## Thinking Path
> - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for
work
> - The server controls secrets, host files, outbound requests, and
workspace commands
> - A red-team review found cases where restricted callers could cross
these trust boundaries
> - These cases could expose credentials or let untrusted input reach
privileged resources
> - This pull request applies least-privilege checks at each affected
server boundary
> - The benefit is safer agent execution without changing the
private-instance bootstrap contract
## Linked Issues or Issue Description
**What happened?**
Several server paths used authorization, redaction, or content-delivery
rules that were too broad. Restricted agent keys could obtain
company-level operational data. Some adapter and instruction paths could
reach server-owned network or file resources without the required owner
approval.
**Expected behavior**
Paperclip must redact credential values, enforce restricted-key scopes,
guard outbound network access, prevent same-origin script execution, and
reserve host-level file and command controls for authorized operators.
**Steps to reproduce**
1. Configure an authenticated development instance at the parent commit.
2. Exercise the affected APIs with a restricted agent key or a
non-instance-admin company user.
3. Observe that the parent commit returns privileged data or accepts a
privileged operation.
4. Repeat on this branch and observe a redacted response, a safe
download, or an HTTP 403 response.
**Paperclip version or commit**
The findings reproduce from commit `39898ab22` and are fixed by this
pull request.
**Deployment mode**
Authenticated self-hosted server and local development modes.
**Installation method**
Built from source with pnpm.
## What Changed
- Redact generic secret `value` and `token` fields recursively in
structured logs.
- Classify exact and separator-suffixed `KEY` environment names as
secrets in company exports.
- Limit restricted self-identity responses and protect company run, log,
and secret catalog APIs.
- Route HTTP adapter requests through DNS-pinned SSRF protection with
exact private-origin allowlisting.
- Download HTML, SVG, and other script-capable assets with `nosniff` and
a sandbox CSP.
- Require instance-admin access for external instruction roots and
exports that read them.
- Block agent-authenticated host command persistence across supported
workspace runtime shapes.
- Apply the central runtime-management decision before workspace command
controls.
- Keep the documented first-user instance-admin claim contract
unchanged.
- Add regression tests and server-owner configuration documentation.
## Verification
- `pnpm -r typecheck` passes.
- The Node 24 remediation suite passes with 365 tests. It skips 25
environment-gated tests.
- `pnpm build` passes under Node 24.
- `git diff --check` passes.
- The full local runner reaches known macOS-only general-server harness
failures before the serialized route lane. The Linux PR matrix is the
authoritative full-suite gate.
## Risks
- Restricted agent keys now receive HTTP 403 responses from company-wide
run, log, and secret catalog endpoints.
- Script-capable assets now download instead of rendering inline.
- External instruction roots now require instance-admin access.
- Private HTTP adapter endpoints now require an exact origin in
`PAPERCLIP_HTTP_ADAPTER_PRIVATE_ENDPOINT_ALLOWLIST`.
- Public HTTP adapter endpoints remain enabled. Redirects and metadata
or link-local targets remain blocked.
- No database migration is required.
> For core feature work, check [`ROADMAP.md`](ROADMAP.md) first and
discuss it in `#dev` before opening the PR. Feature PRs that overlap
with planned core work may need to be redirected — check the roadmap
first. See `CONTRIBUTING.md`.
## Model Used
OpenAI Codex, GPT-5. The exact serving snapshot and context-window size
are not exposed. The model used tool-enabled reasoning, repository
access, code execution, and test execution.
## Checklist
- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes
#` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant
issue template
- [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or
links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip`
URLs)
- [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`)
and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green
- [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge
---------
Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
## Thinking Path
> - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for
work.
> - The runner package is useful only when the application can start,
observe, and recover a native Codex run safely.
> - Existing direct adapters must keep their current execution and
finalization paths.
> - The application boundary therefore needs additive persistence,
authorization, coordination, and recovery behind an explicit
experimental adapter.
