Tests like tests/gateway/test_goal_verdict_send.py monkeypatch Path.home()
to a tmpdir; resolving the guard's 'real root' through Path.home() made the
test's own hermetic home look like production (false positive). Resolve via
os.path.expanduser/LOCALAPPDATA instead — the hermetic conftest never
rewrites HOME, so this always names the actual production root.
Forensics on a live developer machine found pytest fixture rows inside the
REAL ~/.hermes/state.db — sessions with chat_id 'chat-1', '123', 'wx-chat',
and gateway_routing rows whose scope was literally under /tmp/pytest-of-*/.
A pytest-spawned process also opened the live DB and flipped its journal
mode (journal_mode=DELETE fallback on SQLite 3.50.4) under the WAL-mode
gateway writer, destroying committed transcripts ("Persisted transcript
lagged live cached history ... possible FTS write corruption", 15+
occurrences). The existing live-system guard covers kill primitives but not
the SessionDB/SessionStore write paths.
Root cause (leak vector): the session-level HERMES_HOME sandbox in
tests/conftest.py only created a tempdir when HERMES_HOME was UNSET. On a
machine where the shell (e.g. gateway-launched, or an exported
HERMES_HOME=~/.hermes) hands pytest the production home, the sandbox was
skipped entirely — every argless SessionDB()/SessionStore() and every
collection-time DEFAULT_DB_PATH froze onto the real state.db.
Fixes (fail the class, one owner):
* hermes_state._ensure_test_isolation(): single choke point wired into
SessionDB.__init__ (every construction, incl. read_only). Under pytest
(PYTEST_CURRENT_TEST / PYTEST_VERSION — inherited by subprocess
children), a db path resolving to <real-root>/state.db or
<real-root>/profiles/<name>/state.db raises RuntimeError('live-system
guard: ...') before any connection, mkdir, or journal-mode pragma.
* tests/conftest.py: session sandbox now also tempdir-redirects a pre-set
HERMES_HOME that points at the production root (the actual escape
vector); kanban deny-list capture updated to match. New autouse
_state_db_write_guard fixture honors the existing
@pytest.mark.live_system_guard_bypass marker as the escape hatch and
feeds custom (non-~/.hermes) production roots into the guard deny-list.
* gateway/session.py: SessionStore.__init__ no longer swallows the guard's
RuntimeError into the JSONL fallback — guard trips are loud.
* tests/hermes_state/test_live_db_isolation_guard.py: behavioral
regression tests — production paths (direct, profile, read-only,
unnormalized, default-resolution) raise; tmp HERMES_HOME works; bypass
marker works; SessionStore re-raises guard errors but still degrades on
ordinary failures; subprocess child without HERMES_HOME is refused while
a hermetic child succeeds.
No new HERMES_* env vars; no hardcoded ~/.hermes (platform root comes from
hermes_constants._get_platform_default_hermes_home()).
The WAL-reset-vulnerability gate (#70055 lineage) could flip a LIVE WAL
database to journal_mode=DELETE while another process was writing to it.
Observed on state.db (Aug 5): a pytest process on the repo .venv (SQLite
3.50.4, vulnerable) opened the live ~/.hermes/state.db while the gateway
(SQLite 3.53.1, WAL) held it, downgraded the journal mode, and destroyed
the gateway's committed-but-uncheckpointed WAL transactions (disk rows
went 10 -> 0 while memory held 185). cron/executions.db already had the
"leave WAL in place, no live downgrade under concurrent openers" rule via
the on-disk WAL probe; state.db and every other store shared the hole
whenever the mode PROBE itself was blocked by a concurrent opener's locks
("could not read the mode" was treated as "not WAL" -> flip anyway).
Generalized in the single journal-mode owner (apply_wal_with_fallback),
covering ALL call sites (state.db, kanban.db, projects.db,
cron/executions.db, delivery_ledger, async_delegation,
verification_evidence, discord recovery, response_store.db,
memory_store.db):
- _set_journal_mode_no_wait(): the only journal-mode switch primitive for
non-WAL targets. Forces busy_timeout=0 around the pragma so SQLite's own
exclusivity requirement for leaving WAL becomes the concurrent-opener
detector — any other opener (this process or another) makes the flip
fail immediately instead of waiting out a busy timeout and sneaking the
flip in under a live writer.
