrent.futures` refuses new work
with `RuntimeError: cannot schedule new futures after interpreter shutdown`
and asyncio's default executor is gone, so the cron delivery and dispatch
paths crash the tick and spray a traceback into errors.log on every
restart-race. Telegram/live-adapter deliveries surface it as
"Telegram send failed: ... cannot schedule new futures after interpreter
shutdown".
Add `_interpreter_shutting_down()` and consult it at the scheduling sites:
- the standalone delivery path (`asyncio.run` + the fresh-pool fallback),
- the tick dispatch (`_submit_with_guard` `pool.submit`).
When finalizing, skip gracefully with a warning instead of raising; the job
stays due and fires on the next healthy tick. The helper also matches the
RuntimeError text as a fallback, since the concurrent.futures global flag can
be set a hair before `sys.is_finalizing()` flips.
Fixes#58720. Also addresses the cron paths in #55924.
The #22773 heuristic classified any telegram:<positive_chat_id>:<numeric_thread_id>
cron target as a Bot API channel Direct-Messages topic and routed it via
direct_messages_topic_id, which nulls message_thread_id. A normal forum-style
topic inside a private chat has the identical shape, so every such cron
delivery landed in General instead of the target thread (#52060). It also
means the only way to address a genuine channel DM topic was this same
ambiguous guess.
Disambiguate with the real runtime signal instead: probe the live adapter's
get_chat_info once and route via direct_messages_topic_id only when the chat
is actually a channel; everything else (private forum topic, forum supergroup,
group) and any probe failure fall back to message_thread_id — parity with
0.16.0 and with live reply routing. This fixes forum-topic delivery AND makes
genuine channel DM-topic cron delivery work correctly.
Once profile isolation is active (multiple gateway profiles or room->profile
multiplexing), get_secret() fails closed outside an installed scope. The cron
ticker fires jobs from a thread with no per-turn scope, so run_job() died in
resolve_runtime_provider() with UnscopedSecretError (e.g. for
OPENROUTER_BASE_URL / CUSTOM_BASE_URL) before model selection - every cron
job failed while interactive turns worked fine.
Wrap run_job() in set_secret_scope(build_profile_secret_scope(...)) with a
finally-reset, mirroring the proven per-turn pattern in gateway/run.py
(_profile_runtime_scope). Single-profile installs are unaffected (the scope
is just the profile's own .env).
tests/cron: 611 passed, 1 pre-existing unrelated failure
(TestRoutingIntents::test_all_token_case_insensitive fails identically on
unmodified main in a full-suite run and passes in isolation).
A Z.ai desktop user reported thinking reverting to medium after one turn,
burning ~200% of a week's credits in 4 days despite reasoning_effort: false
in config.yaml. Four compounding bugs:
- _session_info reported reasoning_effort "" for disabled reasoning,
indistinguishable from unset — the desktop adopted it after the first
turn, wiping its sticky "thinking off" pick so every later chat
reverted to the default effort.
- config.set key=reasoning always wrote agent.reasoning_effort to global
config.yaml, so every desktop model-menu selection (preset.effort ??
'medium') clobbered the user's configured value. Now session-scoped
like the messaging gateway's /reasoning, landing on
create_reasoning_override so lazily-built sessions keep it too.
- YAML `reasoning_effort: false`/`off`/`no` (boolean False) was coerced
to "" by every loader's `str(x or "")`, silently re-enabling thinking.
parse_reasoning_effort now treats False/"false"/"disabled" as
{"enabled": False}; loaders (tui gateway, gateway, cli, cron,
delegate) pass the raw value through. The desktop config reader also
crashed on the boolean (false.trim()), aborting voice/STT settings.
- The zai provider profile never sent thinking on the wire, and GLM-4.5+
defaults to thinking ON server-side — so disabling reasoning was a
silent no-op on direct Z.ai, the actual token burner. The profile now
emits extra_body.thinking {"type": "enabled"|"disabled"} for
thinking-capable GLM models, mirroring the DeepSeek profile.
Also: /new (session reset) now carries reasoning_config across the
rebuild like model_override; config.get reasoning prefers the session's
live value and maps a config False to "none"; Settings shows "Off"
instead of a blank select for hand-written false.
The standalone thread-pool fallback in _deliver_result() runs inside the
`except RuntimeError:` block (taken when asyncio.run() sees a running loop).
When future.result() raised there (SMTP ConnectionError, timeout, etc.), the
exception was NOT caught by the sibling `except Exception:` — it escaped
_deliver_result() and crashed the whole delivery loop, silently skipping every
remaining target. Multi-target delivery (e.g. deliver: 'email:a,email:b') is a
documented feature, so this broke a promised contract.
Wrap the fallback in its own try/except so a per-target failure is logged with
exc_info and the loop continues to the next target.
Fixes#47163
The in_channel surface DOES add a seed: _seed_cron_channel_session CREATES
the flat (platform, chat_id, None) session and mirrors the brief into it,
because mirror_to_session only APPENDS to an existing session and the flat
channel row is otherwise absent for a chat_postMessage delivery. Correct
the scheduler thread-skip comment and the test class docstring, which still
described the earlier 'let the existing mirror seed it' design.
Live testing exposed a real bug: an in_channel continuable cron delivered
flat to the channel (✅) but the reply did NOT continue the job — the bot
had no brief in context and confabulated the answer.
Root cause: mirror_to_session only APPENDS to a session that already
exists (_find_session_id → no-op when none matches); it never CREATEs one.
A flat (slack, chat_id, None) row is only created when a human posts a
top-level message the bot processes — a cron chat_postMessage delivery
never goes through the inbound handler, so the row is absent and the brief
is silently dropped. The prior impl relied on the bare mirror (F5/OQ-1
concluded "deletion only" — wrong).
Fix: _seed_cron_channel_session mirrors _seed_cron_thread_session —
get_or_create_session FIRST (chat_type = "dm" if is_dm else "group",
thread_id=None), keyed to the ORIGIN USER'S id, then mirror. The channel
session key embeds user_id (…:group:<chat>:<user>), so a system:cron id
would key the seed away from the reply; the origin user's id makes seed
key == inbound reply key. DM key ignores user_id but needs chat_type=dm
to match the prefix. Wired into the in_channel branch after delivery;
suppresses the generic mirror to avoid double-write.
DM validated (per request): the seeded key equals the inbound DM reply key
for a 1:1 DM; continuation works there too.
Tests:
- Rewrote the in_channel tests to use a real _session_store and the origin
user_id; assert get_or_create_session is called with the flat, correctly-
keyed source. Prove-fail: (a) reverting the create step and (b) seeding
with system:cron each turn a targeted test RED; restore → GREEN.
- +2 direct _seed_cron_channel_session unit tests asserting the KEY-MATCH
invariant (seed key == inbound reply key) via build_session_key, for both
channel and DM.
- Rewrote tests/manual/cron_inchannel_e2e.py to drive a REAL SessionStore +
real mirror_to_session + real _find_session_id + real build_session_key
(no session-layer mocks — the old mocked E2E is exactly why the bug
shipped). Asserts the brief lands in the transcript and the reply resolves
to the same session, for BOTH channel and 1:1 DM.
Full relevant sweep: 283 passed.
Add a per-platform `cron_continuable_surface` extra key
(`thread` default | `in_channel`) so a continuable cron job can deliver
FLAT into a Slack channel — no dedicated thread — and still be
replied-to. In `in_channel` mode the scheduler skips the thread-open
branch (leaves `thread_id=None`); the shipped origin-mirror then seeds
the `(slack, chat_id, None)` shared-channel session — the same bucket
`reply_in_thread: false` routes inbound channel replies to — so a plain
channel reply continues the job in context.
Design: specs/cron-inchannel-continuable (D1–D7, F5). Model B
(shared-channel session), NOT anchoring to the delivery `ts` — on Slack
replying to a specific message IS threading, so a `ts` anchor would only
relocate the thread, never deliver true threadless continuable.
- gateway/platforms/base.py: `supports_inchannel_continuable` capability
flag (default False → unsupported platforms fail SAFE to `thread`).
- plugins/platforms/slack/adapter.py: flag=True; `_cron_continuable_surface()`
resolver (coerces to the two-value enum); `_warn_if_inchannel_without_flat_reply`
connect-time warning (D5: warn, not hard-require — the misconfig fails safe).
- gateway/config.py: shared-key bridge line (top-level OR nested config).
- cron/scheduler.py: read the key generically from platform config, gate
the `in_channel` branch on the adapter capability flag, skip thread-open.
No new seed function (reuses the existing mirror — G6).
Pairing (docs): `in_channel` + `reply_in_thread: false` +
`require_mention: false` (or a free-response channel). Missing
`reply_in_thread: false` fails safe to a threaded continuation.
Gateway-side config flag — `/restart` to apply; NO Slack app reinstall.
Tests (from inside the worktree, PYTHONPATH=$PWD):
- +6 cron scheduler tests (in_channel skips thread-open; seeds flat
channel session with thread_id=None; thread-mode regression;
fail-safe on unsupported platform; value coercion). Prove-fail:
removing the `and not in_channel_surface` guard turns the two
load-bearing tests RED; restore → GREEN.
- +10 slack resolver/capability/warning tests; +2 config-bridge tests.
- tests/manual/cron_inchannel_e2e.py: offline E2E driving BOTH real
legs (delivery seed + inbound reply keying) → both converge on
(slack, C, None).
- No regressions: test_slack.py 216 passed alone; broader sweep green
(4 pre-existing cross-file-ordering failures reproduce identically on
pristine origin/main).
Docs: cron.md + slack.md + zh-Hans mirrors of both.
Rework follow-up on the per-job TERMINAL_CWD readers-writer lock.
The lock was acquired BEFORE the try: whose finally: is the only release
site, with the env-override statements (os.environ[TERMINAL_CWD] = workdir;
logger.info) sitting in the unprotected window between acquire and try. Any
exception there — a raising log handler, an os.environ error, a thread
interrupt — propagated out of run_job WITHOUT running the finally, leaking
the lock. A leaked writer permanently deadlocks the whole scheduler (every
future cron job blocks on acquire_*); a leaked reader blocks all writers.
- Snapshot _prior_terminal_cwd before the acquire (so the finally can always
restore env even if the body raises before the override).
- Open the try: immediately after acquire and move the env-override lines
inside it, so the existing finally always releases the lock.
- Add a mutation-verified regression test: a workdir job whose in-window
logger.info raises must still release the writer lock (a subsequent
acquire_write must not block).
A cron job with a per-job `workdir` overrides the process-global
`os.environ["TERMINAL_CWD"]` for the entire duration of its agent run and
restores it afterwards. The scheduler dispatches workdir jobs on a
single-thread sequential pool and workdir-less jobs on a separate parallel
pool, and the in-code comments claimed this made the override safe.
That only prevents two workdir jobs from overlapping each other. The two
pools run concurrently in the same process and share `os.environ`, so while
a workdir job has `TERMINAL_CWD` pointed at its project directory, any
workdir-less job firing in the same window reads that same global through the
terminal, file, and code-exec tools and runs its commands in the wrong
directory. The corruption window spans the whole workdir-job run, and a file
write or delete can land in another job's tree.
This serializes the override with a writer-preferring readers-writer lock.
Workdir jobs acquire it as writers (exclusive for their whole run); workdir-
less jobs acquire it as readers, so they still run in parallel with each
other but never alongside a workdir job's override. The guarantee is based on
run overlap rather than tick boundaries, so it also holds when a workdir job
spans ticks.
## What does this PR do?
Fixes a directory-isolation bug in the cron scheduler: a workdir cron job's
process-global `TERMINAL_CWD` override could be observed by a concurrently
running workdir-less cron job, causing that job's shell/file/code-exec
commands to execute in the wrong directory.
## Related Issue
N/A
## Type of Change
- [x] 🐛 Bug fix (non-breaking change that fixes an issue)
- [ ] ✨ New feature (non-breaking change that adds functionality)
- [ ] 🔒 Security fix
- [ ] 📝 Documentation update
- [ ] ✅ Tests (adding or improving test coverage)
- [ ] ♻️ Refactor (no behavior change)
- [ ] 🎯 New skill (bundled or hub)
## Changes Made
- `cron/scheduler.py`: add `_ReadWriteLock` (writer-preferring) and the
module-global `_terminal_cwd_lock`.
- `cron/scheduler.py`: in `run_job`, acquire the lock as a writer for workdir
jobs and as a reader for workdir-less jobs, spanning the `TERMINAL_CWD`
override and its restore in the `finally` block.
- `cron/scheduler.py`: correct the stale comments in `run_job` and `tick` that
claimed the sequential pool alone made the override safe.
