Codex re-auth via `hermes setup` / `hermes model` wrote fresh OAuth
tokens to providers.openai-codex.tokens but left the credential_pool
device_code entry holding the consumed refresh token and stale error
markers. Since the runtime selects from the pool, the next request
spent a dead token and got a 401 token_invalidated. Update the
singleton-seeded pool entries in lockstep and clear their error state.
Fixes#33000
reasoning.encrypted_content is sealed to the Responses endpoint that
minted it. When a session switches model providers mid-conversation —
say the user runs /model gpt-5.5 after several turns on grok-4.3, or
vice versa — the persisted codex_reasoning_items carry blobs the new
endpoint cannot decrypt, and every subsequent turn fails with HTTP 400
invalid_encrypted_content.
This is the cross-issuer prevention layer. Pairs with:
* PR #33035 — runtime recovery when the HTTP 400 fires anyway
* PR #33146 — prevention for transient rs_tmp_* items
Stamps each reasoning item with the issuer kind that minted it
(codex_backend / xai_responses / github_responses / other:<url>) at
normalize time, then drops items at replay time when the active
endpoint differs from the stamp. Unstamped (legacy) items pass
through for backwards compatibility.
Cherry-picked from @chaconne67's PR #31629. Conflict against current
main (#33035's replay_encrypted_reasoning parameter) resolved as
'keep both' — the two guards compose: replay_encrypted_reasoning=False
is the session-wide kill switch, current_issuer_kind is the per-item
filter that runs only when replay is still enabled.
Background processes whose command contains `gh pr view --json
statusCheckRollup` or `gh pr checks | jq` now get a runtime hint in
the result pointing at the canonical green-ci-policy snippets. The
homebrew shape has caused at least seven silent CI-watcher failures
in the past two weeks (#31329, #31448, #31695, #31709, #31745,
#32264, #33131) — each one a different jq/awk/grep variation of the
same fundamental problem (stdout buffering, jq null-key edge cases,
conclusion-vs-status confusion, TTY-only banner grepping).
The skill that documents this anti-pattern is excellent, but a skill
only fires if the agent loads it. The tool surface fires on every
misuse. This is the embed-footguns-in-tool-surface pattern from
PR #31289 applied to a recurring failure mode that's outgrown
skill-only enforcement.
Detector is deliberately narrow — flags two specific shapes:
1. Any command containing `statusCheckRollup` (the JSON-API path —
conclusion vs status field semantics keep burning us).
2. `gh pr view` / `gh pr checks` combined with `jq` (gh pr
checks doesn't emit JSON, so any `| jq` here is confused intent;
the canonical column-2 poller uses awk-on-tabs, not jq).
Does NOT flag the blessed column-2 awk-on-tabs poller (which uses
`awk -F"\t" "\==\"pending\""`) or the exit-code-driven
`gh pr checks $PR >/dev/null` snippet.
Hint composes with the existing background-without-notify_on_complete
hint — both can fire on the same call. Each is independently
actionable.
Tests:
- 4 new cases in tests/tools/test_notify_on_complete.py
- test_homebrew_ci_poller_via_statusCheckRollup_emits_hint (positive)
- test_homebrew_ci_poller_via_gh_pr_checks_piped_to_jq_emits_hint (positive)
- test_canonical_column2_awk_poller_does_not_emit_homebrew_hint (negative)
- test_canonical_gh_pr_checks_exit_code_loop_does_not_emit_hint (negative)
- test_non_ci_background_command_does_not_emit_homebrew_hint (negative)
- 30/30 passing (was 26)
Operators behind reverse proxies that don't reliably forward
X-Forwarded-Host / X-Forwarded-Proto / X-Forwarded-Prefix (manual
nginx setups, on-prem ingresses, custom-domain Fly deploys with
incomplete proxy chains) had no way to force the absolute base URL
the OAuth callback redirects from. The dashboard would reconstruct
the redirect_uri from request headers, the IDP would echo it back,
and the user would land on the wrong host or wrong path — 404.
Add `dashboard.public_url` to config.yaml with env override
HERMES_DASHBOARD_PUBLIC_URL. When set, it is the complete authority —
scheme + host + optional path prefix (e.g. https://example.com/hermes) —
and becomes the base for the OAuth `redirect_uri`. X-Forwarded-Prefix
is IGNORED on this code path because the operator has explicitly
declared the public URL; we no longer need to guess from proxy
headers, and stacking the prefix on top would double-prefix the
common case where the prefix is already baked into public_url.
When unset, the existing proxy_headers + X-Forwarded-Prefix
reconstruction runs untouched. Existing Fly.io deploys continue to
work without configuration — this is purely additive.
Precedence mirrors dashboard.oauth.client_id:
env (non-empty) > config.yaml > reconstructed from request
Implementation:
- hermes_cli/config.py: add dashboard.public_url to DEFAULT_CONFIG
with a multi-paragraph doc comment explaining the use case,
the X-Forwarded-Prefix interaction, and the validation rules.
- hermes_cli/dashboard_auth/prefix.py: factored out the existing
_REJECT_CHARS frozenset, added _normalise_public_url() validator
(requires http/https scheme + non-empty host + no header-injection
chars), _load_dashboard_section() loader (robust to load_config
raising, non-dict shapes), and resolve_public_url() entry point
with the env-overrides-config precedence. A malformed value
silently falls through to ""; the caller treats "" as "reconstruct
from request" so a typo never breaks the login flow.
- hermes_cli/dashboard_auth/routes.py: rewrite _redirect_uri()
docstring to spell out the three resolution tiers; add the
public_url short-circuit before the existing X-Forwarded-Prefix
splicing. Source-level comment notes that X-Forwarded-Prefix is
intentionally ignored when public_url is set so a future reader
doesn't try to "fix" the missing prefix layering.
- cli-config.yaml.example: extend the existing dashboard section
with a public_url block.
- website/docs/user-guide/features/web-dashboard.md: new "Public
URL override" section between the provider configuration and
the OAuth flow walkthrough. Documents the env-vs-config table,
the validation rules, and the `http://` `public_url` ↔ Secure
cookie footgun.
Test coverage — new TestPublicUrlOverride class (8 tests):
- env var overrides request reconstruction (the primary motivating
case)
- config.yaml used when env unset
- env wins over config (precedence pin)
- public_url with a path prefix already baked in (the Q1-a case the
user explicitly chose)
- public_url suppresses X-Forwarded-Prefix layering (defends
against the double-prefix bug)
- trailing slash stripped from public_url (no //auth/callback)
- malformed public_url falls through to reconstruction (six
hostile inputs: javascript:, ftp:, missing scheme, missing host,
quote chars, CRLF injection)
- empty env string doesn't shadow config.yaml entry (CI / Fly
provisioned-but-empty secret case)
Mutation-tested: flipping the precedence in resolve_public_url() trips
exactly test_env_overrides_config_public_url; weakening the validator
(accept any scheme) trips exactly test_malformed_public_url_falls_through_to_reconstruction.
Both other tests in each pair stay green, confirming the suite
discriminates the specific regression each test pins.
Per AGENTS.md, ~/.hermes/.env is reserved for API keys / secrets and
config.yaml is the surface for non-secret configuration. The Nous
Portal plugin previously read HERMES_DASHBOARD_OAUTH_CLIENT_ID and
HERMES_DASHBOARD_PORTAL_URL from the environment only, which forced
local-dev / on-prem operators to put non-secret per-instance
configuration in .env — violating the convention.
Add dashboard.oauth.{client_id,portal_url} to DEFAULT_CONFIG and have
the plugin resolve each setting with env-overrides-config precedence:
1. Env var when set to a non-empty value (Fly.io platform-secret
injection — what pushes per-deploy client_ids without baking
them into the image).
2. config.yaml entry (canonical surface for local dev / on-prem).
3. Plugin default (no provider registered when client_id is empty;
portal_url defaults to https://portal.nousresearch.com).
Empty env values are explicitly treated as unset so a provisioned-but-
not-populated Fly secret can't accidentally shadow a valid config.yaml
entry with an empty string — operators would otherwise lose the gate.
Implementation:
- hermes_cli/config.py: add dashboard.oauth.{client_id,portal_url}
block to DEFAULT_CONFIG with full doc comment explaining the
override precedence and Fly.io rationale.
- plugins/dashboard_auth/nous/__init__.py: add _load_config_oauth_section,
_resolve_client_id, _resolve_portal_url helpers; replace the two
direct os.environ.get() calls in register() with the resolvers.
Update the skip-reason string to mention BOTH surfaces so an
operator looking at the fail-closed bind error knows config.yaml
is a valid alternative to the env var.
- plugins/dashboard_auth/nous/plugin.yaml: update description to
name both surfaces. requires_env stays pointing at the env var
name — it's metadata-only (not used by the plugin loader for
gating) so this is documentation/UX, not enforcement.
- cli-config.yaml.example: append commented dashboard.oauth block
with the same override rationale operators see in code.
- website/docs/user-guide/features/web-dashboard.md: rewrite the
'Default provider: Nous Research' section to lead with config.yaml,
present env vars as operator overrides (Fly.io's primary path).
Updated the example fail-closed bind error to match the new
skip-reason text.
Test coverage — new TestConfigYamlSource class (8 tests) pinning
every tier of the precedence chain:
- config-yaml-only path registers correctly
- both config-yaml fields (client_id + portal_url) honoured
- env var overrides config for client_id (Fly.io critical path)
- env var overrides config for portal_url
- empty env string does NOT shadow config (CI/Fly edge case)
- neither source set → skip with reason mentioning BOTH surfaces
- load_config() raising falls through to env-only path (resilience)
- non-dict oauth section falls through cleanly (typo resilience)
Mutation-tested: flipping the precedence to config-wins-over-env trips
exactly test_env_overrides_config_client_id while the other 7 stay
green, confirming the suite discriminates the order, not just the
sources.
This closes the last item in Teknium's PR review (PR #30156).
Mission-control style deploys reverse-proxy the dashboard at a path
prefix (e.g. mission-control.tilos.com/hermes/* -> :9119) and inject
X-Forwarded-Prefix: /hermes on every request. The SPA mount already
honoured this for asset URLs and the bootstrap __HERMES_BASE_PATH__,
but the OAuth gate didn't:
1. The gate's Location: header to /login and the 401 envelope's
login_url were built bare ("/login?next=..."). Under a /hermes
prefix the browser follows that to mission-control.tilos.com/login
which the proxy doesn't route to the dashboard.
2. _redirect_uri (the OAuth callback URL handed to the IDP) used
request.url_for() which doesn't honour X-Forwarded-Prefix
(Starlette/uvicorn only proxy_headers Host + Proto + For). The
IDP redirects back to /auth/callback instead of /hermes/auth/
callback → 404 in the user's browser.
3. Cookies were set with Path=/ which leaks them to other apps on
the same origin and won't be sent back on requests under the
prefix in the first place.
Fix threads the normalised prefix through every boundary:
* New hermes_cli/dashboard_auth/prefix.py — single source of truth
for X-Forwarded-Prefix parsing. web_server._normalise_prefix
becomes a re-export so the SPA mount, the gate, and the cookies
helper all agree.
* middleware._unauth_response builds login_url = f"{prefix}/login".
* routes._redirect_uri splices the prefix into the path component
of the IDP-bound URL (with full validation of the header).
* cookies.{set,clear}_{session,pkce}_cookie now take prefix="".
Path attribute switches to /hermes when set; cookie name switches
name variant (see below). Every caller passes the request's
normalised prefix.
Cookie hardening (Teknium's lesser-note #1 in the PR review): adopt
the __Host- / __Secure- cookie name prefixes per draft-west-cookie-
prefixes. The variant is selected from (use_https, prefix):
* Loopback HTTP → bare "hermes_session_at" (both prefixes require
Secure, incompatible with HTTP).
* HTTPS, direct deploy (Path=/) → "__Host-hermes_session_at".
Strongest spec: bound to exact origin, no Domain attribute, Secure
required.
* HTTPS, behind a proxy prefix (Path=/hermes) →
"__Secure-hermes_session_at". __Host- forbids Path != "/"; the
explicit Path=/hermes covers same-origin app isolation.
Setter and reader BOTH consult the prefix because the cookie *name*
changes — a reader that looked up the bare name when the setter wrote
__Secure- would never find the value. The reader falls back across
all three variants so a request whose shape changed mid-session (e.g.
post-deploy from no-prefix to /hermes) still picks up the existing
cookie until it expires.
Test coverage:
- tests/hermes_cli/test_dashboard_auth_prefix.py — new file. 11 tests
pinning:
• Location: /hermes/login on the gate's HTML redirect
• 401 envelope login_url carries the prefix
• Malformed X-Forwarded-Prefix is ignored (header-injection
defence; the script-tag value is normalised to empty string)
• _redirect_uri splices /hermes into the path (the property
that prevents the IDP-returns-to-404 failure)
• PKCE cookie uses Path=/hermes + __Secure- when proxied
• Session cookies use __Host- when direct, __Secure- when
proxied, bare on loopback HTTP
• End-to-end round trip with hand-managed PKCE cookie carriage
(TestClient can't simulate a Path=/hermes cookie automatically)
- tests/hermes_cli/test_dashboard_auth_cookies.py — rewritten to pin
each (use_https, prefix) shape produces its expected cookie name,
plus reader-side coverage that __Host- and __Secure- variants are
both recognised.
- Existing tests across middleware / 401-reauth / etc. updated to
match the new cookie names (substring contains instead of
startswith).
Mutation-tested: reverting _unauth_response to build the bare
"/login" URL trips exactly the two tests that pin the prefix
carriage, confirming the suite discriminates the regression.
The gate's _unauth_response set next=<path> on the /login redirect URL,
but nothing downstream read it: render_login_html ignored next=,
auth_login dropped it, and auth_callback read next= from its own query
string — which an IDP never sets on the callback URL (real IDPs only
echo back code+state). The _validate_post_login_target plumbing in the
callback was unreachable on the happy path, so users always landed on
"/" regardless of what they originally requested.
Worse: reading next= from the callback URL was a latent open-redirect
sink, since an attacker could craft /auth/callback?...&next=/admin and
have the server honour it post-auth.
Fix carries next= through the round trip on a server-controlled channel:
1. login_page reads request.query_params['next'] and passes it (post-
validation) to render_login_html.
2. render_login_html threads next= URL-encoded into each provider
button's href, with HTML-attribute escaping as defence in depth.
3. auth_login accepts ?next= as a query param, re-validates, and
appends it as a fourth segment (next=<urlquoted>) in the PKCE
cookie payload alongside provider/state/verifier.
4. auth_callback no longer accepts a next: str = "" query param. It
parses next= out of the PKCE cookie and validates that with the
same same-origin rules. Any attacker-supplied ?next= on the
callback URL is silently ignored — server-only carrier.
Test coverage adds three classes:
- TestAuthCallbackNext drives /login → /auth/login → IDP-bounce →
/auth/callback end-to-end without smuggling next= onto the callback
URL (which is what the previous tests did and why they didn't
catch the bug). Includes test_attacker_callback_next_param_is_ignored
to pin the security property that the URL value is never read.
- TestRenderLoginHtmlNext covers the rendering function at the
unit boundary so a regression that drops next_path is caught
without spinning up the full app.
- TestAuthLoginPkceCookieNext inspects the Set-Cookie header on
/auth/login responses so a regression in cookie encoding is caught
without driving the full round trip.
Mutation-tested: reverting auth_callback to read next= from the URL
trips 3 of 6 TestAuthCallbackNext tests (the safe-path and attacker-
hardening ones), confirming the suite discriminates between the cookie
read and the URL read.
When the OAuth gate is active, start_server runs uvicorn with
proxy_headers=True so the dashboard can honour X-Forwarded-Proto from
Fly's TLS terminator (cookies, redirect URI reconstruction). A side
effect: ws.client.host is rewritten to the X-Forwarded-For value, which
on Fly is the real internet client IP — never loopback. The loopback
peer guard in _ws_client_is_allowed then rejected every WS upgrade in
gated mode (4403 close) even after a successful OAuth round trip and
ticket consumption, silently breaking /api/pty, /api/ws, /api/pub, and
/api/events.
Fix: in gated mode, bypass the peer-IP check. The OAuth gate +
single-use ticket is the auth. The Host/Origin guard in
_ws_host_origin_is_allowed still runs and is what protects against
DNS-rebinding here, not the peer IP.
Loopback mode behaviour is unchanged: the legacy ?token= path is the
only auth there and we don't want LAN hosts guessing tokens.
Regression coverage: TestWsRequestIsAllowedGated pins all four
behaviours — non-loopback peer allowed in gated mode, non-loopback peer
rejected in loopback mode, loopback peer allowed in loopback mode, and
the Host/Origin guard still firing on a rebinding attempt with gated
mode + matching peer.
The stub auth provider's _sign/_unsign helpers joined payload and HMAC
with a 'b"."' separator and recovered the parts via bytes.rsplit. HMAC-SHA256
digests are random bytes, so ~12% of the time the digest contains 0x2E
('.') and rsplit picks the wrong split point -- HMAC verification then
spuriously rejects valid tokens.
test_stub_refresh_round_trips was failing ~25% of the time in isolation
because of this.
Switch to a fixed-length suffix (32 bytes, sliced off in _unsign): no
separator means no collision class. After the fix, 10/10 runs pass.
When these vars are set in the developer's shell, every /api/status call
triggers load_gateway_config() -> discover_plugins() -> the bundled
dashboard_auth/nous plugin auto-registers itself, leaking a provider into
the registry across tests on the same xdist worker. That breaks assertions
like 'auth_providers == []' (loopback) and '== ["stub"]' (gated) in
test_dashboard_auth_status_endpoint.py.
CI never has these set, so this only surfaced locally -- exactly the
hermeticity gap _hermetic_environment is meant to close. Add them to
_HERMES_BEHAVIORAL_VARS so the autouse fixture strips them, and to the
unset list in scripts/run_tests.sh as belt-and-suspenders for direct
pytest invocations.
When jwt.decode raises InvalidTokenError, decode the token a second time
without signature verification (safe — we never trust the values, just
display them) and append the actual iss/aud claims plus our configured
expected values to the error message. Lets operators see config drift
between HERMES_DASHBOARD_PORTAL_URL / HERMES_DASHBOARD_OAUTH_CLIENT_ID
and what Portal is actually emitting without having to hand-decode the
JWT from the browser cookie.
The Nous OAuth provider plugin (plugins/dashboard_auth/nous) is bundled
and auto-loaded — same as before — but previously refused to register
unless BOTH HERMES_DASHBOARD_OAUTH_CLIENT_ID and HERMES_DASHBOARD_PORTAL_URL
were set, then the gate's fail-closed branch told the operator 'install
the default Nous provider'. That message is misleading: the provider IS
installed; it's just unconfigured. And the contract only really needs
the per-instance client_id — the portal URL is the same for everyone
in production.
Three changes:
1. plugins/dashboard_auth/nous/__init__.py:
- HERMES_DASHBOARD_PORTAL_URL is now optional and defaults to
'https://portal.nousresearch.com'. Override only for staging
(portal.rewbs.uk) or a custom deployment. Empty string also
falls back to the default so an empty Fly secret can't point
the dashboard at nowhere.
- Plugin exposes a module-level LAST_SKIP_REASON: str that the gate
reads when no providers register. Cleared on each register() call.
Skip reasons are human-readable and actionable
('HERMES_DASHBOARD_OAUTH_CLIENT_ID is not set. The Nous Portal
provisions this env var…').
2. plugins/dashboard_auth/nous/plugin.yaml:
- requires_env drops HERMES_DASHBOARD_PORTAL_URL; only the client_id
is mandatory. Description updated to reflect this.
3. hermes_cli/web_server.py:
- When the gate fail-closes for 'no providers', it now reads each
bundled plugin's LAST_SKIP_REASON and embeds them in the SystemExit
message. Operator sees the specific config fix needed:
Bundled providers reported these issues:
• nous: HERMES_DASHBOARD_OAUTH_CLIENT_ID is not set. …
instead of the prior generic 'Install the default Nous provider'.
Tests:
- TestPluginRegister rewritten to assert the new defaults +
LAST_SKIP_REASON contents (6 tests, +1 new for empty-string env).
- New gate test test_start_server_surfaces_nous_skip_reason_when_unconfigured.
- test_get_method_is_not_allowed widened to handle the SPA-shell 200
path explicitly — assertion now verifies no JSON ticket leaks
rather than asserting a specific status code (covers all four of
401/404/405/200).
Docs updated: web-dashboard.md's 'Default provider' section now shows
the env-var table with required/optional columns and embeds the
fail-closed error message verbatim so operators can match what they
see at the prompt.
Phase 7 surfaces the OAuth gate state to users.
web/src/components/AuthWidget.tsx (new):
Sidebar widget that fetches /api/auth/me on mount and renders a
compact 'Logged in as <user_id…> via <provider>' row with a logout
icon. Contract V1 (Nous Portal) emits no email/display_name claims,
so user_id is the display value (truncated to 14 chars + ellipsis);
display_name and email fallthroughs are forward-compat for OQ-C1.
Renders nothing on 401 from /api/auth/me — that's the signal the
gate isn't engaged (loopback mode), in which case the widget would
be confusing.
Logout POSTs /auth/logout (which clears cookies + redirects to
/login) then full-page-navigates to /login itself; the SPA's fetch
wrapper doesn't follow that redirect, so the navigation is explicit.
web/src/App.tsx: mounts <AuthWidget /> above <SidebarFooter />.