- Vulnerable-SQLite gate: an unreadable journal mode (probe blocked) now
means "ownership not provably exclusive" — leave the mode untouched and
warn, never flip. A lock conflict on the flip itself likewise leaves the
mode alone.
- Configured journal_mode=delete: refuses (raises) rather than downgrading
blind when the mode cannot be verified under a concurrent opener.
- Filesystem-incompat fallback: re-raises instead of downgrading when the
on-disk mode cannot be verified.
- New/exclusively-owned DBs on vulnerable builds behave exactly as before
(DELETE gate retained per #70055).
Behavioral tests use a REAL second process (and a real second connection
holding an exclusive lock) with the blocked-state assertions running WHILE
the holder owns the DB, plus exclusive-ownership downgrade-still-happens
coverage.
Follow-up to #79722, which introduced _escape_like in hermes_state.py for
the prune/archive filter fix. The same three-replace escape chain existed
as five more inline copies in hermes_state.py and two in
hermes_state_search.py (which must not import hermes_state — cycle).
Move the helper to hermes_state_common.escape_like (the module that exists
for exactly this) and route every copy through it:
- hermes_state.py: session-ID prefix resolution, find_session_by_title,
get_next_title_in_lineage, the _like_pattern closure in list projection,
and the kanban cwd retag
- hermes_state_search.py: the two LIKE-fallback token escapes
hermes_state re-imports it as _escape_like for back-compat. No behavior
change: every site produces byte-identical SQL patterns.
Follow-up on the salvage of #78681 + #78927: the second fix inlined the
exact body of the _escape_like helper the first fix introduced ten lines
above. Call the helper instead so there is one copy of the escaping rule.
_cwd_prefix_clause builds "cwd is this directory or under it" for session
listing, workspace resume and prune/archive. The two LIKE arms bound the
raw prefix, so `_` and `%` acted as wildcards on a value that is a path:
cwd_prefix="/home/me/my_project"
main -> ['sibling', 'target'] # /home/me/myXproject/src matched too
fix -> ['target']
`_` matches any single character, so a same-length sibling directory with
children falls inside the pattern. prune_sessions() deletes the rows it
matches (and their on-disk transcripts), so an unrelated project's history
goes with it.
Escape the needle and pair both arms with ESCAPE, the convention the rest
of this file already uses; the literal separator backslash in the Windows
pattern is escaped for the same reason. The `=` arm is an exact compare and
keeps the raw prefix, so directory-and-children matching is unchanged.
Follow-up to the *_like filters in #78681, kept separate because this helper
is shared by four call sites beyond prune.
_prune_filter_where documents title_like / model_like / branch_like as
"case-insensitive substring matches", and the CLI confirmation renders them
as "title contains 'X'". They were bound straight into a bare LIKE, so `_`
matched any single character and `%` any run.
The builder backs prune_sessions(), which deletes session rows and their
on-disk transcripts, so the over-match is unrecoverable: pruning
title_like="user_auth" also destroys "user-auth", "userXauth" and
"user auth". `_` is not exotic here -- git branch names and session titles
carry it routinely.
Escape the operator's needle and add ESCAPE '\' to the three clauses, the
same convention the rest of this file already uses for LIKE queries. Match
direction is unchanged for needles without wildcards.
Left alone: _cwd_prefix_clause has the same unescaped shape but is shared
by four call sites beyond prune, so it is a separate change.
archive_and_compact's new model_config_patch block was the third
near-identical SELECT -> tolerant-parse -> merge -> UPDATE copy in
hermes_state.py (update_session_runtime_lock and set_session_yolo carry
the other two). Extract _merge_model_config_json(conn, sid, patch,
on_missing=...) and route all three through it, preserving each
caller's missing-row policy (flag setters skip, archive raises).
Also adds the two small accessors the compressor needs:
- patch_session_model_config(): standalone atomic merge for callers
that must update model_config without rewriting the transcript
- get_session_model_config_value(): tolerant single-key read
Follow-up to the salvaged #79286 commit, per the repo's
extend-don't-duplicate rule.
get_compression_lineage's forward walk accepted any non-branch child as
the compression continuation. Delegate subagent rows (_delegate_from)
and tool-tagged rows (source=tool) created before the real continuation
were picked as the lineage successor, so the lineage — and session .md
export built on it — followed a subagent's transcript instead of the
actual conversation continuation.
