## Thinking Path
> - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for
work.
> - Issue interactions give agents and people a structured decision
record.
> - Resolver routes used different authorization rules.
> - Some routes blocked valid agents, including task watchdogs with
normal issue access.
> - The API did not show who could resolve a pending interaction.
> - This pull request gives every interaction kind one resolver policy
evaluator.
> - The benefit is a clear decision path with consistent governance and
company isolation.
## Linked Issues or Issue Description
Fixes: #8087
Refs: #7403
Related PR: #11082 proposes board-only confirmation rules. This change
keeps human-only review as an explicit policy.
**What happened?**
Agents could create issue interactions. Some resolver routes still
required board access.
This left valid agent confirmations pending. Task watchdogs could see
the same problem without board identity.
**Expected behavior**
Every interaction kind must use one resolver policy contract.
The contract must support `anyone`, `not_creator`, and `human_only`. It
must also apply all normal governance controls.
**Steps to reproduce**
1. Create a `request_confirmation` interaction as an agent.
2. Resolve it with another authorized agent.
3. Observe the board-only denial.
**Paperclip version or commit**
The problem exists on `master` before this change.
**Deployment mode**
Local development with `pnpm dev`.
## What Changed
- Add canonical policies for `anyone`, `not_creator`, and `human_only`.
- Use one server evaluator for every interaction kind.
- Apply named addressees, company limits, review rules, and task
watchdog scope.
- Charge cross-issue resolutions to the existing per-run action limit.
- Return the effective resolver audience in attention and interaction
data.
- Show the audience, governance choices, and denial reasons in the board
UI.
- Add telemetry, API documents, product documents, and regression
fixtures.
- Add migration provenance for safe legacy behavior.
- Make migration `0218` safe for complete replays and partial prior
runs.
## Product Rules
- An interaction records a response. It does not grant authority for the
next action.
- `anyone` lets any authorized issue participant respond.
- `not_creator` requires a responder other than the interaction creator.
- `human_only` requires an authorized person.
- A named addressee, company policy, or governed action can narrow the
audience.
- These controls cannot widen the audience.
- A task watchdog uses the same rules as an ordinary agent.
- A task watchdog does not receive board authority.
- An agent resolution on another issue uses the shared cross-issue
action limit.
- Legacy pending interactions keep their earlier restrictions.
- The UI shows the effective audience and a permanent denial reason.
## Verification
- `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/db check:migrations`
- `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/db typecheck`
- `pnpm exec vitest run
packages/db/src/issue-thread-interaction-resolver-policy-migration.test.ts`
- The focused PostgreSQL test applies migration `0218` twice.
- The test also completes a partial prior run and preserves existing
provenance.
- The latest GitHub head has 29 successful checks.
- The opt-in Storybook visual check skipped as expected.
- Greptile reports 5/5 with no open comments.
## Risks
- New interaction writes use `anyone` by default.
- Callers must select `not_creator` or `human_only` when they need
stricter review.
- Legacy pending interactions keep the old creator and human
restrictions.
- Migration `0218` fills only missing provenance fields during recovery.
- Cross-issue resolutions can reach the existing action limit.
- The shared evaluator affects every interaction kind.
- Route, service, database, shared contract, and UI tests cover these
rules.
> This work matches the Agent Reviews and Approvals direction in
`ROADMAP.md`. It does not duplicate a planned item.
## Model Used
OpenAI Codex, GPT-5. The runtime does not expose the exact deployment ID
or context window.
The agent used reasoning, repository tools, shell commands, and test
execution.
## Checklist
- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] I have either linked public issues or described the issue with the
required labels
- [x] I have not referenced internal Paperclip issues or links
- [x] My branch name describes the change and contains no internal
ticket id
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation
- [x] I have considered and documented the risks
- [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green
- [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open comments
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge
---------
Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
## Thinking Path
> - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for
work
> - Companies onboard human members through shareable invite links; the
`/api/invites/:token` endpoints are deliberately public so a recipient
can view the invite and accept it without being logged in
> - That publicness makes the invite token itself the only secret
guarding company membership — and it was guessable: the token suffix
carried only ~41 bits of entropy, and the endpoints had no rate limiting
> - An attacker could therefore enumerate the token space online and
accept an invite into someone else's company, gaining member access to
its onboarding data, skills, and workspace
> - This pull request widens invite tokens to 256 bits of entropy and
puts a per-IP rate limit in front of every public `/invites/:token`
sub-route
> - The benefit is that invite links stop being brute-forceable while
their shape, storage scheme, and UX stay exactly the same — existing
links keep working
## Linked Issues or Issue Description
No public issue exists; describing the problem in-PR (security/bug):
**What happens:** Company invite tokens are **public**: anyone with the
link can `GET /api/invites/:token`, fetch onboarding/logo/skills, and
`POST /api/invites/:token/accept`. Two weaknesses combined to make them
brute-forceable:
1. **Token entropy ~41 bits.** The token suffix was 8 chars over a
36-char alphabet (`8 * log2(36) ≈ 41.4` bits). That is
online-enumerable.
