## Thinking Path
> - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for
work
> - The instance settings surface (Access, Plugins, Adapters, General,
Experimental) assumes the person at the keyboard operates the whole
instance
> - Operators who host Paperclip for others — a managed cloud or an
internal shared server — expose settings pages and toggles that do not
apply to their deployment, and the related mutation APIs stay open
> - A hosted tenant can open Plugins or Adapters, try an action, and hit
a confusing failure, because only a few hardcoded platform floors exist
> - This pull request adds a generic, operator-configured visibility
mechanism: one env var hides declared settings surfaces in the UI and
floors their mutation routes with a stable 403 code
> - The benefit is a clean hosted-tenant settings surface for any
operator, with zero behavior change for normal self-hosted instances
## Linked Issues or Issue Description
**Subsystem affected**
Instance settings (server routes and UI), the shared settings registry
in `packages/shared`, and the `/api/health` bootstrap payload.
**Problem or motivation**
An operator who hosts Paperclip for other people cannot hide settings
surfaces that the platform manages. Tenants see Access, Plugins, and
Adapters pages, backup retention, and host-level experimental toggles
that do nothing useful for them. The mutation APIs behind these surfaces
also stay open, so a tenant admin can attempt actions the platform must
control. ROADMAP.md names a cleaner shared deployment story as a goal
("Teams should be able to run the same product in hosted or semi-hosted
environments without changing the mental model").
**Proposed solution**
Add a declarative registry of hideable settings surfaces and one env
var, `PAPERCLIP_HIDDEN_SETTINGS`. The server parses the list at boot,
reports it on `/api/health`, and rejects value-changing writes to hidden
surfaces with a stable `settings_operator_managed` 403 code. The UI
reads the list from the health payload and removes the hidden pages,
sections, and toggles from navigation, routes, and page content. Unknown
keys warn and are ignored, so one list can roll across a fleet with
mixed app versions. With the variable unset, behavior is byte-identical
to today.
**Alternatives considered**
- Hardcode the hidden set for cloud instances in this repo: rejected,
because each hosting operator needs a different policy, and policy does
not belong in shared code.
- Deliver the hidden set through the managed-config document: rejected,
because that channel is cloud-specific and fail-closed on unknown
fields; a plain env var works for any operator, including self-hosted
shared servers.
- Lock the controls with a badge instead of hiding them: rejected for
these surfaces, because they are meaningless to tenants, not merely
platform-controlled; the existing managed-overlay lock stays the right
tool for controlled flags.
**Roadmap alignment**
Supports the "shared deployment story" item in ROADMAP.md: hosted and
semi-hosted deployments keep the same product with a settings surface
that matches what the tenant can actually do.
## What Changed
- New `packages/shared/src/settings-visibility.ts`: registry of hideable
surfaces (every instance settings page — profile, environments, access,
heartbeats, experimental, plugins, adapters; every Instance → General
section; every experimental flag as `instance.experimental.<key>`), the
`PAPERCLIP_HIDDEN_SETTINGS` parser, and the `settings_operator_managed`
error code. The General page stays visible as the settings root and
redirect target.
- New `server/src/services/settings-visibility.ts`: parse-once accessor;
unknown keys log one warning and are ignored.
- `/api/health` reports `hiddenSettings` on every response shape; the
field is omitted when nothing is hidden.
- Server floors on hidden surfaces, with same-value echo tolerance (the
`executionMode` precedent): field-backed general sections and
experimental keys reject value-changing PATCHes, and hiding the whole
Experimental page floors every toggle; plugin lifecycle and config
writes, adapter management writes, and the Access admin routes (reads
included) return 403 `settings_operator_managed`. Reads the app itself
needs (plugin `ui-contributions`, adapter metadata, plugin job trigger)
stay open. Pages without instance-scoped mutation routes are hidden in
the UI only.
- UI: new `useHiddenSettings` hook and `HiddenSettingsPageGate` route
gate (hidden pages redirect to the settings root); the settings sidebar
and tab bar drop hidden entries; remembered settings paths remap to the
default page; `InstanceGeneralSettings` skips hidden sections; every
`ExperimentalToggleCard` now carries its flag key and renders nothing
when hidden.
- Removed the dead `InstanceSidebar` component (referenced only by its
own test).
- Docs: `docs/deploy/environment-variables.md` documents the variable
and the key registry.
## Verification
- `pnpm vitest run` over the new and extended suites: shared registry
and parser, representative floor tests per route class (changed-value
403, same-value echo 200, unset env 200, page-level Experimental
hiding), the health field, the route gate, nav filtering, and
section/card hiding with one hidden example per surface kind — 168 tests
pass.
- Full root `pnpm typecheck` passes.
- Manual: booted a server with the variable set. `/api/health` lists the
keys; an unknown key logs one warning and the server boots; hidden pages
redirect; hidden sections and cards do not render; hidden-field PATCH
returns 403 with `details.code = "settings_operator_managed"`; a
same-value echo returns 200. Unset the variable: the full settings
surface returns and responses are byte-identical to master.
## Risks
- Low risk for self-hosted instances: with the variable unset, the
hidden set is empty, the health field is omitted, and no floor
activates.
- Flooring plugin config writes assumes hosted deployments configure
plugins through the platform. If a future bundled plugin needs
tenant-entered config, the floor needs a narrow carve-out.
- Hidden-key floors tolerate same-value echoes, so API clients that
round-trip full GET responses keep working.
- Hiding a toggle does not change its value; operators pair hiding with
the desired default where the value matters.
## Model Used
Claude Fable 5 (Anthropic, `claude-fable-5`) with extended thinking and
agentic tool use, driven through the Claude Code CLI (file edits, test
execution, and live-server verification loops).