Rename _is_branch_child_row to _is_explicit_fork_child_row, treat
_delegate_from and source=tool rows as explicit forks alongside
_branched_from, and require _is_compression_child_row in the forward
walk instead of merely excluding branches.
Sliced from PR #79024 by @RyderFreeman4Logos (the cache-scope portion
of that PR is tracked separately in #79017).
A session created in the wrong directory needs its cwd corrected after the
fact. session.cwd.set only reaches live runtime sessions, so cold rows were
stuck. The new RPC targets the persisted row by session_key, validates the
folder, and REPLACES the git branch/root identity (update_session_cwd grows a
replace_git_meta flag) so the project tree's grouping follows the move instead
of pinning the session under the project it left via a stale git_repo_root.
A live idle agent bound to the row is re-anchored through the runtime path;
a mid-turn session refuses with 'session busy'. Runs on the RPC pool — the
git probes are subprocesses.
Adds a last_read_at watermark to the sessions table so surfaces (CLI,
TUI, desktop) can badge unread conversations. Read state derives from
the watermark vs latest activity, so new messages flip a conversation
back to unread with zero writes on the message path. NULL means never
tracked, so shipping the column doesn't badge pre-existing history.
set_session_read() stamps the whole compression lineage, matching the
archive/pin semantics; list_sessions_rich() rows carry a derived
`unread` key. DB layer only — no surface exposes it yet.
#75017: Telegram polling conflict retry used drop_pending_updates=False,
starting a new getUpdates session that immediately got 409'd by the
previous still-expiring session — creating the very conflict it was
trying to recover from. Switch to drop_pending_updates=True so Telegram
terminates stale sessions. Also add a recovery-generation guard so the
first transient getUpdates success after a retry doesn't reset the
conflict counter back to 0 (defense-in-depth from PR #75096).
#75153: The WAL-reset warning always said 'hermes update can repair'
even for git/pip/system Python installs where it can't. Now uses
detect_install_method() + recommended_update_command_for_method() to
give a context-appropriate hint (hermes update for git, docker pull for
docker, nix message for nix, generic install hint as fallback).
purge_stale_tool_call_markers ran a permanent, irreversible UPDATE with
no backup — inconsistent with repair_state_db_schema's backup-by-default
convention for destructive state.db operations elsewhere in this file.
Take a full snapshot via VACUUM INTO (safe against a live connection,
unlike the raw-copy _backup_db_file used for malformed-schema repair)
before the write, timestamped beside state.db. Skipped when dry_run or
when there's nothing to change. Add --no-backup to `hermes sessions
clean-markers`, mirroring `sessions repair`.
Verified end-to-end: the CLI run against a real temp state.db produces
the backup file before printing the cleared-row count.
The load-on-read repair (_strip_stale_tool_call_markers) fixes affected
sessions in memory on every resume, but never touches the DB — long-lived
sessions re-scan and re-repair the same rows on every load, and the
contaminated bytes stay in state.db (and any backup/cache snapshot of it)
indefinitely.
Add SessionDB.purge_stale_tool_call_markers(dry_run=False): a one-time,
idempotent UPDATE that permanently blanks the content column on affected
rows. Only content is touched — tool_calls and every other column are
left untouched, so provider tool_call/tool_result pairing survives.
dry_run reads through the no-lock read path and never writes.
Wire it up as `hermes sessions clean-markers [--dry-run]`, mirroring the
existing optimize/repair subcommands. Verified end-to-end against a real
temp state.db: dry-run reports the row without writing, the real run
clears it and preserves tool_calls, and a second run is a no-op.
The conversation_loop fix (previous commit) stops new "[memory]"-style
bare tool-call markers from being cached/persisted, but sessions written
before that fix can still carry rows where a bare marker was saved as
the assistant's "final response".
Add a load-on-read repair pass in hermes_state.py, mirroring the existing
_strip_background_review_harness defense-in-depth: on session restore,
any assistant row whose content is only a bracketed marker (e.g.