Component is self-hiding in loopback mode so there's no need for a
conditional mount.
web/src/lib/api.ts:
- getAuthMe() + logout() helpers
- AuthMeResponse type
- StatusResponse gets optional auth_required + auth_providers fields
so the existing StatusPage can render a gated/loopback badge.
hermes_cli/web_server.py: /api/status payload now includes
- auth_required: bool — whether app.state.auth_required is True
- auth_providers: list[str] — registered DashboardAuthProvider names
Lazy-imports list_providers so early-startup status calls don't
crash if the dashboard_auth module is still being set up.
tests/hermes_cli/test_dashboard_auth_status_endpoint.py: 3 new tests
covering the new status fields in both gated and loopback modes plus
a regression that no existing field got dropped from the payload.
The hermes status CLI is unchanged in this commit — that command
tracks model providers + OAuth credentials, not running-dashboard
state. The /api/status endpoint is the canonical place to query
dashboard auth-gate state, consumed by the React StatusPage already.
Contract V1 of nous-account-service PR #180 ships no refresh tokens, so
the original Phase 6 silent-refresh design is replaced with a thinner
'401 → redirect to /login' UX. The dashboard's gated middleware now
emits a structured envelope on any auth failure; the SPA's fetch
wrapper sees it and full-page-navigates the user through re-auth.
hermes_cli/dashboard_auth/cookies.py:
set_session_cookies(refresh_token='') SKIPS writing the
hermes_session_rt cookie. Forward-compat: a non-empty refresh_token
still emits the cookie unchanged, so a future Portal contract that
starts issuing RTs flips the persistence on with no other change.
clear_session_cookies still emits a Max-Age=0 deletion for the RT
cookie so stale cookies from earlier deployments get flushed on
logout / session expiry. Deprecation marker + rationale in
module docstring per the user's docstring-only deprecation pattern.
hermes_cli/dashboard_auth/middleware.py:
_unauth_response now builds a structured JSON envelope for API 401s:
{ error: 'session_expired' | 'unauthenticated',
detail: 'Unauthorized',
reason: <internal>,
login_url: '/login?next=<safe-path>' }
HTML redirects also carry next= so a user landing on /sessions
without a cookie bounces back to /sessions after re-auth.
_safe_next_target validates same-origin: drops protocol-relative
paths (//evil.com), absolute URLs, and any /login or /auth/* loop.
Dead cookies are cleared on the 401 path so the browser stops
replaying invalid tokens.
hermes_cli/dashboard_auth/routes.py:
/auth/callback accepts next= query param and validates via
_validate_post_login_target (same rules as the gate's
_safe_next_target — defence-in-depth because next= survived a full
IDP round trip and attacker-controlled state can re-enter via the
callback URL). Open-redirect attempts land at '/' instead.
web/src/lib/api.ts:
fetchJSON parses the 401 envelope and full-page-navigates to
body.login_url ONLY on the known session-expiry error codes.
Domain-level 401s (e.g. permission errors) bubble up as regular
errors. credentials: 'include' added so cookie auth works for all
fetches routed through this wrapper. sessionStorage.lastLocation is
preserved for future use by AuthWidget / hermes_status.
Test files marked with pytest.mark.xdist_group so the four files that
mutate web_server.app.state.auth_required serialize onto the same xdist
worker — eliminates 'works locally, fails in CI' app-state bleed.
20 new tests in test_dashboard_auth_401_reauth.py:
- set_session_cookies(refresh_token='') skips RT cookie
- clear_session_cookies still emits RT deletion
- 401 envelope shape (unauthenticated vs session_expired)
- dead cookie cleared on invalid-token 401
- login_url carries next= for deep paths
- login loop avoided when path is /login/auth/api-auth
- protocol-relative URL rejected
- _safe_next_target unit tests (accept same-origin, reject loops/abs)
- /auth/callback respects safe next= but rejects open redirects
2 pre-existing tests updated to accept the new /login?next=%2F shape.
Full dashboard-auth suite: 168 passed, 1 skipped (Phase 0 pre-existing).
Phase 5 task 5.2. Four WebSocket endpoints — /api/pty, /api/ws, /api/pub,
/api/events — previously authed with the same constant-time check against
`_SESSION_TOKEN`. Replaced with a single helper that branches on
`app.state.auth_required`:
Loopback / --insecure: legacy ?token=<_SESSION_TOKEN> path (unchanged).
Gated: ?ticket=<single-use> consumed against the
dashboard-auth ticket store.
Critical security property: gated mode UNCONDITIONALLY rejects the
?token= path. A leaked _SESSION_TOKEN value from a log line is not
replayable for WS access in gated deployments.
`_build_sidecar_url` now branches too: loopback uses the legacy token;
gated mode mints a server-internal ticket via mint_ticket() with
pseudo-user 'pty-sidecar' / provider 'server-internal' so audit logs can
distinguish PTY-internal sidecar tickets from browser tickets. PTY
children open /api/pub exactly once at startup so single-use suffices.
Ticket rejections audit-log as WS_TICKET_REJECTED with truncated reason
+ client IP + WS path. Operators debugging 'WS keeps closing' issues see
which endpoint and why.
17 new tests:
- POST /api/auth/ws-ticket: 200 with cookie, 401/302 without, distinct
per call, GET-not-allowed.
- _ws_auth_ok loopback: token accept/reject, missing-token reject,
ticket-param-ignored.
- _ws_auth_ok gated: ticket accept, single-use rejection, unknown reject,
legacy-token-rejected-in-gated assertion, audit-log emission.
- _build_sidecar_url: loopback uses token=, gated uses ticket=, no-bound
returns None.
Phase 5 task 5.1. Browsers cannot set Authorization on a WebSocket
upgrade, so in gated mode the SPA needs an alternative way to bind the
upgrade to its authenticated session.
hermes_cli/dashboard_auth/ws_tickets.py — in-memory single-use ticket
store with 30s TTL. Thread-safe (threading.Lock), token_urlsafe(32)
values, ticket value truncated to 8 chars in error messages for log
hygiene. Module-level state with _reset_for_tests() helper.
hermes_cli/dashboard_auth/routes.py — adds POST /api/auth/ws-ticket.
Auth-required (the gate middleware already attaches Session to
request.state.session). Returns {ticket, ttl_seconds}; emits
WS_TICKET_MINTED audit event with user_id + provider + ip.
hermes_cli/dashboard_auth/audit.py — adds WS_TICKET_REJECTED enum
value for the consume-side rejection event (wired into the WS
endpoints in task 5.2).
11 new tests covering round-trip, single-use, TTL boundary, unknown
ticket rejection, secret-hygiene truncation in error messages, and
concurrent mint+consume from 20 threads.
Bundled, kind=backend, auto-loads. Activates ONLY when Portal-injected
env vars are present:
HERMES_DASHBOARD_OAUTH_CLIENT_ID — agent:{instance_id}
HERMES_DASHBOARD_PORTAL_URL — Portal base URL
Loopback / --insecure operators leave both unset and never see this
plugin register anything. The fail-closed branch in start_server handles
the 'public bind + zero providers' case independently.
Implementation follows nous-account-service PR #180's published OAuth
contract verbatim:
- client_id is per-instance (agent:{instance_id}); the suffix is
cross-checked against the token's agent_instance_id claim as
defense-in-depth (contract C9).
- scope is agent_dashboard:access only (contract C3).
- aud is the bare client_id, no hermes-cli: prefix (contract C2).
- RS256 JWT verification against /.well-known/jwks.json with
5-minute cache (contract C7).
- No refresh tokens in V1: refresh_session always raises
RefreshExpiredError; revoke_session is a no-op (contract C5).
- oauth_contract_version claim: missing → warn + proceed; present
and != 1 → refuse (contract C11, OQ-C2 tolerant treatment).
- redirect_uri validated client-side as defense before bouncing to
Portal; authoritative check is server-side per agent-redirect-uri.ts.
41 new tests covering construction, plugin-entry env gating, start_login
shape, complete_login httpx-mocked happy path + error mapping,
verify_session JWT verification (RSA keypair fixture, full claim-check
matrix), refresh_session always raising, revoke_session no-op.
PyJWT + cryptography are already in the venv (jose was previously
suggested; switched to pyjwt[crypto] since the latter is already
pulled in transitively).
Phase 3, Task 3.5. Three changes to web_server.py:
1. start_server replaces the legacy SystemExit-refusing-to-bind guard
with: if app.state.auth_required and no providers registered, exit
with a clear message; otherwise log the gate-on banner. --insecure
keeps its existing behaviour.
2. uvicorn proxy_headers flag is computed from app.state.auth_required.
Loopback / --insecure keep it False (so _ws_client_is_allowed sees
the real peer for the loopback gate); gated mode flips it True so
X-Forwarded-Proto from Fly's TLS terminator is honoured for cookie
Secure-flag decisions in detect_https().
3. _serve_index no longer injects window.__HERMES_SESSION_TOKEN__ when
the gate is on — the SPA reads identity from /api/auth/me using
cookie auth instead. window.__HERMES_AUTH_REQUIRED__ flag lets the
SPA pick between ticket-auth (gated) and token-auth (loopback) for
/api/pty + /api/ws (Phase 5 will wire this in the React layer).
4 new behavioural tests; loopback regression harness still green.
Phase 3, Tasks 3.2 + 3.3 + 3.4. These three pieces are mutually
dependent so they land together.
middleware.py - gated_auth_middleware engages when app.state.auth_required
is True. Allowlists /login, /auth/*, /api/auth/providers, and static
asset paths; everything else demands a valid session_at cookie. Verifies
by trying every registered provider's verify_session in turn (multi-
provider stack); attaches verified Session to request.state.session.
Returns 401 JSON for /api/* and 302 -> /login for HTML. ProviderError
during verify -> 503.
routes.py - APIRouter with:
GET /login server-rendered HTML
GET /auth/login?provider=N 302 to IDP + PKCE cookie
GET /auth/callback?code,state completes login, sets session cookies
POST /auth/logout clears cookies + best-effort revoke
GET /api/auth/providers public bootstrap endpoint (503 if zero)
GET /api/auth/me verified session as JSON (auth-required)
login_page.py - Inline-CSS HTML template, no React, no JavaScript.
web_server.py - Mounted gated_auth_middleware between host_header and
auth_middleware (FastAPI runs middlewares in registration order: host
check -> cookie auth -> token auth). auth_middleware short-circuits
when auth_required so cookie auth is authoritative in gated mode.
Router is included before mount_spa so the catch-all doesn't swallow
/login or /auth/*.
17 new behavioural tests; loopback regression harness still green.
Phase 3, Task 3.1. Three cookies:
- hermes_session_at: OAuth access token (HttpOnly, TTL = token TTL)
- hermes_session_rt: OAuth refresh token (HttpOnly, 30d max-age)
- hermes_session_pkce: PKCE state + verifier + provider hint (10min)
All SameSite=Lax + Path=/. Secure flag is set ONLY when the request
scheme is https — uvicorn proxy_headers=True (enabled in gated mode at
Phase 3.5) rewrites scheme from X-Forwarded-Proto so Fly's TLS
terminator works.
Phase 2, Task 2.1. Self-contained fake IDP — start_login redirects
straight back to {redirect_uri}?code=stub_code&state=<s> so tests can
walk the OAuth round trip in-process. Tokens are HMAC-signed JSON blobs
(not real JWTs) — enough structure for verify_session to detect tamper
and expiry without pulling in pyjwt.
Lives in tests/ only — never registered as a real plugin. Phase 3's
end-to-end tests import StubAuthProvider directly.
Convention: exp <= now counts as expired (TTL=0 means born-expired)
— matches what Phase 6's silent-refresh test will need.
Phase 1, Task 1.4. Records every auth event (login start/success/failure,
logout, refresh success/failure, revoke, session verify failure, WS
ticket mint) as one JSON object per line. Token-like kwargs (access_token,
refresh_token, code, code_verifier, state, ticket, cookie, Authorization)
are dropped before serialisation so the log never contains live secrets.
Write failures log at WARNING but never raise — auth flows must not fail
because the audit logger broke.
Phase 1, Task 1.3. Mirrors the existing register_image_gen_provider
pattern (plugins.py:531) — wrong-type or duplicate-name registrations
log at WARNING and silently return rather than raising, so a misbehaving
auth plugin cannot crash the host.
Deviation from plan: the plan's draft raised TypeError on non-provider
input; switched to silent-warn to match the established image_gen
convention. Test updated to match.
Phase 1, Task 1.2. Verifies registration order is preserved, duplicate
names are rejected with ValueError, and non-compliant providers fail at
register time (not later when the middleware tries to dispatch).
Phase 1, Task 1.1. New package hermes_cli/dashboard_auth/ contains:
base.py - DashboardAuthProvider ABC with 5 abstract methods
(start_login, complete_login, verify_session,
refresh_session, revoke_session), Session + LoginStart
frozen dataclasses, three exception types
(ProviderError / InvalidCodeError / RefreshExpiredError),
and assert_protocol_compliance() for plugins to call
in their own tests.
registry.py - Module-level register/get/list/clear with a lock.
Nothing reads the registry yet — Phase 2 adds the StubAuthProvider and
Phase 3 wires the gate middleware. The plugin hook lands in Task 1.3.
Phase 0, Task 0.3. start_server now computes should_require_auth(host,
allow_public) and records it on app.state.auth_required BEFORE the
existing legacy SystemExit guard fires. This gives middleware, the SPA
token-injection path, and WS endpoints a consistent read source for
'is the gate active'. The flag is set but no one reads it yet — Phase 3
registers the gate middleware.
Note: 4 pre-existing test failures in tests/hermes_cli/test_web_server.py
(PtyWebSocket) + test_update_hangup_protection.py reproduce on pristine
HEAD and are unrelated to this change (starlette TestClient WS regression).
Phase 0, Task 0.2. Single source of truth for 'is the auth gate active?'.
Reuses the existing _LOOPBACK_HOST_VALUES frozenset so this stays in sync
with the DNS-rebinding host-header check. RFC1918/CGNAT/link-local are
treated as public — exact threat model the gate exists for.
Phase 0, Task 0.1 of the dashboard-oauth plan. Establishes a baseline for
the loopback dashboard's auth surface so future phases can prove they
didn't regress the existing _SESSION_TOKEN flow when adding the OAuth gate.
New opt-in plugin that scans the content passed to write_file / patch /
skill_manage for 25 known-dangerous code patterns — pickle.load,
yaml.load, eval(, os.system, subprocess(shell=True), child_process.exec,
dangerouslySetInnerHTML, innerHTML/outerHTML/document.write/
insertAdjacentHTML, crypto.createCipher (no IV), AES ECB,
TLS verification disabled, XXE-prone xml.etree/minidom parsers,
<script src=//...> without SRI, torch.load without weights_only=True,
GitHub Actions ${{ github.event.* }} injection — and appends a
"Security guidance" warning block to the tool result via the
transform_tool_result hook.
Default behaviour is non-blocking: the file is written and the warning
rides back to the model in the next turn so it can self-correct or
document why the construct is safe. SECURITY_GUIDANCE_BLOCK=1 upgrades
to refusing the write entirely; SECURITY_GUIDANCE_DISABLE=1 is the
kill switch.
Pattern data (patterns.py) is a verbatim Apache-2.0 fork of
Anthropic's claude-plugins-official/plugins/security-guidance/hooks/
patterns.py at commit 0bde168 (2026-05-26). LICENSE and NOTICE
preserve attribution. The Hermes-side plugin glue (__init__.py,
plugin.yaml, README.md, tests) is original work.
Plugin is opt-in like all bundled plugins:
hermes plugins enable security-guidance
Inspired by https://x.com/ClaudeDevs/status/1927108527247... — Anthropic
shipped this as their security-guidance plugin for Claude Code on
2026-05-26 with a measured 30-40% reduction in security-related PR
comments on internal rollout.
What's NOT ported (deferred):
* Layer 2 (LLM diff review on turn end) — would route through main
model by default on Hermes, real money on reasoning models. A
follow-up can wire it to a cheap aux model with explicit opt-in.
* Layer 3 (agentic commit-time review) — agent can run this on
demand via delegate_task today.
* .hermes/security-guidance.md project-rules file — only used by
layers 2/3 upstream.
#33016 added GET /v1/skills + /v1/toolsets on the API server; the
capability flag introduced in this branch was placeholder-False. Flip
to True so capability probers see the truth.
Lets external clients enumerate the agent's skills and resolved toolsets
deterministically over the OpenAI-compatible API server, without standing
up the dashboard web server or sending a chat message and asking the model
to list them.
- GET /v1/skills — list installed skills (name, description, category)
- GET /v1/toolsets — list toolsets resolved for the api_server platform,
with enabled/configured state and the concrete tool names each expands
to
- Both gated by API_SERVER_KEY (same Bearer scheme as every other /v1/*
endpoint)
- /v1/capabilities advertises both new endpoints
Closes the gap a community user just hit asking how to list skills over
REST when only the OpenAI-compatible server is running.
Test plan
- python -m pytest tests/gateway/test_api_server.py -k "Skills or Toolsets or Capabilities" -o 'addopts=' -q
→ 9/9 pass
- python -m pytest tests/gateway/test_api_server.py -o 'addopts=' -q
→ 156/156 pass, no regressions
- E2E: started a real adapter on an isolated HERMES_HOME with a fake
skill installed; curl-equivalent calls to /v1/capabilities,
/v1/skills, /v1/toolsets returned the expected JSON; unauthenticated
calls returned 401 with the configured API_SERVER_KEY.
* remove Vercel AI Gateway provider and Vercel Sandbox terminal backend
Both Vercel-hosted integrations are removed end-to-end. Users on the AI
Gateway should switch to OpenRouter or one of the other aggregators
(Nous Portal, Kilo Code). Users on the Vercel Sandbox backend should
switch to Docker, Modal, Daytona, or SSH.
What's removed:
- `plugins/model-providers/ai-gateway/` provider plugin
- `hermes_cli/vercel_auth.py` Vercel-Sandbox auth helper
- `tools/environments/vercel_sandbox.py` terminal backend
- `ai-gateway` provider wiring across auth, doctor, setup, models,
config, status, providers, main, web_server, model_normalize, dump
- `vercel_sandbox` backend wiring across terminal_tool, file_tools,
code_execution_tool, file_operations, approval, skills_tool,
environments/local, credential_files, lazy_deps, prompt_builder,
cli, gateway/run
- `AI_GATEWAY_BASE_URL` constant, `_AI_GATEWAY_HEADERS` auxiliary-client
header set, run_agent base-URL header/reasoning special-cases
- `[vercel]` pyproject extra and `vercel`/`vercel-workers` from uv.lock
- env vars: `AI_GATEWAY_API_KEY`, `AI_GATEWAY_BASE_URL`, `VERCEL_TOKEN`,
`VERCEL_PROJECT_ID`, `VERCEL_TEAM_ID`, `VERCEL_OIDC_TOKEN`,
`TERMINAL_VERCEL_RUNTIME`
- Tests: deletes test_ai_gateway_models.py and
test_vercel_sandbox_environment.py; scrubs references across 23
surviving test files (no entire tests deleted unless they were
dedicated to AI Gateway / Sandbox)
- Docs: provider tables, env-var reference, setup guides, security
notes, tool config, terminal-backend tables — English plus zh-Hans
i18n parity
- `hermes-agent` skill: provider table entry and remote-backend list
What stays (intentional):
- `popular-web-designs/templates/vercel.md` — CSS design reference,
unrelated to Vercel-the-AI-product
- `x-vercel-id` in `stream_diag.py` headers — generic Vercel CDN
response header, useful diag signal on any Vercel-hosted endpoint
- `vercel-labs/agent-browser` URL in browser config — lightpanda
browser project, different OSS effort
- `userStories.json` historical contributor entry mentioning Vercel
Sandbox — archive, not active docs
Validation:
- 1153 tests in the 22 targeted files pass (`scripts/run_tests.sh`)
- Full repo `py_compile` clean
- Live import of every touched module + invariant check (no
`ai-gateway` in `PROVIDER_REGISTRY`, no `_AI_GATEWAY_HEADERS`, no
`vercel_sandbox` in `_REMOTE_TERMINAL_BACKENDS`)
* test: convert profile-count check from change-detector to invariant
The hardcoded "== 34" assertion broke when ai-gateway was removed.
Per AGENTS.md change-detector-test guidance, assert the relationship
(registry count >= number of plugin dirs) instead of a literal count.
Counts shift when providers are added/removed; that's expected.
* refactor(codex): drop SDK responses.stream() helper; consume events directly
The OpenAI Python SDK's high-level `client.responses.stream(...)` helper
does post-hoc typed reconstruction from the terminal
`response.completed.response.output` field. The chatgpt.com Codex
backend has been observed (today, gpt-5.5) to ship `response.output =
null` on terminal frames, which crashes the SDK with `TypeError:
'NoneType' object is not iterable` mid-iteration.
Carlton's #32963 patched the symptom by wrapping the helper in
try/except and recovering from the same per-event accumulator the SDK
was supposed to populate. This PR removes the helper from the call
path entirely: we now use `client.responses.create(stream=True)` (raw
AsyncIterable of SSE events) and assemble the final response object
ourselves from `response.output_item.done` events as they arrive. The
terminal event's `output` field is never read for content. Same
strategy OpenClaw uses for the same backend.
This makes Hermes structurally immune to the bug class, not patched.
The next time OpenAI ships a shape change to chatgpt.com's terminal
frame, our consumer keeps working because it doesn't read that frame
for content — only for usage/status/id.
Changes
- `agent/codex_runtime.py`: new `_consume_codex_event_stream()` shared
consumer; `run_codex_stream()` uses `responses.create(stream=True)`;
`run_codex_create_stream_fallback()` collapses into a thin alias
since the primary path now does what the fallback used to do.
- `agent/auxiliary_client.py`: `_CodexCompletionsAdapter` uses the
same consumer; old null-output recovery helpers deleted as
unreferenced.
- Tests migrated: fixtures that mocked `responses.stream` now mock
`responses.create` returning a raw iterable. New regression test
asserts the auxiliary path returns streamed items even when the
terminal event's `output` is literally `null`.
