## Thinking Path
> - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for
work.
> - Several people can send instructions to the same agent and task.
> - A fixed GitHub token in the provider process can keep the first
person's access after another person's message is accepted.
> - Task ownership cannot select credentials for each accepted
instruction or preserve the identity of an operation already in
progress.
> - This pull request records ordered execution identity contexts and
resolves credentials when managed Git, gh, or GitHub tools start.
> - The benefit is automatic personal GitHub access for shared agents,
with durable continuation rules and no teammate credential fallback.
## Linked Issues or Issue Description
**Subsystem affected**
Cross-cutting: orchestration, connection grants, database, runtime
adapters, native runners, and run details.
**Problem or motivation**
A shared agent must use the person whose instructions it has accepted. A
queued message must retain its author. A retry or approval without new
instructions must retain the originating identity. GitHub must remain
optional for ordinary work.
**Proposed solution**
Persist execution identity separately from task ownership. Give new
processes a run-scoped broker capability and token-free managed
launchers. Capture identity at operation start. Keep an explicit
dedicated-agent grant as an override. Show redacted diagnostics in run
details.
**Alternatives considered**
Per-task ownership, fixed provider tokens, and mutable repository author
configuration do not handle accepted steering or concurrent operations.
A manual account-selection action would add unnecessary setup to each
turn.
**Roadmap alignment**
This completes the existing Multiple Human Users, MCP Tool Gateway &
Apps, Secrets Manager, and Self-healing Runs capabilities. The
implementation follows the maintainer-approved plan.
Related work: Refs #12843, Refs #12907. Existing proposals #4618 and
#8945 cover per-agent or per-worktree author configuration. This change
instead follows the accepted human instruction across runtime types.
Refs #11831 for governed personal connection delegation; this change
preserves connection audience checks and does not use standing
delegation as a personal credential fallback.
## What Changed
- Add durable, ordered identity contexts and active run references.
Preserve message authors through consolidation, steering, retries,
delegation, approvals, routines, and restart.
- Add an authenticated operation-time GitHub credential broker and
local/remote managed git and gh launchers. Keep personal tokens out of
the long-lived provider process.
- Resolve GitHub gateway and server-side Git operations through the same
responsible-person or dedicated-grant selection rules.
- Make absent and unavailable GitHub credentials non-blocking at generic
startup. Clear host and prior-person credentials. Keep anonymous Git
access where supported.
- Add run-detail identity history and the dedicated-account warning.
Keep task ownership and queue-versus-steer decisions unchanged.
- Preserve personal OAuth declarations through connection edits. Retain
exact selected grants in the gateway.
- Fix continuation races found during real acceptance: verify a warm
owner before credential rotation, and wait for bounded durable runner
suspension before the next run starts.
- Make migrations replay-safe. Retain identity through agent/run
deletion, remove it with its company, and clean terminal launcher
directories before releasing execution environments. Document
coordinated release and rollback.
## Verification
- Full workspace typecheck, build, and token gates passed. The complete
local suite passed in its normal test groups: 17,120 passing tests,
including all 143 serialized server suites. After integrating the newly
merged runner API work, full local typecheck and build passed again,
along with 890 focused integration tests. All 31 checks on the
integrated revision passed, including build, browser E2E, release
registry, canary dry run, typecheck, security and all test suites.
Greptile is 5/5 with all review threads resolved.
- Current focused checks passed: 142 native executor tests, 67 runtime
lifecycle tests, 9 durable identity tests, 75 credential/routine tests,
19 low-trust/resumption tests, and the executable migration replay test.
- Authenticated browser acceptance with two Paperclip users and two
GitHub accounts on one shared native agent passed. Real commits and
pushes followed A → B accepted steering → queued A continuation in the
same saved conversation. GitHub commit author and committer identities
matched all three operations. Both runs succeeded and task ownership
stayed unchanged.
- Real GitHub MCP calls switched from A to B after accepted steering. A
delegated subtask retained its originating identity across a server
restart.
- Disabling B's GitHub connection left ordinary work successful. Managed
gh was unauthenticated and the provider had no inherited GH_TOKEN or
GITHUB_TOKEN.
- The browser displayed run-detail diagnostics and the exact
dedicated-account warning. A final controller-restart check followed by
another-person continuation retained the conversation, selected the
correct GitHub login and Git author, and removed each terminal launcher
directory.
- Company-lifetime migration and all five previously failing CI suites
passed locally (167 tests). Same-token gateway A → B → A and six
broker/launcher boundary tests passed.
- Remote callback, launcher, sandbox, and runtime contract tests passed.