> - This pull request adds that Codex-only boundary without activating
generalized providers, remote environments, or the later task/SDK
surfaces.
## Linked Issues or Issue Description
**Subsystem affected**
Shared contracts, database persistence, adapter utilities, server
native-runtime services, and the experimental Paperclip Runner adapter.
**Problem or motivation**
The already-landed runner package has a qualified Codex path, but the
application needs durable native-run state, guarded runtime selection,
authenticated coordination, tool security, finalization, and recovery
before the experimental adapter can be exercised safely.
**Proposed solution**
Add a Codex-only `paperclip_runner` application path behind the existing
default-off native-runner setting. Bind native state and coordination to
company/run identity, preserve persisted-run recovery, and leave every
direct adapter on its existing legacy execution path.
**Alternatives considered**
The earlier stack boundary introduced a generalized executor and
remote-environment lifecycle here. That made this PR depend on
implementations in higher PRs and changed reusable sandbox behavior
globally. Those pieces are now deferred together to #12592.
**Roadmap alignment**
ROADMAP.md does not list a conflicting native-runner integration
project. This change adds the application boundary for the existing
Runner architecture.
## What Changed
- Added native run/result/finalization/provider-trace persistence,
shared validators, and idempotent migration/replay coverage.
- Added guarded Codex-only runtime selection, authenticated PRP
coordination, recovery, finalization, and interaction services.
- Added run/company-bound tool-gateway authorization, credential
redaction, SSRF protections, and replay-safe behavior.
- Added the explicit `paperclip_runner` adapter behind the default-off
rollout setting.
- Preserved legacy answered-question wake projection and direct-adapter
execution/finalization paths.
- Hardened cancellation so only owned in-memory child processes are
signaled; persisted recycled PIDs/process groups are never trusted.
- Retained the narrow Claude ACPX isolated-context security follow-up
discovered after #12590.
- Deferred the generalized executor, provider ingress, remote lifecycle,
SDK/lab/eval work, release-process changes, and lockfile.
## Verification
- Changed-file delta against `master`: 133 files.
- GitHub Actions is the authoritative verification environment for this
PR.
- Full CI, security, and Greptile review will run on this lowest
unmerged stack PR.
- Local tests/build/typecheck were not run because this checkout is
resource constrained.
- Static diff/reference checks pass, and `pnpm-lock.yaml` is unchanged.
## Risks
- This touches central heartbeat and agent-route code, so legacy
compatibility is the primary risk.
- Runtime selection remains Codex-only and explicit; direct Codex,
Claude, OpenCode, process, HTTP, and plugin adapters remain on their
existing paths.
- Fresh native starts fail closed while the rollout flag is off;
persisted native records remain readable and recoverable.
- Cancellation, company/run binding, tool calls, status decisions, and
completion writes are guarded or replay-safe.
> For core feature work, check [ROADMAP.md](ROADMAP.md) first and
discuss it in #dev before opening the PR. Feature PRs that overlap with
planned core work may need to be redirected.
## Model Used
OpenAI Codex, GPT-5.6, with repository tools, code execution, and
parallel agent review.
## Checklist
- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] I have either linked existing issues or described the issue in-PR
following the relevant issue template
- [x] I have not referenced internal or instance-local Paperclip issues
or links
- [x] My branch name describes the change and contains no internal
Paperclip ticket id
- [ ] I have run tests locally and they pass — GitHub Actions is
authoritative for this resource-constrained checkout
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented risks above
- [ ] All Paperclip CI and security gates are green
- [ ] Greptile is 5/5 with no open actionable findings
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before merge
## Stack
- Position: 3 of 5 overall; lowest of 3 currently unmerged
- Base: `master`
- Previous:
[#12590](https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip/pull/12590), qualified
Claude ACPX runtime — merged
- Next: [#12592](https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip/pull/12592),
generalized Codex executor, task experience, and developer SDKs
---------
Co-authored-by: Dev Agent <dev@paperclip.ing>
## Thinking Path
> - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for
work.
