Commit Graph

2 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Dotta 7f766526a6
feat(sandbox): add task-scoped egress grants (#10155)
## Thinking Path

> - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for
work
> - Confinement providers protect agent runs with default-deny network
policies
> - Kubernetes environments currently apply only provider-level,
namespace-wide egress allowances
> - Tasks that legitimately need GitHub or package registries therefore
cannot request narrow access, while network failures do not explain the
governing policy or how to request a grant
> - This pull request adds issue-scoped egress grants that become
workload-owned, run-label-selected policies and carries the effective
grant through lease audit metadata
> - The benefit is that internet-dependent work can run without enabling
broad egress for every concurrent task, and denied requests point
operators to the exact grant path

## Linked Issues or Issue Description

No public issue exists. Related but distinct: Refs #9944, which adds a
provider-wide open-internet posture; this PR keeps provider defaults
narrow and adds per-task grants.

**Problem / motivation**
Kubernetes sandbox egress is configured at the provider/tenant level. A
task that needs to clone from GitHub or install from PyPI cannot request
those destinations without changing the policy for every run in the
tenant namespace. DNS/connectivity failures also surface as generic tool
errors with no policy name or remediation path.

**Proposed solution**
Accept `executionWorkspaceSettings.networkEgress.allowFqdns` and
`allowCidrs`, forward the setting through heartbeat environment
acquisition, and create a workload-owned NetworkPolicy or
CiliumNetworkPolicy selected by `paperclip.io/run-id`. Record the
effective grant in lease activity/metadata, expose policy context
through `PAPERCLIP_NETWORK_EGRESS_*`, and append the grant path to
likely policy-related stderr failures.

**Alternatives considered**
A provider-wide open-internet switch is broader than required and is
already covered by #9944. Mutating the existing namespace policy would
leak each task's destinations to other concurrent runs. Standard
Kubernetes NetworkPolicy cannot enforce FQDNs exactly, so standard mode
uses the existing hardened public-IPv4 TCP 80/443 fallback only for the
selected run; Cilium mode remains exact.

**Roadmap alignment**
This extends the existing cloud/sandbox agent roadmap capability with
task-level control-plane policy and does not duplicate a planned roadmap
item.

## What Changed

- Added validated `networkEgress` grants to issue execution workspace
settings and forwarded them through environment lease acquisition.
- Added workload-owned, run-label-scoped
NetworkPolicy/CiliumNetworkPolicy resources for task FQDN/CIDR grants.
- Added lease audit metadata, sandbox policy environment variables, and
actionable network-denial stderr guidance.
- Added focused parser, manifest, policy creation, and denial-message
tests plus Kubernetes provider documentation.

## Verification

- `pnpm -C packages/shared exec vitest run src/validators/issue.test.ts`
— 27 passed.
- `pnpm -C packages/plugins/sandbox-providers/kubernetes test -- --run
test/unit/network-policy.test.ts test/unit/cilium-network-policy.test.ts
test/unit/scoped-network-egress.test.ts` — 21 passed.
- `pnpm -C server exec vitest run
src/__tests__/execution-workspace-policy.test.ts` — 15 passed.
- `pnpm exec vitest run
server/src/__tests__/heartbeat-plugin-environment.test.ts
server/src/__tests__/environment-runtime.test.ts` — 26 passed.
- `pnpm --dir packages/db build && pnpm --dir packages/shared build &&
pnpm --dir packages/plugins/sdk build` — passed, including migration
safety checks.
- `pnpm --dir packages/plugins/sandbox-providers/kubernetes typecheck &&
pnpm --dir server typecheck` — passed after refreshing the worktree's
frozen offline dependencies.
- End-to-end cluster validation of the `build-cython-ext` benchmark
remains for CI/maintainer Kubernetes infrastructure; the focused tests
assert `github.com` and `pypi.org` produce a policy selected only by the
granted run.

## Risks

- Standard NetworkPolicy cannot express FQDNs, so an FQDN grant allows
hardened public IPv4 TCP 80/443 for that run; use Cilium mode for exact
hostname enforcement.
- The new field is additive and absent by default, so existing runs keep
the current provider-level policy.
- Workload owner references garbage-collect scoped policies with the
Job/Sandbox; a cluster/controller that ignores owner references could
temporarily strand a policy that still selects no future run ID.

> For core feature work, check [`ROADMAP.md`](ROADMAP.md) first and
discuss it in `#dev` before opening the PR. Feature PRs that overlap
with planned core work may need to be redirected — check the roadmap
first. See `CONTRIBUTING.md`.

## Model Used

OpenAI Codex, exact model ID `gpt-5.6-sol`, high reasoning mode, tool
use and code execution. The runtime did not expose a context-window
size.