## Checklist
- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes
#` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant
issue template
- [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or
links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip`
URLs)
- [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`)
and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [ ] All Paperclip CI gates are green
- [ ] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge
## Thinking Path
> - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for
work
> - Environments give each agent run an execution target: the local
host, SSH, or a sandbox provider
> - A managed deployment can provision one platform-managed sandbox
environment through the `PAPERCLIP_MANAGED_CONFIG` `environments`
section
> - That row is fully locked today. A tenant cannot add environment
variables for their agents. There is also no way to hide local execution
— run selection falls back to the local row
> - A platform that manages the sandbox for its tenants needs both: the
tenant adds env vars (and nothing else), and local execution is neither
visible nor reachable
> - This pull request opens exactly one tenant edit (env vars) on the
managed sandbox row, and adds an `enableManagedSandboxOnly` mode that
hides local and makes run selection fail closed
> - The benefit is a complete managed-sandbox experience with no change
for self-hosted instances
## Linked Issues or Issue Description
**Subsystem affected**
Environments (managed sandbox provisioning, environment routes, run
environment selection) and the environments UI.
**Problem or motivation**
Platform-provisioned sandbox environments
(`metadata.managedByPaperclip`) reject every write on cloud-managed
instances. Agents often need environment variables inside their sandbox.
The tenant has no way to set them on the managed row. Separately, an
operator cannot remove local execution: the environment list always
shows the local row, and run selection falls back to it when no default
is set.
**Proposed solution**
Allow an envVars-only PATCH on the managed sandbox row, and echo those
env vars back for editing. Add a managed-tier feature
(`enableManagedSandboxOnly`) that hides the local environment from all
read surfaces and redirects local-landing run selection to the managed
sandbox environment, failing closed when it is unavailable.
**Alternatives considered**
UI-only hiding of the local row. This was rejected: it does not stop a
run from resolving to local, so it is presentation without enforcement.
Full unlock of the managed row was also rejected: name, driver, and
config stay platform-owned so boot reconciliation cannot fight tenant
edits.
## What Changed
- `server/src/routes/environments.ts`: the platform-provisioned write
floor admits an envVars-only PATCH on the generalized managed sandbox
row (sandbox driver, `managedByPaperclip`, not legacy kubernetes-marker
rows). Name, driver, config, status, metadata, and DELETE stay rejected.
The read floor stops blanking env vars on that row; credential-shaped
config keys stay redacted for every actor. Legacy kubernetes-marker rows
keep the full floor.
- Same file: under `enableManagedSandboxOnly`, the environments list and
the by-id read omit the local row for every actor, including instance
admins.
- `server/src/services/execution-workspace-policy.ts`:
`resolveExecutionWorkspaceEnvironmentId` gains the managed-sandbox-only
inputs. A selection that lands on the local environment is redirected to
the managed sandbox environment. With no active managed row it throws
`ManagedSandboxUnavailableError` — never local. Non-local selections
(ssh, user-created sandboxes) are untouched.
- `server/src/services/heartbeat.ts`: the run path reads the flag, looks
up the managed row (`findManagedSandboxEnvironment`, new read-only
finder in `environments.ts`), and passes both to the resolver. Mirrors
the forced-kubernetes precedent, which keeps precedence when both
regimes are on.
- `server/src/services/managed-environments.ts`: after a successful
reconcile, the instance default environment moves to the managed sandbox
row when the current default is unset, local, or dangling. A
tenant-chosen custom environment is never overridden.
- `packages/shared`: new `enableManagedSandboxOnly` key (schema default
false, catalog tier `managed`, cloudDefault false, selfHostedDefault
false) and the matching interface field.
- UI: managed rows show a "Managed by Paperclip" lock badge; editing one
opens a dedicated env-vars-only editor that sends the one PATCH shape
the server admits (the old full form failed with a 403 on save). New
`ui/src/lib/managed-sandbox-environment.ts` mirrors the local filter for
cached lists (applied in the project picker; the agent picker already
excluded local). The experimental settings page gains the toggle at its
alphabetical card position. `environmentsApi.update` now declares the
`envVars` field it already sent.
- Tests: environment route floor coverage (envVars-only accepted, mixed
bodies rejected, legacy rows still blanked and locked, local hidden and
404 under the flag, self-hosted unchanged), an embedded-postgres service
test pinning that boot reconciliation never touches tenant env vars,
resolver redirect/fail-closed cases, managed-environments
default-stamping cases, and UI lib/settings tests.
## Verification
- `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server exec vitest run
src/__tests__/environment-routes.test.ts
src/__tests__/environment-service.test.ts
src/__tests__/execution-workspace-policy.test.ts
src/services/managed-environments.test.ts` — all pass.
- `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/shared exec vitest run` — 425 pass
(catalog/schema default parity is pinned by an existing test).
- `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/ui exec tsc --noEmit` and the affected UI
suites (CompanyEnvironments, InstanceExperimentalSettings incl.
card-order test, new lib test) — all pass.
- Full workspace `pnpm test`: 3,414 passed. 17 files report failures on
this machine; the identical 17 fail on a clean `origin/master` worktree
in the same environment (git-worktree/skills/embedded-postgres
environment dependencies and plugin-SDK zero-test collections). One
additional file (`issue-monitor-scheduler.test.ts`) failed one
timing-sensitive test in one of two full-suite runs and passes 7/7 in
isolation on this branch — a flake in a domain this diff does not touch.
The branch introduces no new failures.
- Self-hosted zero-delta: every new behavior is gated on the
cloud-managed instance check or the new flag, which defaults to false in
schema and catalog; pinned by the "does not floor platform-marked rows
on self-hosted instances" and flag-off tests.
## Risks
- Behavior is opt-in twice over: the write-floor exception applies only
to rows the managed-config provisioner stamps, and the hiding/forcing
applies only when `enableManagedSandboxOnly` is on (default false
everywhere). Self-hosted instances see no change.
- The env-vars echo is scoped to the generalized managed sandbox row;
legacy kubernetes-marker rows keep the blanket floor because
pre-generalization builds may have written platform values there.
- Fail-closed run selection means a managed instance with the flag on
and an archived managed row (provider plugin down) refuses runs with a
precise error instead of running locally. That is the intended posture.
## Model Used
Claude Fable 5 (`claude-fable-5`), extended thinking, agentic tool use
via Claude Code CLI.
## Checklist
- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes
#` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant
issue template
- [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or
links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip`
URLs)
- [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`)
and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green
- [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge
## Thinking Path
> - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for
work.