> - Apps give those agents governed access to external tools.
> - Remote MCP setup needs secure endpoint validation and durable
credentials.
> - PostHog needs both browser sign-in and personal API key setup paths.
> - This pull request adds the shared remote MCP foundation and the
PostHog definition.
> - The benefit is a secure and reusable base for later app connection
work.
## Linked Issues or Issue Description
Refs #11965
This is stack 1 of 11. It replaces the first reviewable part of #11965.
## What Changed
- Add guarded remote MCP setup and credential handling.
- Add PostHog OAuth and API key connection methods.
- Add focused server, shared contract, and UI coverage.
- Keep the migration replay-safe and idempotent.
- Give the late-close security regression the same 10-second CI headroom
as the adjacent real-timer handshake test.
- Synchronize fake-timer handshake tests at the exact ensure-session
boundary so real filesystem setup cannot race the fake deadline.
- Drive PTY overflow coverage only after listener registration so
scheduling cannot reorder the test fixture.
## Verification
- pnpm exec vitest run
packages/adapter-utils/src/acpx-engine/execute.test.ts
server/src/__tests__/plugin-worker-manager.test.ts (220 passed; affected
cases also passed five focused stress repetitions)
- `pnpm exec vitest run
packages/adapter-utils/src/acpx-engine/execute.test.ts -t "never leaks a
sandbox-provided value from a late close rejection into logs or the
result"` (1 passed)
- `pnpm exec vitest run
packages/adapter-utils/src/acpx-engine/execute.test.ts -t "never
promotes a late ensureSession resolution|closes a late-resolving real
handle exactly once"` (2 passed)
- `pnpm -r typecheck`
- `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server exec vitest run
src/__tests__/tool-access-service.test.ts`
- `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/db check:migrations`
- `pnpm build`
## Risks
- Remote endpoint validation can reject configurations that previously
passed without checks.
- OAuth configuration errors can block setup until the operator corrects
the provider settings.
- The migration uses guarded statements so repeated execution is safe.
- The test-only synchronization changes do not affect runtime behavior;
they remove filesystem/fake-clock and listener-registration races
observed under parallel CI load.
> I checked `ROADMAP.md`. This stack continues the existing app
connection work from #11965 and does not duplicate another planned item.
## Model Used
OpenAI Codex, GPT-5. The runtime model ID and context window were not
exposed. The model used reasoning, tool use, and code execution.
## Checklist
- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes
#` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant
issue template
- [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or
links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip`
URLs)
- [x] My branch name describes the change and contains no internal
Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green
- [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge
---------
Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
## Thinking Path
> - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for
work.
> - Managed worktree services run isolated Paperclip instances with
cloned databases.
> - A reachable service was reported as ready even when its database,
runtime identity, or login path was not usable.
> - The first candidate added verified database seeding and managed
repair in #11665.
> - This pull request consolidates that candidate with signed login
handoff and a complete readiness contract.
> - Post-QA fixes close five defects in repair identity, repair
responses, UI retry, seed journal handling, and seed-source trust.
> - The benefit is a workspace that either opens safely or reports one
accurate recovery action.
## Linked Issues or Issue Description
No public GitHub issue exists for this work, so the problem is described
here.
**What happened**
Managed workspace URLs could return HTTP 200 and report ready while
login failed. QA also found cases where repair used the wrong instance
identity, returned a generic error, left the UI stuck, rejected a safe
journal lag, or trusted a mutable workspace manifest.
**Expected behavior**
Opening a ready workspace signs the board user in to the correct
isolated instance. Provisioning and repair use a registered source and
report a structured recovery state.
**Actual behavior**
Entry depended on a password copied into the clone. Several failure
paths could publish stale readiness, hide the repair precondition, or
trust state that the workspace could modify.
**Additional context**
This pull request includes the commits first published in #11665. That
pull request keeps the original base head for review history. This
consolidated pull request is the merge candidate. Related open readiness
work includes #11575 and #11621.
