# Paperclip Tailscale HTTPS broker Least-privilege host broker that manages **only** Paperclip-owned, tailnet-only, same-number HTTPS-to-loopback listeners for managed branch runtimes. It exists so the Paperclip app/agent account never gains Tailscale operator authority (see [PAP-16989](../../)) while still getting automatic trusted HTTPS previews per branch runtime. Design: [PAP-17049](../../) plan; security contract: [PAP-17050](../../) threat-model verdict. Runtime services opt in explicitly; existing services and the primary `:443` route are unchanged: ```json { "port": { "type": "auto", "envKey": "PORT" }, "expose": { "type": "tailscale_https", "hostname": "auto", "publicPort": "same", "includePaperclipViteHmr": true, "failurePolicy": "fail_closed" } } ``` ## What it can and cannot do Supported operations (over a Unix socket, one runtime-service at a time): - `list` — the caller's own exposures (never returns lease handles). - `reserve` — atomically reserve an app/HMR pair before either backend binds, returning an unguessable, short-lived lease handle bound to the caller, runtime ID, ports, purposes, and generation. - `expose` — redeem that reservation only after `/proc` proves both listeners are loopback-only and owned by the configured managed-runtime UID. - `remove` — remove the caller's own listeners, proven by exact lease handle. Hard-denied, deny-by-default: Funnel, certificates, Tailscale Services, `serve reset` / `set-config`, path handlers, arbitrary targets, non-loopback or wildcard/dual-stack backends, port `443`, privileged/reserved ports, ports outside the dedicated runtime range, unknown fields, and removal of any mapping not matching an exact registry + lease + live Serve entry. The primary `:443 → 127.0.0.1:3100` route is verified structurally **before and after every mutation** and is never modified. The socket transport reads Linux `SO_PEERCRED` before admission, admits at most 8 concurrent sockets per resolved UID, and reserves 4 of its 32 global slots for the configured Paperclip service UID. Connection deadlines destroy the socket so timed-out peers cannot retain kernel-level connection slots. Missing or invalid native credentials fail closed; socket permissions are not used as a substitute identity. ## One-time host installation (`paperclip-dev`) These steps require **root** and must be run by CloudOps/host owner, not the Paperclip agent account. They install the broker as a dedicated Tailscale-operator service account distinct from the Paperclip app account. 1. **Preconditions.** Tailscale is installed and up on the node, the node has an HTTPS-capable trusted cert (MagicDNS + HTTPS enabled), and the existing `:443 → 127.0.0.1:3100` Serve mapping is present. 2. **Create the dedicated operator account and socket group.** ```sh sudo useradd --system --home /var/lib/paperclip-tailscale-broker \ --shell /usr/sbin/nologin paperclip-tsbroker sudo groupadd --system paperclip-tsbroker-sock # The Paperclip *app* service account must have this as its PRIMARY group so # its SO_PEERCRED gid matches the socket group (supplemental membership is # intentionally NOT accepted). sudo usermod -g paperclip-tsbroker-sock ``` 3. **Grant Tailscale operator authority to the broker account only.** ```sh sudo tailscale set --operator=paperclip-tsbroker ``` Do **not** grant `--operator` to the Paperclip app/agent account (that grant was explicitly rejected in PAP-16989). 4. **Create state directories (not writable by the Paperclip app).** The packaged unit creates these automatically; for a manual install use: ```sh sudo install -d -o paperclip-tsbroker -g paperclip-tsbroker-sock -m 0750 /run/paperclip-tailscale-broker sudo install -d -o paperclip-tsbroker -g paperclip-tsbroker-sock -m 0700 /var/lib/paperclip-tailscale-broker sudo install -d -o paperclip-tsbroker -g paperclip-tsbroker-sock -m 0700 /var/log/paperclip-tailscale-broker ``` The broker refuses to start if the registry path's parent is group/other writable. 5. **Build, install the package under `/opt/paperclip`, and install the packaged systemd unit.