> - Operators use the same board application in self-hosted and
Paperclip Cloud deployments.
> - A Cloud tenant contains one company, so an in-app company switch
does not change the active Cloud stack.
> - Cloud operators need the sidebar and company surfaces to use the
signed-in user's stack portfolio.
> - The server must derive Cloud identity and links from trusted
instance context instead of client input.
> - This pull request adds canonical Cloud context, a trusted stack
portfolio proxy, and Cloud-aware navigation.
> - The benefit is consistent stack switching on Cloud while self-hosted
company behavior stays unchanged.
## Linked Issues or Issue Description
**Subsystem affected**
Cross-cutting: server REST routes and the React board UI.
**Problem or motivation**
A Cloud-managed instance contains one company. The existing company
switcher could only switch records inside that tenant. It could not move
the operator to another Cloud stack. The existing header also gave long
organization names too little width.
**Proposed solution**
Expose a canonical public Cloud context in health data. Add a trusted
server proxy for the current user's stack portfolio. Use that data in
the board UI to switch stacks with top-level navigation. Keep the
existing company behavior on self-hosted instances. Move search into the
navigation and keep long organization names inside the sidebar panel.
**Alternatives considered**
An in-app `/stacks` route was rejected because Cloud tenant hosts
reserve that path and stack selection must wake or authenticate another
tenant. Client-supplied user identity was rejected because the server
can derive the trusted Cloud actor.
**Roadmap alignment**
This change advances the Cloud deployments milestone. It keeps the
product local-first and Cloud-ready without changing the self-hosted
mental model.
## What Changed
- Added canonical Cloud instance context and public health metadata.
- Added a Cloud-only stack portfolio proxy with trusted actor forwarding
and per-user caching.
- Prevented normal company creation on Cloud-managed instances.
- Switched the sidebar and Companies page from company actions to stack
actions on Cloud.
- Added full-page stack navigation and Cloud create-stack links.
- Moved search into the sidebar navigation so the organization name
keeps more width.
- Added truncation and hover recovery for long organization and stack
names.
- Added server and UI regression coverage for Cloud and self-hosted
behavior.
- Updated the implementation specification for the Cloud contracts.
## Verification
- `node scripts/check-token-gates.mjs` passed. All three token gates are
clean.
- `pnpm --dir server exec vitest run src/__tests__/health.test.ts
src/__tests__/cloud-instance.test.ts src/__tests__/cloud-routes.test.ts
src/__tests__/company-cloud-floor.test.ts
src/__tests__/company-portability-routes.test.ts` passed: 5 files and 66
tests.
- `pnpm --dir ui exec vitest run
src/components/SidebarCompanyMenu.test.tsx` passed: 1 file and 11 tests.
- Pre-PR QA report `7da87ca7` passed all 8 acceptance criteria with real
HTTP route factories and real Chromium screenshots in Cloud and
self-hosted modes.
- Security reviews passed for the canonical Cloud context and stack
portfolio proxy.
## Risks
- Cloud stack switching depends on the configured Cloud application and
tenant portfolio URLs.
- The new health `cloud` block is public by design, but it contains only
canonical public instance metadata.
- The stack proxy fails closed on self-hosted instances and derives the
user identity from the trusted actor.
- Self-hosted navigation and company creation retain their existing
paths and behavior.
> For core feature work, check [`ROADMAP.md`](ROADMAP.md) first and
discuss it in `#dev` before opening the PR. Feature PRs that overlap
with planned core work may need to be redirected — check the roadmap
first. See `CONTRIBUTING.md`.
## Model Used
- OpenAI Codex, model `gpt-5`. The run used reasoning, repository tools,
shell execution, and GitHub integration. The deployment did not expose
its context-window size.
## Checklist
- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes
#` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant
issue template
- [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or
links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip`
URLs)
- [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`)
and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green
- [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge
---------
Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
## Thinking Path
> - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for
work
> - Cloud-managed instances authenticate tenant users through a
trusted-header path (`resolveCloudTenantActor`) that deliberately never
grants `instance_admin`, so every tenant user is company-scoped
> - On a dedicated (single-owner) managed instance that leaves the
paying owner unable to administer their own instance: instance settings,
the environments admin surface, and the custom sandbox image flow are
all instance-admin gated (the environments UI can't even show the
provider/image of the platform sandbox because the restricted read view
blanks `config` entirely)
> - Re-granting the old blanket `instance_user_roles` row would repeat
the mistake the shared-pool hardening fixed: DB rows go stale, resurrect
via restores, and elevate through every auth path
> - This pull request elevates only the stack `owner`, computed per
request at the trusted-header boundary behind a new managed-tier feature
flag, and ships that elevation together with code floors on the
platform-owned surfaces an instance admin must not control on a managed
instance
> - The benefit is that dedicated-stack owners can administer their own
instance while platform credentials, execution policy, backups, and
runtime code-install stay platform-owned, and self-hosted behavior is
unchanged
## Linked Issues or Issue Description
No public GitHub issue exists for this change; the underlying issue is
described here following the feature-request template.
### Problem or motivation
- On cloud-managed instances, tenant users resolved from trusted headers
are always company-scoped. For dedicated instances with a single paying
owner, the owner cannot reach any instance-admin surface of their own
instance (instance settings, environments administration, custom image
setup), and the restricted environment read view hides even structural
fields like the sandbox provider and image.
- The previous hardening intentionally removed blanket elevation (and
purges stale `instance_user_roles` rows on every trusted-header
authentication). That protection must not regress for shared
multi-tenant pools.
### Proposed solution
- Owner-only, computed, flag-gated elevation plus code floors on
platform-owned surfaces, in one PR so the elevation can never ship
without the floors.
### Alternatives considered
- Re-inserting an `instance_user_roles` row for owners (the
pre-hardening model): rejected — DB rows go stale, survive restores, and
elevate through every auth path; #7525 removed exactly this.
- Widening only the environments read view without any elevation:
rejected — it fixes one screen but still leaves a dedicated-instance
owner unable to administer instance settings or custom images.