## What Changed
- Adds a short-lived, signed, single-use login ticket. It binds the
user, workspace, instance, and runtime origin.
- Exchanges the ticket through Better Auth. It creates the session and
cookie through the supported adapter path.
- Adds protected workspace readiness fields for the database, clone
data, login handoff, seed phase, and runtime identity.
- Fails readiness closed when the guest has no company or
execution-workspace binding.
- Binds ticket issuance to the exact cloned user and active company
membership selected for the handoff.
- Verifies every current active board identity through the exact-user
handoff before publication or reuse.
- Gates managed runtime publication on the readiness contract and the
recorded worktree instance identity.
- Refreshes runtime work products from the live runtime row after a port
change.
- Adds one workspace access card with ready, degraded, repairing, and
failed states.
- Uses the runtime response identity for repair. It returns structured
repair precondition errors.
- Lets a valid source journal lag converge during provisioning.
- Binds seed and repair manifests to a source registered outside the
agent-writable worktree.
- Clears recovered UI errors so a successful retry can open the
workspace.
- Makes runtime tests register canonical sources and avoid ports owned
by live host listeners.
- Keeps Vitest on source suites when compiled `dist` trees exist.
- Isolates CLI and adapter tests from ambient AWS and runtime API
environment variables.
- Preserves a 404 response for cross-company workspace ID lookups before
runtime authorization.
- Makes concurrent single-flight coverage independent of
path-canonicalization scheduling order.
## Verification
The following checks passed on the integrated head:
```sh
pnpm -r typecheck
pnpm build
pnpm check:token-gates
pnpm --filter @paperclipai/db check:migrations
```
- The server source lane passed 420 files and 4,953 tests. Five tests
were skipped.
- The CLI lane passed 57 files and 385 tests.
- The database lane passed 26 files and 97 tests.
- The shared package passed 58 files and 506 tests.
- The adapter utility lane passed 640 tests. Four tests were skipped.
- The Claude adapter passed 220 tests. One test was skipped.
- The Codex adapter passed 323 tests.
- The OpenClaw adapter passed 13 tests.
- The OpenCode adapter passed 42 tests.
- The plugin SDK passed 45 tests.
- The workspace runtime suite passed 124 tests.
- The caller-scoped readiness and handoff suite passed 52 tests.
- The workspace provisioning shell suite passed 7 tests.
- The runtime exposure suite passed 17 tests while live host mappings
occupied fixed test ports.
- `git diff --check` passed and the worktree is clean.
The serialized route lane will run in GitHub CI with its normal shards.
No deployment or active-workspace migration was performed.
## Risks
- This is a medium-risk authentication and runtime-readiness change.
- The login ticket uses exact origin, workspace, instance, and user
binding. It has a short expiry and a one-time nonce.
- Runtime publication is stricter. A real readiness, identity, per-user
handoff, or control-plane database disagreement now blocks publication.
- This pull request supersedes #11665 as the merge candidate. Close
#11665 after this pull request merges.
- No new database migration is included. The lockfile and workflow files
are unchanged.
- Deployment and active-workspace migration are intentionally outside
this pull request.
> For core feature work, check [`ROADMAP.md`](ROADMAP.md) first and
discuss it in `#dev` before opening the PR. Feature PRs that overlap
with planned core work may need to be redirected — check the roadmap
first. See `CONTRIBUTING.md`.
## Model Used
Claude Opus 5 (`claude-opus-5[1m]`), 1M context, extended thinking, tool
use, and code execution produced the main candidate. OpenAI GPT-5
(`gpt-5`) through Codex, with agentic reasoning, tool use, and code
execution, integrated the post-QA fixes and hardened the test gates. The
Codex context-window size was not exposed.
