fix(adapter-utils): bound header redaction by quoting context
The header rule stopped at the first whitespace or quote, so a multi-part credential such as a Digest or AWS SigV4 authorization value lost only its first token. It also matched any bare word carrying a credential hint, so prose and paths like `auth: failed` or `/v1/tokens:list` were redacted. The value is now bounded by its context: to the closing quote inside a quoted shell argument, and to the end of a comma-separated `key=value` list or a single token when unquoted. A header name must be hyphenated or underscored, or be the bare `authorization` or `apikey`; the `www-authenticate` and `proxy-authenticate` challenge headers are excluded. The recognized scheme list follows the IANA registry plus `AWS4-HMAC-SHA256` and `Token`. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01RYigf3eMFJjey9iKRApPGE
This commit is contained in:
Michel Tomas
parent
e8aaf25d2c
commit
3399fc784f
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@ -178,6 +178,104 @@ describe("redactCommandText header secrets", () => {
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expect(redactDiagnosticText(once)).toBe(once);
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});
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it("redacts an entire quoted digest credential, not just its first parameter", () => {
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const input =
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`curl -H 'Authorization: Digest username="alice", realm="r", nonce="n", uri="/x", response="deadbeef"' https://example.test`;
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const output = redactCommandText(input);
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expect(output).not.toContain("alice");
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expect(output).not.toContain("deadbeef");
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expect(output).not.toContain("nonce");
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expect(output).toBe(
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`curl -H 'Authorization: Digest ${REDACTED_COMMAND_TEXT_VALUE}' https://example.test`,
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);
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});
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it("redacts an unquoted digest credential and stops at the next field", () => {
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// A log line carries the header without shell quoting. The parameter list
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// ends at the last comma-joined `key=value`, so the trailing status field
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// survives.
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const input =
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'Authorization: Digest username="alice", nonce="n", response="deadbeef" status=401';
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const output = redactCommandText(input);
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expect(output).not.toContain("alice");
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expect(output).not.toContain("deadbeef");
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expect(output).toBe(
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`Authorization: Digest ${REDACTED_COMMAND_TEXT_VALUE} status=401`,
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);
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});
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it("redacts an entire quoted sigv4 credential, not just the scheme name", () => {
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const input =
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'curl -H "Authorization: AWS4-HMAC-SHA256 Credential=AKIAEXAMPLE/20260903/us-east-1/s3/aws4_request, SignedHeaders=host;x-amz-date, Signature=abc123"';
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const output = redactCommandText(input);
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expect(output).not.toContain("AKIAEXAMPLE");
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expect(output).not.toContain("abc123");
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expect(output).toBe(
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`curl -H "Authorization: AWS4-HMAC-SHA256 ${REDACTED_COMMAND_TEXT_VALUE}"`,
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);
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});
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it("redacts an unquoted sigv4 credential and stops at the next word", () => {
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const input =
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"Authorization: AWS4-HMAC-SHA256 Credential=AKIAEXAMPLE/20260903/us-east-1/s3/aws4_request, SignedHeaders=host;x-amz-date, Signature=abc123 retry";
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const output = redactCommandText(input);
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expect(output).not.toContain("AKIAEXAMPLE");
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expect(output).not.toContain("abc123");
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expect(output).toBe(
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`Authorization: AWS4-HMAC-SHA256 ${REDACTED_COMMAND_TEXT_VALUE} retry`,
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);
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});
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it("keeps an already redacted unquoted header bounded", () => {
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// The server redaction feeds this shape in after its own rules. The trailing
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// word must survive.
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const input = `prefix Authorization: ${REDACTED_COMMAND_TEXT_VALUE} suffix`;
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expect(redactCommandText(input)).toBe(input);
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});
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it("keeps hint words that are not header names untouched", () => {
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expect(redactCommandText("GET /v1/tokens:list")).toBe("GET /v1/tokens:list");
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expect(redactCommandText("auth: failed")).toBe("auth: failed");
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});
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it("keeps a www-authenticate challenge untouched", () => {
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// The challenge parameters are diagnostics, not credentials.
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const input =
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'WWW-Authenticate: Bearer realm="paperclip", error="invalid_token"';
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expect(redactCommandText(input)).toBe(input);
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});
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it("keeps an empty quoted header argument untouched", () => {
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// A quoted value must open with a non-blank character, so there is nothing
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// to hide here and the argument stays byte for byte.
