Simplify-pass follow-up on the #68157 salvage (regression-neutral \u2014 the
old temp-file version was equally bare): capture ffmpeg's -loglevel
error output so a CalledProcessError carries the real message, and log
it at the voice-input catch site. Parity with transcription_tools'
ffmpeg call sites. Live-verified: forced ffmpeg failure produces the
captured message in the exception.
pcm_to_wav staged every captured utterance in a NamedTemporaryFile just to
hand ffmpeg an input path, then unlinked it. Feed the PCM to ffmpeg's stdin
instead: one fewer file created, written, read back and removed per voice
utterance, and the try/finally cleanup goes away with it.
The WAV output deliberately still goes to output_path rather than being
captured from stdout. ffmpeg cannot seek on a pipe, so a piped WAV is
written with placeholder 0xFFFFFFFF RIFF/data chunk sizes -- Python's wave
module then reports 2147483647 frames for a 1s clip, and strict readers
misjudge the length. Writing to the real path lets ffmpeg seek back and
patch the header.
Tests cover both halves: that the PCM goes over stdin with no temp file,
and (when ffmpeg is installed) that the resulting header reports the true
frame count.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The detached meet_bot child inherits the process environment, not the parent's contextvar secret scope, so process_manager.start() now resolves HERMES_MEET_REALTIME_KEY/OPENAI_API_KEY through get_secret in the parent and passes it explicitly in the child env (spawn-wrap shape). Adds the consolidated per-family regression test file.
NOTION_API_KEY/LINEAR_API_KEY defaults, DEEPINFRA_API_KEY model gate, FAL_KEY via the file's own _scoped_credential helper, XAI/VERCEL/DAYTONA presence checks, GITHUB_TOKEN/GH_TOKEN + GitHub App creds in tirith/skills_hub, and the masked HERMES_API_KEY display in tui_gateway config.show all route through get_secret.
OPENAI_API_KEY, DEEPINFRA_API_KEY and KREA_API_KEY now resolve via get_secret; the OpenAI client is constructed with the scoped key explicitly instead of relying on the SDK's implicit environ read.
Route HINDSIGHT_API_KEY/HINDSIGHT_LLM_API_KEY, HONCHO_API_KEY, SUPERMEMORY_API_KEY, MEM0_API_KEY and RETAINDB_API_KEY reads through agent.secret_scope.get_secret so multiplexed turns resolve the active profile's key instead of the process environment. Also guard supermemory post_setup's os.environ write on not is_multiplex_active() — writing one profile's key into the process-global env pollutes sibling profiles; the single-profile convenience path is unchanged.
Review follow-up on the #62871 salvage (simplify pass, HIGH):
1. Ops unresolved at the wait deadline were RETAINED in the pending set.
A permanently failing status endpoint (auth error, endless 500s, or a
server that loses ops without 404) would grow the set forever and make
EVERY later prefetch burn the full 10s budget re-polling it — and
prefetch()'s bounded 3s join sits on the reply path, so that money-quote
'adds no response latency' claim breaks. Timed-out ops are now dropped
(identical degradation to prefetch_waits_for_retain=False: possibly
stale recall) with a WARNING so persistent server trouble is visible.
Guard test mutation-checked (fails with eviction disabled).
2. Status polls now spaced 0.5s (was 0.05s shared with the local drain
poll): a wedged op cost up to ~200 get_operation_status round trips
per prefetch; now ~20 max over the default 10s budget.
Address PR #62871 review: with the default retain_async=True, aretain_batch
returns when the write is accepted, not when it's durable/recall-visible, so
draining the local writer queue (task_done) is not a read-after-write signal.
The next-turn prefetch could still recall before the just-completed turn was
observable on the server.