## Checklist
- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes
#` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant
issue template
- [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or
links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip`
URLs)
- [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`)
and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green
- [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge
---------
Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
## Thinking Path
> - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for
work
> - Claude agents that run in a remote sandbox need a safe in-product
login path
> - The existing host login route cannot open a pseudo-terminal inside
that sandbox
> - The login flow must protect the browser code, the login URL, and the
OAuth token at every step
> - This pull request adds the parser, the runner, a Daytona
pseudo-terminal transport, and a guarded, owner-bound session route
behind an injectable transport
> - The route stays inert in the default build and fails closed until a
sandbox provider binds the live transport
> - The benefit is a company-scoped setup-token flow with one-time
secret delivery, redaction, and fail-closed transport checks, ready for
a later staged production rollout
## Linked Issues or Issue Description
**Agent or provider**
Claude Code setup-token login for sandbox agents.
**Why this adapter is useful**
Sandbox agents need a supported way to sign in without host credentials.
An authorized owner completes the browser step and receives the token
one time.
**How the agent is invoked**
When a sandbox provider binds the injectable transport, the server
starts `claude setup-token` through a sandbox pseudo-terminal, sends the
browser code to the matched prompt, and returns the token through the
guarded session route. The default build does not bind the transport. In
that state the start route fails closed with a fixed no-secret `503`. It
does not start a process and it does not hold a sandbox lease.
**Additional context**
The transport is injectable, so each sandbox provider binds its own
pseudo-terminal. This pull request adds the Daytona transport but does
not bind it in the production server. A production wiring needs a lease
manager, a live pseudo-terminal factory, a durable token store, and its
own security review. The route keeps secrets out of logs, activity
details, errors, telemetry, and non-owner responses.
## What Changed
- Add strict parsers for the setup-token URL, the prompt, and the
success token.
- Add a login runner that drives the `claude setup-token` command
through a pseudo-terminal.
- Add the Daytona pseudo-terminal transport and the sandbox plugin
wiring.
- Add a company-scoped, owner-bound login session service with rate
limits, a reaper, cleanup, and one-time token delivery.
- Add the guarded session routes at
`/agents/:id/setup-token-login-sessions/*` behind an injectable
transport. The routes become the live login path only when a provider
binds the transport.
- Keep the start route fail-closed in the default build. It returns a
fixed no-secret `503` and it does not bind `setupTokenLogin`.
- Keep the existing host route `POST /agents/:id/claude-login` in place.
This pull request does not replace it.
- Keep confidential responses behind a fail-closed TLS transport guard
with `Cache-Control: no-store`, and extend redaction for the new fields.
- Export the parser and the runner from the Claude local server entry,
and document the new session routes in the OpenAPI spec.
## Verification
- `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server exec vitest run setup-token-route
setup-token-session`
- `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/adapter-claude-local exec vitest run`
- `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server run typecheck`
- Confirm that the pull request checks pass on GitHub.
## Risks
- Low user-facing risk on merge. The default build does not bind the
transport, so the production start route stays fail-closed with a `503`.
The merge does not change the production login behavior.
- When a provider later binds the transport, the flow starts a live
sandbox process and holds a short-lived in-memory secret. Cleanup must
stop the child before it releases the sandbox lease.
- The transport guard fails closed when the deployment does not provide
a trusted TLS path. A wrong proxy allowlist can block a valid request.
- The production wiring is out of scope. It needs a lease manager, a
live pseudo-terminal factory, a durable token store, and its own
security review before the server binds `setupTokenLogin`.
## Model Used
Anthropic Claude Opus 4.8 assisted the implementation. It used extended
reasoning, code execution, repository tool use, and a 200,000-token
context window.
## Checklist
- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` /
`Closes: #` / `Refs: #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the
relevant issue template
- [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or
links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip`
URLs)
- [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`)
and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes (the
OpenAPI spec covers the new session routes; no user-facing documentation
needs changes)
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green
- [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge
---------
Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
## Thinking Path
> - Paperclip uses company skills to make agent capabilities reusable
across an organization.
> - Skill operations currently mix capability availability with
permission checks, which creates avoidable setup friction and
inconsistent denial handling.
> - The policy contract needs to remain open by default while allowing
company-scoped restrictions for governed deployments.
