## Thinking Path
> - Paperclip orchestrates AI agents for zero-human companies
> - In a multi-tenant deployment, route handlers that take a resource id
(`issue`, `goal`, `project`, `approval`, etc.) look the resource up by
id and then call `assertCompanyAccess` on its `companyId` — 404 if it
doesn't exist, 403 if it exists in another tenant
> - The split status codes are a classic *existence oracle*: any
authenticated user can enumerate ids across tenants by probing for the
403/404 boundary, mapping out which issues, labels, approvals, etc.
exist in other customers' tenants even when they cannot read the
contents
> - The right fix is a single uniform 404 for both "not found" and
"found but cross-tenant", which collapses the oracle but still preserves
write-path checks (active membership, viewer-readonly) for *authorized*
tenants
> - This pull request adds a non-throwing `hasCompanyAccess(req,
companyId)` helper plus a `getAccessibleResource` wrapper that ~130
handlers across 14 route files now use, folding the access check into
the existence check while still running `assertCompanyAccess` for
authorized tenants so viewer-readonly / inactive-membership rejections
fire unchanged on write paths
> - The benefit is closing a multi-tenant information leak without
breaking write-path security or single-tenant local-first behavior
## Linked Issues or Issue Description
Refs #709 — asks for company-scope regression coverage across
approval/activity/access routes, because a subtle route refactor could
leak cross-tenant data; this PR hardens exactly those surfaces (uniform
404 across 14 route files including `approvals`, `activity`, `secrets`)
and updates cross-tenant expectations in test files. It does not add the
full coverage matrix #709 asks for — hence Refs, not Closes.
No existing issue covers the oracle itself — described in-PR:
- Route handlers returned 404 for "not found" but 403 for "exists in
another tenant", a classic *existence oracle*: any authenticated user
could enumerate ids across tenants by probing the 403/404 boundary.
- That maps out which issues, labels, approvals, etc. exist in other
customers' tenants even when their contents are unreadable.
- Fix: a uniform 404 for both cases, while keeping write-path checks
(active membership, viewer-readonly) for authorized tenants.
## What Changed
- **`server/src/routes/authz.ts`** — new `hasCompanyAccess(req,
companyId): boolean` helper alongside the existing
`assertCompanyAccess`. Docstring spells out the two-step pattern (404
gate, then `assertCompanyAccess` for write-path checks). The helper
mirrors `assertCompanyAccess`'s company-scope semantics exactly — in
particular, signed-in instance admins do **not** get blanket access to
companies they are not a member of (the repo's `authz-company-access`
tests pin that behavior for `assertCompanyAccess`; an earlier draft of
the helper accidentally widened it for reads).
- **`getAccessibleResource(req, res, lookup, notFoundMessage)`** — the
safe thing is now the easy thing. One helper wraps the whole pattern
(uniform 404 for missing/cross-tenant, then `assertCompanyAccess` for
write-path membership checks) and ~130 handlers across 14 route files
use it:
```ts
const goal = await getAccessibleResource(req, res, svc.getById(id),
"Goal not found");
if (!goal) return;
```
Files: `activity`, `agents`, `approvals`, `assets`, `costs`,
`environments`, `execution-workspaces`, `file-resources`, `goals`,
`issue-tree-control`, `issues`, `projects`, `routines`, `secrets`.
Handlers with bespoke not-found behavior (the legacy `200 []` contract,
audit-logged denials in `file-resources`, null-returning authz helpers)
compose `hasCompanyAccess` directly using the documented two-step
pattern:
```ts
// step 1: close the oracle (uniform 404 for both not-found and
cross-tenant)
if (!existing || !hasCompanyAccess(req, existing.companyId)) {
res.status(404).json({ error: "Goal not found" });
return;
}
// step 2: enforce write-path membership checks for authorised tenants
(no-op on GET)
assertCompanyAccess(req, existing.companyId);
```
Routes where `companyId` comes from *request input*
(`req.params.companyId`, `req.body.companyId`, e.g. in `companies.ts`
and `plugins.ts`) deliberately retain plain `assertCompanyAccess` —
there's no existence oracle to close because the companyId is an input,
not a discovered value.