- Track the async operation_id/operation_ids returned by aretain_batch
- _wait_for_retains_drained now applies two ordered, budget-bounded barriers:
(1) local writer queue drains, then (2) tracked server-side async ops report
completion via operations.get_operation_status (an explicit read-after-write
condition). NotFound (completed+evicted) counts as done; transient errors
keep waiting until the deadline
- Completed ops are removed from the pending set so later prefetches don't
re-poll them; the whole wait stays off the reply path
- Add TestPrefetchServerRetainVisibility: op-id tracking (single/multiple),
no-op tracking when retain_async=False, prefetch waiting for server
completion before recall, timeout fallback on a wedged op, and NotFound /
transient-error status handling
Async retain already keeps the memory WRITE off the reply path (writes drain
on the single writer thread while the user gets their response immediately).
This closes the remaining retain/prefetch race: the next turn's warm prefetch
runs on its own thread and could recall BEFORE the just-enqueued retain write
lands, silently dropping the latest turn from recall.
- The background prefetch now waits (bounded) for pending retains to drain
before recalling, so warmed context includes the just-completed turn.
- The wait runs only on the background prefetch thread, never the reply path,
so it adds zero latency to the user's response and loses no writes.
- Bounded by prefetch_retain_drain_timeout (default 10s) and polls
unfinished_tasks so a wedged write can't hang the prefetch.
- New config keys: prefetch_waits_for_retain (default true),
prefetch_retain_drain_timeout (default 10.0).
When hrr_dim=1 the prefixed float32 blob (4+4=8 bytes) collides in
size with a raw float64 blob (1×8=8 bytes), making the format
discriminator in bytes_to_phases ambiguous — a legacy blob starting
with HRR1 would be misread as a prefixed float32 vector.
- phases_to_bytes now accepts an optional dim and falls back to
writing raw float64 when the two blob sizes are equal.
- bytes_to_phases prefers the legacy float64 interpretation when
sizes collide and dim is provided, since phases_to_bytes never
writes a prefixed float32 blob at dim=1.
- Three regression tests cover dim=1 write, round-trip, and the
legacy-prefix collision case.
Addresses hermes-sweeper review on PR #30499.
- discord/telegram/slack/matrix standalone senders read bot tokens via
get_secret (in-turn: they run inside an installed scope — cron scheduler
and delegate spawns propagate it), never borrowing another profile's
env-bridged token under multiplex.
- telegram webhook-secret and matrix access-token/password startup reads
use the Slack pattern (#59739): get_secret, falling back to os.environ
only on UnscopedSecretError.
Follow-up to the salvaged #59076 commit:
- Replace the bare get_secret import with a module-level Slack-pattern
helper (_get_esecret): try get_secret, on UnscopedSecretError fall back
to os.getenv. The DEFAULT profile's email adapter constructs UNSCOPED
under multiplexing, where a bare get_secret raises and would crash the
email path on startup — the exact WhatsApp defect fixed in 5438e9c629
(whatsapp_common._get_wsecret).
- Extend scope coverage to the remaining scope-blind reads:
EMAIL_IMAP_PORT / EMAIL_SMTP_PORT / EMAIL_POLL_INTERVAL (_esecret_int
replacing utils.env_int) and EMAIL_TRUST_FROM_HEADER (_esecret_bool
replacing utils.env_bool).
- Add tests: default-profile unscoped-under-multiplex construction, and
scoped ports/trust-flag no-environ-inheritance.
The email adapter (plugins/platforms/email/adapter.py) read
EMAIL_ADDRESS, EMAIL_PASSWORD, EMAIL_IMAP_HOST, EMAIL_SMTP_HOST,
EMAIL_ALLOWED_USERS, and EMAIL_ALLOW_ALL_USERS via os.getenv()
directly. In a multiplexed gateway, os.environ holds the default
profile's .env values, so every secondary profile inherited the
default profile's email credentials instead of its own.
This was a sibling of the api_server env-leak bug (#52307/#50051):
the same os.getenv→get_secret migration that PR #50094 applies to
gateway/config.py, but for the email adapter itself, which neither
PR #50094 nor #51374 covers.
Changes:
- plugins/platforms/email/adapter.py: replace os.getenv with
agent.secret_scope.get_secret for all EMAIL_* credential reads
(adapter __init__, check_email_requirements, _allowlist_in_effect,
_dispatch_message allowlist gate, _send_email SMTP helper).