> - Core owns the canonical policy actions, persistence, evaluation, API
behavior, safe import boundaries, and generic denial/read-only UI.
> - Enterprise policy-editor implementation belongs in the separate
`paperclip-ee` repository and is intentionally excluded from this PR.
### Problem or motivation
Company skill operations can encounter permission dead ends even when no
explicit restriction has been configured, and import-source
classification can drift between policy evaluation and execution.
### Proposed solution
Define eight canonical skill policy actions, default all actions to
allowed, persist company-scoped restrictions, expose policy evaluation
APIs, normalize import sources at the boundary, and update Skill Studio
to present actionable restriction states without embedding Enterprise
Edition implementation in the core repository.
### Alternatives considered
Keeping capability checks distributed across routes and UI surfaces was
rejected because it duplicates policy logic and makes denial behavior
inconsistent. Shipping the Enterprise policy editor in this repository
was rejected because `paperclip-ee` is a separate repository and must
receive its own PR.
### Roadmap alignment
Extends the completed **Skills Manager** roadmap area by adding coherent
governance and removing workflow dead ends.
### Additional context
The core API contract remains suitable for a separate Enterprise Edition
editor, but this PR contains no `paperclip-ee` package or EE-specific UI
integration code.
## What Changed
- Added the company skill policy contract to product and implementation
documentation, including the open-by-default rule, eight canonical
actions, decision shape, and core/EE ownership boundary.
- Added the company-scoped policy schema, migration `0170`, shared
validators, policy service, REST routes, OpenAPI coverage, and focused
server tests.
- Hardened import policy enforcement by normalizing import sources and
keeping source classification consistent between policy evaluation and
execution.
- Updated core Skill Studio behavior to remove generic permission dead
ends and show actionable policy/platform denial states only when an
operation is actually denied.
- Removed the `plugin-paperclip-ee` package, Docker wiring, EE
discovery/deep-link helpers, and EE-specific UI tests/stories from this
PR so that implementation can be submitted separately to the EE
repository.
- Preserved open-by-default behavior when no explicit company
restriction exists.
## Verification
- `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/ui exec vitest run
src/components/skill-studio/SkillPolicySurfaces.test.tsx
src/lib/skill-policy-denial.test.ts` — 20/20 passed.
- `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/ui exec tsc --noEmit` — passed.
- `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server exec vitest run
src/__tests__/worktree-config.test.ts` — 12/12 passed.
- `pnpm check:token-gates` — passed with all gates clean.
- `git diff --check` — passed.
- `git diff --name-only origin/master | rg
'paperclip-ee|ee-skill-policy'` — no matches.
## Risks
- Migration `0170` introduces company policy persistence; rollout
depends on the migration applying before policy routes are exercised.
- Open-by-default is an intentional behavioral policy: deployments
expecting implicit denials must configure explicit restrictions.
- Import normalization is security-sensitive and should retain focused
review.
- The separate EE editor must stay contract-compatible with the core
policy API as policy actions evolve.
## Model Used
- OpenAI Codex CLI, runtime model identifier and context-window size not
exposed by this execution environment; reasoning, repository tool use,
shell execution, and code review capabilities enabled.
## Checklist
- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details available to this runtime)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked or
described the result above
- [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes
#` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant
issue template
- [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or
links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip`
URLs)
- [x] My branch name describes the change and contains no internal
Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details
- [x] I have run focused tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green on the latest head
- [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge
---------
Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Evyatar Bluzer <bluzername@users.noreply.github.com>
Resubmits #5820 by @echokos. The original PR's head fork could not
accept maintainer edits (organization-owned fork without cross-org
maintainer-edit access), so we've resubmitted the commits here with
original authorship preserved. Thanks to @echokos for the contribution.
---
## Thinking Path
> - Paperclip orchestrates AI agents for zero-human companies; the
server is an Express app with structured HTTP logging via pino-http.