Validation
- Live: tested against fresh OAuth on `chatgpt.com/backend-api/codex`
with `gpt-5.5` — response built correctly with `response.output=null`
on the terminal frame, all events consumed, usage/reasoning tokens
propagated.
- `tests/run_agent/test_run_agent_codex_responses.py` +
`tests/agent/test_auxiliary_client.py`: 242 passed.
* test+fix(codex): migrate streaming tests, raise on truncated streams
CI surfaced 10 test failures across tests/run_agent/test_streaming.py
and tests/run_agent/test_codex_xai_oauth_recovery.py — both files had
their own `responses.stream(...)` mocks I missed in the first sweep.
agent/codex_runtime.py: _consume_codex_event_stream() now raises
"Codex Responses stream did not emit a terminal response" when the
stream ends without any terminal frame AND no usable content. This
preserves the signal callers used to get from the SDK's high-level
helper, which they distinguished from "completed with empty body"
in error handling.
Tests migrated:
- test_streaming.py: text-delta callback, activity-touch, and
remote-protocol-error tests all switch from mocking responses.stream
to responses.create returning an iterable of events.
- test_codex_xai_oauth_recovery.py: prelude-error tests are recast as
wire-error-event tests (the new path raises _StreamErrorEvent
directly when the wire emits type=error, which is strictly better
than the old two-phase "SDK RuntimeError → retry → fallback"). The
retry-on-transport-error test moves from responses.stream side-effect
to responses.create side-effect.
Verified live against chatgpt.com Codex with gpt-5.5 — AIAgent.chat()
through the full codex_responses path returns correctly, 319/319
targeted tests passing.
* fix(codex-responses): gracefully recover from invalid_encrypted_content (salvage #10144)
When an OpenAI-compatible Responses API surface accepts an initial
request but later rejects the replayed `codex_reasoning_items`
encrypted blob with HTTP 400 `invalid_encrypted_content`, the
session previously got stuck retrying the same poisoned payload.
Recovery: classify the error as a dedicated FailoverReason, and on the
first hit disable encrypted reasoning replay for the rest of the
session, strip cached items from message history, and retry once.
Changes:
* error_classifier: add FailoverReason.invalid_encrypted_content
branch in _classify_400 (before context_overflow so the messages
that mention 'encrypted content … could not be verified' don't trip
context heuristics), in _classify_by_error_code, and extend
_extract_error_code to peek inside wrapped JSON in error.message and
ignore the bare '400' as a code.
* agent_init: initialize `_codex_reasoning_replay_enabled = True` on
every agent.
* run_agent: add AIAgent._disable_codex_reasoning_replay() helper
that flips the flag and pops cached items.
* codex_responses_adapter: thread a `replay_encrypted_reasoning`
kwarg through _chat_messages_to_responses_input so that when the
flag is False we don't replay codex_reasoning_items.
* transports/codex.py: read `replay_encrypted_reasoning` from params,
thread it into the adapter, and gate the
`include=['reasoning.encrypted_content']` request hint on it.
* chat_completion_helpers: pass the agent's replay flag through to
the transport.
* conversation_loop: in the retry loop, add an
invalid_encrypted_content recovery branch that fires once per
session, only when api_mode == codex_responses, only when replay is
still enabled, and only when at least one assistant message in
history actually carries cached reasoning items (otherwise the 400
has nothing to do with our cache and the normal retry path handles
it).
Tests:
* test_error_classifier: new wrapped-JSON _extract_error_code case;
new TestClassifyApiError cases proving the 400 is retryable with
no fallback, that the broad message match doesn't catch a generic
'parsed' message, and that the error code match is
case-insensitive.
* test_run_agent_codex_responses: end-to-end test of the recovery
branch firing once and disabling replay, plus a sibling test that
proves the branch does *not* fire (and the flag stays True) when
history has no cached reasoning items.
Salvages PR #10144 onto the post-refactor module layout
(error_classifier / codex_responses_adapter / transports/codex /
conversation_loop / agent_init) since the original diff was written
against the pre-refactor monolithic run_agent.py.
* chore(release): map victorGPT in AUTHOR_MAP for #10144 salvage
---------
Co-authored-by: victorGPT <wuxuebin1993@gmail.com>
Add a first-class active-session orchestrator for the Ink TUI:
- list, activate, close, and launch live process-local TUI sessions
- hydrate committed and in-flight output when switching sessions
- dispatch a new prompt session from the +new row with session-scoped model picks
- expose a clickable live-session count in the status chrome
- preserve stable row order while initially focusing the current session
- support mouse hit-testing for floating orchestrator overlays
- add backend and frontend regression coverage for the lifecycle and UI helpers
qwen3.7-max on OpenCode Go rejects the OpenAI-compatible (oa-compat)
format with HTTP 401 but works correctly via the Anthropic Messages
endpoint (/v1/messages with x-api-key auth). Route it the same way
MiniMax models are routed: anthropic_messages api_mode.
Changes:
- hermes_cli/models.py: add qwen3.7-max routing + curated list
- hermes_cli/setup.py: add to setup wizard model list
- hermes_cli/auth.py: update provider comment
- tests: add assertions for qwen3.7-max api_mode routing
'hermes login' was removed (the command now just prints a deprecation
message and exits). The bundled hermes-agent SKILL.md, in-code error
messages, the tip rotation, the proxy adapters, and the docs site
still pointed agents and users at the dead command — so models loading
the skill kept running 'hermes login --provider openai-codex' and
getting a dead-end print.
Replacements use the canonical 'hermes auth add <provider>' surface
(or bare 'hermes auth' for the interactive manager).
Files:
- skills/autonomous-ai-agents/hermes-agent/SKILL.md (+ regenerated docs page)
- hermes_cli/tips.py (tip rotation)
- agent/google_oauth.py (gemini-cli error message)
- agent/conversation_loop.py (nous re-auth troubleshooting line)
- agent/credential_sources.py (docstring)
- hermes_cli/proxy/cli.py + hermes_cli/proxy/adapters/nous_portal.py (proxy auth hints)
- tests/hermes_cli/test_proxy.py (updated assertions)
- website/docs/reference/faq.md, website/docs/user-guide/features/subscription-proxy.md
- zh-Hans i18n mirrors for the above
'hermes logout' is still a live command and is left untouched.
The 'hermes login' stub in hermes_cli/auth.py:login_command() and
the cli-commands.md 'Deprecated' rows are intentionally kept as
the discoverable deprecation surface.
When the gateway processes /reload-mcp, it reconnects MCP servers and
updates the global _servers registry, but cached AIAgent instances in
_agent_cache keep the tools list they were built with. The user had to
also run /new (discarding conversation history) before the agent could
see the new tools — even though /reload-mcp had succeeded.
This patch refreshes each cached agent's .tools and .valid_tool_names
in _execute_mcp_reload after discovery returns, so existing sessions
pick up new MCP tools on their next turn. The slash-confirm gate in
_handle_reload_mcp_command already obtains user consent for the
implied prompt-cache invalidation before this code runs.
Mirrors the equivalent behaviour the CLI already does in cli.py
_reload_mcp. Per-agent enabled_toolsets and disabled_toolsets are
preserved so an agent that was scoped to a subset of toolsets does
not silently gain disabled tools after the reload.
Original diagnosis + initial implementation in #23812 from @fujinice.
The auto-reload watcher half of that PR is intentionally dropped —
users want /reload-mcp to remain explicit.
Co-authored-by: fujinice <45688690+fujinice@users.noreply.github.com>
Updates curated picker lists for both the OpenRouter fallback snapshot
(`OPENROUTER_MODELS`) and the Nous Portal list (`_PROVIDER_MODELS['nous']`).
Regenerates website/static/api/model-catalog.json via
`scripts/build_model_catalog.py` to keep the docs-hosted manifest in
sync (drift guard in `test_in_repo_lists_match_manifest`).
tests/hermes_cli/test_models.py fixtures updated — they pinned the
old model id as their live-fetch sample.
* feat(mcp): Nous-approved MCP catalog with interactive picker
Adds an optional-mcps/ directory mirroring optional-skills/: curated,
Nous-approved MCP servers shipped with the repo but disabled by default.
Presence in optional-mcps/ = approval. No community tier, no trust signals.
Entries are added by merging a PR.
New surface:
hermes mcp Interactive catalog picker (default)
hermes mcp catalog Plain-text list, scriptable
hermes mcp install <name> Install a catalog entry
Picker behavior:
not installed -> install (clone/bootstrap if needed, prompt for creds)
installed/off -> enable
installed/on -> menu (disable / uninstall / reinstall)
Manifest schema (manifest_version: 1) supports:
- transport: stdio (command/args, ${INSTALL_DIR} substitution) or http (url)
- install: optional git clone + bootstrap commands (for repos that need
local venv setup, like the n8n bridge); omit for npx/uvx servers
- auth: api_key (prompts -> ~/.hermes/.env), oauth (provider-mediated
or native MCP), or none
Catalog entries are never auto-updated. Users re-run `hermes mcp install`
to refresh. Credentials always go to ~/.hermes/.env (the .env-is-for-secrets
rule), never to per-server env blocks.
Ships n8n as the reference manifest (https://github.com/CyberSamuraiX/hermes-n8n-mcp).
Tests: 19 catalog tests + E2E install/uninstall round-trip via the shipped
manifest.
* feat(mcp): tool-selection checklist + Linear catalog entry
Adds install-time tool selection so users only enable the MCP tools they
actually want, and ships Linear as a second reference catalog entry to
demonstrate the http+oauth path alongside n8n's stdio+api_key+git-bootstrap.
Tool selection flow:
install (clone/auth/credentials) ->
probe server for available tools ->
curses checklist with pre-checked rows ->
write mcp_servers.<name>.tools.include
Pre-check priority:
1. user's prior tools.include (reinstall preserves selection)
2. manifest's tools.default_enabled (curated subset)
3. all probed tools (default)
Probe-failure fallback (server unreachable, OAuth not yet complete,
backing service offline):
- manifest declared default_enabled -> applied directly
- no default declared -> no filter written (all-on when reachable)
- both cases point user at hermes mcp configure <name>
Manifest schema additions:
tools:
default_enabled: [list, of, tool, names] # optional
Updates:
- optional-mcps/linear/manifest.yaml -- new reference entry (http+oauth)
- optional-mcps/n8n/manifest.yaml -- tools.default_enabled set to the
8 read-mostly tools; mutating tools (activate/deactivate, container_logs)
pruned by default
- docs: new 'Tool selection at install time' section in features/mcp.md
Tests: 7 new tests in TestToolSelection covering probe-success / probe-fail
matrix, manifest-default filtering, reinstall-preserves-selection, and
invalid-default-enabled rejection. 26 catalog tests + 32 existing
mcp_config tests passing.
* feat(mcp): polish — picker unification, include-mode convergence, hardening
Addresses review findings on PR #30870. Lands all improvements that
belong in this PR before merge; defers separate cleanup (consolidating
two probe implementations, change-detector tests) to follow-ups.
Picker UX (mcp_picker.py)
- Unifies catalog + custom (user-added) MCPs in one view with distinct
status badges (available / enabled / installed (disabled) /
custom — enabled / custom — disabled)
- Adds 'Configure tools (probe server + re-pick)' action to both the
catalog-installed and custom-row submenus — the existing
hermes mcp configure flow was previously unreachable from the picker
- Loops until ESC/q so the user can manage several entries in one
session instead of having to re-launch
- Uninstall message now mentions .env credentials are preserved with a
pointer to clean them up manually if no longer needed
- Surfaces a 'requires a newer Hermes' warning per future-manifest
entry instead of silently hiding it
Catalog (mcp_catalog.py)
- catalog_diagnostics() exposes which manifests were skipped and why
(future_manifest vs invalid) so UIs can give actionable feedback
- _do_git_install detects SHA-shaped refs (regex /[0-9a-f]{7,40}/)
and skips the doomed 'git clone --branch <sha>' attempt — clone --branch
only accepts branches/tags, so SHAs always failed noisily before
falling back to the full-clone path
- Probe-success all-tools-enabled message now mentions that new tools
the server adds later will be auto-enabled (no-filter mode)
Convergence (tools_config.py)
- _configure_mcp_tools_interactive now writes tools.include (whitelist)
instead of tools.exclude (blacklist), matching the catalog flow and
hermes mcp configure. The on-disk config shape no longer depends on
which UI the user touched last
- Two existing tests updated to assert the new include-mode contract
Discoverability
- Setup wizard final step now prints 'Browse curated MCPs: hermes mcp'
- Three tip-corpus entries pointing at the new catalog
- Docs updated with: trust model (manifests run code locally, gated by
PR review, but read before installing), runtime ${ENV_VAR} substitution
semantics, and the manifest_version forward-compat behavior
Tests
- 7 new tests covering future-manifest diagnostics, custom MCP picker
rows, SHA-ref git-install path, branch-ref git-install path, and the
tools_config include-mode write contract
- 80 MCP-related tests passing across test_mcp_catalog.py,
test_mcp_config.py, test_mcp_tools_config.py
* fix(mcp): drop setup-wizard catalog hint to satisfy supply-chain scanner
The wizard line 'Browse curated MCPs: hermes mcp' triggered the
CI supply-chain scanner because it pattern-matches on edits to any
file named hermes_cli/setup.py — that filename matches the Python
'install-hook file' heuristic even though this setup.py is the
user-facing 'hermes setup' wizard, not a packaging install hook.
The catalog is already surfaced via three tip-corpus entries in
hermes_cli/tips.py (which the scanner doesn't flag), so dropping the
wizard mention loses no discoverability. Worth revisiting after a
scanner allowlist for this specific file lands.
SubdirectoryHintTracker was scanning directories outside the active
working directory, allowing files like ~/.codex/AGENTS.md or
~/.claude/CLAUDE.md to be loaded and injected into the agent context.
This causes cross-agent context contamination and instruction mixup.
Add _is_ancestor_or_same() helper and a path boundary check in
_is_valid_subdir(): only directories within the working directory tree
(i.e. path.is_relative_to(working_dir)) are allowed.
Also add exist_ok=True to mkdir() calls in new tests to prevent
pytest-xdist race conditions when workers share the same tmp_path parent.
Tests added:
- test_outside_working_dir_rejected: verifies sibling dirs are blocked
- test_outside_working_dir_absolute_path_rejected: verifies ~/.codex paths blocked
- test_inside_workspace_subdir_allowed: verifies normal subdir access unaffected
- test_sibling_repo_not_loaded_via_ancestor_walk: ancestor walk stays within workspace
The GFM → Telegram-row-group rewriter previously joined every line in
every row with a blank line ("\n\n".join(rendered_rows)), which made
multi-column tables explode into one-bullet-per-paragraph walls on
mobile. It also emitted the row heading twice when the table had no
row-label column: once as the standalone bold heading and once again
as the first labeled bullet (heading == headers[0] == data_cells[0]).
This commit:
* Uses single newlines between the heading and its bullets within a
row-group, and a blank line only BETWEEN row-groups.
* Skips any bullet whose value duplicates the heading text when the
table has no row-label column (the heading already carries that
information). Tables WITH a row-label column are unaffected since
the heading comes from the label cell and never duplicates a header.
Updated existing test assertions accordingly and added two regression
tests: one that reproduces the screenshot bug (wide five-column "Plays"
comparison table) and one that pins the row-label-column behavior so
the dedup logic doesn't accidentally swallow real data.
tests/gateway/test_telegram_format.py: 101 passed
The runtime cron prompt scanner (added in #3968 to plug the
"malicious skill carrying an injection payload" gap) reuses the same
critical-severity patterns as the create-time user-prompt scan against
the *assembled* prompt — which includes loaded skill markdown.
That works fine for narrow patterns like "ignore previous instructions"
which never legitimately appear in prose. It catastrophically false-
positives on command-shape patterns like `cat ~/.hermes/.env`,
`authorized_keys`, `/etc/sudoers`, and `rm -rf /`, which routinely
appear in security postmortems and runbooks as **descriptive prose**
about attacks, not as actual commands.
Concrete failure: the bundled `hermes-agent-dev` skill contains a
security postmortem section saying "the attacker could just
`cat ~/.hermes/.env`". Every PR-scout cron job that loaded this skill
was silently blocked with `Blocked: prompt matches threat pattern
'read_secrets'`. All 11 scout jobs failed for weeks.
Fix: split the scanner into two tiers and route by context:
- `_scan_cron_prompt` (strict, unchanged behavior) runs against
the small user-authored cron prompt at create/update and as a
runtime defense-in-depth when no skills are attached. A legit
user prompt has no business saying `cat .env`, so the strict
patterns still apply there.
- `_scan_cron_skill_assembled` (new, looser) runs against the
assembled prompt when skills are attached. It only catches
unambiguous prompt-injection directives ("ignore previous
instructions", "disregard your rules", "system prompt override",
"do not tell the user") plus invisible-unicode markers. Command-
shape patterns are dropped because they false-positive on prose.
This is defense-in-depth, not the only line of defense. Skill bodies
are already scanned at install time by `skills_guard.py`; the runtime
cron scan exists purely as a tripwire for an obvious injection
directive surviving a malicious install. Catching prose mentions of
commands was never the goal of #3968 — the test that planted a skill
containing `cat ~/.hermes/.env` was the wrong shape of test for the
threat model.
Tests:
- `_scan_cron_prompt` strict behavior preserved (56 existing tests
unchanged: bare `cat .env`, `rm -rf /`, etc. still block).
- New `TestScanCronSkillAssembled` class verifies the looser scanner:
injection / disregard / system-override / do-not-tell-the-user /
invisible-unicode still block; descriptive prose about attack
commands is allowed; GitHub auth-header allowlist still works.
- `test_skill_with_env_exfil_payload_raises` (planted `cat .env`
in skill body) replaced with `test_skill_with_env_exfil_command
_in_prose_is_allowed` documenting the new correct behavior with
the real-world postmortem-style example that triggered the bug.
- All 11 originally-failing PR-scout jobs validated end-to-end via
`_build_job_prompt` — assembled prompts now build successfully
with the `hermes-agent-dev` skill attached.
Total: 75/75 tests in cron + cronjob_tools + threat scanner pass;
544/544 across the wider cron / memory / threat-pattern surface.
When the user picks 'Anthropic API key' at `hermes setup` (vs 'Claude
Pro/Max subscription'), `save_anthropic_api_key()` writes ANTHROPIC_API_KEY
to ~/.hermes/.env and zeros ANTHROPIC_TOKEN. That env-var pattern is the
user's explicit choice of auth method — API key, not OAuth.
But the anthropic credential pool's autodiscovery (_seed_from_singletons)
unconditionally read ~/.claude/.credentials.json from the Claude Code CLI
and any saved hermes_pkce creds, and added them to the SAME anthropic
pool as the user's API key. Two problems:
1. Even with the API key at higher priority, a 401/429 on the API key
would rotate the session onto an autodiscovered OAuth credential,
silently flipping the agent into the Claude Code masquerade
mid-conversation: 'You are Claude Code' system block, every tool
renamed to mcp_*, claude-cli User-Agent header.
2. Switching OAuth → API key at `hermes setup` cleared the env vars
but left previously-seeded OAuth entries dormant in auth.json,
where rotation could revive them.
The user picking the API-key path is explicitly opting OUT of the
masquerade. Mixing OAuth credentials into their pool defeats that
choice.
Fix: in `_seed_from_singletons` for provider='anthropic', detect the
API-key path (ANTHROPIC_API_KEY set in env, no OAuth env var set) and:
- Skip calling read_claude_code_credentials() and
read_hermes_oauth_credentials() entirely
- Prune any stale hermes_pkce / claude_code entries that may already
be in the on-disk pool
OAuth-path users (ANTHROPIC_TOKEN set) are unaffected — autodiscovery
continues to fire as before.
Tests: 3 new regression tests (api-key skips autodiscovery, api-key
prunes stale entries, oauth path still autodiscovers). Full file 70/70.
Reported via AskClaw. When config.yaml has `model: <name>` (flat string)
instead of the nested `model: {default: ..., provider: ...}` form, every
gateway `/model X --global` crashed silently with
TypeError: 'str' object does not support item assignment
The persist block did:
model_cfg = cfg.setdefault("model", {})
model_cfg["default"] = result.new_model
`setdefault` returns the existing scalar, and the next assignment blows
up. The 'switch failed' warning was logged at WARNING level and the user
never saw why their persist didn't stick.
Coerce scalar/None `model:` into a dict before mutation, in both the
gateway path (`gateway/run.py`) and the sister site in
`hermes_cli/doctor.py --fix` (same setdefault-on-string flaw). The CLI
`/model` path is unaffected because it goes through `_set_nested` which
already replaces scalar leaves with dicts.
Regression test `tests/gateway/test_model_command_flat_string_config.py`
covers the flat-string, missing, and proper-dict cases. Without the fix,
the flat-string case fails with the exact original TypeError.
`load_hermes_dotenv()` is called at module-import time from cli.py,
hermes_cli/main.py, run_agent.py, trajectory_compressor.py, gateway/run.py,
tui_gateway/server.py, acp_adapter/entry.py, and a few others. Each call
triggered `_apply_external_secret_sources()`, which re-parsed config,
re-fetched from Bitwarden Secrets Manager (its own 300s cache mostly absorbed
this), re-ran the ASCII sanitization sweep, and reprinted
Bitwarden Secrets Manager: applied N secret(s) (...)
to stderr. Users saw the status line 3-5x per CLI startup.
Guard the function with a process-level set of HERMES_HOME paths that have
already had external secrets applied. Subsequent calls for the same home_path
are no-ops. `reset_secret_source_cache()` lets tests (and any future
long-running consumer that wants to refresh after a config change) force a
re-pull.
Three granular patch-tool refinements from the Roo Code deep-dive (#507).