- Elevating additional stack roles (`member`/`admin`/`support`):
rejected — only the owner has an ownership claim over the whole
instance; other roles stay company-scoped.
### Roadmap alignment
- Extends the shipped "Cloud deployments" roadmap work (multi-tenant
isolation, company-scoped cloud tenants, managed-instance bootstrap)
without overlapping planned core items, and leaves self-hosted behavior
unchanged.
## What Changed
- **New feature key** `enableOwnerInstanceAdmin` (`packages/shared`):
boolean flag in `instanceExperimentalSettingsSchema`, catalog tier
`managed`, `cloudDefault: true`, `selfHostedDefault: false`. Inert on
self-hosted instances — the elevation path only exists behind the cloud
tenant trust token.
- **Computed elevation** (`server/src/middleware/auth.ts`):
`resolveCloudTenantActor` now returns `isInstanceAdmin: true` only when
the trusted-header stack role is `owner` **and** the flag is enabled.
The flag is resolved through the instance-settings service so the
managed-config overlay applies (the control plane can disable elevation
fleet-wide without touching tenant databases; a DB row edit or restore
cannot resurrect it). Resolution fails closed on settings read errors.
The `instance_user_roles` never-insert and the per-request stale-row
purge are byte-identical. `member`/`admin`/`support` stack roles stay
company-scoped.
- **Authorization guard split**
(`server/src/services/authorization.ts`): the blanket-allow now trusts
the actor's *computed* `isInstanceAdmin` flag (only the attested
resolver can set it for `cloud_tenant` actors) while keeping the
`instance_user_roles` DB lookup excluded for `cloud_tenant` — a stale or
hand-inserted role row still elevates nothing.
- **Floor F1 — platform environment credentials**
(`server/src/routes/environments.ts`): on cloud-managed instances,
platform-provisioned environment rows (`managedByPaperclip` marker, plus
the legacy managed-Kubernetes marker) use a single floored view for
every reader on all environment routes (list, get, create, update,
delete responses): `envVars` are never echoed and credential-shaped
`config` keys (reusing the managed-config
`SECRET_LIKE_CONFIG_KEY_PATTERN`) are dropped — for **all** actors
including instance admins — while structural config (provider, image,
template, region, …) and the managed markers stay visible. This also
fixes the environments UI for managed sandboxes, which previously lost
the provider/image entirely in the restricted view. The floor also
covers writes: `PATCH /environments/:id` and `DELETE /environments/:id`
on a platform-provisioned row are rejected (403,
`environment_platform_managed`) for every actor including instance
admins, and the guard binds to the persisted row's markers so a patch
cannot strip the managed marker to lift the floor. The one recovery path
is a metadata-only PATCH that solely clears the marker keys
(null/false), for rows stamped through the old unrestricted API before
the markers became reserved — and it never applies to a row whose slot
markers are live platform state: the single local row
(`environments_local_driver_idx`), which `ensureLocalEnvironment` adopts
and stamps on cloud-managed instances from every caller (company
creation, the heartbeat, run orchestration), and the single marked
sandbox row (`environments_managed_sandbox_idx`) while a managed-sandbox
bootstrap path is configured (managed-config `environments` section or
`PAPERCLIP_EXECUTION_MODE=kubernetes`) and the provisioner therefore
adopts and refreshes it on every boot. Clearing a live slot row's
markers would let the next write reclassify it as tenant-managed and
bypass the floor; conversely, when no sandbox provisioning path is
configured the platform holds no claim on any sandbox row, so a platform
marker there is stale by definition and the recovery patch applies.
Every marker outside a live slot is clearable, so no legacy row is ever
locked permanently. Custom-image setup and probes on the platform
sandbox stay available to instance admins — those are the owner-facing
flows this elevation exists for. The marker keys themselves are
reserved: client create/update payloads that set `managedByPaperclip` or
`managedKubernetesSandbox` are rejected (422,
`environment_platform_marker_reserved`) on cloud-managed instances, so a
tenant row can never be stamped platform-provisioned through the API and
self-locked behind the write floor (the provisioner writes markers at
the service layer, not through these routes). Tenant-created
environments are otherwise unaffected.
- **Floor F2 — executionMode**
(`server/src/routes/instance-settings.ts`): on cloud-managed instances,
`PATCH /instance/settings/general` rejects writes that would change
`executionMode` (403, `execution_mode_platform_managed`). Same-value
echoes pass so settings forms that submit the full general-settings
object keep working. The boot-time execution-policy bootstrap path is
untouched (it calls the service directly).
- **Floor F3 — manual database backups**
(`server/src/routes/instance-database-backups.ts`): floored off on
cloud-managed instances (403, `database_backups_platform_managed`);
backups are platform-owned there, and the result would also echo a
server-side filesystem path.
- **Floor F4 — adapter code install** (`server/src/routes/adapters.ts`):
`POST /adapters/install` and `POST /adapters/:type/reinstall` are
floored off on cloud-managed instances (403,
`adapter_install_platform_managed`). Adapter packages execute in the
server process, so a runtime install would let an instance admin read
the platform trust anchors out of the process environment. This mirrors
the existing bundled-only plugin install floor; adapter code on managed
instances comes bundled with the platform image.
## Instance-admin surface audit
Before widening who can hold `isInstanceAdmin`, every
instance-admin-gated surface in `server/src` was enumerated and reviewed
for whether its response or side effects could echo process environment
values or platform credentials (tenant trust token, JWT signing keys,
database connection strings, provider API keys): 29 distinct gate
definitions covering ~90+ call sites, in four groups — sole
instance-admin gates (12), instance-admin-or-company-permission gates
(10), response-shaping/scope-widening sites (6), and the central
`allow_instance_admin` short-circuit in the authorization service (58
`decide()` call sites).
Findings and dispositions:
- **Environment read/write responses** exposed platform sandbox
`envVars`/credential-shaped config to instance admins → closed by floor
F1.
- **Manual backup trigger** echoed a server filesystem path and triggers
a platform-owned operation → closed by floor F3.
- **Adapter install/reinstall** loads externally fetched code into the
server process (indirect, complete env exposure) → closed by floor F4.