> - The middleware in `server/src/middleware/logger.ts` defines a
`customProps` hook that attaches request context (`req.body` /
`req.params` / `req.query`) to every 4xx/5xx log entry so operators can
diagnose failed requests.
> - That hook copies the body verbatim. Better Auth's `POST
/api/auth/sign-in/email` carries an `{ email, password }` body — on a
wrong-password attempt the request lands in the 4xx branch and the
plaintext password is written to `~/.paperclip/logs/server.log`.
> - Two existing issues raise this (#3072 plaintext-password leak, #4759
similar concerns) and neither has a fix.
> - Same exposure surface applies to sign-up, reset-password, API key
creation, and any endpoint that accepts a credential in the body and can
return 4xx.
> - This pull request introduces a small `redactSensitive` walker that
returns a shallow copy of the input with values for known
credential-shaped keys replaced with `[REDACTED]`, and applies it at
every body/params/query log site in `customProps`.
> - The benefit is that operators can keep diagnostic logging on without
their disk silently accumulating user passwords and bearer tokens.
## What Changed
- `server/src/middleware/redact-sensitive.ts` (new): depth-capped,
case-insensitive walker. Sensitive keys covered: `password`,
`currentPassword`, `newPassword`, `passwordConfirmation`,
`passwordConfirm`, `confirmPassword` (+ snake_case variants), `secret`,
`client_secret`, `access_token`, `refresh_token`, `id_token`,
`auth_token`, `session_token`, `api_key`, `authorization`,
`private_key`. Bare `token` deliberately not in the list — pagination
cursors and CSRF tokens are not credentials (per Greptile review).
- `server/src/middleware/logger.ts`: wraps the six log sites in
`customProps` (3 ctx-path + 3 fallback-path) with `redactSensitive`.
- `server/src/__tests__/redact-sensitive.test.ts` (new): covers
plaintext password, case-insensitive matching, multiple credential keys,
nested objects/arrays, bare `token` left untouched, primitives
untouched, cycle safety.
- Depth-cap returns `undefined` (field absent from log line) rather than
a sentinel string, per Greptile review.
## Verification
- `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server test redact-sensitive` should run
the new test file green.
- Manual: tail `~/.paperclip/logs/server.log`, hit `POST
/api/auth/sign-in/email` with a deliberately wrong password, confirm the
logged `reqBody.password` reads `[REDACTED]` (not the plaintext) and the
surrounding fields still appear for diagnosis.
## Risks
Low. The walker only rewrites values at the log-emit boundary — the
actual `req.body` object handed to downstream handlers is unchanged
because `redactSensitive` returns a new object. Standard log fields
(email, route path, status code) remain visible. The sensitive-key list
is conservative enough that the only risk is over-redacting a
non-credential field that happens to share a name with a known
credential; the bare `token` carve-out in this revision addresses the
most obvious such case.
## Model Used
- Claude Opus 4.7 (`claude-opus-4-7`), Anthropic, extended thinking
mode, working through Claude Code CLI.
## Checklist
- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [ ] I have run tests locally and they pass (no `node_modules` in my
disposable PR-prep checkout; CI vitest will exercise)
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [ ] If this change affects the UI, I have included before/after
screenshots (N/A — server-only)
- [ ] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes (no
doc surface affected)
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge
Closes#3072. Refs #4759.
---
## Original Context
`customProps` in the HTTP logger copies `req.body` / `req.params` /
`req.query` verbatim into 4xx/5xx log entries. Better Auth's
wrong-password flow therefore writes:
```
{"reqBody":{"email":"…","password":"founding6gomez6croaking"},"msg":"POST /api/auth/sign-in/email 401"}
```
…to disk. This PR rewrites credential-shaped values to `[REDACTED]` at
that boundary.
---
## Cross-references and status (maintainer)
Closes#5820Closes#3095Closes#4760Closes#4886
---------
Co-authored-by: Aurora <aurora@majorimpact.com>
Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
Dotta
Nicky Leach
Devin Foley