- `tests/cron/test_terminal_cwd_lock.py`: new tests for reader concurrency,
writer exclusion, and the no-cross-observation regression.
## How to Test
1. `python -m pytest tests/cron/test_terminal_cwd_lock.py -q` — the regression
test `test_reader_never_observes_writer_override` fails without the lock and
passes with it.
2. `python -m pytest tests/cron/test_cron_workdir.py tests/cron/test_parallel_pool.py -q`
— confirms the existing `TERMINAL_CWD` set/restore and pool behaviour are
unchanged.
## Checklist
### Code
- [x] I've read the Contributing Guide
- [x] My commit messages follow Conventional Commits (`fix(scope):`, etc.)
- [x] I searched for existing PRs to make sure this isn't a duplicate
- [x] My PR contains only changes related to this fix
- [x] I've run the affected `tests/cron/` suites and all tests pass
- [x] I've added tests for my changes (required for bug fixes)
- [x] I've tested on my platform: macOS 15 (Darwin 25.5)
### Documentation & Housekeeping
- [x] I've updated relevant documentation (docstrings/comments) — or N/A
- [x] I've updated `cli-config.yaml.example` if I added/changed config keys — N/A
- [x] I've updated `CONTRIBUTING.md` or `AGENTS.md` if I changed architecture — N/A
- [x] I've considered cross-platform impact (Windows, macOS) — uses stdlib `threading` only
- [x] I've updated tool descriptions/schemas if I changed tool behavior — N/A
Completes the #30719 restart-loop defenses. Defenses 1-2 (the
_HERMES_GATEWAY guard on `hermes gateway stop|restart` + terminal_tool,
and the cron-creation lifecycle filter) already landed on main, but two
gaps remained:
- The agent's `cronjob` model tool calls cron.jobs.create_job directly,
bypassing the hermes_cli.cron.cron_create CLI filter, so lifecycle
commands scheduled via the model tool were only blocked at execution
time (terminal_tool), not at creation. Moved the filter to a shared
cron/lifecycle_guard.py enforced at create_job — the single chokepoint
every job-creation path hits (CLI + model tool). Re-exported
_contains_gateway_lifecycle_command from hermes_cli.cron so
terminal_tool's import keeps working.
- No breaker for the auto-resume loop itself. Defenses 1-2 cover the
cron/CLI/terminal paths, but any other SIGTERM source (e.g. a raw
terminal("launchctl kickstart ai.hermes.gateway")) still triggers the
boot->auto-resume->re-run cycle. Added gateway/restart_loop_guard.py:
counts restart-interrupted boots in a rolling window (config
gateway.restart_loop_guard, default 3 boots / 60s) and skips
auto-resume for that boot once tripped. The gateway still comes up and
serves real inbound messages; it just stops replaying the session that
keeps killing it, putting a human back in the loop.
Also tightened the lifecycle regex over main's version: dropped
`hermes gateway start` (benign), required the gateway identifier on the
launchctl/systemctl branches (so `launchctl unload
ai.hermes.update-checker.plist` and `systemctl restart
hermes-meta.service` no longer false-positive), added the inverse
pkill token order, and fixed the binary-script bypass (decode with
errors='replace' instead of swallowing UnicodeDecodeError). The
create_job guard resolves relative script paths under HERMES_HOME/scripts
the same way the scheduler does, so a bare script name is scanned as the
file that actually runs.
Design and much of defense-2 originate from PR #33395 (@kshitijk4poor),
which itself salvaged #30728 (@SimoKiihamaki). Rebuilt against current
main since defenses 1-2 had already landed under different names.
Closes#30719.
Co-authored-by: SimoKiihamaki <simo.kiihamaki@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: kshitijk4poor <82637225+kshitijk4poor@users.noreply.github.com>
Addresses egilewski (Codex) CR on PR #52351: the run_job() credential-exfil
backstop caught every exception around _validate_cron_base_url() and set
err = None, so an unexpected validator/import error let an unvetted stored
provider/base_url pair reach resolve_runtime_provider() — the very sink this
checkpoint exists to guard. A synthetic validator-exception probe with a
legacy custom:legit + off-host base_url job slipped through (validator_exception
ALLOW).
Now fail closed: if the validator raises and the job carries a base_url
override (the exfil precondition), refuse the run. A job with no base_url
override can't exfiltrate via this path — the validator would return None — so
it still runs, keeping the common no-override jobs from wedging on an unrelated
error. Operator fallback providers come from config, not the job, so they are
unaffected.
Adds two regressions: validator-exception + base_url -> blocked;
validator-exception without base_url -> still allowed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The model-facing cronjob tool accepts free-form provider + base_url. On fire,
the scheduler pairs the named provider's stored credential with the job's
base_url, so a prompt-injected job (e.g. provider=anthropic,
base_url=https://attacker/v1) sends the real API key to an attacker endpoint. A
base_url with no provider inherits the default provider's key for the same
effect.
Add a fail-closed guard at the tool boundary: a base_url override is allowed
only for the custom/BYOK sentinel, a configured custom_providers entry, or when
the override host matches the named provider's own endpoint; an override without
an explicit provider is rejected. The trust boundary is the caller, so
operator-configured base_urls for named providers are unaffected.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
A finite one-shot cron job whose side effect kills the tick (gateway
suicide, OOM, segfault, hard-timeout) re-fired forever: mark_job_run —
which increments repeat.completed and removes the job — runs AFTER the
job, so an abrupt tick death never records completion and every
supervisor relaunch re-dispatches the job (#38758).
Commit the dispatch BEFORE the side effect:
- claim_dispatch() increments repeat.completed under the cross-process
jobs lock and persists it before run_job(), converting finite
one-shots from at-least-once to at-most-times.
- Called from run_one_job (the shared body used by BOTH the built-in
ticker and the external Chronos fire_due path) before run_job.
- mark_job_run skips the increment for pre-claimed one-shots (no
double-count) and still removes at the limit.
- get_due_jobs drops a stale one-shot already at its dispatch limit so
a job claimed-but-not-cleaned-up after a crash stops appearing as due.
- No-op for recurring jobs (advance_next_run) and infinite/no-repeat
one-shots; a handed-in job dict absent from the store proceeds.
Closes#38758
Cron's job runner was the last entry point still reading
fallback_providers/fallback_model as an either/or, silently dropping the
legacy fallback_model when fallback_providers was set. Every other entry
point (cli, gateway, oneshot, fallback_cmd, tui_gateway, auxiliary_client)
already merges both keys via get_fallback_chain(). This aligns cron with
them at both call sites: the auth-fallback resolution loop and the
AIAgent(fallback_model=...) argument.
Co-authored-by: xxxigm <tuancanhnguyen706@gmail.com>
Two live cron bugs, both surfaced by @banditburai in #35616 (whose larger
watchdog/supervisor work is already superseded by the CronScheduler provider
refactor on main):
- #32896: `cron list` crashed on a present-but-null `deliver` field —
`job.get("deliver", ["local"])` returns None for an explicit null, which
then hit `", ".join(None)`. Coalesce with `or ["local"]` (same pitfall
the sibling `repeat` line already guards against).
- #33465: cron jobs 401'd on Bitwarden/BSM-backed secrets. The per-run env
reload used a bare `load_dotenv(override=True)`, which re-applied only the
.env placeholder — startup had already recorded this HERMES_HOME in
env_loader._APPLIED_HOMES, so the external-secret re-pull no-oped. Route the
reload through load_hermes_dotenv() and call reset_secret_source_cache()
first to force the re-pull (Bitwarden's 300s value-cache keeps it off the
network; override honours secrets.bitwarden.override_existing, mirroring
startup).
Tests: null-deliver regression guard in test_cron.py; reset-before-reload
ordering guard in test_scheduler.py. Migrated 31 scheduler-reload test seams
from patching dotenv.load_dotenv to the new load_hermes_dotenv /
reset_secret_source_cache seam.
The handoff seed path inlined its own int(chat_id) > 0 private-chat
check; delivery.py already had the identical heuristic. Promote it to
a public name and reuse it from both sites instead of duplicating.
If redact_sensitive_text() raises or fails to import, stdout/stderr
were silently left unredacted and could leak API keys or tokens into
cron job delivery messages and logs.
Replace bare with a warning log and replace
both outputs with '[REDACTED - redaction failed]' to prevent leaks.
Root cause: silent exception swallow in _run_job_script()
Impact: potential secrets leak in cron job output delivery
Cron pre-run scripts were capped at 120s by default, which surprised
users running long data-collection scripts on crons (the whole point of
crons being to offload long work). Raise _DEFAULT_SCRIPT_TIMEOUT to 3600s
(1 hour).
This bounds the script only — skill/agent jobs already run on a separate
inactivity budget (HERMES_CRON_TIMEOUT, default 600s idle, 0=unlimited),
not a wall-clock cap. Scripts dispatch to a persistent thread pool and do
not hold the tick lock, so a long script doesn't starve other due jobs.
Docs clarified to make the script-vs-agent timeout distinction explicit.
env/config overrides (HERMES_CRON_SCRIPT_TIMEOUT,
cron.script_timeout_seconds) unchanged and still take precedence.
The curator's inactivity prune archived any non-pinned agent-created
skill whose activity was older than archive_after_days (90d). A skill
loaded only by a cron job had its usage bumped solely when the job
fired, so paused jobs, infrequent (quarterly/annual) schedules, and
far-future one-shots aged their skills out from under them — the next
run then failed to load the now-archived skill.
- cron/jobs.py: add referenced_skill_names() returning skills used by
ANY job (incl. paused/disabled).
- curator.apply_automatic_transitions(): skip cron-referenced skills
like pinned; add a use=0 grace floor so a never-used skill is not
marked stale/archived until it is at least stale_after_days old.
- LLM review pass: candidate list marks cron=yes; prompt forbids
pruning cron-referenced skills and never-used skills under 30 days.
Tested E2E against a real cron job + real usage records and with 4 new
unit tests.
* fix(windows): stop terminal-window popups from background spawns
Native-Windows desktop/gateway users saw cmd/conhost windows flash on
gateway restart, image paste, the dashboard Projects tree, voice notes,
and ~5 min after closing the app (detached cron). Two root causes:
- Console-subsystem exes (taskkill, schtasks, wmic, netstat, tasklist,
agent-browser, git, ffmpeg, powershell, git-bash) spawned via raw
subprocess allocate a fresh console when the launching process has
none (pythonw desktop backend / detached gateway) - even with output
captured.
- uv venv pythonw shims re-exec console python.exe, so Python children
get a console regardless of how they're launched.
Fixes:
- Single hidden-spawn primitive (_subprocess_compat.run/.popen) that ORs
CREATE_NO_WINDOW on Windows, no-op on POSIX. Route every Hermes-owned
console-exe spawn through it.
- FreeConsole() catch-all in hermes_bootstrap: any Python child that
exclusively owns an auto-allocated console detaches it at startup
(GetConsoleProcessList()==1 gate leaves shared interactive consoles
untouched).
- Replace PowerShell/wmic gateway PID scans with in-process psutil.
- Skip schtasks queries on non-interactive desktop restarts.
- Prefer native agent-browser .exe over .cmd shims.
- Guard test bans raw subprocess spawns of the Windows-only console
tools repo-wide so the popup class can't regress.
* fix(windows): scope FreeConsole to background entry points; fix merge fallout
Console detach review (per #53810 feedback): GetConsoleProcessList()==1 can't
tell a uv pythonw->python phantom console apart from a user opening the
interactive CLI/TUI in its own fresh console (double-click, shortcut, ConPTY) —
both report a single attached process with a tty. Running FreeConsole() in the
import-time bootstrap therefore risked detaching a legitimately-interactive
terminal.
- Extract FreeConsole into explicit hermes_bootstrap.detach_orphan_console();
remove it from apply_windows_utf8_bootstrap() (import side effect).
- Call it only from known background mains: gateway run, dashboard backend
(start_server, what the desktop spawns), cron standalone, tui_gateway entry,
slash worker. Interactive CLI/TUI never calls it.
- Behavior-contract tests: frees only when solo owner, leaves shared console,
no-op without console / on POSIX, and asserts it's not an import side effect.
Merge fallout from origin/main (#53791):
- local.py: 3-way merge left a dangling **_popen_kwargs (NameError crashing
every terminal init). _subprocess_compat.popen already hides the window, so
drop it.
- discord adapter: merge stacked an undefined windows_hide_flags() onto the
primitive call; drop the redundant arg.
- test_gateway: scan now goes psutil-first (zero spawn); rewrite the
case-variant test to drive that production path.