The sibling plugin-install path already had a bundled-only floor on
managed instances and needed no change.
- **Token-minting surfaces** (gateway tokens, custom-image
terminal/connection tokens) mint credentials scoped to the instance's
own resources, not platform trust anchors → acceptable for an
owner-admin of a dedicated instance; unchanged.
- All remaining gated surfaces return ordinary instance-scoped business
data; none echo `process.env` or platform secrets directly. OAuth client
secrets are referenced by env-var *name* only; SSH private keys are
stored as secret refs before persistence and are not echoed.
Operational note for managed platforms: this model assumes the process
environment of a managed instance holds only that instance's own
credentials. Platform operators should keep provider credentials
per-instance (never fleet-shared) since an instance admin ultimately
controls in-process code on their own instance.
## Verification
- `pnpm vitest run server/src/middleware/cloud-tenant-actor.test.ts` —
resolver matrix: owner × flag on/off, flag via managed overlay
(on-over-DB-off and off-over-DB-on), member/admin/support × flag on,
no-token self-hosted, fail-closed settings read, purge still runs and no
role row is ever inserted (14 tests).
- `pnpm vitest run server/src/__tests__/authorization-service.test.ts` —
computed flag elevates a `cloud_tenant` actor; a stale
`instance_user_roles` row still never does; `session` actors unchanged
(full suite, embedded Postgres).
- `pnpm vitest run server/src/__tests__/environment-routes.test.ts` —
F1: no secret echo to admins on get/list, structural config visible to
restricted readers, platform-row PATCH/DELETE rejected for admins
(including a marker-stripping patch), marker-clear recovery allowed for
stale legacy rows and for a marked sandbox row when no provisioning path
is configured, but refused on the managed local row and on the sandbox
slot row under a managed-config `environments` entry or the forced
kubernetes execution mode, client marker-stamping creates/patches
rejected, tenant rows still readable and writable, self-hosted
read+write regression (60 tests).
- `pnpm vitest run server/src/__tests__/environment-service.test.ts` —
`ensureLocalEnvironment` adopts a pre-existing local row on
cloud-managed instances (marker stamped, other metadata preserved,
idempotent — no rewrite on re-ensure) and leaves self-hosted rows
untouched (22 tests, embedded Postgres).
- `pnpm vitest run server/src/__tests__/instance-settings-routes.test.ts
server/src/__tests__/instance-database-backups-routes.test.ts` — F2
change-vs-echo matrix incl. self-hosted regression; F3 floor for both
admin shapes (32 tests).
- `pnpm vitest run server/src/__tests__/adapter-routes-authz.test.ts` —
F4 floor; self-hosted install/reinstall behavior unchanged (existing
cases).
- `pnpm vitest run server/src/__tests__/first-admin-claim.test.ts
server/src/__tests__/bootstrap-claim-routes.test.ts
server/src/__tests__/managed-config.test.ts
server/src/__tests__/health.test.ts
server/src/__tests__/instance-settings-managed-overlay.test.ts
server/src/services/managed-environments.test.ts
server/src/services/execution-policy-bootstrap.test.ts` — first-admin
bootstrap gate and managed-config behavior unchanged (91 tests).
- `pnpm vitest run packages/shared/src/feature-catalog.test.ts` —
catalog/schema sync tests cover the new key (selfHostedDefault must
equal the schema default).
- `pnpm run typecheck` — all 31 workspace projects clean.
## Risks
- Self-hosted behavior is unchanged: every floor binds to
`isCloudManagedInstance()` (tenant trust token present), the new flag
defaults off with no elevation path, and regression tests pin the
self-hosted branches.
- The elevation is fail-closed and stateless: turning the flag off
(managed overlay or DB) de-elevates on the next request; there is no
role row to clean up and restores cannot resurrect elevation.
- On a cloud-managed instance a pre-existing unmarked local row is
adopted (stamped `managedByPaperclip`) by the next ensure and becomes
platform-owned — the intended managed-product semantic: the platform
owns the single local slot. Self-hosted instances are untouched.
- F1 widens restricted readers' view of platform-provisioned rows from
fully blanked `config`/`metadata` to structural-only `config` plus
markers. Platform-delivered config is guaranteed secret-free by the
managed-config contract (secret-shaped keys fail startup), and the floor
re-drops secret-shaped keys defensively.
- One extra instance-settings read per trusted-header request for
owner-role actors (the resolver already performs several queries per
request).
## Model Used
Claude Fable 5 (Anthropic) — model id `claude-fable-5`, extended
thinking enabled, agentic tool use via Claude Code; read-only explore
subagents on the same model were used for the surface audit sweep.
## Checklist
- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes
#` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant
issue template
- [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or
links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip`
URLs)
- [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`)
and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green
- [ ] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge
---------
Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
## Thinking Path
> - Paperclip is the control plane people use to manage AI-agent
companies and their work
> - The activity log is the generic audit spine for mutations across the
control plane
> - Activity rows identify agents and runs, but they do not persist the
responsible human upstream
> - Relying only on run joins loses attribution after run pruning and
misses agent API-key actions outside a run
> - This pull request resolves responsible-user attribution when each
activity row is written and stores it directly
> - The benefit is durable, queryable agent audit feeds without
rewriting historical provenance
## Linked Issues or Issue Description
### Problem or motivation
Agent activity records do not persist the responsible user, so
attribution can disappear when runs are pruned and no-run API-key
mutations cannot be attributed correctly.
### Proposed solution
Resolve attribution for each new activity row from the run, related
issue, active agent API key, or company default, in that order, and
persist the result directly.
### Alternatives considered
Read-time joins alone were rejected because pruned runs lose durable
attribution and out-of-run agent-key actions have no run to join.
Historical backfill was rejected because it would invent provenance.
### Roadmap alignment
This strengthens the durable audit-trail direction described in
`ROADMAP.md` without adding a new product surface.
## What Changed
- Added nullable `activity_log.responsible_user_id` plus
company/agent/time and company/responsible-user/time indexes.
- Added an idempotent forward-only migration with no historical
backfill.
- Added centralized write-time resolution: heartbeat run → issue
attribution → active agent API key → company default.