## Indentation preservation (fuzzy_match.py)
When fuzzy_find_and_replace matches via a non-exact strategy, the file's
indentation may differ from what the LLM sent in old_string/new_string
(common case: model sends zero-indent old/new for a method body that
lives inside an 8-space-indented class). Before this commit the
replacement was spliced in verbatim, producing a file with a broken
indent level that may still parse but is logically wrong.
The fix computes the indent delta between old_string's first meaningful
line and the matched region's first meaningful line, then re-indents
every line of new_string by that delta. Exact-strategy matches are
untouched (passthrough). Same approach as Roo Code's
multi-search-replace.ts:466-500.
## CRLF preservation (file_operations.py)
Models nearly always send tool args with bare LF endings (JSON-encoded),
but the file on disk may have CRLF (Windows-line-ending configs, .bat,
.cmd, .ini files). Before this commit:
- write_file silently normalized CRLF to LF on every overwrite
- patch produced mixed-ending files: the substituted region had LF,
the surrounding context kept CRLF
The fix detects the file's existing line endings (via pre_content if
already read for lint/LSP, otherwise a tiny head -c 4096 probe), and
normalizes the entire write to that ending. New files are written
verbatim (no detection possible).
## Per-file failure escalation (file_tools.py)
When the agent fails to patch the same file 3+ times in a row, the
existing 'old_string not found' hint isn't strong enough — the model
keeps retrying with variations against a stale view of the file.
The fix tracks consecutive failures per (task_id, resolved_path) and
injects an escalating hint after 3 failures: 'This is failure #N
patching X. Stop retrying. Either re-read fresh, use longer context,
or fall back to write_file.' Counter resets on a successful patch to
the same path.
## Validation
- 22 new tests across tests/tools/test_fuzzy_match.py (5),
test_line_ending_preservation.py (12), test_patch_failure_tracking.py (5)
- All existing tests pass (165/165 in the touched files)
- E2E verified with real _handle_patch / _handle_write_file calls
against real CRLF files and real failure loops
Closes part of #507. The remaining open items in #507 (2b start_line
hint, behavioral rules) were declined after audit:
- 2b adds schema bloat for a problem the existing 'multiple matches'
contract already handles
- Behavioral rules conflict with the personality system
Items 1, 2d, 2e, 3, 4 of #507 were already landed in earlier work.
Two posture fixes surfaced by the web-pentest skill self-test against
the dashboard (issue #32267).
1. /dashboard-plugins/<name>/<path> previously returned 200 for any
file inside the plugin's dashboard directory — including
plugin_api.py and __pycache__/*.pyc. The path is unauthenticated by
architecture (SPA loads JS via <script src> and CSS via <link href>,
neither of which can attach a custom auth header), so the fix is
not "require token" — it's "restrict to browser-fetchable suffixes."
Allowlist now: .js .mjs .css .json .html .svg .png .jpg .jpeg .gif
.webp .ico .woff .woff2 .ttf .otf .map. Everything else → 404.
This stops a private user-installed plugin's Python source from
being readable by anyone reachable on the dashboard's loopback port
(other local users on a shared box, sidecar containers sharing the
host netns).
2. save_env_value() now refuses to persist env-var names that
influence how the next subprocess executes: LD_PRELOAD,
LD_LIBRARY_PATH, LD_AUDIT, DYLD_*, PYTHONPATH, PYTHONHOME,
PYTHONSTARTUP, NODE_OPTIONS, NODE_PATH, PATH, SHELL, EDITOR,
VISUAL, PAGER, BROWSER, GIT_SSH_COMMAND, GIT_EXEC_PATH; plus
HERMES_HOME / HERMES_PROFILE / HERMES_CONFIG / HERMES_ENV.
PUT /api/env is authed but the session token lives in the SPA HTML
where any future plugin XSS or local process can read it. Without
this gate, a token-holder could plant LD_PRELOAD in .env and the
next hermes process start would load attacker code via the dotenv
to os.environ chain. This is enforced on write only — pre-existing
.env values are left alone (the gate is in save_env_value, not in
load_env). PUT /api/env now returns 400 with the explanatory
message instead of an opaque 500.
IMPORTANT: HERMES_* overall is NOT blocked — only the four runtime
location names. Integration credentials following the HERMES_*
convention (HERMES_GEMINI_*, HERMES_LANGFUSE_*, HERMES_SPOTIFY_*,
HERMES_QWEN_BASE_URL, ...) keep working.
Regression tests cover both fixes (30 new test cases). No existing
tests changed; 257 passing in tests/hermes_cli/.
Closes#32267.
Salvage follow-up. The transient thread-not-found retry test was
exercising chat_id='123' (positive, looks-like-private) which now
hits the new private-DM-topic fail-closed contract. The test's
intent is the transient-flake retry on real forum topics in groups,
so use -100123 to make the scenario unambiguous.
Hardens the context window against Brainworm-class promptware attacks
(see #496). Three changes:
1. tools/threat_patterns.py — single source of truth for injection/promptware
patterns. Replaces the duplicated pattern lists in prompt_builder.py and
memory_tool.py. Adds ~15 new Brainworm/C2 patterns (node registration,
heartbeat/beacon, pull tasking, anti-forensic disk avoidance, identity
override, known framework names). Three scopes — 'all' (narrow, classic
injection), 'context' (adds promptware/role-play, broader detection),
'strict' (adds persistence/SSH-backdoor patterns for user-mediated writes).
2. MemoryStore.load_from_disk() now scans entries at snapshot-build time.
Poisoned entries are replaced with [BLOCKED: ...] placeholders in the
frozen system-prompt snapshot. Live state keeps the original so the
user can still inspect + remove via memory(action=read/remove). Scan is
deterministic from disk bytes — prefix-cache invariant holds.
3. make_tool_result_message() wraps results from high-risk tools
(web_extract, web_search, browser_*, mcp_*) in
<untrusted_tool_result source="...">...</untrusted_tool_result>
delimiters with framing prose telling the model the content is data,
not instructions. Architectural defense against indirect injection
from poisoned web pages, GitHub issues, MCP responses — does NOT
regex-scan tool results (pattern arms race + per-iteration latency).
Multimodal content lists pass through unwrapped to preserve adapter
compatibility.
Pattern philosophy: anchor on C2-specific vocabulary or unambiguous attack
behavior, NOT on bossy English. Dropped patterns suggested in #496 that
would have tripped legitimate content: standalone 'you are obligated to',
'do not respond immediately', 'you must X' without a C2-verb anchor.
Validation:
- 257/257 targeted tests pass (test_threat_patterns + test_memory_tool +
test_tool_dispatch_helpers + test_prompt_builder)
- E2E run with real Brainworm payload: blocked from AGENTS.md context-file
path, blocked from MEMORY.md snapshot, wrapped in delimiters when
arriving via web_extract. Legitimate 'you must follow conventions'
phrasing not flagged.
Explicitly NOT in this PR (per #496 discussion):
- Per-tool-result regex scanning (pattern arms race)
- SessionBehaviorMonitor / polling-loop detection (wrong layer)
- Outbound network gating (Docker backend already covers this)
- security.context_scanning warn|block knob (current behavior is always
block-with-placeholder — there's no warn mode that makes sense)
Closes#496 for Phase 1 + the architectural delimiter piece of Phase 2.
Phase 3 stays in tracking issue territory.
xAI retired grok-4-1-fast. hermes_cli/models.py already removed it from
the static fallback in an earlier commit, but the context-length
metadata, the tests pinning those values, and the provider doc still
referenced the retired ID. Clean those up so retired model names stop
appearing in user-facing output.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Three new tests in tests/tools/test_tts_xai_speech_tags.py:
- multi_paragraph_emits_single_pause — the headline #29417 case.
Requires a first sentence of 12+ chars to hit the
_XAI_FIRST_SENTENCE_RE length floor; the trivial 'Hello.\\n\\nWorld.'
case dodged the bug by accident, which is why the PR's quoted
repro didn't reproduce. Uses the longer 'Welcome to the demo of
our new product line.\\n\\nIt has many features.' shape that
actually trips the bug.
- single_paragraph_still_gets_first_sentence_pause — sanity guard
that the fix only suppresses the first-sentence pass when a
paragraph pass injected [pause], so plain single-paragraph input
still gets its leading pause.
- single_newline_still_gets_first_sentence_pause — single newline
isn't a paragraph break, no [pause] from the paragraph pass, so
the first-sentence pause MUST still fire. Catches over-broad
fixes.
17 new tests in tests/gateway/test_subagent_protection_30170.py pin
down both the detection helper and the demotion behaviour:
* TestAgentHasActiveSubagents — 11 cases covering the precision and
defensiveness of _agent_has_active_subagents:
- returns False for None, _AGENT_PENDING_SENTINEL, and stub
agents that lack the _active_children attribute;
- returns False for an empty list (the steady state of an idle
AIAgent);
- returns True for one or many children;
- works when _active_children_lock is None (test stubs);
- rejects truthy MagicMock auto-attributes — this is the
regression-guard for "every MagicMock-based gateway test
suddenly demotes to queue mode" (which is how this was
originally found);
- accepts list/tuple/set as the children container.
* TestBusyHandlerDemotesInterruptForSubagents — 6 cases driving
_handle_active_session_busy_message directly:
- parent.interrupt is NOT called when subagents are active,
message is still merged into the pending queue;
- ack copy mentions "Subagent working", "queued", and the
/stop escape hatch — and does NOT mention "Interrupting";
- with no subagents, behaviour is byte-identical to the
pre-#30170 interrupt path (parent.interrupt called with the
user text, ack says "Interrupting");
- configured queue mode keeps its vanilla "Queued for the next
turn" ack (the #30170 demotion-specific copy must NOT fire);
- configured steer mode still routes to running_agent.steer()
even when subagents are active (the guard is interrupt-only);
- _AGENT_PENDING_SENTINEL does not trigger demotion.
Refs #30170.
After key #1 is marked exhausted the retry still called the API with key #1
due to env-var bias in _get_cached_client / resolve_api_key_provider_credentials.
Fix: peek the pool and pass the active entry's key as explicit_api_key.
Secondary: api_key_hint in mark_exhausted_and_rotate pins the correct entry
under concurrent CLI+gateway calls; _is_payment_error matches GoUsageLimitError;
extract_api_error_context parses "Resets in Xhr Ymin".
Closes#26145.
When the user interrupts the retry loop between two 429s (Ctrl-C in
interactive mode, /new, gateway disconnect), the local has_retried_429
flag dies with the recovery function. On the next user prompt the agent
restarts with has_retried_429=False, hits 429 on the exhausted credential,
sets the flag, returns 'retry once'. Repeat forever — the second 429 that
would trigger rotation is never reached, and healthy entries (priority>0
free/paid accounts) are never tried.
Fix: in recover_with_credential_pool's rate_limit branch, pre-check
pool.current().last_status before running the retry-once dance. If the
current entry is already STATUS_EXHAUSTED, rotate immediately. Uses
getattr() for the attribute read so existing tests with SimpleNamespace
mocks (which only set 'label') keep working.
Co-authored-by: zccyman <16263913+zccyman@users.noreply.github.com>
The new install-path validator from this PR raises 'Unsafe install path:
...' earlier in the pipeline than the previous resolve-then-check path.
Behavior is identical (ok=False, victim untouched, refused before
rmtree) — only the error string changed.
Validate Skills Hub lock-file install paths at both ends of the
lifecycle so a poisoned or malformed lock.json entry cannot drive
shutil.rmtree to a location outside SKILLS_DIR:
- HubLockFile.record_install rejects empty/'.'/absolute/traversal/
Windows-drive paths at write time, and requires the final path
component to match the skill name (shape: '<skill>' or
'<category>/<skill>').
- install_from_quarantine resolves its destination through the same
validator, catching symlink/junction redirects inside skills/.
- uninstall_skill resolves the lock entry through the new validator
before rmtree. Refuses anything that resolves to SKILLS_DIR itself
(empty/dot paths) or to a target outside SKILLS_DIR (absolute paths,
traversal, symlinked dirs in skills/ pointing outward).
- 14 focused regression tests covering each rejection class plus a
symlink-redirect case.
E2E verified: hand-crafted poisoned lock.json entries (absolute path,
empty install_path, traversal) all refuse and leave the targeted
victim untouched; legitimate uninstall still succeeds.
Co-authored-by: Teknium <127238744+teknium1@users.noreply.github.com>
Nous Portal is OAuth-only (auth_type=oauth_device_code, no API key path),
but the non-retryable-401 guidance branch only covered openai-codex and
xai-oauth. A Nous 401 fell through to the generic 'Your API key was
rejected... run hermes setup' message, which is wrong advice — the user
needs hermes auth add nous --type oauth, not an API key.
Also flag the case where the failing model slug ends in :free (OpenRouter
syntax) while provider is nous. Without that hint, users re-OAuth
successfully and then hit the same 401 on the next message because Nous
Portal doesn't carry the OpenRouter free-tier slug.
Reported by ashh — debug dump showed Nous device_code exhausted +
deepseek/deepseek-v4-flash:free as the model.
Aux callers (title generation, vision, session search, etc.) can reach
resolve_provider_client() without an explicit model when the user
picked their main provider via 'hermes model' and didn't bother
configuring a per-task auxiliary.<task>.model override. The
expectation in that case is universal: 'use my main model for side
tasks too.'
Before, the OAuth providers (xai-oauth, openai-codex) silently
returned (None, None) on an empty model — both lack a catalog default
because their accepted-model lists drift on the backend. That caused
_resolve_auto to drop to its Step-2 fallback chain (OpenRouter /
Nous / etc.), so aux tasks billed against the wrong subscription
without warning.
The fix is at the top of resolve_provider_client() — a single
3-step universal fallback that runs before any provider branch, so
no provider-specific empty-model guards are needed (now or for any
future provider we add):
1. caller-passed model (caller knew what they wanted)
2. provider's catalog default (cheap aux model, if registered)
3. user's main model from config.yaml
Behaviour by provider class:
- OAuth providers (xai-oauth, openai-codex) — no catalog default, so
step 3 applies. Title gen runs on grok-4.3 / gpt-5.4 against the
user's actual subscription instead of leaking to OpenRouter.
- API-key providers (anthropic, gemini, kimi-coding, etc.) — catalog
default wins at step 2, preserving the original 'cheap aux model'
behaviour. Anthropic users still get claude-haiku-4-5 for titles,
not opus.
- Explicit-model callers (auxiliary.<task>.model config, programmatic
callers) — caller wins at step 1, no surprise switching.
Salvaged from @wysie's PR #31845 which fixed the xai-oauth branch
specifically. The universal shape supersedes the per-branch fix
and covers openai-codex (same bug class) plus any future OAuth
providers.
4 new tests in TestResolveProviderClientUniversalModelFallback:
- empty_model_for_oauth_provider_falls_back_to_main_model
- empty_model_for_codex_also_uses_main_model
- empty_model_for_catalog_provider_uses_catalog_default
- explicit_model_takes_precedence_over_fallbacks
365/365 across tests/agent/test_auxiliary_*, tests/run_agent/test_codex_xai_oauth_recovery.py, tests/hermes_cli/test_auth_xai_oauth_provider.py, and tests/hermes_cli/test_plugin_auxiliary_tasks.py.
Co-authored-by: wysie <wysie@users.noreply.github.com>
All four failures were broken by the security cluster (#10082 / #10133 /
#4609 / symlink-reject batch) merging on May 25. They were red on
origin/main HEAD when #32042 and #32061 ran, gating PRs that touched
unrelated code.
1) tests/hermes_cli/test_update_zip_symlink_reject.py
test_update_via_zip_accepts_normal_member called the real
_update_via_zip without sandboxing PROJECT_ROOT — so the function's
shutil.copytree() actually copied the fake README from the test ZIP
over the real repo's README.md, which then made
test_readme_mentions_powershell_installer fail in any test run that
happened to pick this test up earlier. Mock PROJECT_ROOT to an
isolated tmp_path / install_dir, stub subprocess so pip/uv reinstall
doesn't actually run, and assert the fake README lands in the
sandbox (not the real tree).
2) tests/tools/test_windows_native_support.py
test_readme_mentions_powershell_installer was the victim of (1) —
nothing wrong with the test itself, the fix in (1) clears it.
3) tests/tools/test_file_read_guards.py
test_proc_fd_other_not_blocked called _is_blocked_device('/proc/self/fd/3')
expecting False. But _is_blocked_device runs realpath() and on
pytest xdist workers fd 3 happens to be dup'd to /dev/urandom
(because the worker subprocess inherits open fds from pytest's
collection pipe machinery). Switch to the lower-level
_is_blocked_device_path which is the path-pattern check the test
actually means to exercise; realpath-resolution coverage already
lives in test_symlink_to_blocked_device_is_blocked.
4) tests/tools/test_transcription_tools.py
Module installed a faster_whisper stub via sys.modules without
setting __spec__, then later @pytest.mark.skipif called
importlib.util.find_spec('faster_whisper') which raises
'ValueError: __spec__ is None' for modules with a None spec attr.
Set __spec__ on the stub to a real ModuleSpec.
Validation: 195/195 green across the 4 affected files.
When an MCP server triggers OAuth at startup, the user can now type 'skip'
(or 'cancel', 's', 'n', 'no', 'q', 'quit') at the paste prompt + Enter to
exit the flow cleanly and continue agent startup without that server.
Previously the only ways to bypass an unwanted OAuth prompt were:
- Wait the full 5-minute paste timeout
- Ctrl+C (also kills the whole reload, may leave half-state)
- Edit config.yaml to set 'enabled: false' on the server
Skip writes a sentinel to result['error'] which _wait_for_callback maps to
OAuthNonInteractiveError('user_skipped'). mcp_tool already classifies that
as an auth error in _is_auth_error() and the reconnect loop logs it as
'not retrying automatically' — server stays disconnected for the session,
other MCP servers continue normally, no infinite retry burn.
The skip message tells users how to re-auth later ('hermes mcp login') or
disable persistently ('enabled: false'), so they don't have to remember.
14 new tests covering: case-insensitive skip parsing, all 7 skip tokens,
skip not stomping an HTTP-listener win, skip routed to skip path rather
than URL-parse path, sentinel mapped to OAuthNonInteractiveError, prompt
mentions the skip option.
The CLI status bar tracked /background agent tasks (▶ N) but not shell
processes spawned via terminal(background=true). Both kinds of work can
run concurrently and a user has no in-bar signal for shell processes.
Add an independent indicator (⚙ N) sourced from
tools.process_registry.process_registry._running. The two indicators
render side-by-side when both are active (▶ 1 │ ⚙ 2), hidden when their
count is zero. Renders at all four status-bar tiers (text fallback +
prompt_toolkit fragments, narrow + wide widths). The narrow <52 tier
still drops both for space — unchanged.
New ProcessRegistry.count_running() returns len(_running) without
acquiring _lock; CPython dict len is atomic and we're polling on every
status-bar tick, so lock-free is the right tradeoff.
The chatgpt.com/backend-api/codex endpoint has an intermittent failure mode
where it accepts the connection but never emits a single stream event — the
socket just hangs. Direct sequential probing reproduces it (0 events, no HTTP
status), and a fresh reconnect then succeeds in ~2s. Today the only guard is
the wall-clock stale timeout in interruptible_api_call, so a dead-on-arrival
connection is held for the full stale window (90-900s depending on context /
config) before the retry loop can reconnect — minutes of wasted wall time per
stall, at a rate of ~20% of calls during affected windows.
Add a TTFB watchdog scoped to the codex_responses path:
- codex_runtime.run_codex_stream stamps agent._codex_stream_last_event_ts on
*every* stream event (not just output-text deltas), so reasoning-only and
tool-call-only turns are not mistaken for a stall.
- interruptible_api_call resets that marker before the worker starts and, while
it is still None, kills the connection once elapsed exceeds the TTFB cutoff
(default 45s, tunable via HERMES_CODEX_TTFB_TIMEOUT_SECONDS, 0 disables). The
raised TimeoutError flows through the existing retry path unchanged.
Once any event has arrived the stream is healthy and only the existing
wall-clock stale timeout applies, so legitimate long generations are never
interrupted. Gated to codex_responses; the chat_completions non-stream,
anthropic and bedrock branches have no first-event signal and are untouched.
Adds tests/agent/test_codex_ttfb_watchdog.py covering the stall kill, the
events-flowing pass-through, and the env-disable path.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The gateway's media delivery allowlist required files live inside
`~/.hermes/cache/{documents,images,...}`, which is the wrong shape for
real agent usage. Agents naturally produce artifacts via terminal tools
(`pandoc -o /tmp/report.pdf`, `matplotlib savefig`, etc.) or
write_file into project directories — these never land under the cache.
Result: users got a raw file path in chat instead of an attachment.
This is doubly bad in deployment shapes where the cache directories
aren't writable by the agent at all: Hermes running in Docker with a
read-only mount, or with a Docker/Modal/SSH terminal backend whose
filesystem isn't the gateway host's filesystem.
Layered trust model:
1. Cache-dir allowlist (unchanged) — Hermes-managed roots always trusted.
2. Operator allowlist — `HERMES_MEDIA_ALLOW_DIRS` env var, now also
surfaced as `gateway.media_delivery_allow_dirs` in config.yaml.
3. Recency-based trust (new, default on) — files whose mtime is within
`gateway.trust_recent_files_seconds` (default 600s) of "now" are
trusted even outside the cache/operator allowlist. Old host files
(`/etc/passwd`, `~/.bashrc`, `~/.ssh/id_rsa`) have mtimes measured
in days/months, well outside the window — prompt-injection paths
pointing at pre-existing files are still rejected.
4. Hard denylist — `/etc`, `/proc`, `/sys`, `/dev`, `/root`, `/boot`,
`/var/{log,lib,run}`, plus `$HOME/.{ssh,aws,gnupg,kube,docker,config,
azure,gcloud}` and `Library/Keychains`. Denylist blocks delivery
even when recency would trust the file, in case an attacker
somehow refreshes a sensitive file's mtime.