* test(claw): mock _subprocess_compat.run seam for Windows process scan
claw.py's Windows tasklist/powershell scan routes through the hidden-spawn
primitive; the tests still patched claw_mod.subprocess, so on win32 the mock
was never hit and real spawns returned nothing. Patch the actual seam.
A profile's cron jobs now provably live in AND execute under that profile's
HERMES_HOME. A job authored under profile `coder` is stored at
`~/.hermes/profiles/coder/cron/jobs.json` and runs with coder's .env,
config.yaml, scripts and skills — never the default root's.
This was the de-facto behavior on main but only by accident: PR #50112 had
re-anchored cron storage at the shared default root, and a later stale-branch
squash merge (#52147) silently reverted it back to the profile home. Neither
direction was guarded by a test, so it could flip again on the next stale merge.
Changes:
- cron/jobs.py: document the per-profile storage anchor (get_hermes_home, NOT
get_default_hermes_root) and why anchoring at the root leaks
config/credentials/skills across profiles — the #4707 security boundary.
- cron/scheduler.py, cron/suggestions.py: same intent documented at the
dynamic resolution helper and the suggestions store.
- tests/cron/test_cron_profile_isolation.py: pin storage, lock-path, and
execution-home resolution to the active profile so a re-anchor can't regress.
Verified E2E: jobs created under two profiles land in separate per-profile
stores with zero cross-profile leakage and no shared-root store; scheduler
execution-home follows the active profile. Full cron suite: 576/576.
* fix(cron): add default retention to per-run job output to bound disk usage (#52383)
Per-run cron output (cron/output/<job>/<timestamp>.md) is written once
per execution and was never pruned, so a frequently-scheduled job on
a long-running deploy accumulates one file per run indefinitely and
can fill the volume ('no space left on device').
save_job_output() now keeps the most recent N output files per job and
removes older ones. N defaults to 50 and is configurable via
cron.output_retention; a non-positive value disables pruning for
operators who manage cleanup externally.
Salvaged from #52402 by @0xDevNinja.
Closes#52383
* fix(config): add cron.output_retention to DEFAULT_CONFIG
Follow-up to #52383: the retention config key was functional via
get()-with-default but missing from DEFAULT_CONFIG, so the deep-merge
wouldn't auto-populate it for new installs. Add it explicitly.
---------
Co-authored-by: 0xDevNinja <manmit0x@gmail.com>
Scheduled jobs delivering to Telegram/etc. started posting a literal
'⚠️ No reply: the model returned empty content…' message instead of
staying silent. Two interacting causes:
1. The turn-completion explainer (#34452) replaces an empty model turn
with a user-facing '⚠️ No reply…' string. In a cron context that is
not a silence marker, so the scheduler delivered it — a regression
from the previously-silent empty turn. run_job now detects the
explainer text deterministically (via the same formatter that
produced it) for abnormal-empty turn_exit_reasons and strips it to
empty, so the existing empty-response suppression + soft-fail guard
apply. The explainer is unchanged on CLI/gateway.
2. The cron suppression used a loose 'SILENT_MARKER in ...upper()'
substring check. It leaked bracketless near-markers the model emits
('SILENT', 'NO_REPLY', 'NO REPLY' — #51438, #46917) and wrongly
swallowed a real report that merely quoted '[SILENT]' mid-sentence.
Replaced with _is_cron_silence_response(): suppresses a canonical
token as the whole response, its own first/last line, or the
documented bracketed '[SILENT] <note>' prefix — while a token buried
mid-sentence in a genuine report is delivered. Preserves the
intentional cron trailing/prefix tolerance (existing tests unchanged).
Tests: bracketless-variant suppression, mid-sentence-quote delivery,
direct matcher contract, and explainer-strip + defensive real-report
delivery.
Addresses review on #51077 (kxee). The continuable-cron mirror reused
gateway.mirror.mirror_to_session, which writes role=assistant — re-
introducing the exact alternation violation #2313 (37a997945)
deliberately removed: a cron brief landing as assistant after the
agent's last turn yields assistant->assistant, which breaks strict-
alternation providers (OpenAI/OpenRouter) per issue #2221. The mirror/
mirror_source metadata is also dropped at the SQLite boundary, so the
[Delivered from cron] label is lost on replay.
This is an intentional, opt-in (default OFF) reversal of #2313's
'cron output does not belong in interactive history' for the reply-to-
cron use case — gated behind cron.mirror_delivery / attach_to_session.
Fixes:
- mirror_to_session gains a role param (default 'assistant' — interactive
send_message mirror unchanged, it IS the agent speaking). Cron paths
pass role='user' with a '[Cron delivery: <task>]' prefix so the brief
collapses via repair_message_sequence's consecutive-user merge on every
provider, and stays distinguishable on replay despite the metadata drop.
- thread_seeded: defer seeding + the flag until delivery into the new
thread actually succeeds. Previously set pre-delivery, so an open-
succeeds / deliver-fails case both stranded a seeded-but-unseen brief
AND suppressed the DM-fallback mirror.
- seed mirror now passes user_id='system:cron' to resolve the exact
thread-keyed session row it just created.
- dedupe the duplicate BasePlatformAdapter import in _deliver_result.
- trim oversized docstrings to non-obvious WHY (AGENTS.md).
- docs: document cron.mirror_delivery / attach_to_session in
website/docs/user-guide/features/cron.md.
- test: assert the cron mirror writes role='user' with the label prefix.
204 cron+mirror tests pass.
Continuable cron jobs (attach_to_session / cron.mirror_delivery, default
OFF) now prefer a dedicated thread on thread-capable platforms, falling
back to origin-DM mirroring where threads don't exist.
- Thread-capable (Telegram topics, Discord/Slack threads): open a fresh
thread for the job via the shipped adapter.create_handoff_thread,
route the brief into it, and seed the thread-keyed session so the
user's in-thread reply continues with full context. This is the
'continuable cron opens its own thread' interface.
- DM-only (WhatsApp/Signal/SMS): create_handoff_thread returns None ->
fall back to mirroring into the origin DM session (existing behaviour).
Reuses existing infrastructure end-to-end — no new adapter surface, no
provider-chain signature change:
- adapter.create_handoff_thread (already implemented per-platform,
returns None on unsupported platforms = the fallback signal)
- the live SessionStore via adapter._session_store (already set on every
adapter), reached without threading a new param through the frozen
CronScheduler.start() contract
- gateway.mirror.mirror_to_session for the seed/append
- existing per-target delivery routing carries the new thread_id for free
Mirrors GatewayRunner._process_handoff's open-thread-or-fallback +
seed pattern, standalone for the cron delivery path. thread_seeded
guards against a double-mirror after seeding. Scoped to the origin
target only; fan-out/broadcast targets are never threaded or mirrored.
Config docs updated (cron.mirror_delivery) + cronjob tool
attach_to_session description reframed around continuable/thread-preferred.
Tests: +5 (thread id returned on thread platform; None on DM platform;
None without capability/loop; seed creates thread session + mirrors;
seed no-op on empty). 22/22 in TestCronDeliveryMirror; 532 cron tests
pass (4 failures pre-existing: croniter-not-installed + TZ).
Multi-participant parity with interactive send_message, which passes
HERMES_SESSION_USER_ID to gateway.mirror.mirror_to_session so the mirror
lands in the exact participant's session.
- cronjob_tools._origin_from_env now captures user_id from the session
context at job-create time (alongside platform/chat_id/thread_id).
- _maybe_mirror_cron_delivery forwards user_id to mirror_to_session.
- _deliver_result threads origin.user_id through for the origin target.
Effect: in a per-user-isolated group chat (group_sessions_per_user=True,
the default), the mirror resolves to the member who scheduled the job
instead of conservatively no-op'ing on ambiguous candidates. DMs and
shared group/thread sessions are unaffected (single candidate). Default
still OFF.
Tests: helper forwards user_id; E2E _deliver_result forwards origin
user_id. 17/17 in TestCronDeliveryMirror; 527 cron tests pass (4 failures
pre-existing: croniter-not-installed + TZ, identical on baseline).
The cron->session mirror now fires ONLY for the delivery target that
equals the job's origin (platform+chat_id[+thread_id]). A job created
from a live gateway chat stamps that chat as origin, and that session is
guaranteed to exist (it is the conversation the user scheduled the job
in). Fan-out / broadcast / home-channel-fallback targets are never
mirrored: they are not a continuation of a conversation and may have no
session at all.
This makes the prior 'cold-start session seeding' concern a non-case by
construction: when the mirror semantically applies the session exists;
when none exists the target was never the origin, so we no-op.
Adds _target_matches_origin() + origin-scoping tests (exact match,
other-chat/other-platform/no-origin rejection, thread scoping, fan-out
mirrors only the origin target).
Adds an opt-in path so a cron job's delivered output is also appended to
the TARGET chat's gateway session transcript (as an assistant turn), so a
user reply to a recurring delivery (daily brief, reminder) is answered with
the delivery in context instead of 'what is that?' amnesia.
- Reuses the shipped gateway.mirror.mirror_to_session — the same primitive
interactive send_message mirroring already uses. No messaging-toolset
change (cron still can't call send_message; this rides delivery).
- Gated: per-job attach_to_session overrides global cron.mirror_delivery
(config.yaml). Default OFF — historical isolation preserved byte-for-byte.
- Mirrors the CLEAN agent output, not the cron header/footer wrapper.
- Alternation/cache-safe: append lands at a turn boundary, never mid-loop,
never mutates the cached system prompt. Cold-start (no target session)
is a silent no-op; mirror errors never fail a successful delivery.
- Surfaced on the cronjob tool (attach_to_session) + config schema.
Driven by enterprise cron-as-control-plane use case. 10 new tests; full
cron + cronjob-tool suites pass (600).
A naive ISO timestamp (e.g. 2026-06-22T20:07:00) was anchored to the
server's local timezone via dt.astimezone(), but the due-check
(get_due_jobs -> _hermes_now()) runs in the CONFIGURED Hermes timezone.
When the two diverge (cloud host on UTC with a different timezone: set,
or vice-versa) the stored instant lands hours off the user's wall-clock
intent, so one-shots never become due and recurring jobs fire at the
wrong time. The ticker stays healthy (heartbeat + success markers fresh)
because every tick finds nothing due, matching the silent no-fire in #51021.
Anchor naive timestamps to _hermes_now().tzinfo so '20:07' means 20:07 on
the same clock the scheduler checks against. The legacy _ensure_aware path
still treats already-stored naive values as server-local for back-compat.
Fixes#51021
* Revert "fix(cron): scope job execution to its owning profile (#32091 follow-up) (#50993)"
This reverts commit 660e36f097.
* Revert "fix(cron): anchor cron storage at the default root home (not the active profile)"
This reverts commit a5c09fd176.
The #32091 fix moved every profile's cron jobs into one shared root store,
but never wired the execution-scoping half it recommended: a job still ran
under whichever profile's ticker picked it up, not its owning profile. So a
job created under `hermes -p donna` could execute with the root profile's
.env / config.yaml / credentials.
- jobs.py: create_job auto-captures the active profile (explicit profile=
override available) and stores it on the job; resolve_profile_home() maps a
profile name to its HERMES_HOME; legacy jobs backfill to 'default'.
- scheduler.py: run_job applies the job's profile via a scoped HERMES_HOME
override (env var + in-process ContextVar) before any .env/config/script
load, restored in finally. tick() routes profile-mismatched jobs to the
single-worker sequential pool so the env mutation can't race.
- cronjob tool threads profile through (NOT exposed in the model schema, to
avoid cross-profile privilege escalation); hermes cron add gains --profile.
E2E verified against a temp HERMES_HOME with a real profile dir: a root-profile
ticker runs a profile='donna' job with HERMES_HOME=donna during execution and
restores the ticker env afterward.
An unpinned cron job follows the global default provider (config.yaml
model.default + resolve_runtime_provider). If that global state is changed
after the job is created — e.g. a temporary switch to a paid provider like
nous/claude-fable-5 — the job silently inherits it on its next tick and spends
real money. This is the reported $7.73 incident: a job created under a
free/default provider later inherited a temporary paid switch.
Fix (ask #1 only) preserves the legitimate "unpinned job should follow
model.default" use case by detecting *drift* rather than freezing the model:
- create_job (cron/jobs.py): for UNPINNED, agent-backed jobs (no explicit
provider, not no_agent), snapshot the provider that resolution WOULD pick
right now into a new optional `provider_snapshot` field, resolved via the
same resolve_runtime_provider() path the ticker uses. Fail-open to None on
any resolution error so job creation never breaks.