## Checklist

- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes
#` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant
issue template
- [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or
links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip`
URLs)
- [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`)
and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green
- [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge

---------

Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
2026-07-24 09:58:58 -05:00
Jannes Stubbemann 05ab45225a
feat(plugin-kubernetes): self-hostable Kubernetes sandbox provider (stage 1/3: plugin package) (#5790)
## Thinking Path

> - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for
work
> - Sandbox providers are the seam that lets agent runs execute in
isolated environments; today the only first-party remote provider is
Daytona, a hosted third-party service
> - Self-hosters running Paperclip on their own infrastructure (often
Kubernetes already) have no first-party way to run agent sandboxes on a
cluster they control
> - That gap matters for teams with data-residency, sovereignty, or cost
constraints who cannot or will not send workloads to a hosted sandbox
service
> - This pull request adds a Kubernetes sandbox-provider plugin as a
standalone, workspace-excluded package: it implements every
SandboxProvider hook the Daytona provider does, on infrastructure the
operator owns
> - The benefit is that any Paperclip deployment with a Kubernetes
cluster gets multi-tenant, network-isolated, quota-bounded agent
sandboxes with zero new external dependencies

## Linked Issues or Issue Description

No existing issue. Following the feature template:

- **Problem:** Paperclip's remote sandbox execution requires a hosted
third-party provider. Self-hosters cannot run agent sandboxes on their
own Kubernetes clusters with a first-party provider.
- **Proposed solution:** A `@paperclipai/plugin-kubernetes`
sandbox-provider plugin with two backends: long-lived sandboxes via the
[kubernetes-sigs/agent-sandbox](https://github.com/kubernetes-sigs/agent-sandbox)
CRD (multi-command exec, adapter-install pattern) and one-shot
`batch/v1` Jobs (stable APIs only, no extra controllers).
- **Alternatives considered:** Driving kubectl from a generic shell
provider (no lifecycle/lease semantics), or requiring a hosted provider
(exactly the constraint this removes).

## What Changed

This is **stage 1 of 3** of a staged contribution (direction agreed with
maintainers): the plugin package alone. Stage 2 (server integration:
lease params, provider registration) and stage 3 (agent runtime images +
CI) are companion PRs that will be cross-linked from a comment here.

- New package `packages/plugins/sandbox-providers/kubernetes`
(workspace-excluded, like the path already carved out in
`pnpm-workspace.yaml`): src, unit + kind integration tests, operator
prerequisite manifests, README, smoke-test guide
- Implements the full SandboxProvider hook surface the Daytona provider
implements: `validateConfig`, `probe`, `acquireLease`, `resumeLease`,
`releaseLease`, `destroyLease`, `realizeWorkspace`, `execute`
- Two backends: `sandbox-cr` (default; long-lived pod via the
agent-sandbox `Sandbox` CR, supports multi-command exec) and `job`
(one-shot `batch/v1` Job; nothing beyond k8s 1.27+ required)
- Per-run adapter resolution: one environment serves mixed harnesses;
the per-run `adapterType` hint is read through a local optional type
extension, so the plugin typechecks and builds against the current
plugin SDK and simply falls back to the environment's configured default
adapter until stage 2 lands
- Exec-env wrapping: the Kubernetes exec API carries no environment, so
commands are wrapped to receive the run's env
- Fast-upload interception for workspace realization, scoped per lease
- Per-tenant isolation: derived namespace per company, RBAC,
ResourceQuota, restricted-PSS pod security (runAsNonRoot, drop ALL,
seccomp RuntimeDefault, no SA token automount)
- Network egress policy in two flavors: native `NetworkPolicy` and
`CiliumNetworkPolicy` (FQDN allowlists)
- Image allowlist with glob matching, registry override, and per-run
image override validation
- Per-run Kubernetes Secrets carrying agent credentials, ownerRef'd to
the Job or Sandbox CR for cascade GC

## Verification

- Standalone build, exactly as the README documents:
  ```bash
  cd packages/plugins/sandbox-providers/kubernetes
  pnpm install --ignore-workspace
  pnpm test        # 147 unit tests, 17 files, all green
  pnpm typecheck   # clean against the in-repo plugin SDK on master
pnpm build # dist/ emitted, manifest + worker entrypoints present
  ```
- A kind-cluster end-to-end integration test is included
(`RUN_K8S_INTEGRATION_TESTS=1 pnpm test
test/integration/end-to-end-run.test.ts`)
- Beyond CI: this provider has been verified in a production
multi-tenant deployment against five harnesses (opencode, pi, codex,
gemini, claude code) with real billed runs

## Risks

- **Zero behavior change for any existing deployment.** The package is
workspace-excluded; nothing in the server imports or loads it until
stage 2's integration lands. No existing code paths are touched.
- The default `sandbox-cr` backend depends on an alpha CRD
(`agents.x-k8s.io/v1alpha1`); the README flags this and the `job`
backend uses only stable APIs as a fallback.
- Risk surface is confined to deployments that explicitly install and
configure the plugin.
- The default runtime images (`ghcr.io/paperclipai/agent-runtime-*`) are
published by the stage 3 companion PR (#7934); until that lands,
deployments must point `runtimeImage` at their own images.

## Model Used

Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context), extended thinking, with tool use (Claude
Code).

## Checklist

- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes
#` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant
issue template
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [ ] If this change affects the UI, I have included before/after
screenshots (no UI changes)
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [ ] All Paperclip CI gates are green (pending this push)
- [ ] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-10 21:07:00 -07:00