2. **No rate limit on `/invites/:token*`.** The public endpoints had no
throttling, so the ~41-bit space could be enumerated online.
**Impact:** an attacker who guesses a live token can accept the invite
and join the company as a member — unauthenticated, from any IP.
**Expected:** invite tokens should be computationally infeasible to
guess, and the public endpoints should throttle guessing attempts anyway
(defense in depth).
## What Changed
**Entropy**
- `createInviteToken` now uses `crypto.randomBytes(32)` (256 bits)
base64url-encoded, keeping the human-readable `pcp_invite_` prefix so
link shape and UX are unchanged. The duplicate generator in
`plugin-host-services.ts` is updated to match.
- Tokens are stored **hashed** (sha256) in `invites.tokenHash`; the raw
value is only returned once on creation. Storage scheme is unchanged.
- **Backward compatible**: only newly minted tokens are affected; lookup
is by hash of the presented value, so existing invite links keep
working.
**Rate limit**
- New generic in-memory per-IP sliding-window limiter
(`server/src/services/invite-rate-limit.ts`, 20 req/min/IP), applied as
a router-level middleware on `/invites/:token` so every current and
future sub-route is covered (summary, logo, onboarding, onboarding.txt,
skills/index, skills/:name, test-resolution, and POST accept).
- Returns `429` with `Retry-After` and `X-RateLimit-*` headers.
In-memory ⇒ per-process, which bounds enumeration per replica. Mirrors
the existing `company-search-rate-limit` pattern; no new dependency.
- Adds a `tooManyRequests(429)` error helper in `server/src/errors.ts`.
## Verification
- `invite-token-entropy.test.ts`: prefix preserved, suffix ≥ 128 bits /
22 chars, charset, 1000 unique tokens.
- `invite-rate-limit.test.ts`: allows up to limit then 429s with
retry-after; per-IP isolation; forgets hits after the window.
- `invite-rate-limit-route.test.ts`: `GET /invites/:token` and `POST
/invites/:token/accept` return 429 once the per-IP threshold is
exceeded.
- Manual: create an invite, open the link (works once per token as
before), then hammer `GET /api/invites/<token>` >20 times within a
minute from one IP → `429` with `Retry-After`.
- Server package typechecks clean for all touched files.
## Risks
- Low risk. Token change affects only newly minted tokens; existing
links resolve via the same sha256-hash lookup.
- The limiter is in-memory and per-process: in multi-replica deployments
each replica enforces its own 20 req/min/IP budget. That still bounds
enumeration (per-replica) and matches the existing
`company-search-rate-limit` approach; a shared store can be layered
later if needed.
- Legitimate users behind a single NAT/proxy IP share the 20 req/min
budget for invite endpoints; the invite flow makes only a handful of
requests, so headroom is ample.
- No DB migration, no API shape change.
> For core feature work, check [`ROADMAP.md`](ROADMAP.md) first and
discuss it in `#dev` before opening the PR. Feature PRs that overlap
with planned core work may need to be redirected — check the roadmap
first. See `CONTRIBUTING.md`.
## Model Used
- Claude (Anthropic) — Claude Fable 5 (`claude-fable-5`), extended
thinking enabled, agentic tool use (code search, editing, local
typecheck) via Claude Code.
## Checklist
- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes
#` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant
issue template
- [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or
links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip`
URLs)
- [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`)
and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [ ] All Paperclip CI gates are green
- [ ] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge
Supersedes #8147.
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
## Thinking Path
> - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for
work.
> - Agent runs often need provider credentials, API tokens, and other
environment-bound secrets.
> - Company-level secrets work for shared credentials, but they do not
model values that should differ by human operator.
> - Without a user-scoped model, a run can dispatch without knowing
whether the responsible human has supplied the needed value.
> - Paperclip also needs run attribution to make those user-scoped
runtime checks deterministic and auditable.
> - This pull request adds user-specific secret definitions, per-user
values, environment bindings, responsible-user attribution, and runtime
resolution gates.
> - The benefit is that teams can define the secret once, let each user
provide their own value, and block runs before dispatch when required
user secrets or active definitions are unavailable.
## Linked Issues or Issue Description
Refs #224
Refs #6057
This PR implements user-specific secret support as a core
secret-management capability rather than a one-off adapter setting. It
is related to existing public work on company secrets UI and runtime
secret refs, but is distinct because the value is owned by the
responsible user and resolved at run dispatch time.
Related PR search before opening found existing secrets work such as
#1550, #8256, #8614, #8634, and #8647; none of those add the full
user-secret definition/value/runtime gate covered here.
## What Changed
- Added user-secret definitions and per-user "My secrets" values,
keeping stored values out of access metadata.
- Added `user_secret_ref` environment bindings and UI affordances to
pick them alongside existing secret refs.
- Added responsible-user runtime resolution so user-secret refs resolve
against the human responsible for the run.
- Added pre-dispatch missing-secret gates so runs fail before adapter
dispatch when required user values are absent or definitions are
inactive.
