## Thinking Path
> - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for
work
> - Execution workspaces need isolated databases, ports, and runtime
services
> - Concurrent workspaces could reuse ports or lose service ownership
after a restart
> - A markerless worktree also needed seed recovery, but normal
markerless instances still needed to boot
> - This pull request makes seed, port, and service ownership state
explicit and recoverable
> - It also checks live process and listener identity before it reclaims
shared resources
> - The benefit is reliable workspace startup, restart, adoption, and
concurrent provisioning
## Linked Issues or Issue Description
**What happened?**
Managed workspaces could lose runtime service ownership after a
control-plane restart. Concurrent worktrees could also reuse a port when
their parent paths differed. A seed recovery change made every
markerless instance resolve a worktree seed source, so normal instances
without a source could not start.
**Expected behavior**
Paperclip must preserve healthy managed services across restarts. It
must reserve unique ports across worktree parents. It must provision a
registered markerless worktree, but it must skip seed work for a normal
markerless instance.
**Steps to reproduce**
1. Start two managed worktrees under different parent paths at the same
time.
2. Restart the control plane while a managed service stays alive.
3. Start Paperclip with a config that has no seed markers and no
registered worktree source.
4. Observe duplicate port selection, lost service adoption, or a
seed-source startup error.
**Paperclip version or commit**
Current `master` plus the workspace runtime reliability changes in this
pull request.
**Deployment mode**
Local development with managed execution workspaces and embedded
Postgres.
## What Changed
- Added a shared port registry with lease heartbeats, process identity
checks, and live listener probes.
- Reserved worktree ports across custom parent paths and repaired
duplicate legacy assignments.
- Preserved and adopted healthy managed services across control-plane
restarts.
- Reconciled guest bind modes and verified listener ownership before
termination or reuse.
- Provisioned registered markerless worktree databases and kept normal
markerless instance startup as a no-op.
- Added CLI, shared, server, and shell regression tests for seed, port,
listener, restart, and adoption behavior.
- Updated the worktree development documentation.
## Verification
- `pnpm exec vitest run cli/src/__tests__/worktree.test.ts
--reporter=verbose` — 63 tests passed.
- `pnpm exec vitest run
packages/shared/src/worktree-port-registry.test.ts --reporter=verbose` —
5 tests passed.
- Focused runtime Vitest set — 199 tests passed across 37 suites.
- `node --test scripts/__tests__/provision-worktree-self-heal.test.mjs`
— 10 tests passed.
- `git diff --check` passed.
## Risks
- Port reservation now depends on lease and process identity data. The
fallback listener probe prevents early reclamation when process metadata
is incomplete.
- Runtime adoption is stricter about bind and owner identity. The tests
cover healthy adoption, stale records, PID reuse, and unrelated
listeners.
- Markerless seed detection now separates registered worktrees from
normal instances. The tests cover both paths.
- There are no database schema migrations.
> For core feature work, check [`ROADMAP.md`](ROADMAP.md) first and
discuss it in `#dev` before opening the PR. Feature PRs that overlap
with planned core work may need to be redirected — check the roadmap
first. See `CONTRIBUTING.md`.
## Model Used
- OpenAI Codex with the `gpt-5` model family. The serving snapshot and
context-window size are not exposed. The agent used reasoning,
repository tools, code execution, and test execution.
## Checklist
- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes
#` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant
issue template
- [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or
links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip`
URLs)
- [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`)
and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green
- [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge
---------
Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
Co-authored-by: Dev Agent <dev@paperclip.ing>
<!-- Simplified Technical English (ASD-STE100). -->
## Thinking Path
> - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for
work
> - Paperclip starts and supervises managed runtime services for a
project's execution workspaces, so an agent's branch can be previewed
while it works
> - Those services only listen on plain loopback HTTP. A person on
another device, or on a phone, cannot open the preview
> - A Tailscale HTTPS mapping solves this, but `tailscale serve` needs
host privileges that the Paperclip server process must not hold
> - This pull request adds the foundation only: a separate
least-privilege host broker, the shared exposure contract, and the
database columns that hold exposure state
> - Nothing calls the broker yet, so there is no behavior change. The
benefit is that the privileged surface is small, reviewable, and
isolated before any lifecycle code depends on it
## Linked Issues or Issue Description
No public GitHub issue exists. The change follows the feature request
template.
**Subsystem affected**
Managed workspace runtime services, the shared type and validator
package, and the database schema.