"[memory]", "[skill_manage]") AND that carries tool_calls has its content
blanked before the history re-enters the model's context. The tool call
and its result are left untouched so provider tool_call/tool_result
pairing stays intact. Sessions with no affected rows pass through the
normal path unchanged.
get_messages_as_conversation, get_resume_conversations, and
get_ancestor_display_prefix still took self._lock — the same global
choke point the read-path split (WAL per-thread read-only connections)
was meant to remove from every recall/browse read. These three are the
hottest reads in the file: every session resume across the gateway,
CLI, and ACP adapter goes through one of them, so a resume racing a
burst of concurrent-session writer flushes still convoys behind them
exactly like the fixed paths used to.
_session_lineage_root_to_tip (the lineage walk shared by all three,
plus get_conversation_root) had its own independent self._lock use and
needed the same conversion — without it the outer functions still
blocked on the very first line.
Verified empirically: a reader thread calling all three functions
while another thread holds self._lock blocked for the writer's full
hold duration before the fix, and returned immediately after (SQLite
3.50.4 in this dev venv falls back to journal_mode=DELETE per the
WAL-reset-bug guard, so the requires_wal-marked regression test is
exercised via a local WAL-forced script instead; it still runs and
passes on any runtime where WAL is actually active).
Simplify-pass folds on the #23254 salvage:
- REUSE (HIGH): append_messages_batch now delegates row serialization to
the pre-existing _insert_message_rows helper (already shared by
replace_messages / archive_and_compact / portability import) instead
of adding a third serialization path (_prepare_message_row +
_MESSAGE_INSERT_SQL are gone). One row-writer for every multi-row
path; the row-ID return was consumed by no production caller, so the
batch returns the inserted count.
- QUALITY (HIGH): the compression-lock + compression-closed admission
guards are extracted into _check_transcript_write_guards, shared by
append_message and append_messages_batch (previously duplicated 23
lines that had already needed targeted fixes, #74478). The role-gated
reasoning filtering is no longer duplicated in run_agent.py — it
lives at its one site inside _insert_message_rows.
- EFFICIENCY (MEDIUM, measured): unbounded seed copies hold one BEGIN
IMMEDIATE for seconds (10k rows ~= 2.4s; FTS triggers dominate) and
monopolize the in-process write lock. append_messages_batch grows a
chunk_rows param; all seed/copy call sites use chunk_rows=500. Same
recovery semantics as the old per-row loops, bounded lock holds.
- REUSE (MEDIUM): the two remaining per-row branch-copy loops found by
the pass (gateway/slash_commands.py /branch, hermes_cli
cli_commands_mixin.py branch) are converted to chunked batches too
(AsyncSessionDB's generic to_thread forwarder covers the async site).
Turn-flush benchmark unchanged after the refactor: 2.43 -> 0.87 ms
median per 5-message flush (64% faster).
Re-derivation of #23254 (@devsart95) on today's flush loop. The turn
flush in _flush_messages_to_session_db wrote one BEGIN IMMEDIATE
transaction per message row; a typical agent turn (user + assistant +
tool results) paid 3-8 transactions -- and, off WAL (the default on
macOS while the WAL-reset guard is active), 3-8 fsyncs -- per turn.
Adds SessionDB.append_messages_batch: same row shape as append_message
(shared _prepare_message_row serializer + _MESSAGE_INSERT_SQL column
list, so the two writers cannot drift), same compression-lock and
compression-closed guards, one aggregated session-counter UPDATE, one
transaction for the whole batch. Row serialization stays outside the
write lock.
The flush loop now collects the turn's new rows and writes them in one
call. All-or-nothing pairs exactly with the persisted-marker stamping:
on failure no rows landed and no markers were stamped, so the next
flush re-writes the whole tail (same recovery contract as before,
minus the partial-prefix case that could double-count).
Measured (same harness, 5-message turn, journal_mode=DELETE,
synchronous=FULL): 2.32ms -> 0.83ms median per turn flush (64% faster,
5 fsyncs -> 1). On WAL the win is smaller but the atomicity fix holds.