Both native and legacy Codex completed actual Daytona executions on the
integrated revision ([campaign
results](https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip/actions/runs/34155056509)).
The remote package-manager shim staging regression also passed locally.
## Risks
- Deploy the migrations, server broker, launchers, and runner artifacts
together. Existing processes finish with their original contract. New
managed processes need the broker endpoint for GitHub operations.
- Finish or stop new managed executions before rolling application code
back. Keep the additive schema and identity history during rollback.
- Scripts that require a persistent raw GH_TOKEN must use managed git,
gh, or GitHub gateway tools. Run capabilities authorize code executing
within that run to acquire its current identity; this is not
hostile-code isolation within one execution principal. Managed commands
prevent automatic credential carryover; arbitrary code deliberately
copying a credential is outside that boundary.
- Uncertain steering acknowledgement deliberately holds new credential
acquisition until reconciliation. Already-started operations retain
their captured identity.
- GitHub private access and provider outages can still fail the specific
operation that needs them. Dedicated grant failure does not fall back to
personal access.
## Model Used
OpenAI GPT-6 through Codex assisted implementation, review, shell
execution, and browser acceptance. The exact model variant and
context-window size are not exposed in this session. Tool use included
TypeScript and Rust tests, database integration tests, GitHub CLI, and
authenticated browser control.
## Checklist
- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes
#` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant
issue template
- [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or
links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip`
URLs)
- [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`)
and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green
- [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge
---------
Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
## Thinking Path
> - Paperclip is the open source control plane people use to manage AI
agents for work
> - Local process adapters can enforce network allowlists through a
Unix-socket proxy inside the Linux sandbox
> - The proxy socket was created under `os.tmpdir()`, which can be a
deeply nested run-specific directory
> - Linux Unix-domain socket paths are limited to 107 usable bytes, so
deep temporary paths can be silently truncated during bind
> - A truncated proxy socket resets every confined outbound connection,
including the model provider API, before the agent can do work
> - This pull request creates proxy sockets under the short `/tmp` path
when possible and validates the path length before bind
> - The benefit is reliable sandboxed egress under deep `TMPDIR` values
and an explicit error instead of an opaque connection-reset storm
## Linked Issues or Issue Description
### Pre-submission checklist
- [x] I searched existing open and closed issues and this is not a
duplicate.
- [x] I can reproduce this on upstream `master`.
- [x] I confirmed the error originates in Paperclip's local-process
sandbox proxy.
### What happened?
Sandboxed local-process agents using `networkScope: "allowlist"` could
lose all proxied egress when `TMPDIR` was deeply nested because
`proxy.sock` exceeded Linux's Unix socket path limit. The truncated bind
surfaced as repeated connection resets, including for provider API
traffic.
### Expected behavior
Proxy creation should use a Linux-safe short path and fail explicitly if
no safe socket path can be created.
### Steps to reproduce
1. Set `TMPDIR` to a path long enough that
`<TMPDIR>/paperclip-network-sandbox-XXXXXX/proxy.sock` exceeds 107
bytes.
2. Build or run a local-process sandbox with `networkScope:
"allowlist"`.
3. Make an HTTP or HTTPS request through the generated sandbox proxy.
4. Observe connection resets from the overlong Unix socket path on
affected code.
### Paperclip version or commit
Upstream `master` before this change.
### Deployment mode
Other — Linux local-process adapters using Bubblewrap network
allowlisting.
### Installation method
Built from source.
### Agent adapter(s) involved
Codex and any other local-process adapter using the shared sandbox
utility.
### Operating system
Linux.
### Additional context
GitHub search found no duplicate public issue or pull request for this
defect.
## What Changed
- Add a Linux Unix-socket byte-length guard that reports the unsafe path
before binding.
- Create network proxy temporary directories under `/tmp` first, with
`os.tmpdir()` as a validated fallback.
- Use the safe temporary-directory helper at both allowlist proxy
creation sites while preserving trusted URL handling.
- Add regression coverage that sets a deliberately deep `TMPDIR` and
verifies the working socket remains within 107 bytes under `/tmp`.
## Verification
- `node
/srv/paperclip/home/paperclipai/paperclip/node_modules/vitest/vitest.mjs
run packages/adapter-utils/src/local-process-sandbox.test.ts` — 8
passed, 4 environment-gated tests skipped.
- `git diff --check origin/master...HEAD` — passed.
- Greptile Review — passed after reviewing 2 files with 0 comments and
no unresolved threads; this repository integration did not emit a
separate numeric confidence score.
- Full GitHub CI matrix — passed after one rerun of an unrelated ACPX
`ENOTEMPTY` cleanup flake.