- gateway/config.py: add _getenv/_getenv_str/_getenv_int helpers
(from PR #50094) and replace os.getenv with _getenv for the email
block in _apply_env_overrides, so config.platforms[EMAIL].extra
is populated from the scoped value.
- tests/gateway/test_email_secret_scope.py: 5 new tests covering
scoped credential reads, environ fallback without scope, missing-
key-no-leak, allowlist scoping, and check_email_requirements scoping.
Related: #50051, #52307, PR #50094, PR #51374
FEISHU_APP_SECRET/FEISHU_ENCRYPT_KEY/FEISHU_VERIFICATION_TOKEN, WECOM_SECRET,
PHOTON_PROJECT_SECRET/PHOTON_SIDECAR_TOKEN (adapter + auth.load_project_credentials)
and BUZZ_PRIVATE_KEY now read through _get_scoped_secret.
NTFY_TOKEN, HASS_TOKEN, TWILIO_ACCOUNT_SID/TWILIO_AUTH_TOKEN and
DINGTALK_CLIENT_SECRET now read through _get_scoped_secret. Also replaces
the SMS adapter's bare os.environ["TWILIO_AUTH_TOKEN"]/["TWILIO_ACCOUNT_SID"]
__init__ reads (KeyError-prone) with helper reads defaulting to "".
Route IRC_SERVER_PASSWORD/IRC_NICKSERV_PASSWORD, LINE_CHANNEL_ACCESS_TOKEN/
LINE_CHANNEL_SECRET, TEAMS_GRAPH_ACCESS_TOKEN/TEAMS_CLIENT_SECRET and
MATTERMOST_TOKEN reads at __init__/availability/standalone-send time through
a module-level _get_scoped_secret helper (get_secret, UnscopedSecretError ->
os.getenv fallback), mirroring whatsapp_common._get_wsecret / Slack #59739.
Scoped miss returns the default — no cross-profile environ borrow.
FactRetriever.search() re-encoded the query vector once per candidate,
related() re-encoded both role atoms once per fact row, and probe()
re-encoded the role-content atom once per row. All three encoders are
deterministic (SHA-256 counter blocks), so the hoisted vectors are
bit-identical to the per-iteration values they replace.
Measured (300-fact store, dim=1024, median of 30 calls): search()
11.62 -> 1.46 ms/call (8.0x; encode_text 30 -> 1 per call), related()
63.08 -> 16.17 ms/call (3.9x; encode_atom 601 -> 3 per call), probe()
431.93 -> 389.36 ms/call (1.1x; dominated by per-fact content encoding,
which is inherent to the algorithm and unchanged).
Tests: call-count regression tests for each hoist plus a bit-exact
parity test of search() against the pre-fix per-candidate loop.
Review follow-ups on the #76357 salvage:
- _message_reference_from_ids + _reply_reference_for_send collapse the
3x duplicated MessageReference construction (naming mirrors telegram's
_reply_to_message_id_for_send).
- The overflow elif's comment claimed PartialMessage has no to_reference;
discord.py 2.7.1's PartialMessage does (message.py L1901) — the branch
is belt-and-suspenders for duck-typed priors, now labeled as such.
Every reply paid one extra Discord API round trip: the text send path,
the voice send path, and the edit path each called fetch_message() just
to obtain a reference or an editable handle. Discord resolves
message_reference payloads from ids alone, and PartialMessage.edit()
works without a fetch — so build MessageReference directly (with
fail_if_not_exists=False, preserving the deleted-target behavior the
existing send-side 10008 retry already covered) and use
channel.get_partial_message() for edits. Overflow continuations keep
threading via an ids-built reference fallback for PartialMessage.
Measured by call count (deterministic): reply sends and edits now make
ZERO fetch_message calls where they made 1 per reply and 1 per edit
(including every streaming edit tick).
Tests: pin that first-mode replies construct the reference without any
fetch, deleted-target retry test updated to assert fetch await_count==0
(retry now happens purely send-side), overflow/edit mocks retargeted
from fetch_message to get_partial_message (any fetch regression breaks
all five). Note: 4 discord-suite failures are pre-existing ordering
flakes — identical with the change stashed on clean main.
