Second, deeper pass over tools/gateway/hermes_cli plus first pass over
the trees wave 1 missed (acp, acp_adapter, skills, computer_use, docker,
dashboard, conformance, monitoring, secret_sources, hermes_state,
providers). Same rubric as wave 1 (AGENTS.md test policy); security,
alternation/caching invariants, issue-number regressions, and E2E kept.
Real test-quality fixes found and rooted out along the way:
- tests/tools/test_command_guards.py made real auxiliary-LLM HTTPS calls
(DEFAULT_CONFIG smart-approval leaked in) — pinned approval
mode=manual via autouse fixture: 17.4s → 0.4s.
- test_model_switch_custom_providers.py / test_user_providers_model_switch.py
silently probed live provider catalogs (~2s/test) — stubbed
cached_provider_model_ids/provider_model_ids/fetch_api_models.
- test_telegram_noise_filter.py: 15-platform copy-paste matrix over
shared gateway.run logic → 3 representative platforms (55s → 3.9s).
- test_gateway_shutdown.py: stop()'s 5s interrupt-deadline loop spun on
MagicMock agents — interrupt.side_effect now clears _running_agents
(22s → 1.0s).
- test_gateway_inactivity_timeout.py poll-harness timings shrunk 3-5x
(24s → 1.1s); test_mcp_stability.py backoff/SIGTERM-grace sleeps
patched (15.4s → 2.5s); test_async_delegation.py negative-drain wait
5s → 0.5s.
- test_telegram_init_deadline.py: loop-block margin restored to 1.0s
with rationale comment — the watchdog-dump assertion needs the loop
blocked well past deadline+grace under parallel load (flaked once in
the 40-worker verification run at a 0.2s margin).
Verification: full hermetic suite via scripts/run_tests.sh —
2,438 files, 21,718 tests passed, 0 failed, 293.9s wall.
Suite totals vs original baseline: 46,820 → 19,757 test functions
(−57.8%), wall 583.5s → 293.9s (−50%), subprocess CPU 13,564s → 11,623s.
When terminal.backend is docker/modal/daytona/ssh/singularity, the
terminal runs in a sandboxed container with network isolation, but the
browser still runs on the host. The SSRF guard was skipped because
_is_local_backend() only checked browser.cloud_provider, not the
terminal backend.
Now _is_local_backend() also checks TERMINAL_ENV — when the terminal
is containerized, the browser is treated as non-local and SSRF
protection is enabled.
Fixes#38690
Cloud metadata endpoints (169.254.169.254 etc.) are now always blocked
by browser_navigate regardless of hybrid routing, allow_private_urls,
or backend.
Bug: commit 42c076d3 (#16136) added hybrid routing that flips
auto_local_this_nav=True for private URLs and short-circuits
_is_safe_url(). IMDS endpoints are technically private (169.254/16
link-local), so the sidecar happily routed them to a local Chromium,
and the agent could read IAM credentials via browser_snapshot. On
EC2/GCP/Azure this is a full SSRF-to-credential-theft.
Fix: new is_always_blocked_url() in url_safety.py — a narrow floor
that checks _BLOCKED_HOSTNAMES, _ALWAYS_BLOCKED_IPS,
_ALWAYS_BLOCKED_NETWORKS only. Applied as an independent gate in
browser_navigate's pre-nav and post-redirect checks, BEFORE
auto_local_this_nav gets a chance to short-circuit. Ordinary private
URLs (localhost, 192.168.x, 10.x, .local, CGNAT) still route to the
local sidecar as the #16136 feature intends.
Secondary fix (reporter's finding): _url_is_private() now explicitly
checks 172.16.0.0/12. ipaddress.is_private only covers that range on
Python ≥3.11 (bpo-40791), so on 3.10 runtimes those URLs were routed
to cloud instead of the local sidecar. No security impact — just a
correctness fix for the hybrid-routing feature.
Closes#16234.
The SSRF protection added in #3041 blocks all private/internal addresses
unconditionally in browser_navigate(). This prevents legitimate local use
cases (localhost apps, LAN devices) when using Camofox or the built-in
headless Chromium without a cloud provider.
The check is only meaningful for cloud backends (Browserbase, BrowserUse)
where the agent could reach internal resources on a remote machine. Local
backends give the user full terminal and network access already — the
SSRF check adds zero security value.
Add _is_local_backend() helper that returns True when Camofox is active
or no cloud provider is configured. Both the pre-navigation and
post-redirect SSRF checks now skip when running locally. The
browser.allow_private_urls config option remains available as an
explicit opt-out for cloud mode.
* fix(tools): skip SSRF check in local browser mode
The SSRF protection added in #3041 blocks all private/internal
addresses unconditionally in browser_navigate(). This prevents
legitimate local development use cases (localhost testing, LAN
device access) when using the local Chromium backend.
The SSRF check is only meaningful for cloud browsers (Browserbase,
BrowserUse) where the agent could reach internal resources on a
remote machine. In local mode, the user already has full terminal
and network access, so the check adds no security value.
This change makes the SSRF check conditional on _get_cloud_provider(),
keeping full protection in cloud mode while allowing private addresses
in local mode.
* fix(tools): make SSRF check configurable via browser.allow_private_urls
Replace unconditional SSRF check with a configurable setting.
Default (False) keeps existing security behavior. Setting to True
allows navigating to private/internal IPs for local dev and LAN use cases.
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Co-authored-by: Nils (Norya) <nils@begou.dev>
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