- **Full-sweep coverage** — a scripted audit of every
`assertCompanyAccess(req, <resource>.companyId)` call site in
`server/src/routes/` found ~55 lookup-then-assert pairs the first pass
missed; all are now gated. Notable ones: the
`/secret-provider-configs/:id` CRUD routes, the agents
instructions-bundle/config-revision/skills-sync routes (which check
access via the `assertCanUpdateAgent` / `assertCanReadAgent` /
`assertCanManageInstructionsPath` helpers), `POST
/heartbeat-runs/:runId/watchdog-decisions`, `GET
/issues/:id/cost-summary`, the environment + environment-lease GET
routes, all six issue-tree-control routes, ~24 issue sub-resource routes
(document annotations, interactions, approvals links, recovery actions,
plan decompositions, lock/unlock), and the three workspace file-resource
routes (these throw `notFound` instead of `forbidden` inside their
audit-logging wrappers, so denied attempts are still activity-logged
server-side while the client sees a uniform 404).
- **Helpers made self-defending** — `assertCanUpdateAgent` /
`assertCanReadAgent` / `assertCanManageInstructionsPath` (agents) and
`assertCanManage{Project,Execution}WorkspaceRuntimeServices` throw
`notFound` for cross-tenant resources before their `assertCompanyAccess`
step, so a future caller that forgets the route-level gate still can't
reopen the oracle.
- **Pattern enforcement** — new `authz-existence-oracle-guard.test.ts`
statically scans `server/src/routes/*.ts` and fails CI on any
`assertCompanyAccess(req, <resource>.companyId)` call that is not
preceded by a `hasCompanyAccess` gate, with an explicit allowlist (plus
staleness check) for the request-input cases. New routes that regress to
the 403/404 split fail the suite with a message pointing at the
documented pattern.
- **Tests** — cross-tenant expectations updated from 403→404 where
routes are now gated; new `hasCompanyAccess` unit tests in
`authz-company-access.test.ts` pin the
instance-admin/local-implicit/agent/none semantics in lockstep with
`assertCompanyAccess`; `write-path-membership.test.ts` (added in an
earlier round) confirms viewer/inactive users are still rejected on
writes.
- **One legacy-contract preserve** — `GET /heartbeat-runs/:runId/issues`
still returns `200 []` for both "doesn't exist" and "cross-tenant" so
the legacy contract is preserved while the oracle stays closed.
## Verification
- `pnpm run typecheck` — PASS.
- `pnpm -F @paperclipai/server exec vitest run` — full server suite
green locally apart from 4 pre-existing local-environment failures
(`paperclip-skill-utils` ×2 and `workspace-runtime` ×1 are
cwd/git-environment dependent — verified identical on a clean checkout
of the base; `heartbeat-process-recovery` is the known macOS flake).
- The new `authz-existence-oracle-guard` test sweeps
`server/src/routes/*.ts` and confirms no remaining
`assertCompanyAccess(resource.companyId)` site without a
`hasCompanyAccess` gate; the only allowlisted holdouts take `companyId`
from request input.
## Risks
- **API contract narrowing.** Any client that specifically checked for
`403` on cross-tenant access now sees `404`. This is a strict narrowing
(one status instead of two for the same negative outcome) and matches
what a client should expect for any id it can't access.
- **Write-path checks preserved.** `assertCompanyAccess` still runs
after the 404 gate on write routes, so viewer-readonly /
inactive-membership rejections fire unchanged for legitimate users.
- **Instance-admin scope unchanged.** `hasCompanyAccess` denies
signed-in instance admins without an explicit membership, exactly like
`assertCompanyAccess` (pinned by unit tests) — so the gate introduces no
new read access for admins.