Follow-ups on the #75382 salvage (review findings):
- _wenv/_get_wsecret now catch UnscopedSecretError and fall back to
os.getenv for the DEFAULT profile's adapter, which constructs and sends
outside any _profile_runtime_scope under multiplexing — a bare
get_secret would crash its WhatsApp path (fixing one profile by
breaking another). Same pattern as Slack SLACK_APP_TOKEN (#59739) and
the Matrix recovery key. Scoped misses still return the default — no
cross-profile borrow.
- bridge_env overlay extended to the full WHATSAPP_* set bridge.js
consumes (DEBUG, FORWARD_OWNER_MESSAGES, REPLY_PREFIX,
MAX_MESSAGE_LENGTH, CHUNK_DELAY_MS, SEND_TIMEOUT_MS).
- Removed the always-true conditional on WHATSAPP_MODE injection.
Fix#75349
Root cause:
Under multiplex_profiles, secondary profiles run inside
_profile_runtime_scope which installs a per-profile secret scope via
set_secret_scope. The WhatsApp adapter (and the shared
WhatsAppBehaviorMixin + Cloud API adapter) read WHATSAPP_MODE,
WHATSAPP_DM_POLICY, etc. via raw os.getenv(), bypassing the secret
scope. Since os.environ doesn't contain secondary profile .env values,
the bridge silently falls back to 'self-chat' and rejects all inbound
messages with self_chat_mode_rejects_non_self.
Fix:
- Add _wenv() helper in adapter.py that reads WHATSAPP_* vars through
get_secret() (agent.secret_scope), which honors the active scope.
- Replace all os.getenv('WHATSAPP_*') calls in adapter.py,
whatsapp_common.py, and whatsapp_cloud.py with get_secret()-based
equivalents.
- Inject resolved WHATSAPP_* values into the bridge subprocess
environment so the Node.js bridge (which reads process.env) sees the
profile's own configuration.
Changes:
- plugins/platforms/whatsapp/adapter.py: 37 lines (+ helper, bridge_env
injection, 2 os.getenv→_wenv)
- gateway/platforms/whatsapp_common.py: 13 lines (6 os.getenv→_get_wsecret)
- gateway/platforms/whatsapp_cloud.py: 21 lines (9 os.getenv→_get_wsecret)
- New regression test: 6 test cases covering scope isolation, fallback,
and cross-profile non-leakage.
The Matrix adapter read MATRIX_RECOVERY_KEY via os.getenv, so under
gateway.multiplex_profiles every profile resolved the default profile's
key. That produced "recovery key verification failed: Key MAC does not
match" and broke E2EE for secondary profiles (#69090).
Route the read through agent.secret_scope.get_secret, which honors the
active profile's scope, with an os.getenv fallback for an unscoped read
under multiplex (default-profile startup loop) — mirroring the Slack
app-token pattern (#59739). Applied to both the startup verification
site and the status diagnostic.
Fixes#69090
Track which source seeded the DM allowlist so live intake does not let a
stale env carrier override explicit config, while env-seeded adapters still
reread pairing mutations.
Teknium review on #62947: os.environ.clear()/update around deferred
loaders is unsafe under concurrency and misses teams_pipeline's direct
adapter import.
Defer microsoft_teams binding in the Teams adapter, no-op
dotenv.load_dotenv while the SDK imports, keep api_server explicit
disable, and add SDK-import + load_gateway_config canaries.
Fixes#62935
Carries the new column through create, PATCH, and bulk. Clearing is an
explicit clear_reasoning_effort flag rather than a null, because a null in a
PATCH body means "field not sent", not "set to NULL" — the same shape the
model override already uses, and the reason "none" can stay a real value.
Tests cover normalization, the depth-survives-a-model-clear invariant, both
spawn-argv branches, and the REST round-trip. One asserts the worker CLI
actually accepts the --reasoning flag the dispatcher emits: a spawn arg no
parser accepts would fail every dispatch while every unit test stayed green.