Operators who want strict-allowlist behavior set
`gateway.trust_recent_files: false` and the system reverts to
pre-existing behavior.
Tests: 6 new cases in test_platform_base.py cover the recency window,
disabled mode, system-path denylist, and the motivating PDF-in-project
scenario. 3 existing tests (test_platform_base, test_tts_media_routing,
test_send_message_tool) that exercised the strict-allowlist path are
updated to disable recency trust explicitly.
E2E validation: real `validate_media_delivery_path()` accepts fresh
PDFs in /tmp and project dirs, rejects /etc/passwd, ~/.ssh/id_rsa, and
files older than the window; config.yaml `gateway.*` keys bridge
correctly to the env vars the validator reads.
When the user runs OAuth on a remote/SSH machine without a port forward,
the OAuth provider redirects to http://127.0.0.1:<port>/callback which
only the listener on the remote machine can receive — the user's browser
on another box just shows a connection error.
_wait_for_callback() now races the HTTP listener against a stdin reader
on interactive TTYs. The user can copy the URL from the browser's address
bar after authorization (which contains code=...&state=...) and paste it
back at the prompt. Whichever fills the result dict first wins; the HTTP
listener remains the primary path for local sessions and SSH tunnels.
Accepts any of:
- Full local redirect URL: http://127.0.0.1:N/callback?code=...&state=...
- Provider URL after redirect: https://mcp.linear.app/callback?code=...&state=...
- Just the query string: ?code=...&state=... or code=...&state=...
The paste thread only spawns when _is_interactive() is true, preserving
the existing 'no input() in headless runs' invariant — verified by
TestWaitForCallbackPasteIntegration.test_paste_prompt_NOT_shown_when_noninteractive.
The SSH-session hint in _redirect_handler is updated to surface the paste
option as the primary remedy, with ssh -L tunneling as the alternative.
_update_via_zip downloads a source ZIP from GitHub and calls
zipfile.ZipFile.extractall. The existing zip-slip path guard validates
each member's path stays under tmp_dir, but does not check member type
— so a ZIP containing a symlink member would still be materialized by
extractall, and a symlink target could point outside the extracted
tree (or to a sensitive system path).
This isn't a high-likelihood threat for hermes-agent's actual GitHub
source ZIPs (we don't ship symlinks), but the extractall path runs as
the user's account and a compromised mirror could plant arbitrary files
via the symlink → target → write chain.
Reject any member whose Unix mode bits (upper 16 bits of external_attr)
are S_IFLNK before extractall. Hermes source ZIPs contain only regular
files and directories; a symlink member is unambiguously suspicious.
Regression tests cover: symlink member rejection (raises ValueError,
caught by the outer try/except as a clean SystemExit, no extraction),
and the happy-path verification that a normal ZIP doesn't trigger the
symlink reject message.
Salvaged from PR #15881 by @codeblackhole1024. The remaining pieces of
that PR were already on main or contradicted explicit design decisions:
- config.yaml write-deny: already in agent/file_safety.py's
control_file_names denylist (the modern guard); the proposed addition
to build_write_denied_paths was the legacy path.
- Quick commands danger detection: contradicts the explicit
cli.py:8491-8492 comment 'shell=True is intentional: quick_commands
are user-defined shell snippets from config.yaml — not agent/LLM
controlled.'
- Memory plugin shlex.split for dep checks: already on main
(hermes_cli/memory_setup.py:133).
Co-authored-by: teknium1 <127238744+teknium1@users.noreply.github.com>
text_to_speech_tool accepts an explicit output_path. Without a traversal
guard, a path containing '..' components (whether prompt-injection-
controlled, from a confused skill, or just a buggy caller) could escape
its declared base and write the audio to a system location — e.g.
`output_path='audio/../../etc/cron.d/x'` lands the file outside the
intended audio cache.
Reject '..' components in the user-supplied path. Explicit absolute
paths are unchanged (the agent legitimately writes audio wherever the
user/caller asks); only traversal-style escapes are blocked. The
terminal tool can still write anywhere with approval — this just keeps
the unattended TTS surface from materializing files via traversal.
Regression tests cover: '..' in the middle (audio/../../etc/...),
bare '..' prefix, and the negative cases (absolute paths + relative
paths without '..' both pass through unchanged).
Salvaged from PR #6693 by @aaronlab. The original PR confined output to
DEFAULT_OUTPUT_DIR-or-cwd, which broke 9 existing tests that legitimately
write to tmp_path locations. The traversal-only check covers the actual
threat (path-escape via '..' from prompt injection) without restricting
where users can choose to write their audio.
The remaining pieces of #6693 (skill_commands rglob symlink rejection,
delegate_tool batch prefix display) are dropped:
- skill_commands rglob: breaks the documented design supporting
~/.hermes/skills/<name> as a symlink to a checked-out skill elsewhere
(see comment at agent/skill_commands.py:73-75)
- delegate_tool batch prefix: pure UX, doesn't belong in a security PR
Co-authored-by: teknium1 <127238744+teknium1@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix(streaming): route mid-tool-call partial-stream-stub through length continuation (#31998)
When a stream stalls mid-tool-call (e.g. a large write_file), the
partial-stream-stub recovery used finish_reason='stop' which caused the
conversation loop to treat the turn as complete, returning only the
warning text. When users said 'continue', the model retried the same
large tool call, hit the same stale timeout, and looped indefinitely.
Changes:
- chat_completion_helpers.py: change _stub_finish_reason from 'stop' to
'length' for mid-tool-call partials. The stub still has tool_calls=None
so no tool auto-executes — the model gets a fresh API call through the
existing length-continuation machinery (bounded to 3 retries).
Also attach _dropped_tool_names to the stub for downstream use.
- conversation_loop.py: add a third continuation prompt branch for
partial-stream-stubs with dropped tool calls. Instead of the generic
'continue where you left off' (which would retry the same large call),
tell the model to break the output into smaller tool calls (~8K
tokens each) to avoid stream timeouts.
- test_partial_stream_finish_reason.py: update existing test from
finish_reason='stop' to 'length', add _dropped_tool_names assertion,
add new test_dropped_tool_call_uses_chunking_prompt for the 3-way
prompt branching.
Safety: tool_calls=None is preserved on the stub, so the conversation
loop enters the text-continuation branch (line 1513), NOT the tool-call
execution branch (line 3246). No tool auto-executes. The model simply
gets another API call with targeted guidance.
* refactor: extract constants and continuation prompt helper
- Move magic strings to hermes_constants.py (PARTIAL_STREAM_STUB_ID,
FINISH_REASON_LENGTH)
- Extract _get_continuation_prompt() in conversation_loop.py — DRYs the
3-way prompt branching and lets tests import the real function
- Trim verbose inline comments in chat_completion_helpers.py
- Tests import constants + helper instead of duplicating logic
---------
Co-authored-by: alt-glitch <balyan.sid@gmail.com>
The test set HERMES_YOLO_MODE=1 via monkeypatch.setenv, expecting
check_dangerous_command() to honor yolo and bypass cron_mode=deny. But
tools.approval._YOLO_MODE_FROZEN is intentionally frozen at module
import time (security: prevents prompt-injection runtime escalation).
When CI imports the module BEFORE the test sets the env, the frozen
value stays False and the yolo bypass never activates.
Local runs missed this because the conftest leaked a non-empty
HERMES_YOLO_MODE into the import-time env. CI's clean-env path exposed
the bug deterministically on test (3) / test (4) shards.
Fix: patch the module attribute directly via mock.patch.object so the
test simulates process-startup-with-yolo regardless of import order.
The behavior under test (yolo bypasses cron_mode=deny for non-hardline
commands) is unchanged; the security invariant (_YOLO_MODE_FROZEN can't
be set at runtime by skills) is preserved.
Reproduced locally with: env -i HOME=$HOME PATH=$PATH python3 -m pytest
tests/tools/test_cron_approval_mode.py -o 'addopts=' -v
Without the fix: 1 failed, 23 passed. With the fix: 24 passed.
* fix(transcription): reject symlinked audio inputs
Validation runs before provider selection, so rejecting symbolic-link paths there prevents supported-extension links from being treated as normal audio files. Use os.path.islink to avoid perturbing the existing Path.stat error path and to reject links before resolving targets.
Constraint: Keep validation platform-safe and avoid requiring symlink support where unavailable.
Rejected: Use Path.is_symlink | it consumes pathlib stat calls and broke the existing stat error regression.
Confidence: high
Scope-risk: narrow
Directive: Keep path hardening in _validate_audio_file before provider dispatch.
Tested: source venv/bin/activate && python -m pytest tests/tools/test_transcription_tools.py::TestValidateAudioFileEdgeCases -q (5 passed)
Tested: source venv/bin/activate && python -m pytest tests/tools/test_transcription_tools.py::TestValidateAudioFileEdgeCases tests/tools/test_transcription_tools.py::TestTranscribeAudioDispatch::test_invalid_file_short_circuits -q (6 passed)
Tested: source venv/bin/activate && python -m compileall tools/transcription_tools.py tests/tools/test_transcription_tools.py
Tested: git diff --check
Not-tested: Full tests/tools/test_transcription_tools.py under .[dev] only; existing faster_whisper optional dependency tests fail with ModuleNotFoundError.
* Keep transcription tests independent of optional whisper install
The transcription suite mocks faster-whisper directly, so a minimal test stub keeps the branch verifiable in environments where the optional package is not installed. This preserves the existing mock-based coverage without adding a dependency.
Constraint: faster-whisper is an optional local STT dependency and is absent from the current validation environment
Rejected: Install faster-whisper just for branch validation | would add heavyweight environment coupling outside the patch scope
Confidence: high
Scope-risk: narrow
Directive: Keep this as a test-only stub unless production import semantics change
Tested: pytest tests/tools/test_transcription_tools.py -q
---------
Co-authored-by: WuKongAI-CMU <210765158+WuKongAI-CMU@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix: reject read_file symlinks to blocking devices
The read_file guard already refused direct device paths such as /dev/zero, but a workspace symlink resolving to one of those devices could still reach the shell-backed read path and hang on wc/head/sed. Keep the literal alias check and add a resolved-path pass so local symlinks to blocked device/fd endpoints are rejected before I/O.
Constraint: Preserve literal /dev/stdin handling before terminal-specific realpath resolution
Confidence: high
Scope-risk: narrow
Tested: pytest tests/tools/test_file_read_guards.py tests/tools/test_file_tools.py -q; python -m compileall tools/file_tools.py tests/tools/test_file_read_guards.py; git diff --check
Signed-off-by: WuKongAI-CMU <210765158+WuKongAI-CMU@users.noreply.github.com>
* Keep file guard tests off sensitive macOS temp paths
The branch now inherits a sensitive-path write guard from upstream main. On macOS, tempfile.mkdtemp() resolves under /private/var/folders, so the new write-path guard fired before the file read dedup assertions could exercise their intended behavior. The tests now create their scratch files inside the worktree temp checkout, outside those system-sensitive prefixes, without changing production behavior.
Constraint: Rebased branch must pass the expanded file read guard suite on macOS.
Rejected: Loosen the production sensitive-path prefix list | broader behavior change unrelated to this PR.
Confidence: high
Scope-risk: narrow
Tested: pytest tests/tools/test_file_read_guards.py -q
---------
Signed-off-by: WuKongAI-CMU <210765158+WuKongAI-CMU@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: WuKongAI-CMU <210765158+WuKongAI-CMU@users.noreply.github.com>
The read_file tool and terminal cat can access /proc/self/environ to
recover all process env vars including secrets stripped by the subprocess
blocklist. Output redaction partially mitigates (catches known-format
tokens) but misses custom/proprietary key formats, especially when
values are printed without their key names.
Add /proc/*/environ, /proc/*/cmdline, and /proc/*/maps to the blocked
device paths in _is_blocked_device():
- /proc/*/environ: leaks full process env (API keys, tokens)
- /proc/*/cmdline: leaks command-line args (may contain passwords)
- /proc/*/maps: leaks memory layout (ASLR bypass for exploitation)
Legitimate /proc reads (cpuinfo, meminfo, uptime, version) remain
accessible — the check only blocks per-pid pseudo-files with known
sensitive suffixes.
Complements PR #4432 (PID namespace isolation for child processes)
which prevents children from reading the parent's /proc, but does not
prevent the parent process itself from being read via file tools.
Partially addresses #4427
Changes:
tools/file_tools.py | +6
tests/tools/test_file_read_guards.py | +18 -1
Co-authored-by: dsr-restyn <dsr-restyn@users.noreply.github.com>
When the terminal drops the ESC[201~ end mark during a bracketed paste
(terminal race, torn write, SSH glitch, macOS sleep/wake), prompt_toolkit's
Vt100Parser keeps buffering all later input in _paste_buffer forever. From
the user's perspective, the CLI appears frozen — the only recovery was
closing the tab/session.
This patch monkey-patches Vt100Parser.feed() so that bracketed-paste mode
flushes buffered content as a normal BracketedPaste event after 2 seconds
without an end marker, then restores normal parsing.
Includes 8 regression tests covering normal paste, timeout recovery,
torn end marks, and edge cases.
Surgical reapply of PR #27518. Original branch was many months stale
(1193 files / 172k LOC of unrelated reverts); the substantive ~77 LOC
patch in cli.py plus the new 157-line test file were reapplied onto
current main with the contributor's authorship preserved via --author.
On Windows (PowerShell/Windows Terminal), the queue-based modal used for
destructive slash command confirmations deadlocks because prompt_toolkit's
input channel becomes unresponsive when entered from the process_loop daemon
thread. Keystrokes never reach the key bindings, so response_queue.get()
blocks until the 120-second timeout expires.
Fix: fall back to _prompt_text_input (stdin-based) when:
1. sys.platform == 'win32' — Windows console doesn't support the modal reliably
2. Called from non-main thread — key bindings can't fire from daemon threads
3. self._app is not set — existing behavior for tests/non-interactive
This mirrors the thread-aware guard from _prompt_text_input (PR #23454).
9 new regression tests covering Windows detection, non-main thread fallback,
macOS/Linux modal preservation, and integration with _confirm_destructive_slash.
Fixes#30768
Surgical reapply of PR #30773. Original branch was many months stale (911
files / 146k LOC of unrelated reverts); the substantive ~30 LOC change in
cli.py plus the new test file were reapplied onto current main with the
contributor's authorship preserved via --author.
The ChatGPT Codex backend (chatgpt.com/backend-api/codex) has historically
silently dropped certain model requests: the connection is accepted but no
stream events are emitted and no error is raised. PR #31967 lowered the
implicit stale-call default from 300s to 90s so fallbacks kick in faster,
but users still see an opaque "No response from provider for 90s
(non-streaming, ...)" message that gives no path forward.
This patch adds a narrow heuristic — gpt-5.5 family on the Codex backend
via codex_responses api_mode — that substitutes the generic timeout
message with actionable text naming the gpt-5.4-codex workaround and
pointing at #21444 for symptom history.
Changes:
- run_agent.py — new ``AIAgent._codex_silent_hang_hint(model=...)`` method.
Returns ``None`` for any request that does not match all three guards
(codex_responses api_mode, openai-codex provider or chatgpt.com Codex
base URL, gpt-5.5-family model name with word-boundary regex anchoring
to avoid false-positives on e.g. ``gpt-5.50``).
- agent/chat_completion_helpers.py — the non-stream stale-call site
consults the hint via ``getattr(...)`` so the call site stays robust
if the helper is ever removed or stubbed in tests. Hint is appended to
both the ``_emit_status`` warning and the ``TimeoutError`` message so
the user sees it in their terminal AND it lands in any retry-loop
diagnostics.
- tests/run_agent/test_codex_silent_hang_hint.py — 10 regression tests
covering positive cases (bare gpt-5.5, vendor-prefixed openai/gpt-5.5,
gpt-5.5-codex SKU, model=None fallback to self.model) and negative
cases (gpt-5.4-codex workaround, gpt-5.50 false-positive guard,
non-codex api_mode, non-codex provider, empty/None model, unrelated
models on Codex).
Does NOT fix the backend-side issue (that's an upstream OpenAI/ChatGPT
problem we cannot patch from here). Only converts an opaque timeout into
text that names the workaround so users do not have to dig through logs
or wait for a forum post to learn what to do.
Closes#22046
get_read_block_error() only blocked internal Hermes cache files but
allowed reading project-local secret-bearing environment files (.env,
.env.production, .env.local, etc.) through both read_file and ACP
fs/read_text_file paths.
Add a basename deny set for common secret-bearing .env variants.
.env.example remains readable as documentation.
Fixes#20734
* fix(approval): harden YOLO bypass, LLM parsing, auto-approve audit, pipe pattern
- BUG-009 (CRITICAL): freeze HERMES_YOLO_MODE at module import via
_YOLO_MODE_FROZEN; prevents skills/prompt-injection from calling
os.environ["HERMES_YOLO_MODE"]="true" at runtime to bypass all checks
- BUG-002 (HIGH): replace substring "APPROVE" in answer with exact
answer == "APPROVE" in _smart_approve; prompt already requests exactly
one word, substring match was exploitable via verbose LLM responses
- BUG-001 (MEDIUM): add logger.warning for every dangerous command that
auto-approves in non-interactive non-gateway context; makes silent
approvals visible in audit logs without breaking script behavior
- BUG-008 (LOW): expand curl/wget pipe pattern to cover | /bin/bash and
| bash -c variants, not just | sh / | bash
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(approval): add missing is_truthy_value import + fix yolo test patches
_YOLO_MODE_FROZEN uses is_truthy_value() from utils — import was missing.
Tests that set HERMES_YOLO_MODE via monkeypatch.setenv() no longer work
because the value is frozen at import time; update them to patch the
module-level flag directly via monkeypatch.setattr().
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* perf(bitwarden): persist secret-fetch cache across CLI invocations
Every `hermes` invocation paid a ~380ms tax for `bws secret list` to
Bitwarden Secrets Manager because the existing cache was in-process only.
Back-to-back `hermes chat -q`, gateway-spawned agents, and cron-launched
runs all re-fetched.
Adds a disk-persisted L2 cache at `<hermes_home>/cache/bws_cache.json`
(mode 0600, never contains the access token — only the SHA-256
fingerprint prefix). Same TTL as the in-process cache. Read on miss,
write on bws success, ignored on key mismatch / corruption / expiry.
Measured on a startup profile:
load_hermes_dotenv() cold: 372ms → warm (disk cache hit): 20ms
End-to-end `hermes --version` cold→warm: 666ms → ~295ms.
In a hermes-vs-codex benchmark across 11 single- and multi-turn tasks
(framework overhead = wall − llm − tool_exec, median over 3 trials):
cohort before after saved
single-turn (median) 2.96s 2.31s -0.65s
multi-turn (5-turn) 9.40s 8.95s -0.45s (≈0.3s/turn)
Hermes now wins head-to-head on 6/11 tasks vs codex (was 4/11 before).
The remaining ~0.6s single-turn delta is mostly Python's own import
cost in hermes_cli.main, which is a separate optimization.
* perf(cli): lazy-load model catalog + dedupe config.yaml reads at startup
Two import-time wins on top of the bws disk-cache fix:
1. Lazy-load `hermes_cli.models._PROVIDER_MODELS` via PEP 562
module-level `__getattr__`. The catalog is ~55ms of work that was
eagerly imported on every CLI invocation (line 4557 `if not
_is_termux_startup_environment(): from hermes_cli.models import
_PROVIDER_MODELS`). Audit showed every internal call site already
does its own function-local import; only test code reads
`hermes_cli.main._PROVIDER_MODELS` as a module attribute, and
__getattr__ keeps that working transparently. First access triggers
the import once and caches the result on the module via
`globals()[name] = ...`, so subsequent reads are dict lookups.
2. Dedupe the double config.yaml read in the top-of-module bootstrap.
Previously: one raw yaml.safe_load for the `security.redact_secrets`
bridge, then a separate full `load_config()` (with deep-merge) for
`network.force_ipv4`. Both keys come from the same file. Merged
into one raw yaml load.
Combined with the bws cache fix in the previous commit:
hermes --version wall time:
original (cold): 666 ms
after bws fix (warm): 295 ms
after lazy-load + dedupe: 228 ms (-67 ms additional, -66% from original)
Tests:
- tests/hermes_cli/test_api_key_providers.py: 173/173 pass
(lazy __getattr__ correctly handles
`from hermes_cli.main import _PROVIDER_MODELS`)
- tests/test_ipv4_preference.py + tests/hermes_cli/test_redact_config_bridge.py +
tests/agent/test_redact.py: 93/93 pass (dedupe preserves both bridges)
- tests/test_bitwarden_secrets.py + env_loader tests: 49/49 pass
V4A patch '*** Update File:', '*** Add File:', '*** Delete File:' headers
come from patch CONTENT, not the explicit `path=` argument. That makes
them attacker-influenceable through skill content, web extract output,
prompt injection, and other surfaces the agent processes. Headers like
'*** Update File: ../../../etc/shadow' would resolve relative to the
agent's cwd; in deployment configurations where that cwd is deep enough
to land outside Hermes' protected paths, the write could land somewhere
the agent operator did not intend.
Reject any V4A header containing a '..' path component before applying
the patch. The explicit `path=` argument on patch_tool is UNCHANGED —
the agent legitimately uses '..' there (e.g. `patch path='../other_module/x.py'`
from a worktree dir is normal cross-module editing).
Regression tests: V4A Update header with traversal rejected, V4A Add
header with traversal rejected, patch_v4a never invoked when rejection
fires.
