## Thinking Path
> - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for
work, distributed primarily via the `paperclipai` npm package and its
`@paperclipai/*` workspace packages.
> - The release subsystem (`scripts/release-package-*`) decides which
workspace packages CI republishes at the unified calver version each
release, and `replaceWorkspaceDeps()` rewrites every internal
`workspace:` dependency to that calver version at publish time.
> - The gap: a package that publishes from CI can declare a `workspace:`
dependency on a package that is NOT enrolled for CI publish. The
dependency spec gets rewritten to a calver version that is never
actually published, so the dependent becomes uninstallable.
> - This shipped for real: a recent change made `@paperclipai/server`
depend on `@paperclipai/skills-catalog`, but skills-catalog was not on
the calver release train — so canary builds after that merge failed to
resolve `@paperclipai/skills-catalog@<calver>` and `npx
paperclipai@canary run` broke.
> - This PR addresses it durably by (a) putting every remaining internal
package on the CI release train so no internal dependency can dangle,
and (b) adding a fail-fast guard so this class of break can never ship
again.
> - The benefit is that canary and stable installs resolve all internal
dependencies, and any future unpublishable workspace edge fails the
release build with a clear, named error instead of producing a broken
package.
## Linked Issues or Issue Description
Refs #8327 (introduced the `server -> skills-catalog` runtime dependency
that surfaced the gap).
No public issue tracks this; describing it in-PR:
- **Problem:** After #8327, `npx paperclipai@canary run` failed for
builds past the merge because `@paperclipai/skills-catalog` was
rewritten to a calver version that was never published (the package was
not enrolled for CI publish). Versions before the merge still ran.
- **Root cause:** A `publishFromCi:true` package can declare a
`workspace:` dependency on a package that is not `publishFromCi:true`;
the release-time version rewrite then points at a non-existent published
version.
## What Changed
- Enrolled every remaining internal package on the calver release train
by setting `publishFromCi: true` in
`scripts/release-package-manifest.json`: `skills-catalog`,
`teams-catalog`, `plugin-workspace-diff`, `plugin-kubernetes`,
`plugin-novita-sandbox`. There are now zero `publishFromCi:false`
entries.
- `skills-catalog`, `teams-catalog`, `plugin-workspace-diff` already
existed on npm — CI simply republishes them at calver.
- `plugin-kubernetes` and `plugin-novita-sandbox` were not on npm; their
one-time first publish was bootstrapped so the
`check-release-package-bootstrap` gate passes.
- Added `findUnpublishableWorkspaceEdges()` to
`scripts/release-package-map.mjs`, wired into
`buildReleasePackagePlan()`. The release map build now fails fast
(surfaced by the `check` CI already runs) whenever a
`publishFromCi:true` package declares a runtime `workspace:` dependency
(`dependencies`/`optionalDependencies`/`peerDependencies`) on a
non-`publishFromCi:true` `@paperclipai/*` package, naming the offending
edge.
- Added tests covering positive/negative detection, all three dependency
sections, unknown-package edges, off-train edges, and the live manifest.
## Verification
- `node --test scripts/release-package-map.test.mjs` → 9/9 pass
(includes a test asserting the live manifest has no unpublishable
edges).
- `node scripts/check-release-package-bootstrap.mjs
scripts/release-package-manifest.json` → passes, naming all five
newly-enabled packages (all confirmed present on npm).
- Confirmed via `npm view` that all five packages resolve on the public
registry.
## Risks
- Low risk. The change only enrolls already-existing (or
freshly-bootstrapped) packages onto the existing release train and adds
a build-time validation. No runtime code paths change. The new guard can
only *fail* a release that was already going to ship a broken package.
## Model Used
Claude Opus 4.7 (claude-opus-4-7), extended thinking, with tool use /
code execution.
## Checklist
- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes
#` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant
issue template
- [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or
links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip`
URLs)
- [x] My branch name describes the change and contains no internal
Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] If this change affects the UI, I have included before/after
screenshots (N/A — no UI changes)
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes (N/A —
no doc-facing behavior change)
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [ ] All Paperclip CI gates are green
- [ ] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups
- [ ] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge
Fixes#6470
## Thinking Path
> - Paperclip is an open-source AI agent platform receiving a high
volume of community PRs — currently 2,398 open
> - The contributor experience is broken: PRs sit for months with no
feedback, contributors don't know why they're stuck, and maintainers
spend review time on PRs that are missing basics
> - Common problems: no linked issue, no test coverage, incomplete PR
template, manually-edited lockfile — all catchable before human review
> - At the same time, accepting untrusted PRs from unknown contributors
is a real attack surface: malicious packages, secret injection,
tampering with CI scripts, and code touching the sensitive paths from
the April security advisories
> - This PR adds automated gates that run on every PR: quality failures
get a clear comment telling contributors exactly what to fix, security
concerns are silently flagged as draft advisories and block merge via a
pending check run
> - The benefit is a dramatically faster feedback loop for good-faith
contributors and a meaningful security layer for the maintainers
reviewing them
## What Changed
- **`.github/workflows/commitperclip-review.yml`** — new workflow using
`pull_request_target` (runs in base branch context, has secrets, never
executes PR code). Runs quality gates + security gates on every PR
open/update.