Retarget #73639 onto the SessionDB mixin split (hermes_state_common /
hermes_state_schema). Fresh installs create UPDATE OF content/tool_*
triggers; existing broad AFTER UPDATE triggers are inspected and
replaced under schema init without an FTS rebuild (WHEN clauses already
guarded content correctness; OF skips non-content status writes that
saturated disk I/O on large state.db).
Tests: tests/test_fts_update_of_narrowing.py (4)
Addresses review from @teknium1 on PR #71755:
- Extended apply_database_pragmas() to handle cache_size, mmap_size,
and temp_store from config.yaml (alongside existing wal_autocheckpoint
and journal_size_limit). No hardcoded defaults — all values are
opt-in via config.yaml, avoiding policy conflicts with other PRs.
- Applied to ALL connection types: writer (_connect_and_init),
read_only cross-profile attach, and WAL per-thread readers
(_get_read_conn). Previously PRAGMAs only ran on the writer path.
- Removed inline PRAGMAs from _connect_and_init — single source of
truth in apply_database_pragmas().
- Documented config keys with examples in function docstring.
list_sessions_rich()'s compression-root projection called
_get_session_rich_row() once per root — a separate single-row query per
compression root on every session-list render. Resolve every tip id
first, then fetch all tip rows in one WHERE id IN (...) query via the
new _get_session_rich_rows_batch().
_get_session_rich_row() is now a thin wrapper over the batch method, so
the enriched SELECT (preview + last_active) lives in exactly one place —
future column changes (e.g. #42196's include_system_prompt) only touch
one query.
get_compression_tip()'s chain walk is untouched; it's a genuine
per-session graph walk with branch/delegate-exclusion and race handling,
and batching it safely is out of scope here.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Review fold-ins on top of #56768 (@Skywind5487):
- session_count_ge ran its query without self._lock, unlike every
sibling counter on SessionDB (session_count, session_count_by_source).
- Document the deliberate semantics change: session_count() defaults to
archived = 0, which is both the expensive part (full index scan,
measured 543us vs 4us on 20k sessions) and wrong for the only caller
(has_any_sessions asks 'has this install ever had sessions' -- an
archived session is still a created one).
Two places were using SELECT COUNT(*) when they only needed a boolean:
- has_any_sessions() called session_count() > 1 (full table scan)
- delete_session() used SELECT COUNT(*) WHERE id=? (full matching scan)
Fix:
- Add session_count_ge(n) to SessionDB — short-circuits via
SELECT 1 FROM sessions LIMIT n, returns bool
- has_any_sessions() uses session_count_ge(2) instead of session_count() > 1
- delete_session() uses SELECT 1 ... LIMIT 1 with fetchone() is None
- Add tests for session_count_ge
A session's YOLO bypass lived only in the in-memory
tools.approval._session_yolo set (or the process-frozen --yolo env
var), so resuming a session in a fresh process silently reverted the
user's /yolo ON — dangerous commands started prompting again.
Persist a yolo_mode flag in the session row's model_config JSON and
restore it on every CLI resume path:
- SessionDB.set_session_yolo() merges the flag into model_config
(same lineage-preserving merge as update_session_runtime_lock);
SessionDB.session_yolo_enabled() reads it back, false on any parse
failure.
- /yolo toggle persists ON and OFF through the new helper; the
compression/branch session-id rotation carries the flag onto the
continuation row.
- --yolo launches record the flag at session creation (agent_init),
and a /yolo toggled before the lazily-created row exists is carried
into the creation-time model_config (_ensure_db_session).
- HermesCLI._restore_session_yolo() re-enables the bypass on startup
--resume/-c, the deferred init path, and mid-chat /resume, with a
visible '⚡ YOLO mode restored from session' notice. No-op under a
frozen process-wide --yolo and never enables on absent/garbage flags.
- tests/agent/test_session_activity.py asserts against
ACTIVITY_DESCRIPTION_MAX instead of the literal 120.
- The session-stall WARNING log line names its config knob
(agent.session_stall_timeout) so operators can find the setting.
- hermes_state.py: collapse the triple blank line near line 191.
- hermes_cli/status.py no longer imports the private
hermes_cli.main._relative_time: the helper moved to a public home
(hermes_cli.timefmt.relative_time); main._relative_time stays as a
thin back-compat wrapper (sessions_cmd and external patchers keep
working).
