Widens the Bash-subprocess egress allowlist for common agent workflows:
Anthropic direct (api, statsig), Ubuntu mirrors, NodeSource/deb for Node,
crates.io (Rust), yarn, full npm + pypi groups, GitHub release assets,
and wildcards for geoboundaries, googleapis, jsdelivr — covers dataset
fetches and CDN-backed library assets that previously failed silently.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Closes#10. Until now the sandbox container had unrestricted outbound NAT
on sandbox-net — a compromised agent could curl arbitrary hosts, pip/npm
install malicious packages, or exfiltrate files via WebFetch. The
anthropic-proxy path-allowlist (#6) guarded only the credential-injection
proxy, not general egress.
Two layers added, both shipped as managed (enterprise) settings so user
and project settings cannot downgrade them:
- sandbox.* → bubblewrap + local proxy gating Bash subprocesses (and all
their children: pip, npm, git, curl). enableWeakerNestedSandbox=true
because we run inside Docker without privileged user namespaces;
accepted because the Docker container boundary is unchanged and this
adds new egress filtering that previously did not exist.
- permissions.* → deny-by-default WebFetch with explicit domain allows
(WebFetch bypasses the OS sandbox and needs its own allowlist).
failIfUnavailable=true + allowUnsandboxedCommands=false close the two
silent-fallback paths: if bubblewrap/socat install breaks, the container
fails loud instead of serving unsandboxed bash; and the
dangerouslyDisableSandbox escape hatch is disabled so sandbox violations
can't be bypassed via a permission prompt in our unattended deployment.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Thomas Friedel