- run_job (cron/scheduler.py): right after runtime resolution, if the job has
a provider_snapshot AND is unpinned AND the currently-resolved provider
DIFFERS from the snapshot, fail closed for that run — make no paid call and
deliver a loud, actionable alert naming both providers and telling the user
to pin explicitly (`cronjob action=update job_id=.. provider=..`).
Back-compat: jobs with no snapshot (pre-existing jobs, no_agent jobs, or any
job whose creation-time resolution failed) behave exactly as before — the
guard only engages when a snapshot exists. Explicitly-pinned jobs (job.provider
set) are unaffected since they don't drift with global state.
Tests: tests/cron/test_cron_provider_pin.py covers snapshot-matches (runs),
snapshot-differs (fail closed, no agent constructed), no-snapshot back-compat,
None-snapshot back-compat, explicitly-pinned (runs regardless), plus create_job
snapshot capture/skip/fail-open. The fail-closed case is load-bearing (fails
without the guard).
Issue #44585 asks #2-4 (hard-stop a running job, gateway-stop containment,
fail-closed on provider mutation) are out of scope for this change.
A cron job that sets `enabled_toolsets` to a list of *native* toolsets (e.g.
`["web", "terminal"]`) silently got ZERO MCP tools, while a job with no
per-job list got every globally-enabled MCP server. `_resolve_cron_enabled_
toolsets` returned the per-job list verbatim, bypassing the MCP-merge that the
platform-fallback branch performs via `_get_platform_tools`. So
`discover_mcp_tools()` registered the MCP tools into the registry, but
`get_tool_definitions(enabled_toolsets=...)` kept only the named native
toolsets — the agent then rejected every `mcp_*` call as "Unknown tool". (R2
of #23997.)
Fix: `_merge_mcp_into_per_job_toolsets` layers MCP membership onto a per-job
allowlist with the SAME semantics as `_get_platform_tools`:
* `no_mcp` sentinel present -> no MCP servers (sentinel stripped)
* one or more MCP server names already listed -> treat as an allowlist
* otherwise -> union in every globally-enabled MCP server
To avoid duplicating the "which MCP servers are enabled" computation (it
already existed inline in `_get_platform_tools`), this extracts a shared
`enabled_mcp_server_names(config)` helper in `hermes_cli.tools_config` and has
BOTH the gateway/CLI platform resolver and the cron per-job resolver call it —
so every path agrees on MCP membership (extend, don't duplicate).
Note: the issue's *headline* — bare MCP server names rejected, registry never
includes them — was already fixed on main (commits c10fea8d2 + 04918345e,
both before the issue was filed). This PR closes the remaining cron-specific
gap (R2). The `server:*` / `mcp:server` alias-notation rejection (R1) and the
quiet-mode silent-drop (R3) are tracked separately.
Salvaged from #32788 by sherman-yang (credited below). Reworked to reuse the
shared `enabled_mcp_server_names` helper instead of re-implementing the MCP
membership set in cron/scheduler.py.
Fixes#23997
Co-authored-by: sherman-yang <58446328+sherman-yang@users.noreply.github.com>
`cron/jobs.py` resolved `HERMES_DIR`/`JOBS_FILE` from `get_hermes_home()`,
which follows the active profile override. So a job created from a
profile-scoped agent session (`hermes -p myprofile chat`, where the in-process
`cronjob` tool calls `create_job`) was written to
`~/.hermes/profiles/myprofile/cron/jobs.json`, while the profile-less gateway
(`hermes gateway run`) reads only `~/.hermes/cron/jobs.json`. The job was
silently orphaned: `cronjob action=list` from the same profile reported it
healthy (same file), but the gateway ticker never saw it and it never fired.
`last_run_at` stayed null forever. (#32091)
Fix: resolve the cron store from `get_default_hermes_root()` — the
purpose-built "profile-level operations" root that returns `<root>` even when
`HERMES_HOME` is `<root>/profiles/<name>` (and handles Docker/custom layouts).
Now the creator, the gateway scheduler, and the dashboard all agree on a
single jobs.json at the root, so a job created under any profile is visible to
the gateway.
Scope: this is the storage-location half of the fix. Making a job *execute*
under its originating profile's config/skills (a per-job `profile` field +
runtime context scoping, the #48649 sibling) is a separate, riskier change and
will follow as its own PR — keeping this layer minimal and safe.
Salvaged from #32117 by @mohamedorigami-jpg (authorship preserved). The
comprehensive #33839 (@sweetcornna) takes the same Option-A storage approach
and additionally adds the per-job profile execution scoping; this PR lands the
safe storage layer first.
Tests: `tests/cron/test_cron_profile_storage.py` — asserts the store anchors
at `<root>/cron` under a profile HERMES_HOME (not `<profile>/cron`), and is
unchanged when no profile is active. Full `tests/cron/` suite: 511 passed.
Fixes#32091
Co-authored-by: mohamedorigami-jpg <mohamed.origami@gmail.com>
When a recurring job's execution time exceeds `interval + grace`, the
scheduler entered a perpetual "missed → fast-forward → skip" loop and the
job effectively never ran again. A real job (`hermes-upstream-contribution`)
logged 42 consecutive "missed" events over 9 hours without executing once.
Timeline (5-min interval, 150s grace, ~15-min execution):
14:00 due → advance next_run_at→14:05 → run (blocks 15 min)
14:15 finishes
14:16 tick: next_run_at=14:05, elapsed 660s > grace 150s → "missed!"
→ fast-forward to 14:21 → continue (SKIP) → does NOT run
... repeats forever for any job whose runtime > interval+grace.
The `continue` (skip execution) in `_get_due_jobs_locked` was designed to
prevent burst-catchup after *gateway downtime* — don't run 6 missed
instances of a 30-min job on restart. But it wrongly applied to a job that
missed its slot because it was *still running*, not because the gateway was
down.
Fix: keep the fast-forward (so accumulated missed slots are still collapsed
to a single next slot — no burst) but fall through to `due.append(job)` so
the job runs ONCE now. The log message is updated to be honest about the new
behavior ("Running now; next run fast-forwarded to: ...").
Behavior note: a recurring job missed during gateway downtime now also fires
once immediately on restart (rather than waiting for its next natural slot).
This is the intended trade-off — the same "run once, don't burst" rule now
applies uniformly to both downtime-misses and long-execution-misses.
Salvaged from #33318 by @liuhao1024 (authorship preserved). Also addresses
the diagnosis in #33361 (@agent-trivi), which proposed the same one-line fix.
Tests: updates `test_stale_past_due_skipped` →
`test_stale_past_due_runs_once_and_fast_forwards` (the old test encoded the
skip behavior); adds `test_long_execution_does_not_perpetually_defer` as a
direct regression for the production loop; updates the F2e timezone test that
relied on the old skip path. Full tests/cron/ suite: 510 passed.
Fixes#33315
Co-authored-by: liuhao1024 <sunsky.lau@gmail.com>
PR #22410 added three-mode Telegram topic routing to the live message path
(TelegramAdapter.send via the gateway DeliveryRouter), but the cron delivery
path never got it. cron/scheduler.py::_deliver_result sent through the live
adapter with a bare ``{"thread_id": ...}`` and fell back to the standalone
_send_telegram, neither of which addresses Bot API Direct Messages topics
correctly. After Bot API 10.0 (2026-05-08), sending to a private chat with a
bare ``message_thread_id`` is rejected/mis-routed, so cron deliveries to a
private DM topic landed in the General topic instead of the requested lane.
Fix: the cron live-adapter branch now routes the text send through the
gateway's ``DeliveryRouter._deliver_to_platform`` — the same canonical path
live messages use — so it inherits all three Telegram routing modes:
1. Forum/supergroup (negative chat_id) -> message_thread_id
2. Bot API DM topics (private chat_id + numeric topic id) ->
direct_messages_topic_id (the case #22773 reported)
3. Hermes-created named private DM-topic lanes -> ensure_dm_topic +
reply anchor
For mode 2, a private-chat target with a numeric topic id is passed as
``direct_messages_topic_id`` metadata (verified end-to-end:
TelegramAdapter._thread_kwargs_for_send turns it into
``{message_thread_id: None, direct_messages_topic_id: <int>}``), instead of a
bare message_thread_id. Forum/supergroup and home-channel deliveries are
unchanged. The standalone fallback (gateway down) is preserved.
No new config knob and no duplicated routing logic — this reuses the existing
DeliveryRouter rather than reimplementing topic routing in the cron path.
Salvaged from #42051 (stepanov1975) and #23249 (devsart95), which both
diagnosed the missing three-mode routing in the cron/standalone path;
reimplemented onto the canonical DeliveryRouter that landed since those PRs
were opened.
Co-authored-by: Alex <9785479+stepanov1975@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: devsart95 <devsart95@gmail.com>
A recurring cron job persists `next_run_at` as an absolute timestamp with a
UTC offset (e.g. `2026-05-19T21:00:00+10:00`). Cron expressions, however,
describe *local wall-clock* intent ("run at 21:00"). When Hermes/system
timezone changes after the timestamp was persisted, the stored instant is
re-interpreted in the new zone: `21:00+10:00` is the instant `13:00+02:00`,
which is `<= now` (13:02+02:00) — so the job fires HOURS EARLY, then
`compute_next_run` advances it via croniter to `21:00+02:00` the same day,
producing a SECOND fire. (#28934, recurrence of #24289.)
`_get_due_jobs_locked` now detects this precise migration case before the
due check: for a `cron` job whose converted instant looks due, whose stored
UTC offset differs from the current zone's, AND whose stored *wall-clock*
time is still in the future (distinguishing a migrated offset from a
genuinely missed run), it recomputes `next_run_at` from the schedule and
skips the early fire — preserving the local wall-clock intent.
Verified against the issue's reproducer: stored `21:00+10` under runtime
`+02:00` at wall-clock `13:02` is rescheduled to `21:00+02` instead of
firing early + again.
Salvaged from #28941 by @Tranquil-Flow (authorship preserved). Chosen over
the alternative approaches (#28951 normalize-to-UTC, #28985 rebase-and-match)
because UTC-normalization does not change the absolute-instant comparison and
so does not fix the early fire, and this guard is the tightest: it only acts
when all four conditions hold and reuses the existing `compute_next_run`.
Fixes#28934
The in-process cron ticker (cron/scheduler_provider.py) caught only
`Exception` and logged at DEBUG, so a `SystemExit`/`KeyboardInterrupt`
raised from a misbehaving provider SDK or agent retry path killed the
ticker thread silently. The gateway PROCESS stayed up, so `hermes cron
status` — which only checks `find_gateway_pids()` — kept reporting
"✓ jobs will fire automatically" while no jobs ever fired (#32612,
#32895).
This makes ticker death survivable and detectable:
- The ticker loop now catches `BaseException` and logs at ERROR with a
traceback, so a single bad tick no longer tears the thread down and
the failure is visible in the gateway log.
- The loop records a heartbeat (`cron/ticker_heartbeat`, epoch seconds)
on startup and after every tick — best-effort, never raised into the
loop. Both ticker entry points (the gateway and the desktop fallback
in web_server.py) funnel through `InProcessCronScheduler.start`, so one
heartbeat site covers both.
- `hermes cron status` now reads the heartbeat age: if the gateway is
running but the heartbeat is stale (> 200s, i.e. several missed ~60s
ticks), it reports the ticker as STALLED and suggests a restart instead
of falsely claiming jobs will fire. A missing heartbeat (older build /
never ran) is treated as "unknown", not "dead".
Adds tests for BaseException survival, per-iteration heartbeat recording,
heartbeat round-trip/age, staleness detection, and silent-write-failure.
Salvaged from #49660 (BaseException survival on current structure),
extended with the heartbeat + honest-status reporting that the earlier
(pre-refactor) watchdog PRs #35616 and #33849 proposed.
Fixes#32612Fixes#32895
Co-authored-by: banditburai <promptsiren@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: sweetcornna <96944678+sweetcornna@users.noreply.github.com>
Consolidates three cron-delivery defects in cron/scheduler.py::_deliver_result
that all stem from how the live-adapter send result is interpreted.
#38922 — duplicate message on confirmation timeout.
future.result(timeout=60) raising TimeoutError bubbled to the outer
except handler, which left delivered=False, so `if not delivered:` re-sent
the identical message via the standalone path. future.cancel() cannot
un-send a request already in flight on the wire, so a slow confirmation
deterministically produced a duplicate. The send was already dispatched onto
the gateway loop, so a bare timeout is now treated as delivered
(assume-delivered is safer than guaranteed-duplicate) and the standalone
fallback is skipped. The live-adapter media attempt is also skipped on
timeout since the contended loop would re-block each 30s media budget.
#47056 — silent drop when the gateway has an active session.