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const input = 'curl -H "X-API-Key: " -H "X-Auth-Token:" https://example.test';
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expect(redactCommandText(input)).toBe(input);
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});
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it("redacts a bare apikey header value", () => {
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// Supabase sends the key under an unhyphenated `apikey` header.
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expect(redactCommandText("apikey: abc")).toBe(
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`apikey: ${REDACTED_COMMAND_TEXT_VALUE}`,
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);
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});
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it("redacts a proxy-authorization header value", () => {
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const input = 'curl -H "Proxy-Authorization: Basic dXNlcjpwdw=="';
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const output = redactCommandText(input);
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expect(output).not.toContain("dXNlcjpwdw==");
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expect(output).toBe(
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`curl -H "Proxy-Authorization: Basic ${REDACTED_COMMAND_TEXT_VALUE}"`,
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);
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});
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it("is idempotent over a multi-part credential", () => {
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const input =
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`curl -H 'Authorization: Digest username="alice", response="deadbeef"' https://example.test`;
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const once = redactCommandText(input);
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expect(redactCommandText(once)).toBe(once);
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expect(redactDiagnosticText(once)).toBe(once);
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});
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it("redacts a header secret inside a diagnostic and keeps a JSON secret field working", () => {
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const input = 'command failed: curl -H "X-API-Key: abc" -> {"token":"opaque-value"}';
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const output = redactDiagnosticText(input);
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@ -18,29 +18,80 @@ const COMMAND_ENV_SECRET_ASSIGNMENT_RE = new RegExp(
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);
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const COMMAND_AUTHORIZATION_BEARER_RE =
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/(\bAuthorization\s*:\s*Bearer\s+)[^\s"'`]+/gi;
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// A secret-bearing header names a credential in its own header name. The
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// public Paperclip API documents `X-API-Key`, and a run log can also carry
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// `Api-Key`, `X-Auth-Token`, or `X-Paperclip-Api-Key`. The command redaction
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// handled `Authorization: Bearer <value>` only, so a `curl -H "X-API-Key:
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// <value>"` command kept the credential in clear. This rule redacts the value
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// of any header whose name contains an api-key, token, secret, or auth hint.
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// A secret-bearing header names a credential in its own header name. The public
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// Paperclip API documents `X-API-Key`, and a run log can also carry `Api-Key`,
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// `X-Auth-Token`, `X-Paperclip-Api-Key`, or a bare `Authorization`. This rule
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// redacts the value of such a header wherever it appears in command text.
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//
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// The rule keeps an optional auth scheme in the output. The scheme is not a
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// secret, and it tells a reader which credential form the command used. This
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// also makes the rule agree byte for byte with the bearer rule above, so
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// A header name is either a hyphenated or underscored word carrying an api-key,
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// token, secret, or auth hint, or one of the bare names `authorization` and
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// `apikey`. Requiring the hinted form to open with an alphanumeric run and then
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// a `-` or `_` keeps the rule off prose and paths that merely contain a hint
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// word, such as `GET /v1/tokens:list` or `auth: failed`, and keeps a match from
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// opening at the hyphen inside a longer name. `www-authenticate` and
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// `proxy-authenticate` are excluded: they are response headers whose
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// `error="invalid_token"` parameters are diagnostics worth keeping.
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//
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// The value is bounded by its context, so a multi-part credential stays covered
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// end to end. Inside a double- or single-quoted shell argument the value runs to
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// the closing quote. Unquoted, the value is either a comma-separated `key=value`
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// list, the shape a `Digest` or `AWS4-HMAC-SHA256` credential takes, or a single
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// whitespace-delimited token. A continuation parameter must itself carry an `=`,
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// so a bare word after the last parameter (`... response="r" status=401`)
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// survives.
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//
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// An optional auth scheme stays in the output. The scheme is not a secret, and
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// it tells a reader which credential form the command used. This also makes the
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// rule agree byte for byte with the bearer rule above, so
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// `Authorization: Bearer <value>` produces the same output as before.
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//
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// The header name and the colon match on one line only, and the value ends at
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// the first quote, backslash, or whitespace. The rule therefore stops at the
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// end of one header argument and never runs past it. Excluding the backslash
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// also keeps the rule off an escaped-quote opener such as
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// `Authorization: \"Bearer ...\"` in a serialized diagnostic, which the
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// caller's own authorization rules already redact.
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const COMMAND_SECRET_HEADER_NAME_PATTERN = String.raw`[A-Za-z0-9_-]*(?:api[-_]?key|token|secret|auth)[A-Za-z0-9_-]*`;
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// Every value branch excludes the backslash. That keeps the rule off an
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// escaped-quote opener such as `Authorization: \"Bearer ...\"` in a serialized
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// diagnostic, which the caller's own authorization rules already redact. A
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// quoted value must open with a non-blank character, so an empty header
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// argument such as `-H "X-API-Key: "` stays as it is.