- Propagated authenticated API-key IDs through existing request-backed
`logActivity()` calls.
- Added unit coverage for every fallback and an embedded-Postgres
assertion for the no-run API-key stamping path.
## Verification
- `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/db typecheck`
- `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server typecheck`
- `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server exec vitest run
src/__tests__/activity-log-responsible-user.test.ts
src/__tests__/authz-company-access.test.ts`
- Initial focused verification: 25 tests passed; migration safety
passed.
- Follow-up regression verification: 54 focused
attribution/company-skill/environment/issue-tree/tool-gateway tests
passed; server typecheck passed.
- GitHub: full build, typecheck, server shards, serialized suites, e2e,
security, and policy checks passed.
## Risks
- Adding two indexes to an existing large table can hold a write lock
while the transactional migration runs. The migration safety
suppressions document why `CONCURRENTLY` is unavailable under the
current Drizzle migration runner.
- Historical rows remain nullable by design; this avoids inventing
provenance and keeps the migration forward-only.
- API-key attribution requires request-backed activity call sites to
pass the authenticated key ID; this PR mechanically updates the existing
actor-based activity calls and covers the no-run path with integration
testing.
> For core feature work, check [`ROADMAP.md`](ROADMAP.md) first and
discuss it in `#dev` before opening the PR. Feature PRs that overlap
with planned core work may need to be redirected — check the roadmap
first. See `CONTRIBUTING.md`.
## Model Used
- OpenAI Codex, `gpt-5.4`; context-window size was not exposed by the
runtime. Medium reasoning with repository editing, terminal execution,
and test execution capabilities was used.
## Checklist
- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes
#` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant
issue template
- [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or
links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip`
URLs)
- [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`)
and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green
- [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge
---------
Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
## Thinking Path
> - Paperclip is the control plane for AI-agent companies, so execution
environment selection has to stay inspectable and predictable across
companies, agents, and runs.
> - The environment subsystem decides where an agent heartbeat actually
runs and how remote sandbox state is realized and restored.
> - That subsystem previously mixed company-scoped environment catalogs
with issue-level environment stamping, so a reassigned issue could keep
executing in the previous assignee's sandbox.
> - That behavior breaks the control-plane contract: changing the
assignee should change the executing agent/environment path unless there
is an explicit current override.
> - Fixing it cleanly required more than a narrow patch; the environment
model had to move to instance scope with a single inherited default and
per-agent override semantics.
> - This pull request rewires the schema, server/API surface, runtime
resolution, and UI around that model, then adds regression coverage for
cross-company inheritance and per-agent isolation.
> - The benefit is that environment choice now follows the approved
instance/agent configuration path instead of stale issue state, while
shared environments only need to be configured once per instance.
## Linked Issues or Issue Description
- No directly matching public GitHub issue or PR was found while
searching for this refactor.
### What happened?
Reassigning work between agents with different execution environments
could keep running in the previous sandbox because environment choice
was stamped onto the issue and outranked the current assignee. The same
subsystem also forced environment catalogs to be duplicated per company
even though the underlying execution environments were instance-wide
resources.
### Expected behavior
Execution should resolve through the current instance and agent
configuration path, with one instance-scoped environment catalog, one
instance default, optional per-agent override, and no stale issue-level
environment authority surviving reassignment.
### Steps to reproduce
1. Configure two agents to use different execution environments.
2. Assign an issue to the first agent so the issue records execution
state in that environment.
3. Reassign the same issue to the second agent and run another
heartbeat.
4. Observe that the pre-fix runtime can still sync or execute in the
original sandbox instead of the second agent's environment.
### Paperclip version or commit
Current `master` before this PR.
### Deployment mode
Self-hosted server.
### Installation method
Built from source (`pnpm dev` / `pnpm build`).
### Agent adapter(s) involved
- Claude Code
- Not adapter-specific (core bug in environment authority / resolution)
### Database mode
External Postgres.
### Access context
Both board reassignment and agent heartbeats were involved.
## What Changed
- Moved environments and their default selection contract to instance
scope in DB/shared types, including the migration that dedupes legacy
per-company environments and seeds the instance local default.
- Reworked environment CRUD/auth flows to use instance-scoped APIs and
added route/service coverage for instance-level environment management.
- Changed runtime resolution to prefer `agent default -> instance
default -> built-in local`, removed issue-level environment stamping
from the active execution path, and isolated sandbox/plugin leases by
`(executionWorkspaceId, agentId)`.
- Added environment env-var runtime precedence so environment-provided
values act as the baseline for agent execution.
- Moved the environment UI into instance settings and updated agent
configuration surfaces to reflect inherit/override behavior.
- Added regression coverage for instance-default inheritance across
companies and for the new runtime resolution behavior.
- Fixed a rebase-only duplicate `enableTaskWatchdogs` flag regression in
instance settings types/validators/services so the branch typechecks
cleanly on current `master`.
- Updated stale server tests so CI matches the shipped instance-scoped
environment contract.
## Verification
- `git diff --check`
- `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/shared typecheck`
- `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/db typecheck`
- `pnpm exec vitest run
server/src/__tests__/environment-runtime-driver-contract.test.ts
server/src/__tests__/agent-permissions-routes.test.ts
server/src/__tests__/environment-routes.test.ts
server/src/__tests__/environment-instance-routes.test.ts
server/src/__tests__/execution-workspace-policy.test.ts
server/src/__tests__/heartbeat-plugin-environment.test.ts
server/src/__tests__/instance-settings-routes.test.ts`
## Risks
- The migration changes environment scope and dedupes existing rows, so
installs with unusual legacy environment combinations should be reviewed
carefully during upgrade.
- Remote execution behavior now depends on instance-default inheritance
semantics instead of issue-level stamping, so any remaining code paths
that still assume issue-scoped environment authority would surface as
follow-up bugs.
- This PR includes both server/runtime behavior and UI relocation, so
reviewers should watch for authorization edge cases around instance
settings and environment management.
> I checked [`ROADMAP.md`](ROADMAP.md). This work fits the existing
Cloud / Sandbox agents direction as a bug-fix/refactor to current
behavior, not a new parallel product surface.