The old check `if send_result is None or not getattr(send_result,
"success", True)` let a result object missing a `success` attribute default
to True = counted as a successful delivery, so the scheduler logged
"delivered via live adapter" while the gateway never processed the message.
Delivery is now confirmed via _confirm_adapter_delivery(): only an explicit,
truthy `success` attribute counts; None or a `success`-less object falls
through to the standalone path so the message actually arrives.
A genuine send Exception (not a slow confirmation) still falls through to
the standalone path, and is caught by run_job's outer handler — it is
recorded as the job's last_error and never crashes the cron ticker.
#43014 — deliver=origin fails to resolve in CLI sessions.
A CLI-created job has no {platform, chat_id} origin, so deliver=origin (and
auto-detect / deliver=None) was unresolvable and emitted "no delivery target
resolved" on every run. An unresolvable origin with no configured home
channel is now treated as local (output stays in last_output), matching the
documented auto-deliver contract; a concrete unresolvable platform target
still reports a real error.
Salvaged from #41007 (timeout discriminator), folding in #47127's
_confirm_adapter_delivery hardening and #38937 / #43063's origin→local
fallback. Tests rewritten as behavior contracts (timeout => no duplicate;
None / success-less result => standalone fallback; confirmed success => no
fallback; CLI origin => local, explicit platform => still errors).
Co-authored-by: Evi Nova <66773372+Tranquil-Flow@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: kyssta-exe <kyssta-exe@users.noreply.github.com>
Cron jobs created without an explicit `model` are stored as `model: null`.
At fire time `run_job` resolved `model = job.get("model") or os.getenv(
"HERMES_MODEL") or ""` and then `_model_cfg.get("default", model)`, so when
config.yaml had no `model.default` (or `model: {default: null}`) an empty
string flowed straight to the provider and surfaced as an opaque HTTP 400
("Model parameter is required" / "model: String should have at least 1
character"). The operator had to inspect jobs.json to discover the job was
stored with a null model.
This change makes cron model resolution robust and symmetric with the CLI:
- Coerce `model: null`/missing config to `{}` so a falsy default never
overwrites an already-resolved env value with `None`.
- Only overwrite `model` from `model.default` when the resolved value is
truthy; accept a `model.model` alias key, mirroring the sibling resolvers
in hermes_cli/oneshot.py, fallback_cmd.py and prompt_size.py.
- Resolve AFTER the managed-scope overlay so an administrator-pinned model
still wins.
- Fail fast with an actionable error (caught by run_job's outer handler and
recorded as the job's last_error — the cron ticker is unaffected) instead
of letting an empty model reach the API.
- The per-job model is re-read every tick, so a `cronjob action=update
model=...` after a failed run takes effect on the next tick (no cache).
Adds tests/cron/conftest.py pinning a default HERMES_MODEL so existing
run_job tests don't trip the new guard, plus regression tests covering env
fallback, config.default fallback, string-form config, the model alias key,
null-default-no-clobber, corrupt-config graceful degradation, fail-fast,
and the no-cache re-read property.
Salvaged from #24005, rebased onto current main, with additional test
coverage folded in from #45550 and the alias-key behavior from #43952.
Fixes#43899Fixes#23979Fixes#22761
Co-authored-by: szzhoujiarui-sketch <szzhoujiarui@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: rayjun <rayjun0412@gmail.com>
Matches the env= callsite convention at the other sanitized
subprocess spawns (cua_backend dict(os.environ), gateway
os.environ.copy()). Functionally equivalent — _sanitize_subprocess_env
never mutates its input — but avoids handing the live mapping to the
helper.
Follow-up to salvaged PR #49207.
Cron no_agent and pre-check scripts ran with the full gateway/agent
environment, allowing scripts under HERMES_HOME/scripts/ to read provider
credentials. Apply _sanitize_subprocess_env like terminal and MCP paths
(SECURITY.md section 2.3).
Add regression test asserting blocklisted provider vars are absent in the
child process.
The skin bug was one instance of a class: several subsystems build their
config dict directly from config.yaml instead of routing through
hermes_cli.config.load_config (which carries the managed merge), so they
silently ignored administrator-pinned values. Audited every config.yaml
reader and fixed the behavioral-read bypasses:
- gateway/config.py load_gateway_config (messaging gateway: session_reset,
quick_commands, stt, model, ...)
- gateway/run.py _load_gateway_config (its read_raw_config fast path also
skipped the merge — read_raw_config returns raw user YAML)
- tui_gateway/server.py _load_cfg (new TUI + desktop backend: skin,
reasoning_effort, service_tier, provider_routing)
- cron/scheduler.py (scheduled-job model/reasoning/toolsets/provider_routing)
- hermes_logging.py (logging.level/max_size_mb/backup_count)
- hermes_time.py (timezone)
- hermes_cli/doctor.py (memory-provider diagnostic reads effective config)
All route through a new shared managed_scope.apply_managed_overlay() helper
that mirrors _load_config_impl (env-only expansion so a user ${VAR} can't
shadow a managed literal, root-model-string normalization, leaf-merge) and is
fail-open. cli.py's earlier inline fix is refactored onto the same helper.
Write-back paths (slash_commands, telegram/yuanbao dm_topics, profile
distribution) are deliberately left reading raw user YAML — overlaying managed
values there would persist them into the user file. The dashboard
(web_server.py) already routes through load_config and needed no change.
TUI loader caches the RAW config so _save_cfg never writes managed values to
disk. Adds test_managed_scope_overlay.py (helper) and
test_managed_scope_loaders.py (per-surface integration); mutation-checked.
Two small, focused fixes for the cron scheduler and checkpoint manager.
1. _summarize_cron_failure_for_delivery (cron/scheduler.py):
Replaces the raw error dump in _process_job with a compact
pattern-matched summary. Provider rate limits, timeouts, and
authentication errors now produce a short human-readable message
instead of dumping multi-KB provider JSON into the delivery channel.
2. _repair_bare_repo_dirs (tools/checkpoint_manager.py):
Recreates refs/heads/ and branches/ directories after git gc
--prune=now, which can remove empty dirs from bare repos and cause
subsequent git add -A to fail with 'fatal: not a git repository'.
Called after all four git gc call sites.
Both fixes use only standard library imports and plug into existing
call sites with no architectural changes.
Phase 4F (F.1 + F.2 + F.3, agent side). F.4 is the operator-run live smoke
(needs a NAS deployment); recorded in the PR, not code.
F.1 — on_jobs_changed wiring:
- cron/scheduler.py: _notify_provider_jobs_changed() — resolve the active
provider, call on_jobs_changed(), swallow errors. Lives in scheduler.py (not
jobs.py) so the store stays free of provider imports (no import cycle).
- Wired at the consumer surfaces AFTER a successful mutation: the cronjob model
tool (tools/cronjob_tools.py, create/update/remove/pause/resume) — which the
`hermes cron` CLI also routes through — and the REST handlers
(gateway/platforms/api_server.py, same five). Built-in's no-op default = zero
behavior change on the default path. Sleeping-agent direct jobs.json writes
(no tool/CLI/REST) are covered by reconcile-on-wake in start().
F.2 — config: cron.chronos.{portal_url,callback_url,expected_audience,
nas_jwks_url}. All non-secret; the agent holds no scheduler creds and the
outbound provision call reuses the existing Nous token (no token key). Additive
deep-merge key, no version literal.
F.3 — docs:
- docs/chronos-managed-cron-contract.md: authoritative agent↔NAS wire contract
(the three agent-cron endpoints + inbound /api/cron/fire + the 3-hop trust
model + at-most-once/re-arm semantics). This is what the NAS-side agent builds
against.
- cron-internals.md: "Managed cron (Chronos) for scale-to-zero" section.
- cli-commands.md: cron.provider accepts chronos + the cron.chronos.* keys.
- User docs name no scheduler vendor (QStash is a NAS-internal detail).
INVARIANT re-verified: zero qstash/upstash hits across plugins/cron, gateway,
hermes_cli, tools, website/docs (the one remaining repo hit is an unrelated
Context7 MCP comment in tools/mcp_tool.py).
Tests: test_jobs_changed_notify (5) — notify calls provider hook, swallows
errors, built-in harmless, tool create/remove notify. Full cron + chronos +
webhook + config + api_server_jobs suites green (504 in the cron+chronos+webhook
run).
Phase 4C. claim_job_for_fire(job_id, *, claim_ttl_seconds=300) in cron/jobs.py:
under the existing _jobs_lock() file lock, claim a job for a single external
fire so that across N gateway replicas exactly ONE wins. Single-machine
deployments always win (unaffected).
Semantics:
- missing / disabled / paused job → False.
- a fresh fire_claim (younger than claim_ttl_seconds) already present → False
(someone else holds it). Stale claim (crashed winner) → overwrite, so a job
is never wedged forever.
- on win: stamp fire_claim={at, by:_machine_id()}; for recurring (cron/interval)
advance next_run_at (mirrors advance_next_run's at-most-once bump so a stale
re-delivery can't re-fire); one-shots keep next_run_at but the fresh claim
blocks a duplicate retry for the same fire.
- mark_job_run now clears fire_claim on completion so a re-armed recurring job
is claimable again next fire.
_machine_id() (HERMES_MACHINE_ID env, else hostname:pid) is attribution-only;
correctness is the file lock + fresh-claim check, not the id.
This is consumed by CronScheduler.fire_due (Phase 4B). tick is untouched — it
still uses advance_next_run, so the built-in single-machine path is unaffected.
Tests (real store, temp HERMES_HOME): claim-once-then-block + next_run advance,
one-shot no-double-claim, unknown→False, paused→False, stale-claim reclaimable,
mark_job_run clears the claim (recurring re-claimable). tests/cron/ 470 passed.
Phase 4B. Three NON-abstract hooks on the CronScheduler ABC, all with
built-in-safe defaults so the built-in inherits them without overriding and
test_abc_growth_stays_additive stays green (required surface still {name,
start}):
- on_jobs_changed(): post-mutation reconcile hook. Built-in no-op.
- fire_due(job_id): claim the job via the store CAS (claim_job_for_fire,
Phase 4C) then run it through the shared run_one_job (Phase 4A). Returns
False if the claim is lost or the job vanished (repeat-N exhausted between
arm and fire). The inbound webhook (Phase 4E) routes here.
- reconcile(): converge the external registry toward jobs.json. Built-in no-op.
fire_due imports claim_job_for_fire/get_job/run_one_job INSIDE the method, so
this commits cleanly before Phase 4C lands claim_job_for_fire (import-time is
unaffected; tests monkeypatch it with raising=False).
Tests: required-surface-unchanged guard, built-in inherits no-op defaults, and
fire_due's three paths (claim+run, lost-claim→no-run, missing-job→no-run).
tests/cron/ green (20 in test_scheduler_provider.py).
Phase 4A. Factor tick's per-job closure (_process_job: execute → save →
deliver → mark) into a module-level run_one_job(job, *, adapters, loop,
verbose) so the external Chronos provider's fire_due (Phase 4D) reuses the
IDENTICAL body — no duplicated correctness. tick's _process_job is now a thin
wrapper calling run_one_job; the pool/in-flight-guard/contextvars dispatch
logic is unchanged.
run_one_job fires ONE given job; it does NOT decide due-ness, claim, or compute
next_run (tick advances next_run_at under the file lock; an external provider
claims via the store CAS in Phase 4C). Pure refactor, no behavior change.
TDD: test_run_one_job.py characterizes the sequence through tick() first
(test_tick_process_job_sequence, passed pre-extraction), then unit-tests the
helper directly: success sequence, [SILENT]→skip delivery, empty-response soft
failure (#8585), failed-job-still-delivers, exception→mark-failed.
Verified: tests/cron/ 459 passed (was 453 + 6 new); tick behavior unchanged.
Phase 2 of the pluggable cron-scheduler refactor. Still no call-site changes;
this wires up provider SELECTION with a hard safety net.
Task 2.1: cron.provider config key (hermes_cli/config.py), empty = built-in.
Additive key — deep-merge picks it up into existing configs with no version
bump (verified: load_config() yields the key on a pre-existing config.yaml).
Task 2.2: plugins/cron/__init__.py — discovery machinery cloned near-verbatim
from plugins/memory/__init__.py, retargeted at CronScheduler /
register_cron_scheduler. Bundled (plugins/cron/<name>/) + user
(/plugins/<name>/) dirs, bundled wins collisions. The built-in is
NOT discovered here — it's core, so the fallback can't be removed.
Task 2.3: resolve_cron_scheduler() in cron/scheduler_provider.py — reads
cron.provider and ALWAYS degrades to built-in (missing / unavailable / load
error / typo all fall back with a warning). cron can never be left without a
trigger.