- Package typecheck was attempted, but the existing shared install
cannot resolve `acpx/runtime`; the failure is outside the changed files
and is expected to be covered by CI's clean dependency install.
## Risks
- Low risk: the change is limited to Linux sandbox proxy
temporary-directory selection and validation.
- Systems without a writable `/tmp` fall back to `os.tmpdir()` only when
the resulting socket path is safe; otherwise startup now fails loudly
instead of producing connection resets.
- No schema, API, UI, migration, or documentation behavior changes.
> For core feature work, check [`ROADMAP.md`](ROADMAP.md) first and
discuss it in `#dev` before opening the PR. Feature PRs that overlap
with planned core work may need to be redirected — check the roadmap
first. See `CONTRIBUTING.md`.
## Model Used
- OpenAI Codex, `gpt-5.3-codex`, tool-enabled coding agent with managed
reasoning and code execution; context-window size is not exposed by the
runtime.
## Checklist
- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes
#` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant
issue template
- [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or
links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip`
URLs)
- [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`)
and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green
- [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge
Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
## Thinking Path
> - Paperclip is the control plane people use to coordinate AI agents
and their execution environments.
> - Environment realization decides where an agent runs and which
filesystem and toolchain are authoritative.
> - Copy-based realization is unsafe for container-anchored tasks
because absolute paths such as `/app` can point outside the synchronized
tree and task-specific binaries may be absent.
> - That mismatch can let an agent successfully verify work in a phantom
writable path while sync-back silently discards the result.
> - Existing task environments already provide the authoritative
filesystem and toolchain, so they should be executed in place rather
than copied.
> - Copy mode still needs explicit confinement rules so aliases target
the synchronized workspace and unsynchronized writable paths fail
visibly.
> - This pull request adds typed realization metadata, propagates the
authoritative root through orchestration, and teaches Codex to honor it.
> - The benefit is that container-anchored tasks operate on
verifier-visible state with the intended tools, while copy mode remains
safe and backward compatible.
## Linked Issues or Issue Description
No public GitHub issue exists for this defect.
GitHub duplicate searches for in-place execution, workspace realization,
and authoritative workspace roots found no related pull request to link.
### What happened?
Environment-backed agent runs were always realized through a copied
workspace. Tasks anchored to absolute container paths could therefore
write outside the synchronized tree, and task-provided toolchains were
unavailable in the copy. A run could report success even though
sync-back discarded its output.
### Expected behavior
Existing task environments should run against their real authoritative
root and toolchain. Copy-mode runs should map declared absolute aliases
into the synchronized tree and reject writable paths that cannot be
restored.
### Steps to reproduce
1. Run a Codex task environment whose required files live under `/app`
or `/workspace` and whose required binary exists only in the task
container.
2. Observe that copy realization changes the effective
filesystem/toolchain or permits writes outside the synchronized root.
3. Complete and verify the task inside the agent sandbox.
4. Observe that the verifier cannot see out-of-tree artifacts or that
task-specific commands were unavailable.
### Reproduction context
- Paperclip commit: `3a16b91217483d2c233926de5b7f7bc3a1077924`
- Deployment: built from source in a task-container execution
environment
- Adapter: Codex local
- Database: not database-related
- Access context: agent execution
## What Changed
- Added typed `copy | in_place` workspace-realization metadata,
authoritative roots, confined aliases, and outbound restore paths to
shared execution-target contracts.
- Selected in-place realization for existing task environments and
skipped archive prepare/restore when the authoritative environment is
used directly.
- Propagated the authoritative root into adapter context so Codex uses
it for cwd and `PAPERCLIP_WORKSPACE_*` semantics, including ACP
execution.
- Bound copy-mode aliases such as `/app` to the synchronized workspace
and rejected writable out-of-tree paths without explicit restore
mappings.
- Added focused regression coverage while preserving existing copy-mode
archive restore behavior.
## Verification
- `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/shared typecheck` — passed.
- `pnpm exec vitest run
packages/adapter-utils/src/local-process-sandbox.test.ts
packages/adapters/codex-local/src/server/acp.test.ts
packages/adapters/codex-local/src/server/execute.remote.test.ts
server/src/__tests__/environment-run-orchestrator.test.ts` — 48 passed,
4 skipped.
- `pnpm -r typecheck` — passed.
- `env -u AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID -u AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY -u
AWS_SESSION_TOKEN pnpm test:run` — passed across all general and
serialized Vitest shards.
- `pnpm build` — passed.
- Codex `k=1` acceptance run completed July 24, 2026 at 23:54:30 UTC
with 4 completed, 0 exceptions, and mean reward 1.0: `build-cython-ext`,
`openssl-selfsigned-cert`, `prove-plus-comm`, and `sqlite-db-truncate`
each received terminal grade 1.0 against real task-environment paths and
toolchains.