Under gateway.multiplex_profiles, Discord and Telegram authorization gates
(allowed/ignored channels, allowed users/roles, allow-all flags) were read
from process-global os.environ, populated first-writer-wins by the YAML->env
bridge in each adapter's _apply_yaml_config. The first profile to initialize
pinned its allow/deny lists — and its ALLOW_ALL flags — for every other
profile in the process (issue #72348, incl. the Telegram mirror reported in
the thread).
Fix (per-adapter-instance gate reads, whole class):
- gateway/authz_mixin.py: new _platform_gate_env — scope-authoritative gate
read: under an installed profile secret scope with multiplex active, a
missing key returns the default instead of falling through to os.environ
(which may hold another profile's value). Single-profile behavior is
byte-identical to os.getenv.
- Discord adapter:
- connect() snapshots all gate env vars (_GATE_ENV_KEYS) inside the owning
profile's runtime scope into a per-adapter dict; new accessors
(_get_allowed_channels/_get_ignored_channels/_get_allowed_users/
_get_allowed_roles/_get_no_thread_channels/_discord_allow_all_users/
_gateway_allow_all_users/_get_allow_bots) resolve snapshot -> config.extra
-> scope-aware env, replacing every raw os.getenv gate read: on_message
channel gates, _is_allowed_user allow-all flags, slash authorization,
fail-closed diagnostics, missed-message backfill, bot-message gating,
and _component_check_auth (component buttons).
- _apply_yaml_config always seeds gate values into PlatformConfig.extra
(incl. new allowed_roles / allow_all_users keys) and SKIPS the
process-global env writes when loading a profile-scoped config under
multiplex; the legacy first-writer env bridge is preserved verbatim for
single-profile deployments.
- _resolve_allowed_usernames no longer unconditionally rewrites
os.environ[DISCORD_ALLOWED_USERS] — under multiplex the resolved IDs stay
adapter-local (snapshot refresh); single-profile keeps the env rewrite.
- Telegram adapter (mirror of the same class): intake prefilter and
callback-auth fallbacks, _telegram_auth_env_configured, and the
allowed/ignored chats-topics-threads getters now read via the scoped gate
reader; _apply_yaml_config skips authorization env writes for
profile-scoped loads and seeds free_response_chats/ignored_threads extras.
Regression tests (tests/plugins/platforms/test_discord_gate_isolation.py):
two adapter instances with different allow-lists enforce their OWN lists
order-independently across message, slash, and component gates; negative
allow-all case proves profile A's open-access flag cannot authorize profile
B; username-resolution env-clobber; YAML-bridge seeding/skip matrix; and the
Telegram scoped-reader matrix. Sabotage-verified: reverting either the
Discord snapshot accessors or the Telegram scoped reader fails 12/2 tests
respectively.
Credit: builds on the per-adapter accessor direction of PR #72427
(@JonthanaHanh) and the scope-aware-reader approach validated live on v0.19.0
by @yournetworkplug-ctrl for the Telegram mirror; scope corrections from
jackjin1997's and cal88's analysis in the issue thread (allow-all flags,
unguarded username-resolution env write, per-site channel reads).
Fixes#72348
The #40863 intake prefilter rejected unauthorized DMs whenever an allowlist
existed, so gateway pairing never ran even when the operator set
telegram.unauthorized_dm_behavior: pair (which must win over the #9337
allowlist silence default). Pass those DMs through; groups stay blocked.
Google API and authentication packages permit vulnerable httplib2 and pyasn1
transitives, while the Workspace and Google Chat runtime installers previously
treated any importable version as sufficient. Existing environments could
therefore remain vulnerable after the project dependency pins were repaired.
Carry the fixed versions through the Google and Vertex extras, lazy feature
requirements, lockfile, and both runtime installers. Route the documented
Google Chat installation path through its maintained secure requirements
instead of an unconstrained direct pip command.
Detect stale distributions, install only unsatisfied requirements, and verify
the result before continuing. Behavioral tests cover those repair invariants
without freezing manifests, lockfiles, or complete package sets.