Deviation from plan: the plan's resolver snippet used cfg_get("cron.provider")
(dotted-string form). The real cfg_get signature is cfg_get(cfg, *keys,
default=) — corrected to cfg_get(load_config(), "cron", "provider", default=""),
matching plugins/memory/__init__.py:349. Tests monkeypatch load_config (not
cfg_get) so the real traversal runs.
Tests: default key empty, discovery returns list, unknown load returns None,
and the four resolver paths (empty→builtin, no-section→builtin,
unknown→builtin, unavailable→builtin, available→used). Full tests/cron/: 453
passed; config suite green (additive key, no migration break).
Phase 1 of the pluggable cron-scheduler refactor (Axis B — the trigger).
No call-site changes; this phase only makes the abstraction exist + tested
in isolation.
Task 1.1: cron/scheduler_provider.py — the EXPERIMENTAL CronScheduler ABC.
Required surface is name + start; is_available()/stop() carry safe defaults.
is_available has a no-network invariant. Docstring marks it experimental
until the Chronos provider (Phase 4) validates the shape.
Task 1.2: InProcessCronScheduler wraps the historical 60s ticker loop, calling
cron.scheduler.tick(sync=False) exactly as the raw ticker does. Uses
stop_event.wait(interval) for responsive stop (both raw tickers already do).
Tests: ABC-is-abstract, default-is_available, the InProcess loop drives tick
and stops, stop() no-op, and test_abc_growth_stays_additive (the forward-compat
guard: required abstractmethods must stay exactly {name, start}, so the three
Phase-4 hooks land as NON-abstract additions).
tick() internals in cron/scheduler.py are byte-unchanged (only new file added).
Phase 0 characterization tests still green. Full tests/cron/: 445 passed.
Route curator rollback through the same cross-process cron job lock, make save_jobs lock for legacy direct callers without deadlocking nested mutation paths, and harden the regression test so a second _jobs_lock caller really blocks across processes.
`hermes cron pause`/`resume`/`remove` run in their own CLI process (CLI →
cronjob tool → pause_job → update_job → save_jobs), entirely separate from
the gateway process that also writes jobs.json (mark_job_run, advance_next_run,
due-fast-forward in get_due_jobs). The only synchronization was a module-level
`threading.Lock`, which serializes writers *within a single process* but does
nothing across processes — and update_job/pause_job/remove_job/create_job did
not even take it.
The result is a classic lost update: a `cron pause` issued while the gateway is
live loads jobs.json, sets enabled=False, and saves; concurrently the gateway
loads the same file and saves back its run-bookkeeping, clobbering the pause.
The CLI prints "Paused" (it succeeded against its own in-memory copy) but the
job stays enabled and keeps firing, with no error surfaced. The scheduler's
`.tick.lock` flock can't be reused for this — it is held for the entire tick,
including multi-minute agent runs, so a CLI mutation would block for minutes.
Add `_jobs_lock()`: a short-held cross-process advisory file lock (fcntl/msvcrt
flock on `<hermes_home>/cron/.jobs.lock`) layered over the existing in-process
lock, and wrap every load→modify→save critical section with it — create_job,
update_job, remove_job, mark_job_run, advance_next_run, get_due_jobs,
rewrite_skill_refs. The lock degrades to in-process-only if neither fcntl nor
msvcrt is available, preserving prior behaviour. All critical sections are short
(field edits, no agent execution), so contention resolves in milliseconds.
Adds a regression test that proves the lock excludes a second process (an
in-process threading.Lock cannot).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* docs: finish Automation Blueprints terminology rebrand
Replace leftover "Automation Templates" wording from the Cron Recipes
rebrand, rename the copy-paste cookbook guide to Automation Recipes, and
point the marketing gallery link at the blueprints catalog.
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
* docs: use Automation Blueprints instead of Recipes in guide
Rename the cookbook guide from automation-recipes to
automation-blueprints so sidebar and copy match the product term.
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
* docs: rename automation-blueprints-catalog to automation-blueprints
Drop the -catalog suffix from the reference page slug and title, and
move the copy-paste cookbook to automation-blueprint-examples so the
main Automation Blueprints doc is unambiguous.
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
* Revert "docs: rename automation-blueprints-catalog to automation-blueprints"
This reverts commit 605f1eeab5.
---------
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
Review fixes for the Cron Recipes stack before release:
- hydration-move: */90 in the cron minute field silently wraps to hourly
(croniter-verified) — 90/120-minute options never fired at their stated
cadence. Replaced with an hour-field step (0 9-17/2 * * 1-5) and an
interval_hours slot whose options (1/2/3h) all fire as labeled.
- fill_recipe: reject unknown slot names. A typo'd 'tiem=07:15' used to
silently create the job at the 08:00 default; now it 422s on the dashboard
form and errors on the slash/deep-link paths with the valid slot list.
- deliver slot: non-strict enum (options are suggestions, scheduler
validates downstream) so slack/whatsapp/etc. users aren't locked out;
GET /api/cron/recipes rewrites its options from cron_delivery_targets()
so the dashboard form only offers configured platforms; help text no
longer claims dashboard-created jobs deliver to 'the chat you set this
up from' (the endpoint strips origin — they go to the home channel).
- gateway: success/accept messages no longer point at /cron (cli_only);
surface-aware hint instead. Conversational fill now sends the
'Setting up X — I'll ask you a couple of things…' ack before the agent
turn, matching the CLI experience.
- important-mail catalog entry: reference the urgency classifier by module
path (python3 -m cron.scripts.classify_items) instead of baking an
absolute host path into the job prompt — stale after relocation and
nonexistent on remote terminal backends. cron/scripts is now a real
package and ships in the wheel (pyproject packages.find).
- export_recipe: interval schedules round-trip again — parse_schedule
stores 'minutes' but the renderer only read 'seconds', so every interval
job exported as the silent '0 9 * * *' fallback.
- skills_hub install: say so when a recipe suggestion is dropped
(latched dedup or pending cap) instead of printing nothing.
Targeted tests: 58 cron/recipe + 261 web_server pass; E2E-validated all
14 recipes fill+parse, hydration cadences via croniter, typo rejection on
slash + endpoint paths, surface-aware hints, and interval export round-trip.
Reworks the chat-line UX: pick a recipe by name and the agent asks you for
what it needs, one question at a time, instead of forcing you to hand-type a
slot=val command line.
- /cron-recipe -> lists the catalog
- /cron-recipe <name> -> forgiving name match (exact/prefix/substring/
fuzzy; ambiguous lists candidates), then seeds
the agent with a natural-language fill request
built from the recipe's typed slots + schedule
and prompt templates. The agent asks for each
value one at a time and calls the EXISTING
cronjob tool. No new tool.
- /cron-recipe <name> slot=val -> unchanged deterministic path (fill_recipe ->
create_job) for the dashboard/docs/power user.
Mechanism (no new plumbing, invariant-safe — the seed enters as a normal user
turn, never a synthetic injection):
- shared handler returns RecipeCommandResult{text, agent_seed}; match_recipe()
and build_recipe_seed() are the new shared pieces.
- gateway: dispatch rewrites event.text to the seed and falls through to the
agent (the same pattern /steer uses).
- CLI: handler sets a one-shot self._pending_agent_seed; the interactive loop
consumes it right after process_command() and runs it as the next turn.
The typed-slot schema stays the single source of truth (still validates the
form/inline path via fill_recipe); the agent path just renders those slots into
the questions to ask. Docs updated to lead with the name-then-ask flow.
A 'recipe' is a one-place definition of an automation that every surface
renders natively. The slot schema (cron/recipe_catalog.py) is the single
source of truth; four renderers consume it, and all paths end at the same
cron.jobs.create_job — no second job engine.
Form where there's a screen, conversation where there's a chat line:
- Dashboard / GUI app: a Recipes sub-tab on the Cron page renders each
recipe's typed slots as a form (time-picker, enum dropdown, free-text);
submit POSTs /api/cron/recipes/instantiate which fills + creates the job.
- CLI / TUI / messengers: /cron-recipe lists the catalog, shows a recipe's
fields, or fills + creates from a pasted 'key slot=val' command. The shared
handler (hermes_cli/cron_recipe_cmd.py) names any missing/invalid slot so
the agent can ask a targeted follow-up.
- Docs: a generated Cron Recipes catalog page (website, .mdx + React cards)
shows each recipe with a copy-paste command and a 'Send to App' button.
- Desktop: a hermes:// URL scheme (Electron single-instance lock +
setAsDefaultProtocolClient + open-url/second-instance) routes
hermes://cron-recipe/<key>?slot=val into the chat composer pre-filled.
Typed slots (time/enum/text/weekdays) with defaults: users never type raw
cron — recipes parameterize time-of-day and weekday sets and translate to
cron expressions; a free-text 'schedule' slot is the full-flexibility escape
hatch. Consent-first throughout: nothing schedules without an explicit submit
or send.
Core:
- cron/recipe_catalog.py — CronRecipe + RecipeSlot, 5 curated recipes,
recipe_form_schema / recipe_slash_command / recipe_deeplink /
recipe_catalog_entry renderers, fill_recipe (validate + translate to
create_job kwargs).
- hermes_cli/cron_recipe_cmd.py — shared /cron-recipe handler (CLI + TUI +
gateway never drift). CommandDef + dispatch in commands.py / cli.py /
gateway/run.py.
Dashboard: GET /api/cron/recipes + POST /api/cron/recipes/instantiate
(web_server.py), CronRecipes.tsx gallery+form, Segmented sub-tab on CronPage,
api.ts methods + types.
Desktop: hermes:// scheme end to end (main.cjs deep-link router + ready-queue,
preload onDeepLink/signalDeepLinkReady, global.d.ts types, desktop-controller
composer prefill, electron-builder protocols key).
Docs: extract-cron-recipes.py generator wired into prebuild.mjs,
cron-recipes-catalog.mdx + CronRecipesCatalog React component, sidebar entry.
Generated index json gitignored like skills.json.
Tests: 23 core (catalog/slots/schedule-resolution/validation/renderers/command
handler/generator) + 5 web_server endpoint tests. E2E verified end to end:
slot fill -> create_job -> persisted job with correct schedule/deliver/origin.
Hermes can propose automations and let the user accept them with one tap
via /suggestions, instead of making them assemble cron jobs by hand. Every
proposal — wherever it originates — flows through one surface.
Sources (the 'where suggestions come from'):
- catalog: curated starter automations (daily briefing, important-mail
monitor, weekly review, workday-start reminder) via /suggestions catalog
- recipe: installing a skill that carries a metadata.hermes.recipe block
registers a suggestion instead of auto-scheduling
- usage / integration: reserved for the background-review detector and
account-connect triggers (sources defined; emitters land next)
Pieces:
- cron/suggestions.py — the store. add/list/accept/dismiss, dedup+latch by
key (dismissed proposals never re-offered), pending cap so it can't become
a nag wall. Accepting calls the existing cron.jobs.create_job — there is
NO second job engine. Mirrors jobs.py storage (atomic writes, lock, 0600).
- cron/suggestion_catalog.py — the curated set. The important-mail monitor
entry is where the old proactive-monitor poll->classify->surface engine
lives now (cron/scripts/classify_items.py + the 'monitor' aux task), as ONE
catalog automation rather than a standalone feature.
- tools/recipes.py — recipe<->job bridge; register_recipe_suggestion() makes
a recipe source 'recipe' of this surface. recipe_to_job_spec() is the single
translation both the direct and suggestion paths share.
- hermes_cli/suggestions_cmd.py — shared /suggestions handler (CLI + gateway
never drift); /suggestions [accept N|dismiss N|catalog|clear].
- Wired: CommandDef + CLI dispatch (cli.py) + gateway dispatch (gateway/run.py)
+ aux 'monitor' task (config.py) + recipe-install hook (skills_hub.py).
Consent-first throughout: nothing auto-schedules; acceptance is always
explicit; dismissals latch.
Supersedes #41122 (proactive-monitor) and #41127 (recipes): both fold in here
as a catalog entry and a suggestion source respectively.
Tests: store (dedup/cap/accept/dismiss/latch), catalog seeding+idempotency,
recipe->suggestion bridge, command handler, aux config. E2E: recipe SKILL.md
-> parsed -> suggested -> accepted -> real cron job persisted to jobs.json.
Fully removes the cron per-job 'profile' arg added in #28124: the
cronjob tool schema field, CLI --profile flags on cron create/edit,
job-record storage/validation, the scheduler's _job_profile_context
wrapper, and the script-runner env override. Sequential-partition
logic reverts to workdir-only.