- Added low-trust allowlist hardening for user-secret runtime access.
- Added issue, routine, run, and agent API key responsible-user
attribution and fail-closed dispatch behavior when attribution cannot be
resolved.
- Added denial-copy mapping so responsible-user authorization failures
surface as actionable run outcomes instead of opaque setup failures.
- Added OpenAPI documentation for the user-secret routes.
- Rebases cleanly on current `master`; migrations were renumbered
incrementally as `0128_user_specific_secrets`,
`0129_agent_api_key_responsible_user`, and
`0130_run_responsible_user_invariant` after upstream `0126`/`0127`
migrations.
- Removed previously committed local design screenshots so the PR
contains code/docs/tests only.
## Verification
- PASS: PR head `2527febd106bcf3ca264ca0da7fca491084192d6` is based on
`paperclipai/paperclip:master`.
- PASS: `git diff --check`
- PASS: `git diff --name-only public/master...HEAD | rg
'^(pnpm-lock\\.yaml|\\.github/workflows/|screenshots/)' || true`
produced no files.
- PASS: migration journal audit confirmed unique indexes through `130`
with tail entries `0126_issue_comment_derived_attribution`,
`0127_environment_custom_images_instance_scoped`,
`0128_user_specific_secrets`, `0129_agent_api_key_responsible_user`, and
`0130_run_responsible_user_invariant`.
- PASS: `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/ui typecheck`
- PASS: `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server typecheck`
- PASS: `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server exec vitest run
src/__tests__/heartbeat-responsible-user-invariant.test.ts`
- PASS: `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server exec vitest run
src/__tests__/heartbeat-active-run-output-watchdog.test.ts
src/__tests__/heartbeat-stale-queue-invalidation.test.ts
src/__tests__/heartbeat-workspace-finalize-branch.test.ts
src/__tests__/issue-monitor-scheduler.test.ts`
- PASS: `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server exec vitest run
src/__tests__/heartbeat-comment-wake-batching.test.ts
src/__tests__/heartbeat-retry-scheduling.test.ts
src/__tests__/heartbeat-accepted-plan-workspace-refresh.test.ts
src/__tests__/heartbeat-plugin-environment.test.ts`
- PASS: `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server exec vitest run
src/__tests__/low-trust-red-team-routes.test.ts`
- PASS: `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server exec vitest run
src/__tests__/secrets-service.test.ts` (55 tests)
- PASS: `pnpm vitest run server/src/__tests__/secrets-routes.test.ts
server/src/__tests__/secrets-service.test.ts` (89 tests after final
Greptile cleanup fixes)
- PASS: `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server exec vitest run
src/__tests__/heartbeat-issue-liveness-escalation.test.ts` (17 tests
after the final rebase CI fix)
- PASS: focused server Vitest batches covering heartbeat recovery,
project env, plugin env, routines, low-trust, pipelines, monitors,
watchdog, and stale queue paths.
- PASS: GitHub checks are green on
`2527febd106bcf3ca264ca0da7fca491084192d6`, including Typecheck +
Release Registry, Build, General tests, serialized server suites, e2e,
Canary Dry Run, verify, security checks, and Greptile Review.
- PASS: Greptile Review completed successfully on
`2527febd106bcf3ca264ca0da7fca491084192d6` with Confidence Score 5/5,
and GraphQL review-thread audit returned zero unresolved non-outdated
threads.
## Risks
- Runtime behavior now depends on a run having a correct responsible
user; missing or incorrect responsibility assignment can block runs
before adapter dispatch.
- `user_secret_ref` bindings intentionally expose metadata without
values, but UI/API callers may need to handle the new binding kind
explicitly.
- External secret providers and IAM policies are not automatically
provisioned by this PR; operators still need to configure provider-side
access for non-local vaults.
- The PR is broad across db/shared/server/UI/runtime paths, so release
validation should include both API and UI secret workflows before merge.
- The migration renumbering is intentionally incremental after upstream
migrations; the branch migrations use guarded
column/table/index/constraint creation so users who tested the older
draft numbering should not hit duplicate DDL for the existing objects.
> For core feature work, check [`ROADMAP.md`](ROADMAP.md) first and
discuss it in `#dev` before opening the PR. Feature PRs that overlap
with planned core work may need to be redirected — check the roadmap
first. See `CONTRIBUTING.md`.
## Model Used
OpenAI Codex, GPT-5-based coding agent (`gpt-5`), Codex local adapter
with shell/tool use and code execution. Context window and internal
reasoning mode are not exposed by the runtime.
## Checklist
- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes
#` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant
issue template
- [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or
links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip`
URLs)
- [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`)
and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green
- [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge
---------
Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
New routes: companies, approvals, costs, dashboard, authz. New
services: companies, approvals, costs, dashboard, heartbeat,
activity-log. Add auth middleware and structured error handling.
Expand existing agent and issue routes with richer CRUD operations.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Michael Nguyen
Dotta
Jannes Stubbemann
Forgotten