Related #72108
Extracted from #72840
Co-authored-by: Teknium <127238744+teknium1@users.noreply.github.com>
The embedded Hindsight daemon's profile env file carries the plaintext
HINDSIGHT_API_LLM_API_KEY but was written via bare write_text(), leaving
it with umask-derived (typically world-readable) permissions.
- Create/truncate the file via os.open(..., 0o600); chmod a pre-existing
file to 0600 BEFORE writing new secret bytes.
- Post-write validation on POSIX: verify 0600, retry chmod, and raise if
the file still isn't owner-only.
- If validation fails, unlink the secret file so a plaintext key is never
left behind with unverified permissions.
- Regression tests under tests/plugins/ for fresh-write mode, tightening a
pre-existing 0644 file, and cleanup on validation failure.
Narrowed reimplementation of #74236 confined to plugins/memory/hindsight/;
the core utils.py atomic-replace opt-out from the PR was dropped.
Co-authored-by: carrion256 <carrion256@proton.me>
524ab5399 widened the media read timeout from send_video to "all upload send
paths" - send_voice/send_audio/send_photo/send_document/send_media_group/
send_animation. Both send_photo calls inside send_image() were missed, so
they still ran on the short timeout the rest of the Bot API is tuned for
while the sibling media paths already pass it.
The missed pair is the worst one to miss: send_image tries a URL send first,
then falls back to downloading the image and uploading the bytes - the path
documented as "supports up to 10MB", i.e. the slowest send in the file and
the one whose server-side processing wait most often outlasts the short
budget. When it times out the handler's last resort posts the bare URL as
text, so the picture silently never arrives as a picture.
Pass _MEDIA_SEND_READ_TIMEOUT on both, covered by two behavioral tests that
drive send_image for real - the URL send and the forced byte-upload fallback
- and assert the read_timeout that actually reaches the Bot API.
Address review feedback from teknium1:
1. Re-validate stale 'test' category entries in quick() — existing
tracked.json entries under now-protected directories (patches/,
projects/, etc.) are re-classified via guess_category() and
dropped instead of deleted, mirroring the cron-output pattern.
2. Add patches, projects, skins, themes, contributors to
_EMPTY_DIR_PROTECTED_TOP_LEVEL so the empty-directory sweep
never traverses into these user-authored project trees.
guess_category() classified any file whose name starts with 'test_' or
'tmp_' as disposable, even when the file lived under user-authored
directories like patches/, projects/, skins/, or themes/. Files in
these trees were silently deleted on session end.
Added the missing user-project directories to the exclusion list so
that basename-based classification only applies to files in temporary
or scratch locations, not durable project trees.
The chronos cron-fire verifier constructed PyJWKClient without explicit
headers, so its JWKS fetch to the NAS portal hit the same WAF 403 the
dashboard-auth providers already guard against. It reaches the same
portal issuer, so it's the same bug class — mirror the fix here and add
a constructor-contract regression test.
Co-authored-by: James Hodgkinson <james@terminaloutcomes.com>
The Nous PyJWKClient was constructed without explicit headers, while the
self_hosted provider already sends Accept + User-Agent. Without them the
Portal WAF can block the JWKS fetch, so the same failure mode remained for
the Nous dashboard-auth route. Mirror the self_hosted fix and add a
constructor-contract regression test.
Follow-up to PR #70238. Remove 'free-response channel' and
'authorization' jargon from the model-facing prompt. Collapse the
triple-negative 'do not ask / do not reject / do not stay silent'
into a single directive. ~70 tokens vs ~175 in the contributor's
version, same semantics.
send_video got the 60s read_timeout but send_voice/send_audio/send_photo/
send_document/send_media_group/send_animation upload through the same PTB
request path and hit the same server-side processing wait before the
response arrives. Same class, all sites: they all pass
_MEDIA_SEND_READ_TIMEOUT now. Also drops an unused test helper.
kshitij
Jesse Casco
Teknium
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James Hodgkinson
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