The context-local HERMES_HOME override in hermes_constants and the
subprocess bridging in tools/environments/local.py are kept — they
now have other consumers (dashboard multi-profile, TUI gateway).
The runtime assembled-prompt scan (#3968 lineage) selected its pattern
tier on has_skills alone. A script-driven, no-skills job injects its
script's stdout into the prompt, and that blob was scanned with the
STRICT user-prompt pattern set — so any command-shape string in the
data feed (e.g. a triage bot ingesting a bug report that quotes
`rm -rf /`) hard-blocked the job on every tick.
Script output and context_from output are runtime DATA produced by
operator-authored code — the same trust class as install-vetted skill
markdown, not a user-authored directive prompt. Select the scan tier by
what the assembled prompt CONTAINS: when it includes skill content OR
injected data, use the looser _scan_cron_skill_assembled set (keeps
unambiguous injection directives, drops command-shape patterns,
sanitizes invisible unicode instead of blocking).
Defense-in-depth is preserved:
- The raw user prompt is still strict-scanned at create/update
(api_server paths untouched) AND re-scanned strict at runtime even
when the looser tier was selected for the data blob.
- Plain no-script/no-skills jobs keep the strict scan on the whole
assembled prompt.
- Injection directives arriving via script stdout still block.
Rejected alternative: removing destructive_root_rm from the strict set
or a per-job skip_injection_scan flag — both weaken the guard globally.
A cron session's first message is the injected "[IMPORTANT: you are running as
a scheduled cron job …]" delivery hint, so with no explicit title the sidebar
and history rows fell back to that hint as their label.
Set the session title from the job (name → short prompt → id) with a run-time
suffix for uniqueness against the sessions.title index. Done after the run so
the agent's own INSERT keeps model/system_prompt — this only updates the title.
* fix: respect disabled auto-compaction on context overflow
Port from anomalyco/opencode#30749.
When compression.enabled is false, NO automatic compaction trigger may
fire. The proactive token-threshold paths (preflight + post-response
should_compress gate) already honoured the setting, but the three
provider-overflow recovery paths in the agent loop — long-context-tier
429, 413 payload-too-large, and context-overflow — called
_compress_context() unconditionally, silently compressing and rotating
the session against the user's explicit choice.
Add a single guard at the top of the overflow-recovery dispatch: when
compression is disabled and the error is one of those three overflow
classes, surface a terminal error (compaction_disabled: True) telling the
user to /compress manually, /new, switch to a larger-context model, or
reduce attachments. Manual /compress (force=True) is unaffected — it never
enters this loop.
Tests: new TestOverflowWithCompactionDisabled (413 + 400 overflow don't
compress when disabled; control case still compresses when enabled).
Existing overflow-recovery tests updated to enable compaction explicitly
(they verify the recovery fires); fixture defaults flipped to True to
match production (compression.enabled defaults to True).
* fix(dashboard): populate cron delivery dropdown from configured platforms
The dashboard cron-create/edit dropdown hardcoded five delivery options
(local, telegram, discord, slack, email), so users on Matrix — or any
other backend-supported platform — had no way to pick their channel even
though the cron scheduler delivers to all of them. It also offered
Telegram/Discord/etc. to users who never set those up.
- cron/scheduler.py: add cron_delivery_targets() — the single source of
truth. Intersects gateway-configured platforms with cron-deliverable
ones and reports whether each platform's home channel is set.
- web_server.py: GET /api/cron/delivery-targets exposes that list (+ the
implicit local option) to the dashboard.
- CronPage.tsx: both modals render options from the endpoint. Configured
platforms missing a home channel still appear, annotated "set a home
channel first" (option B), so the user knows what to fix. Edit modal
preserves a job's current target even if it's no longer configured.
Local-only state shows a "configure a platform under Channels" hint.
Validation: scheduler + endpoint E2E'd with a Matrix gateway (home set
and unset); 5 new tests; tests/cron + tests/hermes_cli/test_web_server
green (366 passed).
Follow-up on the parallel-dispatch decoupling: the sequential pass for
workdir/profile jobs still ran inline in the ticker thread, so a long
workdir/profile job reintroduced the exact starvation #37312 describes,
just for env-mutating jobs. And the MCP orphan sweep ran immediately
after dispatch in sync=False mode — before jobs finished — defeating its
own 'runs after every job' contract and racing jobs still spawning MCP
children.
- Sequential jobs now queue to a persistent single-thread cron-seq pool
(preserves one-at-a-time ordering across ticks, never blocks the tick).
- Same in-flight dedup guard now covers sequential jobs.
- MCP orphan sweep runs via a done-callback after the LAST dispatched job
completes in async mode; inline after as_completed in sync mode.
Verified E2E: tick(sync=False) returns in ~1ms with a 1.5s sequential job
in flight; sweep fires only after that job ends.
PR #13021 fixed serial starvation by adding ThreadPoolExecutor to tick(),
but kept as_completed(timeout=600) which still blocks the ticker thread
until the slowest job finishes. This causes the same starvation pattern:
when one job runs long (15+ min), other jobs' next_run_at expires past the
grace window and they get perpetually fast-forwarded instead of running.
This PR decouples dispatch from completion:
- Persistent ThreadPoolExecutor (reused across ticks, no auto-join)
- Fire-and-forget dispatch: tick submits and returns immediately
- Running-job guard: prevents re-dispatching active jobs
- sync parameter: defaults to True (backward compatible), callers opt
into sync=False for non-blocking behavior
- atexit shutdown handler for clean pool teardown
- gateway/run.py: production ticker opts into sync=False
Refs #33315 (complementary — that issue's PRs fix grace handling in
jobs.py; this PR prevents the grace from expiring in the first place)
A stray zero-width space (U+200B), BOM, or bidi control in loaded skill
markdown permanently killed any cron that loaded it. The skills-attached
assembled-prompt scan hard-blocked on any invisible-unicode char, even
though skill bodies are already install-time vetted by skills_guard.py and
the chars commonly appear in copy-pasted unicode docs / code examples.
The skills path now strips invisibles (logging the codepoints) and runs the
cleaned prompt. The raw user-prompt path (_scan_cron_prompt) keeps the hard
block — that is the actual #3968 injection surface, where a small directive
prompt with a ZWSP is a smoking gun, not prose. Stripping does not let a real
injection slip through: the directive still matches after sanitization.
_scan_cron_skill_assembled now returns (cleaned_prompt, error).
Salvages 8 distinct fixes from a batch of PRs by @kyssta-exe, reapplied
onto current main (original branches were stale) with a few refinements.
- cron(jobs.py): load_jobs() validates top-level JSON shape — a bare
list auto-repairs into the {"jobs": [...]} dict; scalars/null raise a
clear RuntimeError instead of an uncaught AttributeError that took
down the whole cron subsystem (#37065, closes#36867).
- web(web_server.py): close the per-action log file handle after Popen
so the parent stops leaking one fd per spawned action (#36843).
- web(web_server.py): DELETE /api/env returns 400 for invalid key names
instead of a misleading 500, mirroring PUT /api/env (#36840).
- gateway(gateway.py): read /proc/<pid>/cmdline inside a with-block so
the fd is released immediately instead of relying on GC (#36804).
- web-tools(web_tools.py): include "xai" in check_web_api_key() so a
configured X.AI web backend reports as available (#36802).
- compression(conversation_compression.py): mark the feasibility check
done only after it completes, and default the gate to "not checked"
if the attribute is missing (#36803).
- completion(completion.py): replace `ls` with directory globbing in the
generated bash/zsh/fish profile listers — handles names with spaces
and skips non-directory entries (#36806).
- terminal-tool(terminal_tool.py): drop a duplicate `import threading`
(#36808).
- claw(claw.py): the migrate recommendation now points at the real
`hermes gateway stop` command instead of the non-existent
`hermes stop` (#36795, #36796, closes#36771).
- tests: guard against a leaked HERMES_CRON_SESSION breaking gateway
approval tests — add it to the hermetic conftest unset list (root
cause, protects every test) and pop it in the affected test's
setup_method (#36796).
Co-authored-by: kyssta-exe <kyssta-exe@users.noreply.github.com>
The runtime cron prompt scanner (added in #3968 to plug the
"malicious skill carrying an injection payload" gap) reuses the same
critical-severity patterns as the create-time user-prompt scan against
the *assembled* prompt — which includes loaded skill markdown.
That works fine for narrow patterns like "ignore previous instructions"
which never legitimately appear in prose. It catastrophically false-
positives on command-shape patterns like `cat ~/.hermes/.env`,
`authorized_keys`, `/etc/sudoers`, and `rm -rf /`, which routinely
appear in security postmortems and runbooks as **descriptive prose**
about attacks, not as actual commands.
Concrete failure: the bundled `hermes-agent-dev` skill contains a
security postmortem section saying "the attacker could just
`cat ~/.hermes/.env`". Every PR-scout cron job that loaded this skill
was silently blocked with `Blocked: prompt matches threat pattern
'read_secrets'`. All 11 scout jobs failed for weeks.
Fix: split the scanner into two tiers and route by context:
- `_scan_cron_prompt` (strict, unchanged behavior) runs against
the small user-authored cron prompt at create/update and as a
runtime defense-in-depth when no skills are attached. A legit
user prompt has no business saying `cat .env`, so the strict
patterns still apply there.
- `_scan_cron_skill_assembled` (new, looser) runs against the
assembled prompt when skills are attached. It only catches
unambiguous prompt-injection directives ("ignore previous
instructions", "disregard your rules", "system prompt override",
"do not tell the user") plus invisible-unicode markers. Command-
shape patterns are dropped because they false-positive on prose.
This is defense-in-depth, not the only line of defense. Skill bodies
are already scanned at install time by `skills_guard.py`; the runtime
cron scan exists purely as a tripwire for an obvious injection
directive surviving a malicious install. Catching prose mentions of
commands was never the goal of #3968 — the test that planted a skill
containing `cat ~/.hermes/.env` was the wrong shape of test for the
threat model.
Tests:
- `_scan_cron_prompt` strict behavior preserved (56 existing tests
unchanged: bare `cat .env`, `rm -rf /`, etc. still block).
- New `TestScanCronSkillAssembled` class verifies the looser scanner:
injection / disregard / system-override / do-not-tell-the-user /
invisible-unicode still block; descriptive prose about attack
commands is allowed; GitHub auth-header allowlist still works.
- `test_skill_with_env_exfil_payload_raises` (planted `cat .env`
in skill body) replaced with `test_skill_with_env_exfil_command
_in_prose_is_allowed` documenting the new correct behavior with
the real-world postmortem-style example that triggered the bug.
- All 11 originally-failing PR-scout jobs validated end-to-end via
`_build_job_prompt` — assembled prompts now build successfully
with the `hermes-agent-dev` skill attached.
Total: 75/75 tests in cron + cronjob_tools + threat scanner pass;
544/544 across the wider cron / memory / threat-pattern surface.
Two defense-in-depth fixes on cron output path handling:
1. cron/jobs.py:update_job() rejects mutation of the immutable 'id' field
(raises ValueError). Dashboard PUT /api/cron/jobs/{id} converts this to
HTTP 400. Without this, an attacker who can reach the update endpoint
could rename a job's id to '../escape' and move its output directory
outside OUTPUT_DIR.
2. cron/jobs.py:_job_output_dir() validates job IDs before composing
paths: rejects '.', '..', '/', '\\', absolute paths, and Windows drive
prefixes. Used by save_job_output() and remove_job() so legacy unsafe
IDs (from before this guard) fail closed rather than half-applying a
shutil.rmtree or output write outside the sandbox.
Tests:
- update_job rejects {'id': '../escape'} without renaming
- remove_job(legacy '../escape' id) raises ValueError without deleting
files outside OUTPUT_DIR or removing the job from the store
- save_job_output rejects '..', './escape', 'nested/escape',
absolute paths
- dashboard PUT /api/cron/jobs/{id} with {'id': '../escape'} returns
400, job list unchanged
Salvaged from PR #29826 by @zapabob. Simplified implementation:
- Dropped a 23-line _validate_job_output_id() helper using Path.parts
semantics. The inline check (path separators + dot-components +
is_absolute) is shorter and behaviorally identical.
- Dropped the secondary OUTPUT_DIR.resolve()/relative_to() check —
redundant once we reject any path separator at the input boundary.
- Dropped the _docs/2026-05-21_cron-output-path-hardening_codex.md
planning artifact (we don't check planning docs into the repo).