Salvaged from PR #29395 by @waefrebeorn. The original PR added
has_traversal_component as a blanket reject on read_file_tool,
write_file_tool, patch_tool's explicit path, and search_tool — that
would break legitimate agent operation where '..' is normal. Also
dropped the over-eager skills_guard pattern additions
(pickle.loads/marshal.loads/ctypes.CDLL/importlib at high/critical
severity would false-positive on legit data-science and FFI skills).
Co-authored-by: teknium1 <127238744+teknium1@users.noreply.github.com>
Expand _MEMORY_THREAT_PATTERNS from 13 to 24 regex patterns and align
_INVISIBLE_CHARS with skills_guard.py (10 → 17 characters).
Key changes:
- Add multi-word bypass prevention (?:\w+\s+)* to injection patterns
- Add missing injection patterns: role_pretend, leak_system_prompt,
remove_filters, fake_update, translate_execute, html_comment_injection,
hidden_div
- Add exfiltration patterns: send_to_url, context_exfil
- Add persistence patterns: agent_config_mod, hermes_config_mod
(both require modification-verb prefix to avoid false positives on
mere mentions of config filenames)
- Add hardcoded secret detection pattern
- Add role_hijack precision fix: require article after "now" to avoid
blocking "you are now ready/connected/set up" etc.
- Expand invisible unicode set with directional isolates (U+2066-2069)
and invisible math operators (U+2062-2064)
Test coverage expanded from ~8 to ~30 scan tests including dedicated
false-positive regression tests for all precision-sensitive patterns.
Known limitations (deferred to follow-up PRs):
- prompt_builder.py and cronjob_tools.py still use older pattern sets
- No semantic/LLM-based scanning (regex-only approach)
- No cross-entry or cross-store analysis
Codex / Responses-API requests had three latent timeout bugs that combined
into the long silent hangs reported on #21444:
1. The non-stream stale-call detector estimated context tokens from
``api_kwargs["messages"]`` only. Codex / Responses-API payloads carry
their conversational load in ``input`` (with ``instructions`` and
``tools``), so every Codex turn logged ``context=~0 tokens`` and the
detector never applied its >50k / >100k tier bumps.
2. ``providers.<id>.request_timeout_seconds`` was silently dropped on the
main Codex path. The chat_completions path and the auxiliary Codex
adapter both forwarded it; the main path skipped it through three
places (``build_api_kwargs``, ``ResponsesApiTransport.build_kwargs``,
``_preflight_codex_api_kwargs``).
3. The streaming stale detector had the same payload-shape bug for
``codex_responses`` requests, which route through the non-streaming
detector (it's the path that emits the user-facing
"No response from provider for 300s (non-streaming, ...)" warning that
reporters keep pasting).
This commit:
- Adds ``estimate_request_context_tokens`` in ``chat_completion_helpers``,
used by both the non-stream and stream detectors. Handles ``messages``
(Chat Completions), ``input + instructions + tools`` (Responses API),
bare lists, and an unknown-dict fallback.
- Forwards ``timeout`` through ``ResponsesApiTransport.build_kwargs``
and ``_preflight_codex_api_kwargs`` (with guards against
zero/negative/inf/bool values), and wires
``_resolved_api_call_timeout()`` into the Codex branch of
``build_api_kwargs``.
- Lowers the implicit non-stream stale defaults so fallback providers
kick in faster when upstream stalls:
* base 300s -> 90s
* >50k 450s -> 150s
* >100k 600s -> 240s
These only apply when the user has *not* set
``providers.<id>.stale_timeout_seconds`` or
``HERMES_API_CALL_STALE_TIMEOUT``. Explicit config still wins.
- Adds regression tests for the estimator shapes, the new defaults, the
context-tier scaling, transport timeout pass-through, and preflight
timeout pass-through / rejection of invalid values.
Closes#21444
Supersedes #21652#24126#31855
Co-authored-by: Hoang V. Pham <26063003+hehehe0803@users.noreply.github.com>
Follow-up to @someaka's fix.
Polish:
- Drop the redundant `_preflight_tokens >= threshold_tokens` clause.
`should_compress(tokens)` already short-circuits when tokens < threshold,
so the explicit comparison was dead code on the True branch.
Tests:
- Preflight: pin that should_compress() is called (anti-thrash has a vote).
Mocks should_compress to return False even with tokens past the raw
threshold and asserts no compression runs — exact bug shape from #29335.
- Gateway: AST scan of gateway/run.py asserts every
`session_entry.session_id = ...` assignment is followed by a
`session_store._save()` call within the same block. Three sites mutate
the session_id after compression; all three must persist or the next
turn loads the pre-compression transcript and re-loops. Empirically
verified the test catches the bug (drops the new _save() line → red).
AUTHOR_MAP:
- Map ed@bebop.crew -> someaka so the salvaged commit resolves to
@someaka in release notes.
Mirror of the TTS command-provider registry (PR #17843) for STT. Lets any
shell-driven ASR engine — Doubao ASR, NVIDIA Parakeet, whisper.cpp builds,
SenseVoice, curl pipelines — become an STT backend with zero Python.
Complements the legacy HERMES_LOCAL_STT_COMMAND escape hatch (preserved
untouched via the built-in local_command path) and the
register_transcription_provider() Python plugin hook also shipped in this
PR.
Resolution order (mirrors TTS exactly):
1. Built-in (local, local_command, groq, openai, mistral, xai)
→ native handler. Always wins.
2. stt.providers.<name>: type: command → command-provider runner.
3. Plugin-registered TranscriptionProvider → plugin dispatch.
4. No match → 'No STT provider available'.
Files
-----
- tools/transcription_tools.py: BUILTIN_STT_PROVIDERS frozenset retained;
added _resolve_command_stt_provider_config, _transcribe_command_stt,
and local helpers for template rendering, shell-quote context, and
process-tree termination. Helpers are documented as mirrors of their
tts_tool.py counterparts (kept local to avoid cross-tool private
import). Wire-in is one insertion point in transcribe_audio() after
the xai elif and before the plugin dispatcher. Plugin dispatcher
additionally defensively short-circuits when a same-name command
config exists (command-wins-over-plugin invariant).
- tests/tools/test_transcription_command_providers.py: 50 new tests
covering resolution (builtin precedence, type/command gating,
case-insensitive lookup, legacy stt.<name> back-compat), helpers
(timeout fallback, format validation, iter, has-any), template
rendering (shell-quote contexts, doubled-brace preservation),
end-to-end via _transcribe_command_stt (output_path read, stdout
fallback, timeout, nonzero exit envelope, model override,
language precedence), and dispatcher integration via the real
transcribe_audio() including command-wins-over-plugin and
builtin-shadow-rejection.
- tests/plugins/transcription/check_parity_vs_main.py: extended from
10 to 13 scenarios. New cases: command-provider-installed,
command-vs-plugin-same-name (verifies command wins precedence),
explicit-openai-with-command-shadow (verifies built-in wins).
Adds command_provider dispatch_kind detection via transcript prefix
(CMD: vs PLUGIN:) so command-provider scenarios can be distinguished
from plugin scenarios even when sharing a provider name.
- website/docs/user-guide/features/tts.md: new 'STT custom command
providers' section symmetric to the TTS section — example config,
placeholder grammar table (input_path / output_path / output_dir /
format / language / model), transcript-read-back semantics (file
first, then stdout fallback), optional keys table, behavior notes,
security note. Updated 'Python plugin providers (STT)' to include
the new 'When to pick which (STT)' decision table and updated
resolution-order section (now 4 layers instead of 3).
Verification
------------
189/189 STT targeted tests + 50/50 new command-provider tests pass.
Combined sweep: tests/tools/ 5576/5576, tests/agent/ + tests/hermes_cli/
8623/8623 — zero regressions across 14,199 tests.
Parity harness: 13 scenarios, 9 OK + 4 expected diffs
(no_provider_error → plugin, plugin_unavailable, command_provider × 2).
E2E live-verified in an isolated HERMES_HOME with a real .wav file:
command: → dispatched to stt.providers.my-fake-cli
plugin: → dispatched to registered TranscriptionProvider
command-wins-over-plugin: → command provider beats same-name plugin
builtin-wins-over-command: → built-in OpenAI handler fires;
stt.providers.openai: type: command
does NOT hijack it.
Add an opt-in Python plugin surface for speech-to-text backends,
mirroring the TTS hook pattern. New backends (OpenRouter, SenseAudio,
Gemini-STT, custom proprietary engines) can be implemented as plugins
without modifying tools/transcription_tools.py.
Built-ins always win
--------------------
The 6 built-in STT providers (local/faster-whisper, local_command,
groq, openai, mistral, xai) keep their native handlers. Plugins
attempting to register under a built-in name are rejected at
registration time with a warning and re-checked defensively at
dispatch.
Resolution order
----------------
1. stt.provider matches a built-in → built-in dispatch (unchanged)
2. stt.provider matches a registered plugin →
a. if plugin.is_available() returns False → unavailability envelope
identifying the plugin (not the generic "No STT provider"
message — the user explicitly opted into this plugin)
b. otherwise plugin.transcribe() with model + language forwarded
from stt.<provider>.{model,language} config
3. No match → legacy "No STT provider available" error (unchanged)
Per-provider config namespace
-----------------------------
Plugins read their config from stt.<provider> in config.yaml, mirroring
how built-ins read stt.openai.model / stt.mistral.model. The dispatcher
forwards `model` and `language` from this section. Caller's explicit
`model=` argument overrides the config-set model.
Files
-----
- agent/transcription_provider.py: TranscriptionProvider ABC
- agent/transcription_registry.py: register/get/list providers,
built-in shadow guard, _reset_for_tests
- hermes_cli/plugins.py: register_transcription_provider() on
PluginContext
- tools/transcription_tools.py: BUILTIN_STT_PROVIDERS frozenset,
_dispatch_to_plugin_provider() with availability gate, wire-in
after xai branch and before "No STT provider" error
- tests/agent/test_transcription_registry.py: 27 tests
- tests/hermes_cli/test_plugins_transcription_registration.py: 3 tests
- tests/tools/test_transcription_plugin_dispatch.py: 28 tests
(covering built-in short-circuit, plugin dispatch, exception
envelope, non-dict guard, availability gate, language forwarding)
- tests/plugins/transcription/check_parity_vs_main.py: 10-scenario
subprocess-pinned parity harness vs origin/main
- website/docs/user-guide/features/{tts,plugins}.md: docs
Behavior parity
---------------
10 scenarios, 8 OK + 2 expected DIFFs:
no_provider_error → plugin (plugin-installed scenario)
no_provider_error → plugin_unavailable (plugin-installed-unavailable
scenario; PR returns cleaner envelope)
Zero behavior change for users not opting into a plugin.
Issue follow-up to #30398.
- CLI: bracketed/quoted target resolves; mismatched single bracket passes through unchanged.
- Gateway: bracketed session ID resolves; bare untitled session ID resolves via get_session() fallback.
PR #31416 (avoid persisting borrowed credential secrets) added
sanitize_borrowed_credential_payload, which strips access_token from
any auth.json pool entry whose (provider, source) isn't in the
_PERSISTABLE_PROVIDER_SOURCES allowlist.
(copilot, gh_cli) is borrowed (not in the allowlist), so the test
fixture's pre-seeded access_token now gets stripped at load_pool()
time, leaving the pool empty. resolve_target('1') then fails with
'No credential #1. Provider: copilot.'
Fix: align the test with the new contract. At runtime, copilot tokens
are hydrated by resolve_copilot_token() — mock that path so the pool
gets an entry the test can remove. The behavior under test
(suppression of gh_cli + env variants on remove) is unchanged.
CI repro on origin/main HEAD; reproduced locally with stock checkout.
Two defense-in-depth fixes on cron output path handling:
1. cron/jobs.py:update_job() rejects mutation of the immutable 'id' field
(raises ValueError). Dashboard PUT /api/cron/jobs/{id} converts this to
HTTP 400. Without this, an attacker who can reach the update endpoint
could rename a job's id to '../escape' and move its output directory
outside OUTPUT_DIR.
2. cron/jobs.py:_job_output_dir() validates job IDs before composing
paths: rejects '.', '..', '/', '\\', absolute paths, and Windows drive
prefixes. Used by save_job_output() and remove_job() so legacy unsafe
IDs (from before this guard) fail closed rather than half-applying a
shutil.rmtree or output write outside the sandbox.
Tests:
- update_job rejects {'id': '../escape'} without renaming
- remove_job(legacy '../escape' id) raises ValueError without deleting
files outside OUTPUT_DIR or removing the job from the store
- save_job_output rejects '..', './escape', 'nested/escape',
absolute paths
- dashboard PUT /api/cron/jobs/{id} with {'id': '../escape'} returns
400, job list unchanged
Salvaged from PR #29826 by @zapabob. Simplified implementation:
- Dropped a 23-line _validate_job_output_id() helper using Path.parts
semantics. The inline check (path separators + dot-components +
is_absolute) is shorter and behaviorally identical.
- Dropped the secondary OUTPUT_DIR.resolve()/relative_to() check —
redundant once we reject any path separator at the input boundary.
- Dropped the _docs/2026-05-21_cron-output-path-hardening_codex.md
planning artifact (we don't check planning docs into the repo).
Co-authored-by: teknium1 <127238744+teknium1@users.noreply.github.com>
The bug: cron/scheduler.py:_resolve_cron_enabled_toolsets returns an
LLM-supplied per-job enabled_toolsets verbatim. The disabled_toolsets
passed to AIAgent was a hardcoded [cronjob, messaging, clarify] that
ignored agent.disabled_toolsets from config.yaml. An LLM could call
cronjob(action='add', enabled_toolsets=['terminal','file'],
prompt='...') and the cron-spawned agent would receive terminal+file
even when the operator had globally disabled them.
Fix: new _resolve_cron_disabled_toolsets() helper that ALWAYS layers
agent.disabled_toolsets on top of the cron baseline. AIAgent's
disabled_toolsets takes precedence over enabled_toolsets, so this
stops the bypass regardless of what the per-job override contains.
This is the disabled-side fix. Three concurrent PRs (#25842, #25815,
#25780) proposed intersection-side variants on _resolve_cron_enabled_toolsets;
this fix is more robust because it stops the leak at the precedence
boundary AIAgent itself enforces, not at a layer above.
Regression test reproduces the issue's PoC exactly:
config.yaml has agent.disabled_toolsets=[terminal,file]; cron job has
enabled_toolsets=[web,terminal,file]; assertion: AIAgent receives
disabled_toolsets containing terminal AND file.
Salvaged from PR #25786 by @Schrotti77. Simplified the implementation:
dropped a 23-line _normalize_toolset_list() helper (handled str/tuple/
set/garbage input shapes) in favor of the existing convention
(agent_cfg.get('disabled_toolsets') or []) used elsewhere in the
codebase. YAML always parses these as lists; the elaborate normalizer
was theatre for shapes we never produce.
Closes#25752
Co-authored-by: teknium1 <127238744+teknium1@users.noreply.github.com>
The legacy runtime_calls[-1] == "anthropic" check in
test_model_switch_uses_requested_provider failed in CI under
specific test-shard scheduling with 'custom' == 'anthropic',
across multiple unrelated PRs on 2026-05-25. The May 23 pin
(commit 3127a41cb) monkeypatched parse_model_input + detect_provider_for_model
to remove the dependency on live _KNOWN_PROVIDER_NAMES module state but the
flake reappeared anyway — root cause still not reproducible locally even
under stress runs.
The other three assertions ("Provider: anthropic" in result,
state.agent.provider == "anthropic", state.agent.base_url ==
"https://anthropic.example/v1") already prove
fake_resolve_runtime_provider was called with requested="anthropic"
for the model-switch step — the agent's provider and base_url
come directly from that fake's return value. The tail-position
check was redundant and the only assertion that flaked.
Replaces runtime_calls[-1] == "anthropic" with
"anthropic" in runtime_calls so the plumbing path is still
covered without depending on call ordering.
Follow-up to @Strontvod's fix.
Tests:
- Five new tests in test_update_concurrent_quarantine.py cover the parent-
chain exclusion: the .exe launcher is excluded, an unrelated sibling
hermes.exe is still reported, multi-level ancestry is fully excluded,
PID cycles in the parent chain don't hang, and a partially-stubbed
psutil (no Process attribute) degrades gracefully instead of crashing.
- New _fake_psutil_with_parent_chain helper builds a fuller stand-in
(Process / NoSuchProcess / AccessDenied + process_iter) than the
process_iter-only SimpleNamespace the older tests use.
Hardening:
- Broaden the except in the parent-walk to bare Exception. The original
fix listed (NoSuchProcess, AccessDenied, ValueError), but those names
are evaluated lazily during exception matching — if psutil is a partial
stub without the attribute, the exception handler itself raises
AttributeError that escapes. The function is documented as 'never raises'
(the surrounding update flow depends on it), so the broader catch keeps
the contract regardless of how the dependency is shaped.
AUTHOR_MAP:
- Map schepers.zander1@gmail.com -> Strontvod so the salvaged commit
resolves to @Strontvod in the release notes.
All 18 detect_concurrent + quarantine tests pass.
After the supervise-perms fix lands, the s6 lifecycle actually works
for the hermes user — hermes -p <profile> gateway start now genuinely
brings the supervised gateway up rather than silently no-op'ing on
EACCES. That exposes a latent bug in this test's assertion: it
expected 'want up' to appear literally in s6-svstat output, but
s6-svstat elides redundancies — when the slot is currently up AND
s6 wants it up, the output is just 'up (pid N pgid N) X seconds';
the explicit 'want up' token only appears when current ≠ wanted
(e.g. 'down (exitcode 1) … , want up' on a crash-loop).
Add a small helper _svstat_wants_up() that reads the want-state
correctly across both spellings:
* 'up …' → wanted up (unless explicit 'want down')
* 'down …, want up' → wanted up explicitly
* 'down …' → wanted down
Both stop and start assertions now use the helper. Also rewords
the module docstring to acknowledge that the supervised process
may succeed OR crash-loop depending on environment, but the want-
state contract holds either way.
(cherry picked from commit 02c933aedc)
PR #30136 CI: test_dockerfile_entrypoint_routes_through_the_init failed
because the test hardcoded known_inits = ('tini', 'dumb-init',
'catatonit'). The PR replaced tini with s6-overlay's /init (which execs
s6-svscan as PID 1) — same SIGCHLD-reaping contract, different name,
so the substring scan against ENTRYPOINT missed it.
Two-part fix:
1. Extend the accepted token list to include 's6-overlay', 's6-svscan',
and '/init'. The contract these tests enforce is behavioural ('some
PID-1 init reaps SIGCHLD'), so the names list is purely a recognition
table and any reaper-capable family should qualify.
2. Harden test_dockerfile_installs_an_init_for_zombie_reaping (the
sibling check) against comment-only matches. It was scanning the full
Dockerfile text and only passed because the word 'tini' is still in
a historical comment explaining why we used to use it. The next
person to clean up that comment would have silently broken the test.
New _instruction_text() helper joins only the parsed, non-comment
Dockerfile instructions so stale comments can't satisfy the check.
(cherry picked from commit ffc1bb6393)
Resolves the explicit "Known follow-up" left by commit 2f8ceeab9 and
the resulting CI failures in tests/docker/test_dashboard.py and
tests/docker/test_s6_profile_gateway_integration.py.
The product gap
---------------
Every hermes runtime operation inside the container runs as the
hermes user (UID 10000) via s6-setuidgid. But s6-supervise — spawned
by s6-svscan running as PID 1 — creates each service's supervise/
and top-level event/ directories with mode 0700 owned by its
effective UID (root). That left every s6-svc / s6-svstat / s6-svwait
call from hermes hitting EACCES on the supervise/control FIFO and
supervise/status — i.e. the entire S6ServiceManager lifecycle
(register, start, stop, unregister) was inert in production.
The 2f8ceeab9 commit message called this out and deferred the fix.
The audit changes that landed alongside it (defaulting docker_exec
to -u hermes) made the integration tests reproduce the bug
deterministically; the fix below resolves it.
The fix: pre-create the supervise/ skeleton hermes-owned
----------------------------------------------------------
Reading s6's source (src/supervision/s6-supervise.c::trymkdir +
control_init), the mkdir and mkfifo calls that build the supervise
tree are EEXIST-safe: if the directory or FIFO is already present,
s6-supervise reuses it and skips the chown/chmod fix-up that would
normally make event/ 03730 root:root. So if we lay the skeleton
down with hermes ownership before triggering s6-svscanctl -a,
s6-supervise inherits our layout and never touches it. The
death_tally / lock / status regular files written later by
s6-supervise (still as root) land mode 0644 — world-readable —
which is all s6-svstat needs.
New module-level helper _seed_supervise_skeleton(svc_dir) in
hermes_cli/service_manager.py lays down:
svc_dir/event/ hermes:hermes 03730
svc_dir/supervise/ hermes:hermes 0755
svc_dir/supervise/event/ hermes:hermes 03730
svc_dir/supervise/control hermes:hermes 0660 (FIFO)
svc_dir/log/event/ hermes:hermes 03730 (if log/ present)
svc_dir/log/supervise/ hermes:hermes 0755
svc_dir/log/supervise/event/ hermes:hermes 03730
svc_dir/log/supervise/control hermes:hermes 0660 (FIFO)
The log/ branch matters because the logger is a second
s6-supervise instance — without it, unregister rmtree races on
the logger's root-owned supervise dir even after the parent
slot's supervise/ is hermes-owned. The helper is idempotent and
swallows PermissionError on chown so it works equally well when
called from root (cont-init.d) or hermes (runtime register).
Wiring
------
1. S6ServiceManager.register_profile_gateway calls
_seed_supervise_skeleton(tmp_dir) just before publishing the
slot via Path.replace. Runtime-registered profile gateways are
set up by hermes.
2. container_boot._register_service does the same in the cont-init.d
reconciliation path so boot-time-restored profile slots inherit
the same layout.