**Problem or motivation**
A managed runtime service binds to loopback only. There is no supported
way to reach that preview from another device. Adding HTTPS directly to
the server would mean the server process runs `tailscale serve`, which
needs privileges far wider than the task requires. A compromised or
buggy server could then map any port to the tailnet.
**Proposed solution**
Split the privileged work into a separate broker process with a narrow
protocol, and define one shared contract that the server, the UI, the
runtime, and the broker all read. Land this foundation first, with no
caller, so the privileged code can be reviewed on its own.
**Alternatives considered**
- Call `tailscale serve` from the server process. This was rejected
because it gives the server unrestricted mapping authority.
- Use `sudo` for single `tailscale` commands. This was rejected because
the argument list is the only guard, and it is easy to widen by
accident.
- Use a generic reverse proxy. This was rejected because it does not
remove the need for a privileged Tailscale mapping step.
**Roadmap alignment**
This supports the existing managed workspace runtime capability. It adds
no new product surface on its own.
**Additional context**
The broker is the security boundary of the feature, so it is
deliberately the first slice. Three later pull requests build on it: the
server exposure lifecycle, the runtime lease and recovery integration,
and the leased-port mediator.
## What Changed
- Add the `@paperclipai/tailscale-https-broker` workspace package. The
broker listens on a unix socket, authorizes each peer with
`SO_PEERCRED`, and answers a small request protocol.
- Restrict what the broker will map. It accepts only same-number
HTTPS-to-loopback pairs inside the Paperclip port range, refuses
protected ports, and confirms that the loopback port belongs to a
Paperclip-owned listener.
- Parse every request with a strict JSON reader that rejects duplicate
keys, prototype keys, and unknown fields.
- Write an append-only audit record for each broker decision.
- Add the shared exposure contract in `@paperclipai/shared`: the
`RuntimeExposureConfig`, `RuntimeExposureState`, and
`RuntimeExposureStatus` types, their zod validators, the app and HMR
port rules, and the loopback-bind helpers.
- Persist exposure state on `workspace_runtime_services` with the new
`exposure` column, plus the server-private `exposure_handle` and
`backend_url` columns that are never serialized to API clients.
- Add the `execution_workspace_runtime_leases` table that the later
lease slice uses.
- Extend the runtime read-model test fixture for the three new columns.
## Verification
Focused checks, all run on this branch:
- `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/tailscale-https-broker test` — 12 files,
82 tests pass. This covers peer credentials, port policy, protected
ports, the serve config writer, the strict JSON reader, argv parsing,
and the socket server.
- `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/tailscale-https-broker typecheck` — clean.
- `npx vitest run --root packages/shared src/runtime-exposure
src/validators/runtime-exposure.test.ts` — 3 files, 40 tests pass.
- `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/db typecheck` — runs `check:migrations`
first. Migration numbering and migration safety both pass.
- `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/shared typecheck` — clean.
- `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/ui typecheck` — clean.
- `npx vitest run --root server
src/services/workspace-runtime-read-model.test.ts` — 3 tests pass.
- `npx tsc --noEmit -p server/tsconfig.json` — 139 errors, which is
exactly the count on `master` before this branch. All 139 come from the
unbuilt `@paperclipai/plugin-sdk` package.
To confirm the exposure state is inert, start a managed runtime service
as usual. The new columns stay null and the service behaves as it does
today.
## Risks
- Migration risk is low. Both migrations only add a table and three
nullable columns. No column is backfilled and no existing column
changes. The migration safety check passes.
- Behavior risk is low. No code path calls the broker in this pull
request, and the shared exposure fields are optional.
- The broker is privileged, so it is the real risk surface. It is
mitigated by peer-credential authorization, a fixed port range, a
protected-port deny list, same-number pair enforcement,
listener-ownership checks, strict JSON parsing, and an audit trail.
Reviewers should read
`packages/tailscale-https-broker/src/authorization.ts` and
`src/port-policy.ts` closely.
- The broker requires a `tailscale` version floor, which its README
records. An older host CLI makes the broker refuse to start rather than
map incorrectly.
- `pnpm-lock.yaml` changes because a new workspace package is added. The
diff is the new importer block, plus one duplicate `tinyexec` entry that
pnpm removed.
> For core feature work, check [`ROADMAP.md`](ROADMAP.md) first and
discuss it in `#dev` before opening the PR.
## Model Used
Claude Opus 5 (`claude-opus-5`), 1M context window, extended thinking,
with tool use and code execution.
## Checklist
- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes
#` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant
issue template
- [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or
links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip`
URLs)
- [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`)
and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [ ] All Paperclip CI gates are green
- [ ] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge
Dotta