Activity heartbeat writes and turn-end label clears ran synchronously on
the response-critical path with the full ~20s routine write-patience
budget — under contention an otherwise-finished reply could stall for
seconds just to update observation labels, mimicking the very stall the
watchdog detects.
touch_session_activity and clear_session_activity_labels now use a
dedicated 0.5s patience budget (they are observation-only; the next
heartbeat window retries naturally), and a no-op label clear (labels
already empty) skips the write transaction entirely.
Regressions: with another connection holding BEGIN IMMEDIATE, both writes
give up well under the routine budget; the no-op clear performs zero
write transactions.
PR #76354 review, 'activity writes are synchronous on critical paths' /
merge gate 9.
Three mechanisms to detect and notify when gateway sessions stall silently:
1. Mid-turn activity heartbeats stamped to SessionDB so hermes sessions list
and hermes status show progress during long turns without new message rows.
2. Stall watchdog: when a busy session has pending inbound and the shared
activity clock is idle past agent.session_stall_timeout (default 300),
log a WARNING and notify the user once to try /new. Notify-only; does
not kill the turn.
3. Compaction timeout: fenceless compress_context callers get a progress-aware
host budget (compression.context_timeout_seconds default 120 idle,
compression.context_total_ceiling_seconds default 600 ceiling). On timeout,
cancel via commit fence, skip compaction without dropping messages, and
continue the turn.
Closes#72016 (slices 1-3; slice 4 cumulative SSE stream-retry deadline
remains a follow-up).
Cherry-picked from PR #72424 by @fangliquanflq.
Makes interrupt-protected context compression cancellable by an explicit
user or lifecycle stop, without weakening protection against ordinary
incoming messages, voice interjections, or active-turn redirects.
Separates explicit hard cancellation from ordinary interrupt/redirect
state with a dedicated threading.Event; introduces
AuxiliaryExplicitCancellation as an attempt-local frozen-cause signal;
isolates the synchronous provider callback in a bounded daemon worker
during protected compression; atomically linearizes Codex timeout
cleanup against explicit cancellation; propagates hard cancellation
through child agents and explicit stop surfaces; serializes hard-cancel
admission against compression commit admission with
CompressionCommitFence; aborts before session rotation or late DB commit,
restores in-place transcript mutations and compressor state, and releases
the heartbeat and compression lease.
Based on #74449 by @suparious. Resolved merge conflicts in
agent/context_compressor.py (feasibility check + try/except) and
tui_gateway/methods_session.py.
The RO branch's new FTS capability probe raises sqlite3.DatabaseError on
a malformed store (the probe itself only catches OperationalError). The
outer __init__ handler re-raises without closing self._conn, leaking a
tracked connection for the process lifetime — which makes
_backup_db_file refuse its raw-copy, so the writable heal that follows
(web_server's stale-schema/malformed reopen) repairs the store WITHOUT
the forensic backup repair_state_db_schema promises. Close-then-reraise
on any probe failure, mirroring _open_probed's cleanup discipline.
Regression test: corrupt sqlite_master (duplicate messages_fts row),
assert the failed RO open leaves no live tracked connection and the
subsequent writable heal creates its malformed-backup file. Mutation-
checked: no-oping the cleanup handler makes the test fail.
The rebase onto main's extracted _sleep_before_write_retry() method left
three call sites pointing at the dropped local helper; rewire them.
Also adds contributors/emails mappings (Dannou, trippyogi, spfcraze).
Under dual gateway/agent WAL contention (FTS5 trigram sync holding the
write lock on large appends) the SQLite engine can raise a transient
'no more rows available' error. The exception CLASS varies with the
build — some surface it as InterfaceError, a SIBLING of DatabaseError —
so it escaped both existing retry branches in _execute_write on attempt
0 and killed the turn as session_persistence_failed even though the
identical write succeeds standalone.