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//
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// The schemes come from the IANA HTTP Authentication Scheme Registry, plus
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// `AWS4-HMAC-SHA256` and `Token`, which are widely used but unregistered. A
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// longer alternative precedes a shorter one that shares its prefix.
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const COMMAND_AUTH_SCHEMES = [
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"AWS4-HMAC-SHA256",
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"Basic",
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"Bearer",
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"Digest",
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"DPoP",
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"GNAP",
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"Hawk",
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"HOBA",
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"Mutual",
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"Negotiate",
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"OAuth",
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"PrivateToken",
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"SCRAM-SHA-256",
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"SCRAM-SHA-1",
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"Token",
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"vapid",
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] as const;
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const COMMAND_SECRET_HEADER_HINT_PATTERN = String.raw`(?:api[-_]?key|token|secret|auth)`;
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const COMMAND_SECRET_HEADER_NAME_PATTERN =
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String.raw`(?!(?:www|proxy)-authenticate\b)(?:(?=[A-Za-z0-9]+[-_])[A-Za-z0-9_-]*${COMMAND_SECRET_HEADER_HINT_PATTERN}[A-Za-z0-9_-]*|authorization|apikey)`;
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const COMMAND_SECRET_HEADER_PREFIX_PATTERN =
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COMMAND_SECRET_HEADER_NAME_PATTERN +
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String.raw`[ \t]*:[ \t]*(?:(?:${COMMAND_AUTH_SCHEMES.join("|")})[ \t]+)?`;
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const COMMAND_SECRET_HEADER_PARAM_PATTERN =
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String.raw`[^\s"'` +
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"`" +
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String.raw`\\,=]+=(?:"[^"\\\r\n]*"|'[^'\\\r\n]*'|[^\s"'` +
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"`" +
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String.raw`\\,]*)`;
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const COMMAND_SECRET_HEADER_UNQUOTED_VALUE_PATTERN =
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String.raw`(?:${COMMAND_SECRET_HEADER_PARAM_PATTERN}(?:[ \t]*,[ \t]*${COMMAND_SECRET_HEADER_PARAM_PATTERN})*|[^\s\\"'` +
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"`" +
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String.raw`]+)`;
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const COMMAND_SECRET_HEADER_RE = new RegExp(
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String.raw`(\b${COMMAND_SECRET_HEADER_NAME_PATTERN}[ \t]*:[ \t]*(?:(?:Bearer|Basic|Digest|Token)[ \t]+)?)[^\s\\"'` +
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"`" +
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String.raw`]+`,
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String.raw`("${COMMAND_SECRET_HEADER_PREFIX_PATTERN})[^\s"\\][^"\\\r\n]*(")` +
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String.raw`|('${COMMAND_SECRET_HEADER_PREFIX_PATTERN})[^\s'\\][^'\\\r\n]*(')` +
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String.raw`|(\b${COMMAND_SECRET_HEADER_PREFIX_PATTERN})${COMMAND_SECRET_HEADER_UNQUOTED_VALUE_PATTERN}`,
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"gi",
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);
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const COMMAND_OPENAI_KEY_RE = /\bsk-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{12,}\b/g;
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@ -83,7 +134,22 @@ export function redactCommandText(
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if (!maybeContainsSecretText(command)) return command;
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return command
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.replace(COMMAND_AUTHORIZATION_BEARER_RE, `$1${redactedValue}`)
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.replace(COMMAND_SECRET_HEADER_RE, `$1${redactedValue}`)
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.replace(
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COMMAND_SECRET_HEADER_RE,
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(
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_match,
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doubleQuotedPrefix: string | undefined,
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doubleQuoteClose: string | undefined,
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singleQuotedPrefix: string | undefined,
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singleQuoteClose: string | undefined,
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unquotedPrefix: string | undefined,
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) => {
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const prefix =
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doubleQuotedPrefix ?? singleQuotedPrefix ?? unquotedPrefix ?? "";
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const closingQuote = doubleQuoteClose ?? singleQuoteClose ?? "";
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return `${prefix}${redactedValue}${closingQuote}`;
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},
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)
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.replace(COMMAND_CLI_SECRET_OPTION_RE, `$1${redactedValue}$3`)
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.replace(
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COMMAND_ENV_SECRET_ASSIGNMENT_RE,
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