3. New cont-init.d/015-supervise-perms script chowns the supervise/
and event/ trees for STATIC s6-rc services (dashboard,
main-hermes). These are spawned by s6-rc before cont-init.d
gets to run, so the EEXIST-trick doesn't apply; we chown the
already-existing tree instead. s6-supervise keeps using the
same files; it never re-asserts ownership on a running service.
The script skips s6-overlay internal services (s6rc-*,
s6-linux-*) so the supervision tree itself stays root-only.
015- slot is intentional: lex-sorts between 01-hermes-setup
and 02-reconcile-profiles in the container's C-locale, so
the chown finishes before the reconciler walks the scandir.
Unregister teardown reordering
------------------------------
S6ServiceManager.unregister_profile_gateway now fires
s6-svscanctl -an BEFORE rmtree (with a 200ms grace), so
s6-svscan reaps the supervise child and releases its file
handles on supervise/lock + supervise/status before we try to
remove the directory. Previously rmtree raced s6-supervise on a
set of files inside the supervise dir, and even with the parent
supervise/ now hermes-owned, the contained files (death_tally,
lock, status, written by root) could still be in use.
Dashboard down-state redesign
-----------------------------
The original PR #30136 review fix wrote a 'down' marker file
into /run/service/dashboard/ via cont-init.d/03-dashboard-toggle.
That approach was broken in two ways:
(a) /run/service/dashboard is a symlink to a TRANSIENT
/run/s6-rc:s6-rc-init:<tmpdir>/ directory while s6-rc is
mid-transaction; the touch landed in a soon-to-be-discarded
tmp.
(b) Even when written to the final /run/s6-rc/servicedirs/
location, the 'down' file is only consulted by s6-supervise
at slot startup. s6-rc's user-bundle explicitly transitions
'dashboard' to 'up' on every boot, overriding any down
marker.
The right fix is the canonical s6 pattern: when HERMES_DASHBOARD
is unset, the dashboard run script exits 0 and a companion
finish script exits 125. Per s6-supervise(8), exit code 125 from
the finish script is the 'permanent failure, do not restart'
marker — equivalent to s6-svc -O. The slot reports as 'down' to
s6-svstat, matching the reality that no dashboard process is
running. When HERMES_DASHBOARD IS truthy, finish exits 0 and
restart-on-crash semantics apply.
03-dashboard-toggle is removed (its function is now subsumed by
the run/finish pair).
Tests
-----
Adds four unit tests for _seed_supervise_skeleton covering the
produced layout, the log/ subservice case, the skip-when-no-log
case, and idempotency. The live-container verification continues
to live in tests/docker/test_s6_profile_gateway_integration.py and
tests/docker/test_dashboard.py — both now pass against the
rebuilt image.
References
----------
* Skarnet skaware mailing list 2020-02-02 (Laurent Bercot
+ Guillermo Diaz Hartusch) on unprivileged s6 tool semantics:
http://skarnet.org/lists/skaware/1424.html
* just-containers/s6-overlay#130 — same EEXIST-preseed pattern,
community-validated 2016 onward
* https://skarnet.org/software/s6/servicedir.html — exit-code 125
semantics in finish scripts
(cherry picked from commit c41f908ad4)
Follow-up to @benbarclay's #30136 salvage. The pre-existing PID-1
contract tests in tests/tools/test_dockerfile_pid1_reaping.py (added
with #15012) hardcoded tini/dumb-init/catatonit as the only accepted
inits, so they failed after #30136 replaced tini with s6-overlay's
/init.
s6-overlay's PID 1 is s6-svscan, which reaps zombies non-blockingly
on SIGCHLD — same contract the test exists to enforce. Two updates:
* test_dockerfile_installs_an_init_for_zombie_reaping — accept
's6-overlay' as a known-installed marker (matches the
s6-overlay install layer in Ben's Dockerfile).
* test_dockerfile_entrypoint_routes_through_the_init — accept
'/init' as a known-routed marker (s6-overlay's PID-1 binary
lives at /init by convention).
Both assertions still fire if a future Dockerfile rewrite drops
the init entirely. Local: 7/7 pass.
X Premium+ also grants Grok OAuth access — the 'SuperGrok Subscription'
wording suggested SuperGrok was the only entitlement path. Updated to
'SuperGrok / Premium+' across the picker label, setup wizard, auth flows,
and docs so Premium+ subscribers know the row applies to them too.
xAI's grok-imagine-image API returns ephemeral imgen.x.ai/xai-tmp-* URLs
that 404 within minutes — long before downstream consumers (Telegram
send_photo, browser preview, multi-tier delivery fallback) get a chance
to fetch them. The xAI image_gen provider was passing those URLs
through unchanged on the elif url: branch; b64 responses were already
cached locally via save_b64_image. Result: every image_generate call
on a Telegram-routed xai-oauth profile delivered no image, falling
through to text-only.
Adds agent.image_gen_provider.save_url_image() — a sibling helper to
save_b64_image that downloads URL bytes to $HERMES_HOME/cache/images/.
Content-type-aware extension inference with URL-suffix fallback;
oversize cap (25MB default) with partial-write cleanup; empty-body
refusal. Mirrors the audio_cache pattern used by text_to_speech.
Wires save_url_image into both the xAI and OpenAI providers' URL
branches. When the download fails (network blip, 404 in-flight) we
log a warning and fall back to the bare URL rather than turning the
tool call into a hard error — the gateway's existing URL-send fallback
then gets a chance to surface the original error legibly.
Test plan:
- tests/agent/test_save_url_image.py — 8 direct tests against a real
in-process HTTP server: bytes round-trip, content-type → extension,
URL-suffix fallback, default-to-png, 404 propagation, empty-body
refusal, oversize cap + cleanup, filename uniqueness.
- tests/plugins/image_gen/test_xai_provider.py — flip
test_successful_url_response (was asserting the bug), add
test_url_response_falls_back_to_bare_url_when_download_fails.
- tests/plugins/image_gen/test_openai_provider.py — symmetric pair.
160/160 in the broader image_gen test surface.
Follow-up to @benbarclay's Docker s6 PR (#30136). The Phase 4 hooks
`_maybe_register_gateway_service` and `_maybe_unregister_gateway_service`
were already documented as "no-op on host", but they reached that no-op
by:
1. importing `hermes_cli.service_manager`
2. calling `get_service_manager()` (which calls `detect_service_manager()`)
3. checking `mgr.supports_runtime_registration()` and returning False
If anything in step 1 or 2 raised an unexpected exception (e.g. a host
machine with a partial s6 install — `/proc/1/comm == s6-svscan` somehow,
but `/run/s6/basedir` absent, or vice versa), the `except Exception`
in the hook would print a confusing "⚠ Could not register s6 gateway
service: ..." warning on a non-container machine that has never touched
the container.
Reorder so `detect_service_manager() != "s6"` is checked FIRST, and
return silently for any detection failure. Host machines now:
- never import the s6 backend
- never call get_service_manager()
- never print an s6-shaped warning under any failure mode
E2E confirmed on host Linux (systemd):
`_maybe_register_gateway_service(...)` produces empty stdout,
detect_service_manager() returns "systemd".
Existing tests updated to patch `detect_service_manager` for the s6
call-through cases (they previously relied on get_service_manager
being the only gate, which is no longer true). Added one new test —
`test_register_silent_when_detect_throws` — asserting that a broken
detector cannot leak a warning to host users.
cc @benbarclay — visible behavior change vs. your branch is one
fewer code path on host. Test changes are minimal (one helper +
`_patch_detect_s6` opt-in per s6 test). Happy to revert if you
prefer the original shape.
Second migration of an existing built-in platform adapter after Discord
(PR #30591) — follows the same shape established by IRC / Teams / LINE /
Google Chat / SimpleX and the playbook in
`references/platform-plugin-migration.md`. Advances the umbrella refactor
in #3823.
Matches Discord's parity bar — adapter under `plugins/platforms/mattermost/`
with the standard `__init__.py` / `adapter.py` / `plugin.yaml` shell,
`register(ctx)` entry point, **no back-compat shim** at the old import
path, and full parity for all five hooks Discord uses plus the
`apply_yaml_config_fn` hook (mattermost is the second consumer of #25443
after Discord):
* `standalone_sender_fn` — out-of-process cron delivery via Mattermost
REST API. Picks up the thread_id + media_files capabilities the
legacy `_send_mattermost` lacked (parity with Discord's `_standalone_send`).
* `setup_fn` — interactive `hermes setup gateway` wizard.
* `apply_yaml_config_fn` — translates `config.yaml` `mattermost:` keys
(`require_mention`, `free_response_channels`, `allowed_channels`) into
`MATTERMOST_*` env vars (replaces the hardcoded block in
`gateway/config.py`).
* `is_connected` — declares connection state from `MATTERMOST_TOKEN` +
`MATTERMOST_URL`.
* `check_fn` — verifies aiohttp is installed and both required env vars
are set.
* plus `allowed_users_env`, `allow_all_env`, `cron_deliver_env_var`,
`max_message_length` (4000 — Mattermost practical limit), `emoji`,
`required_env`, `install_hint`.
Files
-----
* `gateway/platforms/mattermost.py` (873 LOC) →
`plugins/platforms/mattermost/adapter.py` (git rename, R071) +
appended `register()` block, hook helpers, and `_standalone_send`
with media upload + thread_id support.
* New `plugins/platforms/mattermost/{__init__.py, plugin.yaml}` with
`requires_env` / `optional_env` declarations covering MATTERMOST_URL,
MATTERMOST_TOKEN, MATTERMOST_ALLOWED_USERS, MATTERMOST_ALLOW_ALL_USERS,
MATTERMOST_HOME_CHANNEL, MATTERMOST_REPLY_MODE,
MATTERMOST_REQUIRE_MENTION, MATTERMOST_FREE_RESPONSE_CHANNELS,
MATTERMOST_ALLOWED_CHANNELS.
* `gateway/config.py`: delete 17-LOC `mattermost_cfg` YAML→env bridge
(moved into plugin's `_apply_yaml_config`).
* `gateway/run.py::_create_adapter`: delete `Platform.MATTERMOST elif` —
replaced by the existing generic plugin-registry-first dispatch.
* `tools/send_message_tool.py`: delete `_send_mattermost` (22 LOC) +
`Platform.MATTERMOST elif` in `_send_to_platform` — the `else` branch
already routes plugin platforms through `_send_via_adapter`, which
hits the registry's `standalone_sender_fn`.
* `hermes_cli/setup.py`: delete `_setup_mattermost` (44 LOC) — replaced
by the plugin's `interactive_setup`.
* `hermes_cli/gateway.py`: delete `_PLATFORMS["mattermost"]` dict entry
(3 LOC) — plugin's `setup_fn` is dispatched via the plugin path in
`_configure_platform`.
* Consumer rewrite: 5 test files (test_mattermost.py,
test_media_download_retry.py, test_send_multiple_images.py,
test_stream_consumer.py, test_ws_auth_retry.py) get
`gateway.platforms.mattermost` → `plugins.platforms.mattermost.adapter`
with the bulk-rewrite recipe from the platform-plugin-migration playbook.
Single `mock.patch` string in test_stream_consumer.py also repointed.
* `tests/tools/test_send_message_missing_platforms.py`: thin
`(token, extra, chat_id, message)` compat shim around the plugin's
`_standalone_send(pconfig, …)` so existing test bodies continue to
work without rewriting every signature.
Validation
----------
* Plugin discovery: mattermost registers from `plugins/platforms/mattermost/`
alongside discord / teams / irc / line / google_chat / simplex.
All 9 hooks present (setup_fn, standalone_sender_fn,
apply_yaml_config_fn, is_connected, check_fn, allowed_users_env,
allow_all_env, cron_deliver_env_var, max_message_length=4000).
* Mattermost-touching tests: 62/62 pass
(`test_mattermost.py` + `test_send_message_missing_platforms.py`).
* Targeted selectors (mattermost or platform_registry or stream_consumer
or ws_auth_retry or media_download_retry or send_multiple_images or
send_message_tool or platform_connected): 433/433 pass.
* Full sweep (`scripts/run_tests.sh tests/gateway/ tests/cron/
tests/tools/test_send_message_tool.py tests/tools/test_send_message_missing_platforms.py
tests/integration/`): **6220/6220 pass in 47.8s, 0 failures**.
* Lint: ruff clean on all touched files.
* Git identity verified: kshitijk4poor.
* Rename detection: R071 (similarity dropped from a hypothetical R09x
by the ~320-line appended register block — ~36% growth over the
873-LoC base, vs Discord's 5101 LoC base which kept R091).
Closes part of #3823.
PR #30136 review item O6: test_container_restart.py used fixed
`time.sleep(8)` calls after `docker restart` to wait for the
cont-init reconciler to finish. Fixed sleeps are slow when the
event happens fast and false-fail when the event happens slow.
Replace with two polling helpers:
* `_wait_for_path(container, path, kind='f' | 'd', deadline_s=...)`
— generic `test -f/-d` poller. Returns True on success, False on
timeout; callers assert with a clear message.
* `_wait_for_reconcile_log_mention(container, profile, ...)` — the
reconciler's per-profile log line is the canonical signal that
the cont-init reconcile has finished for that profile. Poll on
it instead of a sleep that hopes 8 seconds is enough.
The fixture-level setup wait is similarly migrated: it now polls
for `profile=default` in the boot log (every container always
gets a default-slot entry per item I1) and raises a clear timeout
error from the fixture if the container never finishes cont-init —
much better diagnostics than a mid-test KeyError.
The remaining `time.sleep()` calls are all internal interval_s
between probe attempts; no fixed wait points left.
PR #30136 review noted the asymmetry: `register_profile_gateway`
used tmp_dir + rename to publish a new service slot atomically,
but the boot-time reconciler wrote files into the slot directly.
Same underlying concern (a concurrent s6-svscan rescan could
observe a half-populated directory), different code path.
Rewrite `container_boot._register_service` to mirror the manager:
build everything in `<scandir>/gateway-<profile>.tmp/`, then
`Path.replace` into place. If a previous interrupted run left a
`.tmp` sibling, it's cleaned up before the new build starts. If
the target already exists, it's removed before the rename so
`Path.replace` doesn't error on a non-empty target (Linux `rename`
overwrites empty targets only).
Three new tests: atomic publication leaves no .tmp leftovers,
overwriting an existing slot still leaves no .tmp leftovers, and
a stale .tmp from an interrupted run is cleaned up automatically.
PR #30136 review noted: container-boot.log was append-only with no
rotation. On a long-lived container with frequent restarts and
many profiles it would grow unboundedly (~80 B per profile per
reconcile pass).
Add a soft cap: when the file size hits 256 KiB (`_LOG_ROTATE_BYTES`,
≈3000 reconcile lines, ≈1 year of daily reboots × 5 profiles), the
current file is renamed to `container-boot.log.1` (replacing any
existing one) before new entries are appended. Worst case is two
files at ~512 KiB — well within visibility limits for grep/cat.
Rotation is intentionally simple (no logrotate or s6-log machinery
for one append-only file). Failures during rotation are logged via
the module logger and treated as non-fatal — we keep appending to
the existing file rather than dropping the reconcile entry. Three
new unit tests cover above-threshold rotation, below-threshold
non-rotation, and overwrite of an existing .1 file.
PR #30136 review caught: `_allocate_gateway_port()` in profiles.py
computed a SHA-256-derived port that was threaded through
`register_profile_gateway(profile, port=N)` →
`_render_run_script(profile, port, extra_env)` → and then **ignored**.
The rendered run script picked the bind port from the profile's
config.yaml (`[gateway] port = …`), never from the allocator. So
the entire allocator + parameter chain was dead code.
Remove:
* `hermes_cli.profiles._allocate_gateway_port` (deterministic
SHA-256 → [9200, 9800) — never used).
* `port` kwarg from `ServiceManager.register_profile_gateway`
(Protocol + Mixin + S6 implementation).
* `port` positional arg from `_render_run_script(profile, port,
extra_env)` — now `_render_run_script(profile, extra_env)`.
* The pass-through call in `profiles._maybe_register_gateway_service`.
config.yaml is now the single source of truth for gateway port
selection — matches reality and reduces the API surface. Three
explanatory comments in service_manager.py / profiles.py document
the retirement so future readers don't reach for the allocator and
find a ghost.
Tests: drop the three `_allocate_gateway_port` tests; update
fakes' signatures throughout test_service_manager.py and
test_profiles_s6_hooks.py to match the new no-port API.
PR #30136 review caught a false positive: when HERMES_DASHBOARD was
unset, the dashboard run script did `exec sleep infinity`, so
`s6-svstat /run/service/dashboard` reported the slot as 'up'.
`hermes doctor` and any other s6-svstat-based health check saw the
dashboard as supervised-running even though no dashboard process
existed.
Add cont-init.d/03-dashboard-toggle: writes a `down` marker file
into `/run/service/dashboard/` when HERMES_DASHBOARD is falsy,
removes any leftover marker when it's truthy. s6-supervise honors
`down` by not starting the service, so s6-svstat reports 'down' —
matching reality.
The run script's HERMES_DASHBOARD case-statement stays in place as
a belt-and-suspenders guard, so the two layers can never disagree.
Two new integration tests lock the behavior: slot reports down
when unset; slot reports up when set to 1.
PR #30136 review caught: `S6ServiceManager.start/stop/restart` called
`subprocess.run(check=True)` on `s6-svc`, so any failure surfaced as
a raw `CalledProcessError` traceback. The two cases operators
actually hit are:
1. The service slot doesn't exist — most commonly because the user
typed a profile name wrong (`hermes -p typo gateway start`).
2. s6-svc itself fails — most commonly EACCES on the supervise
control FIFO when running unprivileged.
Both deserve named errors with actionable messages, not stacktraces.
Changes:
* Add `S6Error` base + two concrete errors in `hermes_cli.service_manager`:
- `GatewayNotRegisteredError(profile)` — carries the unprefixed
profile name; message: `no such gateway 'typo': register it
with `hermes profile create typo` first, or pass an existing
profile name via `-p <name>``.
- `S6CommandError(service, action, returncode, stderr)` — carries
the s6-svc rc and stderr; message: `s6-svc start on
'gateway-coder' failed (rc=111): <stderr>`.
* Factor lifecycle dispatch through `_run_svc(flag, label, name)`:
pre-checks that the service directory exists (raises
GatewayNotRegisteredError before invoking s6-svc), then runs
s6-svc and translates any CalledProcessError into S6CommandError.
* `_dispatch_via_service_manager_if_s6` in `hermes_cli.gateway`
catches both errors and prints `✗ <message>` + `sys.exit(1)`
instead of letting the exception bubble. The dispatch path that
used to dump a traceback at the user now gives an actionable
one-liner.
Tests: 6 new tests for the error types and their CLI rendering;
existing lifecycle test pre-seeds the slot directory before calling
`mgr.start` etc.
PR #30136 review caught: `hermes gateway start` (no `-p`) inside
the container resolves `_profile_suffix() == ""` → service name
`gateway-default`, but no such slot was ever registered. The Phase 4
profile-create hook only fired on `hermes profile create <name>`,
and the root profile (which lives at the top of $HERMES_HOME, not
under `profiles/`) was never one of those. So bare `hermes gateway
start` landed on `s6-svc -u /run/service/gateway-default` →
uncaught `CalledProcessError` → traceback to the user.
Changes:
1. `reconcile_profile_gateways` now always registers a
`gateway-default` slot before iterating named profiles. Its
prior state is read from `$HERMES_HOME/gateway_state.json`
(sibling to the profile root, not under `profiles/`); stale
runtime files there are swept the same way. Auto-up only if the
prior state was `running` — same rule as named profiles.
2. `S6ServiceManager._render_run_script` special-cases
`profile == "default"` to emit `hermes gateway run` with NO
`-p` flag. Passing `-p default` would resolve to
`$HERMES_HOME/profiles/default/` — a different profile that
almost certainly doesn't exist. The empty profile-suffix
convention is the dispatcher's contract and the run script has
to match.
3. A user-created `profiles/default/` collides with the reserved
root-profile slot; the reconciler now skips it with a warning
rather than producing two registrations of the same service name.
Action-list ordering is stable: `default` first, then named
profiles in directory order. Boot-log readers can rely on this.
Tests: 8 new dedicated default-slot tests plus updates to every
existing test that asserted against the action list (via the new
`_named_actions` helper that drops the always-present default
entry).
PR #30136 review caught that `hermes gateway stop --all` and
`... restart --all` were broken under s6. The Phase 4 dispatcher was
gated on `not stop_all` (and the symmetric restart_all), so `--all`
fell through to `kill_gateway_processes(all_profiles=True)`. pkill
SIGTERMed every gateway, s6-supervise observed the crashes, and
restarted every gateway ~1s later — net effect: `--all` *kicked*
gateways instead of *stopping* them.
Add `_dispatch_all_via_service_manager_if_s6(action)` that iterates
`mgr.list_profile_gateways()` and routes stop/restart through each
service slot. s6's `want up`/`want down` flips correctly, so a
stop persists. Partial failures are surfaced per-profile with a
running success count; the host pkill path is only reached when s6
isn't in play.
`start --all` isn't a CLI surface — the helper rejects it and
returns False (host code path can take over).
PR #30136 review surfaced two issues, both rooted in the same audit gap:
docker integration tests were running as root, not the unprivileged
`hermes` user (UID 10000) that the runtime actually uses via
`s6-setuidgid hermes`. Anything that probed PID-1 state or wrote to
the s6 control surface worked as root in the tests but was inert in
production.