Port of #74934 onto the deadline-patience rewrite (8da8a7887d): the
PR's attempt-counted constants (60 retries / 300ms jitter / 2.0s engine
timeout) predate that rewrite and are superseded by the patience
budget, so they are intentionally NOT carried over. Instead the check
is message-scoped and rides the existing deadline/patience loop:
- extract the jittered-sleep-within-deadline logic into a shared
_sleep_before_retry helper (behavior-preserving for locked/busy)
- retry 'no more rows available' from OperationalError, DatabaseError
(checked BEFORE the FTS-corruption rebuild path so it is not
misrouted), and a message-scoped sqlite3.Error catch-all
- any other error in any class propagates untouched on attempt 0
Tests: transient InterfaceError retried to success; unrelated
InterfaceError propagates immediately; DatabaseError variant retried;
exhausted patience surfaces the original error.
append_message refused immediately when another writer held the session's
compression lock. The conversation loop turns that into
session_persistence_failed and tells the operator to check disk space and
permissions, when the store is healthy and merely busy. The two append
attempts in the reported incident were 3ms apart, so there was no wait at
all before the turn was destroyed (#75083).
The wait is deliberately short (_COMPRESSION_BUSY_WAIT_S, 5s) rather than
the 60s transcript write patience. The lease is a correctness boundary, not
just a busy signal: test_compression_lease_blocks_non_owner_but_allows_owner_flush
pins that a late stale turn must not land in a session being compressed.
Reusing the full write patience made that append succeed once the lease
aged out, which is exactly what the guard exists to prevent. A short budget
saves the common case, where compression publishes in a couple of seconds,
and still refuses a writer locked out by a long-running or wedged
compression.
CompressionSessionBusyError could not simply be retried either: it covers
two conditions with opposite handling. A compressor discovering its own
lease is gone is permanent, and retrying that would spend the whole budget
before failing anyway. Split the transient case into a
SessionCompressionInProgressError subclass, raised only by append_message,
and wait on just that. Existing except CompressionSessionBusyError handlers
catch both unchanged.
The retry jitter is extracted into _sleep_before_write_retry so the lock
path and the compression path share one implementation.
Disk-full / ENOSPC / SQLITE_FULL on first-message session persist used to be
swallowed as a debug log while prompt.submit still returned streaming, so the
send vanished with no error. Re-raise those failures, return a real RPC error,
and stamp session_persistence_failed turns with error so clients get a terminal
error frame.
The retag gate was global, so once one board reclaimed its legacy rows a
second board on the same state.db never got swept. Key the state_meta gate
on the workspaces root and skip reopening state.db on every spawn via an
in-process set. Align the dispatcher-spawn test with the worker's own
`kanban` source tag and cover the per-board gate.
CI caught ACP session restore seeing an unexpected _row_id in restored
history — get_messages_as_conversation feeds more than the desktop, and
changing the default shape broke the strictest consumer. Row ids are now
include_row_ids=True, requested only by the gateway's resume/display
projections; ACP restore, export, and inspection get the transcript in its
historical shape.
Reactions live in the existing messages.display_metadata JSON column (no new
table), with iOS Tapback semantics enforced DB-side: one reaction per author
per message, re-tap retracts, different emoji replaces. The desktop catches up
to the reaction contract five platform adapters already ship.
- SessionDB: set/get_message_reaction, latest_message_row_id (role + offset +
require_text so invisible tool-call-only rows are never targeted),
take_unseen_reactions (announce-exactly-once), get_message_role
- message.react RPC: accepts row_id or newest_role for live messages that
haven't learned their durable id yet
- react_to_message tool: desktop-gated (check_fn), defaults to the user's
latest visible message, messages_back for retroactive reactions
- Model context rides run_message only (beside the speech-interrupted note):
the persisted prompt stays clean, so no [The user reacted …] scaffolding in
transcripts, and no cached prefix ever changes
- Resume projection forwards row_id + reactions; _row_id is stripped from
outgoing API copies next to display_metadata
DEFAULT_DB_PATH in hermes_state.py is computed at import time, freezing
the developer's real ~/.hermes even when a test fixture (or runtime
profile switch) later redirects HERMES_HOME. Any default SessionDB() —
e.g. gateway SessionStore — then opened the real state.db.
Add _default_db_path(): resolves get_hermes_home() fresh at call time,
while a deliberately re-pointed DEFAULT_DB_PATH (the established
monkeypatch escape hatch) still wins via an import-time snapshot
comparison, preserving existing test behavior. SessionDB.__init__ and
session_search's requirement check now use the resolver; explicit
db_path arguments are untouched.
