326a757cdb
* Peer- and session-scoped JWTs were effectively workspace-scoped: auth() walked the route's declared scope and fell through to a workspace match, so a {w: ws-a, p: alice} token could act on any peer in ws-a.
* feat: peer keys can read sessions they belong to; require workspace on scoped keys
* fix: authorize JWTs by narrowest scope and gate member reads
Follow-up hardening on the narrowest-claim auth fix:
- Scope get_peer_config member-read to the caller's own peer; a session
member could previously read a co-member's per-session config.
- Enforce session membership on POST /peers/{id}/chat: the session_id
arrives in the body (invisible to require_auth), so a peer key could
read any session's injected message history. Check is_peer_in_session
in the handler before the dialectic runs.
- Consolidate the workspace-match check in auth() to a single hoisted
guard so no branch can silently re-open cross-workspace access.
- Normalize empty-string scope claims to None in verify_jwt so a blank
workspace can't satisfy the peer/session token-shape invariant.
- Extract scope_requires_workspace(), shared by verify_jwt and the keys
API so the creation-time guard and verification invariant can't drift.
route requires auth) and CLAUDE.md auth-scoping guidance.
- docs: describe narrow-scope key semantics in the platform reference.
---------
Co-authored-by: Vineeth Voruganti <13438633+VVoruganti@users.noreply.github.com>
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|---|---|---|
| .. | ||
| __init__.py | ||
| test_auth_route_policy.py | ||
| test_conclusions.py | ||
| test_files.py | ||
| test_keys.py | ||
| test_messages.py | ||
| test_peers.py | ||
| test_queue_status.py | ||
| test_scoped_api.py | ||
| test_sessions.py | ||
| test_validation_api.py | ||
| test_webhooks.py | ||
| test_workspaces.py | ||