- **Single-tenant local-first deploys** behave identically — the helper
short-circuits to `true` for `local_implicit` sessions.
- No new env vars, no deployment-mode switch.
## Model Used
Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context), extended thinking mode; completeness sweep
+ instance-admin parity fix by Claude Fable 5 (1M context).
## Checklist
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] Thinking path traces from project context to this change
- [x] Model used specified
- [x] Checked ROADMAP.md — part of the multi-tenant hardening initiative
- [x] Tests run locally and pass
- [x] Added/updated cross-tenant 404 expectations across test files
- [x] No UI changes
- [x] Documented risks above
- [x] Will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before merge
Part of the multi-tenant hardening initiative — see also #5864
(per-company JWT keys) and #5865 (plugin tables `company_id`).
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
## Thinking Path
> - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for
work
> - Agents block each other with `blockedByIssueIds` relationships to
express dependencies
> - Users and tooling have no lightweight way to inspect *why* an issue
is blocked or whether its blockers are themselves ready to resolve
> - A read-only diagnostic endpoint over the existing blocker graph lets
callers understand dependency chains without requiring a full issue-tree
traversal
> - This pull request adds `GET /api/issues/:id/diagnostics/blockers` —
a bounded, read-only projection over each blocker's readiness state
> - The benefit is that callers can surface blocking-chain diagnosis
(e.g. "waiting on N blockers, M of which are themselves blocked") from a
single authenticated request, using only data they already have read
permission for
## Linked Issues or Issue Description
No public GitHub issue exists for this change. Feature description:
**Subsystem affected:** `server/` — REST API & orchestration services;
`packages/shared` — types, constants, validators, API paths
**Problem or motivation**
There is no API endpoint to inspect *why* an issue is blocked or to get
a per-blocker readiness summary. Clients must walk the issue graph
manually or fetch full issue objects, which requires multiple
round-trips and is expensive.
**Proposed solution**
A single `GET /api/issues/:id/diagnostics/blockers` endpoint returns a
bounded projection: root issue summary, an ordered blocker list with
per-blocker `readiness` state, and a top-level `diagnosis` field
summarizing overall blocking status. Authorization mediation omits
blockers the caller cannot read, so `diagnosis` only reflects visible
data.
**Alternatives considered**
A general graph-walk query (too broad/expensive for a targeted
diagnostic call); enriching the existing `GET /api/issues/:id` response
(too coupled to the main response shape and adds weight for callers that
do not need blocker detail).
**Roadmap alignment**
Read-only observability surface over existing data; no database schema
changes. This aligns with tooling that helps users understand dependency
state without mutating anything.
## What Changed
- Added `GET /api/issues/:id/diagnostics/blockers` route to the server
- Returns per-blocker `readiness` state and a top-level `diagnosis`
field summarizing overall blocking status
- Enforces `issue:read` authorization per-blocker: unauthorized blockers
are omitted and do not influence `diagnosis` or `readiness` values
- Added shared TypeScript response types in `@paperclipai/shared`
- Added route-level tests using embedded Postgres
- Added API documentation in the `paperclip` skill
## Verification
```sh
./node_modules/.bin/vitest run server/src/__tests__/issue-blocker-diagnostics-routes.test.ts
pnpm --filter @paperclipai/shared typecheck
pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server typecheck
```
All three commands pass locally.
## Risks
- Read-only endpoint over existing relations — no writes, no schema or
migration changes — low risk
- Authorization mediation intentionally omits unauthorized blockers from
both the list and from `diagnosis`/`readiness`; callers with partial
access will see a narrower picture than the full blocker graph
## Model Used
- Provider: Anthropic
- Model: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (`claude-sonnet-4-6`)
- Context window: 200k tokens
- Mode: Tool use, code generation, extended reasoning
## Checklist
- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` /
`Closes: #` / `Refs: #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the
relevant issue template
- [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or
links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip`
URLs)
- [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`)
and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green
- [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge
---------
Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
Jannes Stubbemann
Nicky Leach