Co-authored-by: teknium1 <127238744+teknium1@users.noreply.github.com>
The bug: cron/scheduler.py:_resolve_cron_enabled_toolsets returns an
LLM-supplied per-job enabled_toolsets verbatim. The disabled_toolsets
passed to AIAgent was a hardcoded [cronjob, messaging, clarify] that
ignored agent.disabled_toolsets from config.yaml. An LLM could call
cronjob(action='add', enabled_toolsets=['terminal','file'],
prompt='...') and the cron-spawned agent would receive terminal+file
even when the operator had globally disabled them.
Fix: new _resolve_cron_disabled_toolsets() helper that ALWAYS layers
agent.disabled_toolsets on top of the cron baseline. AIAgent's
disabled_toolsets takes precedence over enabled_toolsets, so this
stops the bypass regardless of what the per-job override contains.
This is the disabled-side fix. Three concurrent PRs (#25842, #25815,
#25780) proposed intersection-side variants on _resolve_cron_enabled_toolsets;
this fix is more robust because it stops the leak at the precedence
boundary AIAgent itself enforces, not at a layer above.
Regression test reproduces the issue's PoC exactly:
config.yaml has agent.disabled_toolsets=[terminal,file]; cron job has
enabled_toolsets=[web,terminal,file]; assertion: AIAgent receives
disabled_toolsets containing terminal AND file.
Salvaged from PR #25786 by @Schrotti77. Simplified the implementation:
dropped a 23-line _normalize_toolset_list() helper (handled str/tuple/
set/garbage input shapes) in favor of the existing convention
(agent_cfg.get('disabled_toolsets') or []) used elsewhere in the
codebase. YAML always parses these as lists; the elaborate normalizer
was theatre for shapes we never produce.
Closes#25752
Co-authored-by: teknium1 <127238744+teknium1@users.noreply.github.com>
ntfy now ships as a self-contained plugin under plugins/platforms/ntfy/
instead of editing 8 core files (gateway/config.py Platform enum,
gateway/run.py factory + auth maps, cron/scheduler.py, toolsets.py,
hermes_cli/status.py, agent/prompt_builder.py, gateway/channel_directory.py,
tools/send_message_tool.py).
All routing goes through gateway/platform_registry via register_platform():
- adapter_factory, check_fn, validate_config, is_connected
- env_enablement_fn seeds PlatformConfig.extra from NTFY_* env vars so
gateway status reflects env-only setups without instantiating httpx
- standalone_sender_fn handles deliver=ntfy cron jobs when cron runs
out-of-process from the gateway
- allowed_users_env / allow_all_env hook into _is_user_authorized
- cron_deliver_env_var=NTFY_HOME_CHANNEL for cron home routing
- platform_hint surfaces in the system prompt
- pii_safe=True (topic names are the only identifier; no PII to redact)
Tests moved to tests/gateway/test_ntfy_plugin.py using _plugin_adapter_loader
so the module lives under plugin_adapter_ntfy in sys.modules and cannot
collide with sibling plugin-adapter tests on the same xdist worker. The
core-file grep tests (Platform.NTFY in source, hermes-ntfy in toolsets,
etc.) are replaced with plugin-shape tests covering register() metadata,
env_enablement_fn output, and standalone_sender_fn behavior.
68 tests pass under scripts/run_tests.sh.
Add an official, production-grade WhatsApp integration via Meta's
Business Cloud API as a complement to the existing Baileys bridge.
No bridge subprocess, no QR codes, no account-ban risk — at the cost
of a Meta Business account and a public HTTPS webhook URL.
Setup is fully wizard-driven: 'hermes whatsapp-cloud' walks through
every credential with paste-time validation (catches the #1 trap of
pasting a phone number into the Phone Number ID field), generates a
verify token, and ends with copy-paste instructions for the
cloudflared / Meta-dashboard / Business Manager pieces that can't be
automated. The wizard also points users at Meta's Business Manager
for setting the bot's display name and profile picture.
Feature set:
- Inbound: text, images (with native-vision routing), voice notes
(STT), documents (small text inlined, larger cached), reply context.
- Outbound: text with WhatsApp-flavored markdown conversion, images,
videos, documents, opus voice notes via ffmpeg with MP3 fallback.
- Native interactive buttons for clarify, dangerous-command approval,
and slash-command confirmation flows — matches the Telegram /
Discord UX, graceful degrades to plain text.
- Read receipts (blue double-checkmarks) and typing indicator,
using Meta's combined endpoint so they fire in a single API call.
- Webhook security: X-Hub-Signature-256 HMAC verification (raw body,
constant-time), wamid deduplication, group-shaped-message refusal
(groups deferred to v2 — Baileys still covers them).
- Full integration with the gateway's session, cron, display-tier,
prompt-hint, and auth-allowlist systems. Cloud and Baileys can run
side-by-side against different phone numbers.
Also wires STT (speech-to-text) through Nous's managed audio gateway
for Nous subscribers — previously the default stt.provider=local
required a separate faster-whisper install. New subscribers now get
voice-note transcription out of the box.
Docs: 418-line user guide at website/docs/user-guide/messaging/
whatsapp-cloud.md, sidebar entry, environment-variables reference,
ADDING_A_PLATFORM.md updated with the optional interactive-UX
contract for future adapter authors.
Tests: 100 dedicated tests for the adapter, 32 for the setup wizard,
20 for the Nous subscription STT wiring, plus regression coverage
across display_config, prompt_builder, and the cron scheduler.
Known limitations (deferred until clear demand signal):
- Group chats — use the Baileys bridge if you need them.
- Message templates for 24-hour-window outside-conversation sends —
reactive chat is unaffected; cron / delegate_task with gaps > 24h
will fail with a clear error. The agent's system prompt warns the
model about this so it knows to mention it when scheduling delayed
messages.
Apply CREATE_NO_WINDOW flags when the cron scheduler launches job scripts on Windows so gateway-managed no-agent cron jobs do not flash cmd or python console windows every tick.
1. trajectory_compressor.py: yaml.safe_load() returns None on empty
files, crashing with TypeError on `if 'tokenizer' in data`. Fix by
adding `or {}` fallback. (HIGH — blocks startup with empty config)
2. 6 files with fcntl.flock(LOCK_UN) in finally blocks without
try/except: cron/scheduler.py, hermes_cli/auth.py,
agent/shell_hooks.py, tools/skill_usage.py,
tools/environments/file_sync.py, tools/memory_tool.py. If unlock
raises OSError, fd.close() is skipped and the lock is held forever.
The msvcrt branches already had try/except; the fcntl branches did
not. Fix by wrapping in try/except (OSError, IOError): pass.
3. agent/copilot_acp_client.py line 639: TOCTOU race — path.exists()
followed by path.read_text() with no try/except. If file is deleted
between the check and the read, FileNotFoundError propagates. Fix
by using try/except FileNotFoundError.
4. gateway/sticker_cache.py: non-atomic write via Path.write_text()
can leave truncated JSON on crash, causing JSONDecodeError on next
load. Fix by writing to tempfile + fsync + os.replace (atomic).
When Telegram topic mode is enabled, cron messages delivered to the bot's
root DM (TELEGRAM_HOME_CHANNEL without a thread id) land in the system
lobby — replies there are rebuffed with the lobby reminder and
reply_to_message_id is dropped, so users cannot interact with the cron
output (#24409).
Add an optional TELEGRAM_CRON_THREAD_ID env var that overrides
TELEGRAM_HOME_CHANNEL_THREAD_ID for cron deliveries only. Operators can
create a "Cron" forum topic in the DM, point this var at its thread id,
and replies to cron messages will land in that topic's existing session
instead of the lobby. The home-channel thread id (used elsewhere, e.g.
restart notifications) is unchanged, and explicit
deliver="telegram:chat:thread" targets continue to win over the env var.
Per the reporter's clarification on 2026-05-13, option (a) (cron-side
route to a dedicated topic + config knob) was chosen.
Fixes#24409
Two code paths call json.loads() on output from external tools without
catching JSONDecodeError. If the tool returns a non-JSON string (error
message, empty string, or None), the entire call path crashes.
1. gateway/run.py — text_to_speech_tool() result in voice reply path.
A TTS failure that returns an error string instead of JSON crashes
the voice reply handler, killing the message response entirely.
2. cron/scheduler.py — skill_view() result when loading skills for
cron jobs. A corrupted or missing skill file that returns an error
string instead of JSON crashes the cron tick, preventing all jobs
from executing that cycle.
Both fixes catch (json.JSONDecodeError, TypeError), log a warning,
and gracefully skip the failed operation instead of crashing.
Instead of raising FileNotFoundError (which silently bricks the job),
log a warning and fall back to the scheduler default home. Validates
at create/update time still catches typos. Idea from PR #19958.
Replace generator-based result collection with explicit per-future
handling. Each future is now processed independently with a 600s timeout.
Before: _results.extend(f.result() for f in _futures)
- One exception stops the generator, remaining results are lost
- No timeout: one hung job blocks the entire tick
After: as_completed() + per-future try/except
- Each future handled independently
- 600s timeout prevents indefinite blocking
- Failed futures are logged and counted as failures
Wraps every sync->async coroutine-scheduling site in the codebase with a
new agent.async_utils.safe_schedule_threadsafe() helper that closes the
coroutine on scheduling failure (closed loop, shutdown race, etc.)
instead of leaking it as 'coroutine was never awaited' RuntimeWarnings
plus reference leaks.
22 production call sites migrated across the codebase:
- acp_adapter/events.py, acp_adapter/permissions.py
- agent/lsp/manager.py
- cron/scheduler.py (media + text delivery paths)
- gateway/platforms/feishu.py (5 sites, via existing _submit_on_loop helper
which now delegates to safe_schedule_threadsafe)
- gateway/run.py (10 sites: telegram rename, agent:step hook, status
callback, interim+bg-review, clarify send, exec-approval button+text,
temp-bubble cleanup, channel-directory refresh)
- plugins/memory/hindsight, plugins/platforms/google_chat
- tools/browser_supervisor.py (3), browser_cdp_tool.py,
computer_use/cua_backend.py, slash_confirm.py
- tools/environments/modal.py (_AsyncWorker)
- tools/mcp_tool.py (2 + 8 _run_on_mcp_loop callers converted to
factory-style so the coroutine is never constructed on a dead loop)
- tui_gateway/ws.py
Tests: new tests/agent/test_async_utils.py covers helper behavior under
live loop, dead loop, None loop, and scheduling exceptions. Regression
tests added at three PR-original sites (acp events, acp permissions,
mcp loop runner) mirroring contributor's intent.
Live-tested end-to-end:
- Helper stress test: 1500 schedules across live/dead/race scenarios,
zero leaked coroutines
- Race exercised: 5000 schedules with loop killed mid-flight, 100 ok /
4900 None returns, zero leaks
- hermes chat -q with terminal tool call (exercises step_callback bridge)
- MCP probe against failing subprocess servers + factory path
- Real gateway daemon boot + SIGINT shutdown across multiple platform
adapter inits
- WSTransport 100 live + 50 dead-loop writes
- Cron delivery path live + dead loop
Salvages PR #2657 — adopts contributor's intent over a much wider site
list and a single centralized helper instead of inline try/except at
each site. 3 of the original PR's 6 sites no longer exist on main
(environments/patches.py deleted, DingTalk refactored to native async);
the equivalent fix lives in tools/environments/modal.py instead.
Co-authored-by: JithendraNara <jithendranaidunara@gmail.com>
Cron mutation operations (run/pause/resume/remove) and 'hermes cron edit'
now accept a job name in addition to the hex ID, with case-insensitive
matching. Before this, 'hermes cron run my_job_name' died with
'Job with ID my_job_name not found' and forced the user to look up the
hex ID first.
The original PR matched by name but silently picked the first match when
two jobs shared a name. This version refuses to act on an ambiguous name
and surfaces every matching job (id, name, schedule, next_run_at) so the
caller can pick a specific ID.
- cron/jobs.py:
- get_job() stays ID-only (preserves existing call-site semantics for
web_server/api_server/curator/scheduler/test code that always passes
real IDs).
- resolve_job_ref() is the new name-or-ID resolver, used by pause/
resume/trigger/remove_job. Exact ID match wins over a name match
even if a different job's name happens to equal that ID. Ambiguous
name match raises AmbiguousJobReference with all candidate IDs.
- tools/cronjob_tools.py: dispatch site uses resolve_job_ref, surfaces
ambiguous matches as a structured error with the matching IDs.
- hermes_cli/cron.py: 'cron edit' uses resolve_job_ref so editing by
name works and ambiguous names are reported with IDs.
- tests/cron/test_jobs.py: new TestResolveJobRef covering ID match,
case-insensitive name match, ID-wins-over-name, ambiguous refusal,
and that pause/resume/trigger/remove all refuse on ambiguity.
Closes#2627
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