## Risks
- In-place mode deliberately exposes the authoritative task root to the
adapter; incorrect environment metadata could point execution at the
wrong root. Typed metadata and focused orchestration tests cover
selection and propagation.
- Copy-mode writable-path validation is stricter and may reject
previously accepted unsafe configurations. The rejection is intentional
and produces a visible error instead of silently losing output.
- The acceptance run is focused on four Codex task-environment
workloads, not a broad cross-adapter benchmark. Existing copy-mode
archive tests and the full repository suite remain green.
> For core feature work, check [`ROADMAP.md`](ROADMAP.md) first and
discuss it in `#dev` before opening the PR. Feature PRs that overlap
with planned core work may need to be redirected — check the roadmap
first. See `CONTRIBUTING.md`.
## Model Used
- OpenAI Codex CLI coding agent; exact model ID and context-window size
were not exposed to this runtime. Capabilities used: extended reasoning,
repository editing, shell execution, test/build execution, Git, GitHub
CLI, and Paperclip API tool use.
## Checklist
- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes
#` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant
issue template
- [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or
links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip`
URLs)
- [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`)
and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green
- [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge
---------
Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
## Thinking Path
> - Paperclip is the open source control plane people use to manage AI
agents for work
> - Local coding adapters can be confined with filesystem and network
sandbox policies
> - Codex confinement proxied only user-allowlisted hosts, so it denied
Paperclip's own run API and managed MCP endpoints
> - The same proxy returned untyped plaintext denials, which MCP clients
could treat as a fatal unexpected content type
> - Host-only `PAPERCLIPAI_CMD` values could also leak into agents even
when the referenced checkout module did not exist
> - This pull request gives the sandbox an explicit trusted-URL channel
for Paperclip endpoints, returns structured JSON errors, and removes the
inherited host CLI pointer
> - The benefit is confined Codex agents retain control-plane access
without broadening the operator's external network allowlist or crashing
on policy denials
## Linked Issues or Issue Description
Refs #3802
Related foundation: #9504
### What happened?
A `codex_local` agent configured with `networkScope: "allowlist"` and an
external-only allowlist could not reach its own Paperclip API or
Paperclip-managed MCP endpoints. The sandbox proxy returned a `403`
plaintext response without `Content-Type`, and an inherited
`PAPERCLIPAI_CMD` could point at a missing checkout-local CLI module.
### Expected behavior
Paperclip's run-scoped API and managed MCP endpoints remain reachable
regardless of the user external allowlist. Policy denials are valid
structured JSON responses with an explicit media type, and host-only CLI
pointers are not inherited by agent processes.
### Steps to reproduce
1. Configure a `codex_local` agent with `networkScope: "allowlist"` and
`networkAllowlist: ["api.openai.com"]`.
2. Run the agent and request its Paperclip issue API or a
Paperclip-managed MCP endpoint.
3. Observe the sandbox proxy deny the request with an untyped plaintext
`403` response.
### Environment
- Paperclip commit: `f49a3f99` originally exhibited the defect; fix is
based on current `master`.
- Deployment: local source build on Linux.
- Adapter: Codex.
- Database: not database-related.
- Access context: agent bearer/run-scoped credentials.
## What Changed
- Added internal trusted URL rules to the local network allowlist proxy
and supplied the Codex run API plus managed MCP endpoints.
- Returned JSON error envelopes with `Content-Type` and `Content-Length`
for HTTP and CONNECT policy denials.
- Removed inherited `PAPERCLIPAI_CMD` from child process environments
while preserving explicitly constructed runtime variables.
- Added focused proxy and environment sanitizer regression tests.
## Verification
- `pnpm exec vitest run
packages/adapter-utils/src/local-process-sandbox.test.ts
packages/adapter-utils/src/server-utils-env.test.ts --reporter=verbose`
- 2 test files passed; 8 tests passed; 4 platform-dependent tests
skipped.
- `git diff --check`
- Package typecheck was attempted; it reaches unrelated current-`master`
type drift in untouched files (`spawnCwd` in `adapter-utils`, and
staged-runtime ACP types in `codex-local`).
## Risks
- Low risk: trusted access is restricted to exact HTTP(S) hostname and
port pairs derived from Paperclip-provided URLs.
- Invalid or non-HTTP trusted URL values are ignored rather than
broadening access.
- Denial response bodies change from plaintext to structured JSON;
status codes remain unchanged.
