#22675 Validate RSS feed entry link schemes to prevent javascript: XSS

This commit is contained in:
Arthur 2026-07-14 09:31:51 -07:00
parent 31301cdb95
commit aa3b570219
2 changed files with 36 additions and 19 deletions

View File

@ -358,7 +358,9 @@ class RSSFeedWidget(DashboardWidget):
def cache_key(self):
url = self.config['feed_url']
url_checksum = sha256(url.encode('utf-8')).hexdigest()
return f'dashboard_rss_{url_checksum}'
# The version segment invalidates entries cached by a pre-sanitization release: such
# entries live under the old key and are never read, so they can't be served unsanitized.
return f'dashboard_rss_2_{url_checksum}'
def get_feed(self):
if self.config.get('requires_internet') and settings.ISOLATED_DEPLOYMENT:
@ -366,14 +368,11 @@ class RSSFeedWidget(DashboardWidget):
'isolated_deployment': True,
}
# Fetch RSS content from cache if available
# Fetch RSS content from cache if available. Cached content is always sanitized before
# it is written (see below), so no sanitization is needed on read.
if feed_content := cache.get(self.cache_key):
feed = feedparser.FeedParserDict(feed_content)
# Sanitize on read as well: cached content may have been written by a pre-fix
# release (during an upgrade) and thus not yet sanitized. Idempotent.
self.sanitize_entries(feed.get('entries', []))
return {
'feed': feed,
'feed': feedparser.FeedParserDict(feed_content),
}
# Fetch feed content from remote server
@ -414,12 +413,15 @@ class RSSFeedWidget(DashboardWidget):
"""
allowed_schemes = get_config().ALLOWED_URL_SCHEMES
for entry in entries:
# Blank any link whose scheme isn't permitted (blocks javascript:, data:, etc.)
# Blank any link whose scheme isn't permitted (blocks javascript:, data:, etc.).
# This is the load-bearing control: the template renders entry.link into an href.
if link := entry.get('link'):
result = urlparse(link)
if result.scheme and result.scheme.lower() not in allowed_schemes:
entry['link'] = ''
# Sanitize the summary HTML
# Sanitize the summary HTML as defense-in-depth. The template renders entry.summary
# with auto-escaping (not |safe), so this is not currently load-bearing; it guards
# against a future change that renders the summary as markup.
if summary := entry.get('summary'):
entry['summary'] = clean_html(summary, allowed_schemes)

View File

@ -1,3 +1,5 @@
from unittest.mock import MagicMock, patch
from django.core.cache import cache
from django.test import RequestFactory, TestCase, tag
@ -90,26 +92,39 @@ class RSSFeedWidgetSanitizationTestCase(TestCase):
self.assertIn('<b>ok</b>', entries[0]['summary'])
@tag('regression')
def test_get_feed_sanitizes_cached_content(self):
def test_get_feed_sanitizes_before_caching(self):
"""
Content cached by a pre-fix release must be sanitized on read, not served verbatim.
Fetched feed content must be sanitized before it is rendered or written to the cache,
so a poisoned link is never stored or served.
"""
widget = RSSFeedWidget(config={
'feed_url': 'https://example.com/feed.xml',
'requires_internet': False,
'max_entries': 10,
'cache_timeout': 3600,
})
# Simulate a poisoned feed left in the cache by an older release
cache.set(widget.cache_key, {
'bozo': False,
'entries': [
{'link': 'javascript:alert(1)', 'title': 'evil', 'summary': 'x'},
],
})
rss = (
b'<?xml version="1.0"?>'
b'<rss version="2.0"><channel><title>t</title>'
b'<link>http://example.com</link><description>d</description>'
b'<item><title>evil</title><link>javascript:alert(1)</link>'
b'<description>d</description></item>'
b'</channel></rss>'
)
mock_response = MagicMock()
mock_response.content = rss
result = widget.get_feed()
with (
patch('extras.dashboard.widgets.requests.get', return_value=mock_response),
patch('extras.dashboard.widgets.resolve_proxies', return_value={}),
):
result = widget.get_feed()
# The rendered feed is sanitized...
self.assertEqual(result['feed']['entries'][0]['link'], '')
# ...and the cached copy is sanitized too (never stored poisoned).
cached = cache.get(widget.cache_key)
self.assertEqual(cached['entries'][0]['link'], '')
class RenderWidgetTemplateTagTestCase(TestCase):