## Model Used
- OpenAI Codex coding agent in this Paperclip/Codex session; GPT-5-class
tool-using model with code execution and shell access. The exact backend
model ID is not exposed to the session runtime.
## Checklist
- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes
#` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant
issue template
- [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or
links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip`
URLs)
- [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`)
and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [ ] If this change affects the UI, I have included before/after
screenshots
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [ ] All Paperclip CI gates are green
- [ ] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge
## Thinking Path
> - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for
work.
> - The task lifecycle and recovery subsystems decide when agent work is
still productive, stalled, or ready for review.
> - Existing recovery paths can observe stopped or incomplete work, but
there was no first-class per-task watchdog model with scoped review
permissions.
> - Watchdog follow-ups also need strict boundaries so
recovery/status-only runs cannot mutate approvals or perform deliverable
work.
> - This pull request adds the task watchdog data model, API/service
layer, scheduler/review flow, adapter wake context, UI configuration
surfaces, and docs.
> - The branch has been rebased onto current `paperclipai/paperclip`
`master`; the watchdog migration is now ordered after master's latest
migrations as `0104_issue_watchdogs`.
> - The benefit is a more explicit task-review loop that preserves
Paperclip's single-assignee and governance invariants while making
stalled work easier to route.
## Linked Issues or Issue Description
No linked GitHub issue. Paperclip task:
[PAP-11275](/PAP/issues/PAP-11275).
## Problem or motivation
Task recovery needs a first-class watchdog path that can inspect stopped
work and create scoped follow-ups without bypassing normal task
ownership. Board/UI users need a way to configure watchdogs on tasks and
see watchdog-related live work. Recovery/status-only runs must remain
limited to status reporting and must not create approvals, link
approvals, or submit approval comments.
## Proposed solution
Add a task-watchdog data model, scheduler/classifier, scoped mutation
guard, adapter wake context, API/UI configuration surfaces, and
documentation so watchdog agents can review stopped task subtrees under
explicit boundaries.
## Alternatives considered
Reuse the existing recovery-action flow only. That would keep
stopped-work detection implicit, make per-task watchdog assignment
harder to expose in the UI, and would not provide a durable
scoped-review issue for stalled task trees.
## Roadmap alignment
This is Paperclip control-plane lifecycle infrastructure for task
execution and recovery. I checked `ROADMAP.md`; this PR does not
duplicate an existing planned core item.
## What Changed
- Added issue watchdog schema, migration, shared contracts, validators,
CRUD API, and service support.
- Added task watchdog scheduler/classifier behavior, scoped mutation
enforcement, adapter wake context, and default watchdog mandate
guidance.
- Added UI surfaces for configuring watchdogs on new/existing tasks,
viewing watchdog activity, and exposing the experimental setting.
- Added docs for the user-facing task watchdog workflow and
implementation semantics.
- Gated new-task watchdog setup behind `enableTaskWatchdogs` and blocked
cheap status-only recovery runs from approval mutations.
- Rebased onto current `master` and renumbered the idempotent watchdog
migration from the branch-local `0102_issue_watchdogs` slot to
`0104_issue_watchdogs`.
- Addressed Greptile feedback by loading watchdog classifier input with
a recursive subtree query and centralizing the watchdog origin-kind
constant.
- Added and updated focused server/UI tests for watchdog routes,
scheduler/classifier behavior, scope boundaries, live task visibility,
settings, and new issue dialog behavior.
## Verification
- `pnpm vitest run server/src/__tests__/task-watchdogs-scheduler.test.ts
server/src/__tests__/task-watchdogs-classifier.test.ts`
- `pnpm vitest run
server/src/__tests__/approval-routes-idempotency.test.ts
server/src/__tests__/issue-agent-mutation-ownership-routes.test.ts`
- `pnpm vitest run ui/src/components/NewIssueDialog.test.tsx`
- `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server typecheck`
- `git diff --check`
- Verified the PR diff does not include `pnpm-lock.yaml` or
`.github/workflows`.
## Risks
- Medium risk: this introduces a new task lifecycle surface touching DB
schema, server routes/services, adapter wake context, and UI task
configuration.
- Watchdog scheduling behavior depends on the new experimental setting
and runtime context checks behaving consistently across local and
production agents.
- The watchdog migration is idempotent (`IF NOT EXISTS` /
duplicate-object guards) so users who tried the previous branch-local
migration number should not get duplicate-object failures.
- CI and the second Greptile pass are pending after the latest
review-fix push.
> For core feature work, check [`ROADMAP.md`](ROADMAP.md) first and
discuss it in `#dev` before opening the PR. Feature PRs that overlap
with planned core work may need to be redirected — check the roadmap
first. See `CONTRIBUTING.md`.
## Model Used
OpenAI Codex, GPT-5-class coding agent in the Paperclip workspace. Exact
runtime model id and context window were not exposed to the agent; tool
use and local command execution were enabled.
## Checklist
- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes
#` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant
issue template
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] If this change affects the UI, I have included before/after
screenshots — N/A per Paperclip task instruction: do not add
screenshots/images to this PR unless they are specifically part of the
work.
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [ ] All Paperclip CI gates are green
- [ ] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge
---------
Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
## Thinking Path
> - Paperclip orchestrates AI agents for zero-human companies.
> - Heartbeat liveness recovery decides when stalled issue trees need
manager-visible follow-up.
> - Automatic recovery issue creation is useful, but operators need
instance-level controls for how aggressive it is.
> - Without controls, recovery behavior is harder to tune for local
development, production operations, and noisy edge cases.
> - This pull request adds configurable liveness auto-recovery settings
across shared contracts, API routes, services, and the instance
experimental settings UI.
> - The benefit is that operators can keep liveness findings advisory or
enable bounded recovery automation with explicit intervals and lookback
windows.
## What Changed
- Added shared types and validators for liveness auto-recovery settings.
- Extended instance settings routes and services to persist and validate
the new controls.
- Wired heartbeat/recovery services to honor enablement, minimum
interval, and lookback settings.