> For core feature work, check [`ROADMAP.md`](ROADMAP.md) first and
discuss it in `#dev` before opening the PR. Feature PRs that overlap
with planned core work may need to be redirected — check the roadmap
first. See `CONTRIBUTING.md`.
## Model Used
- OpenAI Codex coding agent (exact model ID and context window are not
exposed to this runtime), reasoning and terminal/tool execution enabled.
## Checklist
- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes
#` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant
issue template
- [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or
links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip`
URLs)
- [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`)
and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green
- [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge
---------
Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
## Thinking Path
> - Paperclip is the open source control plane people use to manage AI
agents for work.
> - Local coding adapters currently spawn their CLI processes directly
on the Paperclip host.
> - CLI-native approval and sandbox flags do not provide a reliable host
filesystem or network boundary.
> - An agent can therefore inspect unrelated host files or fetch
external material when an operator needs stronger isolation.
> - The confinement must stay opt-in so existing local adapter behavior
does not change unexpectedly.
> - This pull request adds a shared Linux Bubblewrap spawn layer for
workspace filesystem and deny/allowlist network scopes.
> - The benefit is enforceable defense in depth around Codex and Claude
local runs while preserving explicit provider connectivity.
## Linked Issues or Issue Description
### What happened?
`codex_local` and `claude_local` processes could read arbitrary host
paths and make unrestricted outbound network requests because Paperclip
did not impose a spawn-level boundary.
### Expected behavior
Operators can opt into a workspace-only filesystem view and either deny
network egress or allow exact provider/API hosts, independently of CLI
approval flags.
### Steps to reproduce
1. Run current `master` on Linux and configure a Codex or Claude local
adapter.
2. Ask the agent to read a canary file outside its active workspace.
3. Ask the agent to `curl` a public host.
4. Observe that both operations succeed without a Paperclip-level
confinement option.
### Environment
- Paperclip commit: `c36f1a4af` / current `master` base.
- Deployment mode: Linux local dev or self-hosted server.
- Installation: built from source.
- Adapters: Codex and Claude Code.
- Database: not related.
## What Changed
- Added a shared Bubblewrap process wrapper with opt-in
`filesystemScope: "workspace"`, managed/extra path mounts, private
`/tmp`, and Linux-only validation.
- Added `networkScope: "deny" | "allowlist"`; both use a private network
namespace, while allowlist mode exposes an exact-host HTTP(S) proxy over
a Unix-socket bridge.
- Wired Codex and Claude local CLI execution through the wrapper and
forced scoped auto runs onto the CLI lane because ACP processes are not
covered.
- Added unit and gated Bubblewrap canaries for outside-file denial,
workspace writes, direct network denial, allowlisted forwarding, and
rejected destinations.
- Documented both scopes, provider allowlist examples, Bubblewrap
requirements, and default-off behavior.
## Verification
- `pnpm exec vitest run
packages/adapter-utils/src/local-process-sandbox.test.ts
packages/adapters/codex-local/src/server/acp.test.ts
packages/adapters/claude-local/src/server/acp.test.ts` — 34 passed, 4
gated Bubblewrap tests skipped by default.
- `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/adapter-utils typecheck`
- `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/adapter-codex-local typecheck`
- `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/adapter-claude-local typecheck`
- `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/adapter-utils build`
- `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/adapter-codex-local build`
- `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/adapter-claude-local build`
- Attempted the gated tests with a vendored Bubblewrap binary; this
container blocks unprivileged namespace setup (`setting up uid map:
Permission denied` / loopback `RTM_NEWADDR: Operation not permitted`),
so kernel-level execution remains for CI or a namespace-enabled Linux
host.
## Risks
- Bubblewrap must be installed and unprivileged user/mount/network
namespaces must be enabled on the host; scoped runs fail clearly if the
prerequisite is missing.
- Allowlist mode depends on the coding CLI honoring standard
`HTTP_PROXY` / `HTTPS_PROXY` variables; custom providers must list every
required exact hostname and port.
- Exact-host allowlists intentionally reject wildcards, which is safer
but may require operators to enumerate multi-host provider setups.
- No behavior changes unless an operator enables `filesystemScope` or
`networkScope`.
> This aligns with the ROADMAP direction toward safer remote and
sandboxed agent environments and does not duplicate an open PR or issue
found in the repository search.
## Model Used
- OpenAI GPT-5.5 (`gpt-5.5`) via Codex CLI, with reasoning, repository
tool use, shell execution, code editing, and test execution. The serving
context-window size is not exposed to the agent.
## Checklist
- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes
#` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant
issue template
- [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or
links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip`
URLs)
- [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`)
and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [ ] All Paperclip CI gates are green
- [ ] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge
---------
Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
Dotta