Reimplemented from PR #11875 by @JorkeyLiu (original diff predates the
hermes_state rewrite); regression test ported and modernized.
Config-driven `journal_mode`, `wal_autocheckpoint`, and `journal_size_limit`
are now honored in `SessionDB` init. Users running SQLite on NFS/SMB or
with custom tuning had no supported config surface; values were hardcoded
at connection time.
What
- New `apply_database_pragmas()` in `hermes_state.py`
- Reads nested `database:` keys from `config.yaml` via existing `cfg_get`/`load_config`
- Called after `apply_wal_with_fallback()` in `SessionDB._connect_and_init()`
Fix
- Adds optional PRAGMA switches for journal_mode, wal_autocheckpoint, journal_size_limit
- On Darwin; Windows keeps DELETE unless config explicitly requests WAL
Runtime Proof
$ /opt/homebrew/bin/pytest tests/test_hermes_state.py::TestApplyDatabasePragmas -q
3 passed in 0.72s
Regression Checks
- Full `tests/test_hermes_state.py`: 306 passed in 11.32s
Salvages #55322 (ZFS 'disk i/o error' marker) without regressing the
Bug D transient-EIO protection from 5c49cd0ed0. 'disk i/o error' is
ambiguous: deterministic on ZFS/APFS-CoW SHM corruption (#55305,
#71498) but often a one-shot transient (page-cache pressure, lock
contention). A blind marker match re-introduced the mixed-journal-mode
corruption pattern; a blind re-raise wedged state.db on ZFS.
Disambiguate: retry the WAL pragma twice with a short backoff. A
transient EIO clears and WAL proceeds; a deterministic failure keeps
raising and falls through to the guarded DELETE fallback (still
refusing to downgrade a DB whose on-disk header reports WAL).
Tests: transient-EIO recovery, persistent-EIO fallback, and the
never-downgrade-WAL-on-disk guard.
The WAL→DELETE fallback on WAL-incompatible filesystems (NFS / SMB / FUSE /
the AgentFS NFS overlay) was logged at WARNING, treating a real loss of
concurrency — under the kanban dispatcher + workers a write blocks readers,
surfacing as SQLITE_BUSY — as if it were cosmetic. Escalate the deduplicated
fallback log to ERROR so the degradation is observable, not silent.
Add an opt-in require_wal=True to apply_wal_with_fallback that raises a typed
WalUnsupportedError (subclass of sqlite3.OperationalError, so existing DB-init
handlers still catch it) instead of degrading to DELETE, for callers that
mandate WAL concurrency. All four current callers keep the default
require_wal=False so NFS-homed installs keep working unchanged.
Tests: 4 new require_wal cases; WARNING→ERROR assertion updates in both
test_hermes_state_wal_fallback.py and test_kanban_db.py.
apply_wal_with_fallback() only detected WAL-incompatible filesystems via a
RAISED OperationalError matched against _WAL_INCOMPAT_MARKERS. But macOS NFS,
SMB/CIFS, and overlay filesystems (e.g. AgentFS's NFS-backed mount) refuse the
WAL switch WITHOUT raising: `PRAGMA journal_mode=WAL` returns the still-effective
mode ('delete') and no exception. The code then ran `return "wal"`
unconditionally, so it:
1. returned a false "wal" while the DB was actually in DELETE mode, and
2. never called _log_wal_fallback_once, so the operator got ZERO signal that
concurrency had silently degraded (reader-blocks-writer).
state.db and kanban.db share this path, so a session/kanban board DB on a
network or overlay filesystem ran in DELETE with no diagnostic.
Fix: read the row `PRAGMA journal_mode=WAL` returns and verify it is actually
'wal' instead of assuming success; on a silent no-op, emit the existing
fallback WARNING and return the true mode. The raise-based path is unchanged.
Reproduced on a real AgentFS NFS overlay (PRAGMA journal_mode=WAL returned
('delete',) with no OperationalError). Adds a regression test for the
silent-no-op shape; the 16 existing WAL-fallback tests are unchanged.
Teknium
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Hermes agent
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