- Added UI controls for liveness recovery under instance experimental
settings.
- Covered the new server behavior with instance settings and liveness
escalation tests.
## Verification
- `pnpm exec vitest run --project @paperclipai/server
server/src/__tests__/heartbeat-issue-liveness-escalation.test.ts
server/src/__tests__/instance-settings-routes.test.ts --pool=forks
--poolOptions.forks.isolate=true`
- `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/shared typecheck`
- `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server typecheck`
- `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/ui typecheck`
## Risks
- Moderate behavioral risk because recovery automation timing changes
when enabled; defaults keep existing advisory behavior unless the
setting is turned on.
- No database migration in this PR; settings are stored through the
existing instance settings path.
> For core feature work, check [`ROADMAP.md`](ROADMAP.md) first and
discuss it in `#dev` before opening the PR. Feature PRs that overlap
with planned core work may need to be redirected — check the roadmap
first. See `CONTRIBUTING.md`.
## Model Used
- OpenAI Codex, `gpt-5`, coding model with tool use and local command
execution; context window not exposed by the runtime.
## Checklist
- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [ ] If this change affects the UI, I have included before/after
screenshots
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge
---------
Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
## Thinking Path
> - Paperclip is the control plane for autonomous AI companies.
> - V1 needs to stay local-first while also supporting shared,
authenticated deployments.
> - Human operators need real identities, company membership, invite
flows, profile surfaces, and company-scoped access controls.
> - Agents and operators also need the existing issue, inbox, workspace,
approval, and plugin flows to keep working under those authenticated
boundaries.
> - This branch accumulated the multi-user implementation, follow-up QA
fixes, workspace/runtime refinements, invite UX improvements,
release-branch conflict resolution, and review hardening.
> - This pull request consolidates that branch onto the current `master`
branch as a single reviewable PR.
> - The benefit is a complete multi-user implementation path with tests
and docs carried forward without dropping existing branch work.
## What Changed
- Added authenticated human-user access surfaces: auth/session routes,
company user directory, profile settings, company access/member
management, join requests, and invite management.
- Added invite creation, invite landing, onboarding, logo/branding,
invite grants, deduped join requests, and authenticated multi-user E2E
coverage.
- Tightened company-scoped and instance-admin authorization across
board, plugin, adapter, access, issue, and workspace routes.
- Added profile-image URL validation hardening, avatar preservation on
name-only profile updates, and join-request uniqueness migration cleanup
for pending human requests.
- Added an atomic member role/status/grants update path so Company
Access saves no longer leave partially updated permissions.
- Improved issue chat, inbox, assignee identity rendering,
sidebar/account/company navigation, workspace routing, and execution
workspace reuse behavior for multi-user operation.
- Added and updated server/UI tests covering auth, invites, membership,
issue workspace inheritance, plugin authz, inbox/chat behavior, and
multi-user flows.
- Merged current `public-gh/master` into this branch, resolved all
conflicts, and verified no `pnpm-lock.yaml` change is included in this
PR diff.
## Verification
- `pnpm exec vitest run server/src/__tests__/issues-service.test.ts
ui/src/components/IssueChatThread.test.tsx ui/src/pages/Inbox.test.tsx`
- `pnpm run preflight:workspace-links && pnpm exec vitest run
server/src/__tests__/plugin-routes-authz.test.ts`
- `pnpm exec vitest run server/src/__tests__/plugin-routes-authz.test.ts
server/src/__tests__/workspace-runtime-service-authz.test.ts
server/src/__tests__/access-validators.test.ts`
- `pnpm exec vitest run
server/src/__tests__/authz-company-access.test.ts
server/src/__tests__/routines-routes.test.ts
server/src/__tests__/sidebar-preferences-routes.test.ts
server/src/__tests__/approval-routes-idempotency.test.ts
server/src/__tests__/openclaw-invite-prompt-route.test.ts
server/src/__tests__/agent-cross-tenant-authz-routes.test.ts
server/src/__tests__/routines-e2e.test.ts`
- `pnpm exec vitest run server/src/__tests__/auth-routes.test.ts
ui/src/pages/CompanyAccess.test.tsx`
- `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/shared typecheck && pnpm --filter
@paperclipai/db typecheck && pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server
typecheck`
- `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/shared typecheck && pnpm --filter
@paperclipai/server typecheck`
- `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/ui typecheck`
- `pnpm db:generate`
- `npx playwright test --config tests/e2e/playwright.config.ts --list`
- Confirmed branch has no uncommitted changes and is `0` commits behind
`public-gh/master` before PR creation.
- Confirmed no `pnpm-lock.yaml` change is staged or present in the PR
diff.
## Risks
- High review surface area: this PR contains the accumulated multi-user
branch plus follow-up fixes, so reviewers should focus especially on
company-boundary enforcement and authenticated-vs-local deployment
behavior.
- UI behavior changed across invites, inbox, issue chat, access
settings, and sidebar navigation; no browser screenshots are included in
this branch-consolidation PR.
- Plugin install, upgrade, and lifecycle/config mutations now require
instance-admin access, which is intentional but may change expectations
for non-admin board users.
- A join-request dedupe migration rejects duplicate pending human
requests before creating unique indexes; deployments with unusual
historical duplicates should review the migration behavior.
- Company member role/status/grant saves now use a new combined
endpoint; older separate endpoints remain for compatibility.
- Full production build was not run locally in this heartbeat; CI should
cover the full matrix.
## Model Used
- OpenAI Codex coding agent, GPT-5-based model, CLI/tool-use
environment. Exact deployed model identifier and context window were not
exposed by the runtime.
## Checklist
- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] If this change affects the UI, I have included before/after
screenshots
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge
Note on screenshots: this is a branch-consolidation PR for an
already-developed multi-user branch, and no browser screenshots were
captured during this heartbeat.
---------
Co-authored-by: dotta <dotta@example.com>
Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Introduce a singleton instance_settings store and experimental settings API, add the Experimental instance settings page, and gate execution workspace behavior behind the new enableIsolatedWorkspaces flag.
Co-Authored-By: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
Devin Foley
Dotta
dotta
Dotta