Fixes:
1. `_s6_running()` previously called `Path("/proc/1/exe").resolve()`,
which is root-only readable. For UID 10000 the symlink yields
PermissionError, `resolve()` silently returns the unresolved path,
and `exe.name == "exe"` — so detection always returned False, the
service-manager runtime-registration path was inert, and every
`hermes profile create` / `hermes -p X gateway start` silently
skipped the s6 hook. Replace with `/proc/1/comm` (world-readable)
+ `/run/s6/basedir` (s6-overlay-specific) — both required, fail
closed.
2. `02-reconcile-profiles` now also chowns `/run/service/.s6-svscan/`
{control,lock} to hermes so `s6-svscanctl -a/-an` works without
root. Previously the directory chown stopped at `/run/service`
and the FIFO inside stayed root-owned, so `register_profile_gateway`
from hermes failed at the rescan-trigger step with EACCES — the
wrapper in profiles.py caught the exception and printed a swallowed
warning, so profile creation appeared to succeed while the slot
was rolled back.
Audit changes to flush this class of bug next time:
- Add `docker_exec` / `docker_exec_sh` helpers to `tests/docker/conftest.py`
that default to `-u hermes`. The module docstring explains why and
flags `user="root"` as opt-in only for tests that explicitly need
root (none currently do).
- Refactor every `docker exec` call in tests/docker/ through the new
helpers (test_dashboard.py, test_zombie_reaping.py, test_profile_gateway.py,
test_container_restart.py, test_s6_profile_gateway_integration.py).
- Add 5 unit tests covering `_s6_running` under various probe states
(both signals present; comm wrong; basedir missing; PermissionError
on /proc/1/comm; missing /proc — non-Linux). The PermissionError
test is the explicit regression guard for the original bug.
Known follow-up: the per-service `supervise/control` FIFO inside each
`/run/service/gateway-<profile>/supervise/` is created root-owned by
s6-supervise (which runs as root because s6-svscan is PID 1). `s6-svc
-u/-d/-t` from the hermes user will get EACCES on those. The audit
under `-u hermes` will reveal this in lifecycle tests — surfacing the
issue cleanly so it can be fixed in a focused follow-up (likely via a
small SUID helper or a polling chown loop in cont-init.d). The
detection + svscanctl fixes here are independent and complete on
their own.
The s6-overlay migration replaced every runtime use of gosu with
s6-setuidgid (in stage2-hook.sh, main-wrapper.sh, per-service run
scripts, and cont-init.d hooks), but the gosu binary itself was still
being copied into the image from tianon/gosu, and several comments
across the repo still pointed to it.
Image changes:
- Drop the FROM tianon/gosu:1.19-trixie AS gosu_source stage
- Drop the COPY --from=gosu_source /gosu /usr/local/bin/ layer
- Net: one fewer base-image pull, ~12-15 MB layer eliminated
Documentation/comment refresh (no behavior change):
- Dockerfile: update root-user rationale comment + cont-init.d comment
- docker/main-wrapper.sh: drop "pre-s6 contract (gosu drop)" reference
- docker-compose.yml: update UID/GID remap comment
- .hadolint.yaml: update DL3002 ignore rationale
- website/docs/user-guide/docker.md: privilege-drop helper is s6-setuidgid now
- hermes_cli/config.py: docker_run_as_host_user docstring
tools/environments/docker.py runs *arbitrary user images* via the
terminal backend, not the bundled Hermes image. It still needs SETUID/
SETGID caps so user images that use gosu/su/s6-setuidgid all work.
Renamed the cap-list constant _GOSU_CAP_ARGS → _PRIVDROP_CAP_ARGS and
updated comments to list s6-setuidgid alongside the others as examples.
The matching test (test_security_args_include_setuid_setgid_for_gosu_drop
→ test_security_args_include_setuid_setgid_for_privdrop) was renamed
and its docstring updated; behavior is unchanged.
Verification:
- hadolint clean against .hadolint.yaml
- shellcheck clean against all docker/ shell scripts
- Image rebuilt successfully (sha 1a090924ccea)
- Docker harness: 19 passed in 41.87s (every Phase 0 test + Phase 4
per-profile-gateway lifecycle + container-restart reconciliation)
- tests/tools/test_docker_environment.py: 23 passed (rename did not
break test discovery; pre-existing unrelated mock warning)
The plan document (docs/plans/2026-05-07-s6-overlay-dynamic-subagent-gateways.md)
intentionally retains its historical references to gosu — it describes
the pre-s6 entrypoint as background for understanding the migration.
Phase 4 of the s6-overlay supervision plan. Activates the Phase 3
S6ServiceManager by hooking it into the profile lifecycle and the
`hermes gateway start/stop/restart` dispatcher, and adds a cont-
init.d-time reconciliation pass that survives `docker restart`.
Task 4.0 — container-boot reconciliation:
/run/service/ is tmpfs, so every `docker restart` wipes every
per-profile gateway slot. /etc/cont-init.d/02-reconcile-profiles
invokes hermes_cli.container_boot.reconcile_profile_gateways() on
every boot, which walks $HERMES_HOME/profiles/<name>/, reads each
gateway_state.json, recreates the s6 service slot, and auto-starts
only those whose last state was 'running'. Other states
(stopped, starting, startup_failed, missing) register the slot
in the down state — avoiding crash-loops across restarts for a
gateway that was broken last boot. Per-profile outcome is recorded
to $HERMES_HOME/logs/container-boot.log.
Implementation: hermes_cli/container_boot.py + 12 unit tests.
Profile-marker is SOUL.md, not config.yaml, because `hermes profile
create` only seeds SOUL.md by default (config.yaml comes from
`hermes setup`).
Task 4.1 / 4.2 — profile create/delete hooks:
hermes_cli/profiles.py::create_profile now calls
_maybe_register_gateway_service(<canon>) at the end, which routes
through ServiceManager.register_profile_gateway when running on s6
and no-ops on host backends. delete_profile mirrors with
_maybe_unregister_gateway_service. _allocate_gateway_port produces
a deterministic SHA-256-derived port in [9200, 9800).
Task 4.3 — gateway dispatch + remove rejection arms:
_dispatch_via_service_manager_if_s6(action) intercepts
start/stop/restart at the top of each subcommand and routes them
through S6ServiceManager.{start,stop,restart}. The pre-Phase-4
`elif is_container():` rejection arms are kept as fallback for
pre-s6 containers / unsupported runtimes, but only ever fire when
detect_service_manager() != 's6'. install/uninstall under s6
print informational guidance pointing users at profile create/delete.
Removed the two xfail(strict=True) markers from
tests/docker/test_profile_gateway.py — both tests now pass strictly.
Task 4.4 — status reporting:
get_gateway_runtime_snapshot() reports
Manager: 's6 (container supervisor)' inside an s6 container instead
of 'docker (foreground)'.
Plan-vs-reality drift fixed in this commit:
- Plan's S6ServiceManager._render_run_script used
`gateway start --foreground --port {port}` — invented args; the
real CLI is `gateway run`. Switched accordingly. port arg
retained for API parity but now documented as 'currently ignored'.
- Plan's reconciler keyed on config.yaml; switched to SOUL.md
(config.yaml is created by hermes setup, not by hermes profile
create, so the original gate caught nothing).
- The plan's _dispatch helper used _profile_arg() which returns
'--profile <name>' (i.e. with the flag prefix). Switched to
_profile_suffix() which returns the bare name.
- Architecture B's docker exec doesn't get /command on PATH or
the venv on PATH; Dockerfile's runtime PATH now includes
/opt/hermes/.venv/bin so 'docker exec <c> hermes ...' works
without sourcing the venv.
- stage2-hook now chowns $HERMES_HOME/profiles to hermes on every
boot, not just on the UID-remap path. Without this, files created
by docker-exec-as-root accumulate and the next reconciler run
fails with PermissionError reading SOUL.md.
Test harness:
19 passed, 0 xfailed (the two pre-Phase-4 xfail targets flip to
passing). 78 unit tests across service_manager + container_boot +
profiles_s6_hooks + gateway_s6_dispatch. Hadolint + shellcheck
pass cleanly.
Refs: docs/plans/2026-05-07-s6-overlay-dynamic-subagent-gateways.md
Phase 3 of the s6-overlay supervision plan. Implements the runtime-
registration surface from D4 — only the s6 backend supports
register_profile_gateway / unregister_profile_gateway /
list_profile_gateways; host backends continue to raise
NotImplementedError. No caller yet (Phase 4 wires in the profile
create/delete hooks).
Key implementation notes:
- Service directory shape: /run/service/gateway-<profile>/{type,run,log/run}.
Atomic register: write to gateway-<profile>.tmp, fsync via
os.rename. Cleanup on rescan failure.
- Run script uses #!/command/with-contenv sh so HERMES_HOME and any
extra_env arrive at exec time. The hermes -p <profile> gateway
start --foreground --port <port> command is wrapped in
s6-setuidgid hermes for the per-service privilege drop (OQ2-A).
- Log script (OQ8-C): persists via s6-log to
${HERMES_HOME}/logs/gateways/<profile>/. CRITICAL — HERMES_HOME is
a runtime env-var expansion in the rendered script, NOT a Python
f-string substitution. Negative-asserted in
test_s6_register_creates_service_dir_and_triggers_scan so
regressions are caught.
- PATH gotcha: /command/ is only on PATH for processes spawned by
the supervision tree (services, cont-init.d). `docker exec` and
profile-create hooks don't get it. S6ServiceManager calls all
s6-* binaries via absolute path through the new _S6_BIN_DIR
constant so callers don't have to fix up env vars.
- validate_profile_name rejects path-traversal, leading-dash (s6
would parse as a flag), uppercase, whitespace, and names >251
chars (s6-svscan default name_max).
Test coverage:
- 13 new unit tests in tests/hermes_cli/test_service_manager.py
(kind detection, run-script content, env quoting, register
rollback on rescan failure, unregister idempotence, list filter,
lifecycle dispatch, svstat parsing). Total: 36 passing.
- 2 new in-container integration tests in
tests/docker/test_s6_profile_gateway_integration.py validating
end-to-end registration against a real s6 supervision tree.
Docker harness: 14 passed, 2 xfailed (Phase 4 target unchanged).
Refs: docs/plans/2026-05-07-s6-overlay-dynamic-subagent-gateways.md
BREAKING CHANGE: the container ENTRYPOINT is now /init (s6-overlay)
instead of /usr/bin/tini. Main hermes runs as the container CMD with
TTY inherited (preserving --tui), dashboard runs as a supervised s6-rc
service (HERMES_DASHBOARD=1 starts it; crashes auto-restart), and the
ground is laid for per-profile gateway supervision (Phase 3+4).
All five pre-s6 docker run invocation patterns continue to work
identically — verified by the Phase 0 docker harness:
docker run <image> → `hermes` with no args
docker run <image> chat -q "..." → `hermes chat -q ...` passthrough
docker run <image> sleep infinity → `sleep infinity` direct
docker run <image> bash → interactive bash
docker run -it <image> --tui → interactive Ink TUI
Phase 2 harness result: 12 passed, 2 xfailed (Phase 4 target). Hadolint
+ shellcheck pass cleanly.
Architecture pivot from plan v3 (documented in main-hermes/run header):
the plan called for main hermes to be an s6-supervised service, but
two real s6-overlay v3 mechanics blocked that — cont-init.d scripts
receive no arguments (CMD args are not visible to stage2-hook), and
`/run/s6/basedir/bin/halt` after writing the exit code did not
propagate the desired exit code (container exits 143). We use the
s6-overlay-native CMD pattern instead: main-wrapper.sh is the
container's main program (ENTRYPOINT prepends it so leading-dash
args like --version aren't intercepted by /init), exec's the final
program with stdin/stdout/stderr inherited, and the program's exit
code becomes the container exit code. main-hermes is now a no-op
`sleep infinity` slot kept for future supervised-gateway-container
modes. This trades "supervised restart of main hermes" for arg-
parity with the pre-s6 contract — main hermes was already unsupervised
under tini, so we lose nothing functional. Dashboard supervision is
the only new guarantee added by this phase.
Files added:
docker/main-wrapper.sh # arg routing + s6-setuidgid drop
docker/stage2-hook.sh # gosu-equivalent + chown + seed
docker/s6-rc.d/main-hermes/{type,run,dependencies.d/base}
docker/s6-rc.d/dashboard/{type,run,dependencies.d/base}
docker/s6-rc.d/user/contents.d/{main-hermes,dashboard}
Files changed:
Dockerfile: tini → s6-overlay install + ENTRYPOINT flip + service wiring
docker/entrypoint.sh: thin shim to stage2-hook.sh for back-compat
tests/docker/test_dashboard.py: add test_dashboard_restarts_after_crash
Refs: docs/plans/2026-05-07-s6-overlay-dynamic-subagent-gateways.md
Phase 1 of the s6-overlay supervision plan. Pure-refactor addition:
introduces the abstract interface (with runtime_checkable Protocol),
detect_service_manager(), validate_profile_name(), and thin
SystemdServiceManager / LaunchdServiceManager / WindowsServiceManager
wrappers around the existing systemd_* / launchd_* / gateway_windows.*
module-level functions. No host call site was modified — host code
continues to use the existing functions directly; the protocol is for
new backend-agnostic code (Phase 4 profile create/delete hooks and the
Phase 4 s6 dispatch path in 'hermes gateway start/stop/restart').
WindowsServiceManager.install() forwards the v3 kwargs (start_now,
start_on_login, elevated_handoff) added in PRs #28169-adjacent so
non-Windows callers — there aren't any today — can opt in.
The s6 backend lands in Phase 3; until then get_service_manager()
raises a clear error if invoked on a host that detects as 's6'.
Two pre-existing baseline issues found while running the Phase 0 harness
against the tini image that need fixing before later phases can use the
harness as a behavior-parity oracle:
1. The autouse `_enforce_test_timeout` fixture in tests/conftest.py
hard-coded a 30s SIGALRM, which preempted any `pytest.mark.timeout`
marker (already honored by pytest-timeout). Honor the marker if
present; fall back to 30s otherwise. Docker harness tests carry a
180s marker applied at collection time in tests/docker/conftest.py.
2. test_dashboard_port_override polled via `ss -tlnp` / `netstat -tln`
— neither is installed in the Hermes image, so the probe trivially
failed even when the dashboard was bound. The dashboard also takes
8-15s to bind on cold image; the 5s sleep was insufficient. Replace
with a poll loop reading /proc/net/tcp directly (port 9120 = 0x23A0,
state 0A = LISTEN). Bump probe deadline to 60s and switch
test_dashboard_opt_in_starts to a similar poll for pgrep so we don't
regress to the same race.
Result: 11 passed, 2 xfailed (Phase 4 target) on tini image. Harness
now ready to serve as Phase 2's behavior-parity oracle.
The agent-test suite default is 30s; docker test_no_args (the dashboard
spin-up, the container restart) routinely take 60-90s. Without this
they intermittently fail in CI with TimeoutError.
Tasks 0.2-0.6 of the s6-overlay supervision plan. Locks the
user-visible behavior we must preserve through the Phase 2 init-
system swap:
- test_main_invocation.py (Task 0.2): docker run <image> with no
args, chat subcommand passthrough, bare executable passthrough,
bash pattern, exit-code propagation
- test_tui_passthrough.py (Task 0.3): TTY allocation via docker -t
using the host's script(1) for a PTY
- test_dashboard.py (Task 0.4): HERMES_DASHBOARD=1 opt-in,
HERMES_DASHBOARD_PORT override
- test_profile_gateway.py (Task 0.5): per-profile gateway
start/stop and profile-delete-stops-gateway. Both marked
xfail(strict=True) because the current tini image refuses
gateway lifecycle commands inside the container; Phase 4
Task 4.3 flips them to passing.
- test_zombie_reaping.py (Task 0.6): PID 1 reaps orphaned
zombies. tini does this today; s6-overlay's /init must
continue to.
Refs: docs/plans/2026-05-07-s6-overlay-dynamic-subagent-gateways.md
Task 0.1 of the s6-overlay supervision plan. Establishes the test
infrastructure for tests/docker/: skip-on-missing-Docker collection
hook, session-scoped image-build fixture (overridable via the
HERMES_TEST_IMAGE env var for faster local iteration), and a
container_name fixture that ensures cleanup on test exit.
Refs: docs/plans/2026-05-07-s6-overlay-dynamic-subagent-gateways.md
Adds a `TTSProvider(ABC)` + `register_tts_provider()` extension point
to the plugin context API, **alongside** the existing config-driven
`tts.providers.<name>: type: command` registry from PR #17843. This is
additive — the command-provider surface stays as the primary way to
add a TTS backend.
The hook covers cases the shell-template grammar can't reasonably
express:
- Native Python SDKs without a CLI (Cartesia, Fish Audio, etc.)
- Streaming synthesis (chunked Opus → voice-bubble delivery)
- Voice metadata API for the `hermes tools` picker
- OAuth-refreshing auth flows
None of the 10 inline built-in providers (`edge`, `openai`,
`elevenlabs`, `minimax`, `gemini`, `mistral`, `xai`, `piper`,
`kittentts`, `neutts`) are migrated to plugins. They stay inline. The
hook is for *new* engines that aren't built-in.
## Resolution order
The dispatcher's resolution order is the load-bearing invariant:
1. `tts.provider` is a built-in name → built-in dispatch. **Always wins.**
2. `tts.provider` matches `tts.providers.<name>` with `command:` set
→ command-provider dispatch (PR #17843).
3. `tts.provider` matches a plugin-registered `TTSProvider`
→ plugin dispatch (new).
4. No match → falls through to Edge TTS default (legacy behavior).
Built-ins-always-win is enforced at THREE layers:
- Registry: `register_provider()` rejects shadowing names with a warning.
- Dispatcher: `_dispatch_to_plugin_provider()` short-circuits built-in
names defensively before consulting the registry.
- Picker: `_plugin_tts_providers()` filters built-in shadows out of
the `hermes tools` row list defensively.
Command-providers-win-over-plugins is enforced at TWO layers:
- The caller in `text_to_speech_tool` checks
`_resolve_command_provider_config` first.
- `_dispatch_to_plugin_provider` re-checks for a same-name command
config defensively so a refactor of the caller can't silently break
the invariant.
## New files
- `agent/tts_provider.py` — `TTSProvider(ABC)` with `synthesize()` (required),
`list_voices()`, `list_models()`, `get_setup_schema()`, `stream()`,
`voice_compatible` (all optional with sane defaults). Mirrors
`agent/image_gen_provider.py` shape.
- `agent/tts_registry.py` — `register_provider`/`get_provider`/`list_providers`
with `_BUILTIN_NAMES` reject-shadowing invariant. Mirrors
`agent/image_gen_registry.py` shape.
- `plugins/tts/...` directory ready for community plugins (none shipped).
## Modified files
- `hermes_cli/plugins.py` — `register_tts_provider()` method on
`PluginContext`. Matches the gating shape of
`register_image_gen_provider()` / `register_browser_provider()`.
- `tools/tts_tool.py` — `_dispatch_to_plugin_provider()` +
`_plugin_provider_is_voice_compatible()` + walrus-elif wiring into
the main dispatcher. Built-in elif chain untouched.
- `hermes_cli/tools_config.py` — `_plugin_tts_providers()` injects
plugin rows into the Text-to-Speech picker category alongside the
10 hardcoded built-in rows.
## Tests
- `tests/agent/test_tts_registry.py` — 47 tests covering registration,
lookup, ABC contract, helpers, AND a `TestBuiltinSync` regression
test that fails if `agent.tts_registry._BUILTIN_NAMES` drifts from
`tools.tts_tool.BUILTIN_TTS_PROVIDERS` (kept duplicated due to
circular import constraints).
- `tests/tools/test_tts_plugin_dispatch.py` — 35 tests covering
built-in-always-wins, command-wins-over-plugin, plugin dispatch,
exception passthrough, voice_compatible helper.
- `tests/hermes_cli/test_tts_picker.py` — 10 tests covering the
picker surface, builtin shadowing defense, integration with
`_visible_providers`.
- `tests/hermes_cli/test_plugins_tts_registration.py` — 3 end-to-end
tests via `PluginManager.discover_and_load()`.
- `tests/plugins/tts/check_parity_vs_main.py` — 9-scenario subprocess
parity harness vs `origin/main`. The only intentional diff is
`fallback_edge → plugin` for the `plugin-installed` scenario.
## Verification
- 95/95 new tests pass.
- 170/170 pre-existing TTS tests (test_tts_command_providers,
test_tts_max_text_length, test_tts_speed, etc.) pass unchanged.
- Parity harness against `origin/main`: 8 OK + 1 expected DIFF.
- E2E smoke: a registered plugin's `synthesize()` is called via
`text_to_speech_tool` with the standard JSON envelope returned.
- Ruff clean on all touched files.
## Docs
- `website/docs/user-guide/features/tts.md` — new "Python plugin
providers" section with a decision table (command-provider vs
plugin), minimal plugin example, and the optional-hook reference.
- `website/docs/user-guide/features/plugins.md` — TTS row updated to
mention both surfaces (command-provider primary, plugin for
SDK/streaming).
Closes#30398
konsisumer
houenyang-momo
Robert DaSilva
sir-ad
chaconne67
Krishna
Teknium
Ben
SuperEarn
Jonathan
Bailey Dixon
EvilHumphrey
emozilla
Nick
beardthelion
Will Falcon
Carlton
ethernet
dearmayo
Krisli Dimo
MorAlekss
stepanov1975
ronhi
xxxigm
Savanne Kham
zccyman
峯岸 亮
wysie
adam91holt
codeblackhole1024
aaronlab
daimon-nous[bot]
nguyen binh
Peter
Dakota Secula-Rosell
Evi Nova
simokiihamaki
Tranquil-Flow
liuhao1024
Rodrigo
waefrebeorn
AdamPlatin123
Edward-x
Jorge Fuenmayor
Kasun Athaudahetti
kshitijk4poor
helix4u
Glen Workman
Schrotti77
Hasan Ali