- **`.github/dependabot.yml`** — weekly automated dependency
vulnerability PRs for npm and GitHub Actions.
- **`.github/scripts/get-bot-token.mjs`** — generates a short-lived
commitperclip installation token from `COMMITPERCLIP_KEY` secret.
- **`.github/scripts/run-quality-gates.mjs`** — orchestrates 5 quality
gates, posts/updates a single consolidated comment on the PR.
- **`.github/scripts/check-pr-template.mjs`** — validates all 5 required
template sections, Thinking Path depth (≥3 sentences), Model Used not
placeholder.
- **`.github/scripts/check-pr-linked-issue.mjs`** — requires `Fixes
#NNN` or issue URL in PR body.
- **`.github/scripts/check-pr-test-coverage.mjs`** — requires at least
one test file in the diff.
- **`.github/scripts/check-pr-lockfile.mjs`** — blocks manual
`pnpm-lock.yaml` edits (only the refresh bot may change it).
- **`.github/scripts/check-pr-dependencies.mjs`** — informational
comment when new npm packages are added.
- **`.github/scripts/check-pr-security.mjs`** — 6 silent security
checks: secret patterns, CI workflow tampering, build script changes,
supply chain (new packages in lockfile), suspicious test patterns
(outbound network/shell exec/env var reads), and changes to the 9
sensitive path prefixes from the April advisories. When any fire:
creates a draft security advisory + sets `security-review` check to
`in_progress` (blocks merge). When clean: sets `security-review` to
`success`.
- **`actions/dependency-review-action@v4`** — per-PR dependency
vulnerability check (fails if new dep has known CVE).
- **44 unit tests** across all gate modules (`node:test`, no external
deps).
## Verification
Run all unit tests locally:
```bash
node --test .github/scripts/tests/*.test.mjs
```
Expected: 44 pass, 0 fail.
End-to-end: open a PR missing the template, linked issue, and test files
→ commitperclip posts a consolidated comment listing all failures. Open
a PR with all gates satisfied → `✅ All checks passing` comment posted,
all check runs green.
## Risks
**`pull_request_target` security model:** This workflow runs in base
branch context and has access to secrets. It explicitly checks out `ref:
master` (never PR code) and reads the PR diff via GitHub API only — no
PR code is ever executed. This is the correct pattern for running
secret-bearing checks on fork PRs; deviating from it (e.g. checking out
the PR branch) would be a security vulnerability.
**False positives on security gates:** The sensitive-path gate flags any
PR touching the 9 path prefixes from the April advisories. Legitimate
fixes to those paths will trigger draft advisories. This is intentional
— those paths warrant a human look regardless. The `security-review`
check can be manually resolved by a maintainer once reviewed.
**commitperclip not yet installed:** Until the app is installed on this
repo and the `COMMITPERCLIP_KEY` secret is added, the workflow will fail
on the token generation step. The quality gate comment won't post, but
Dependency Review will still run independently.
## Model Used
Claude Sonnet 4.5, 200k context window, extended thinking enabled, tool
use: read/edit files, bash execution, GitHub API calls
## Checklist
- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass (44/44)
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable (44 unit tests
across all gate modules)
- [ ] If this change affects the UI, I have included before/after
screenshots (N/A — CI only)
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge
---
## One-time setup needed from you, Dotta
1. **Install commitperclip app** on this repo:
https://github.com/apps/commitperclip/installations/new
2. **Add `COMMITPERCLIP_KEY`** as a repository secret (Actions →
Secrets) — ask @brandonburr for the key
3. **Add `security_advisories: write` and `checks: write`** to the
commitperclip app permissions (commit-capital org → Settings → Apps →
commitperclip → Permissions)
4. **Install Socket.dev** from GitHub Marketplace for supply chain
scanning
5. **Branch protection** (optional but recommended): require
`commitperclip-review` and `security-review` checks to pass before merge
## Dashboard integration note
The `commitperclip-review` check run result maps cleanly to your PR
triage dashboard. A single filter on your Worker:
```javascript
const gatesCheck = checkRuns.find(r => r.name === 'commitperclip-review');
if (gatesCheck?.conclusion === 'failure') return null; // filter from queue
```
For security flags: `GET
/repos/paperclipai/paperclip/security-advisories?state=draft` — advisory
titles include `PR #NNN` for cross-referencing. PRs with a matching
draft advisory have `security-review` in `in_progress` state (grey
spinner, can't merge via branch protection).
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Devin Foley <devin@devinfoley.com>
Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
Devin Foley
brandonburr