** The unit's `ExecStart` (and the doctor command below) run the build output from `/opt/paperclip/packages/tailscale-https-broker/dist`, so copy it there explicitly. The Linux build requires a C compiler and Node.js headers to compile the dependency-free N-API `SO_PEERCRED` addon. The output is self-contained (Node builtins plus the compiled addon; no `node_modules` needed). ```sh pnpm --filter @paperclipai/tailscale-https-broker build sudo install -d -m 0755 /opt/paperclip/packages/tailscale-https-broker sudo cp -r packages/tailscale-https-broker/dist \ /opt/paperclip/packages/tailscale-https-broker/ sudo install -D -m 0644 \ packages/tailscale-https-broker/deploy/paperclip-tailscale-https-broker.service \ /etc/systemd/system/paperclip-tailscale-https-broker.service sudo install -d -m 0750 /etc/paperclip sudoedit /etc/paperclip/tailscale-https-broker.env ``` The packaged unit is equivalent to: ```ini [Unit] Description=Paperclip Tailscale HTTPS broker After=tailscaled.service Requires=tailscaled.service [Service] Type=simple User=paperclip-tsbroker # Socket must end up 0660 paperclip-tsbroker:paperclip-tsbroker-sock. Set the group here and # the broker chmods the socket to 0660 on bind. Group=paperclip-tsbroker-sock EnvironmentFile=/etc/paperclip/tailscale-https-broker.env ExecStart=/usr/bin/node /opt/paperclip/packages/tailscale-https-broker/dist/main.js Restart=on-failure NoNewPrivileges=true ProtectSystem=strict ReadWritePaths=/run/paperclip-tailscale-broker /var/lib/paperclip-tailscale-broker /var/log/paperclip-tailscale-broker [Install] WantedBy=multi-user.target ``` Put the `BROKER_*` values from the table below in the environment file. Set `PAPERCLIP_TAILSCALE_BROKER_SOCKET=/run/paperclip-tailscale-broker/broker.sock` on the Paperclip service only if overriding its default. Environment variables (defaults in `src/config.ts`): | Var | Required | Default | Meaning | |-----|----------|---------|---------| | `BROKER_NODE_IDENTITY` | yes | — | hostname + boot id; a change forces quarantine + operator reconciliation | | `BROKER_SERVICE_UID` | yes | — | UID of the Paperclip **app** account allowed to connect | | `BROKER_SERVICE_GID` | yes | — | GID of the dedicated socket group (caller's primary GID) | | `BROKER_RUNTIME_UID` | yes | — | UID that owns Paperclip-managed runtime processes (normally the Paperclip app service account); only its loopback listeners are eligible | | `BROKER_TAILSCALE_BIN` | no | `/usr/bin/tailscale` | absolute path to the Tailscale CLI | | `BROKER_SOCKET_PATH` | no | `/run/paperclip-tailscale-broker/broker.sock` | Unix socket path | | `BROKER_REGISTRY_PATH` | no | `/var/lib/paperclip-tailscale-broker/registry.json` | root-owned `0600` ownership registry | | `BROKER_AUDIT_PATH` | no | `/var/log/paperclip-tailscale-broker/audit.log` | append-only security audit log | | `BROKER_PROTECTED_PORTS` | no | *(empty)* | comma/space separated ports the broker must **never** create, remove, or reclaim — even when its own registry holds a valid lease for them (see below) | ### `BROKER_PROTECTED_PORTS` — operator-declared preservation (PAP-17285) The long-standing "unknown/manual entries are never modified" invariant is *provenance-blind*: it protects only entries the broker has no lease for. It therefore could not protect the `42000/52000` mappings, because the broker had itself created them for a canary lane that was later retired — so its registry still called them owned, while operators had reclassified them as must-preserve after failing to attribute them to any live lane. Both views were internally consistent, they disagreed, and a fully authorized, shape-valid, `:443`-preserving removal destroyed them with no guard able to object. A protected port is an **operator assertion that outranks the broker's own ownership record**. Enforcement is fail-closed and layered: refused during argv construction, denied in `reserve`/`expose`/`remove` with `protected_port`, excluded from the allocatable allowlist so no lane can acquire one, and asserted byte-unchanged across every before/after snapshot (`protected_entry_violation`). A malformed list makes the broker refuse to start rather than silently protect nothing; `443` is rejected because the primary route already has a stronger, non-optional invariant. ``` BROKER_PROTECTED_PORTS=42000,52000 ``` Confirm it took effect before trusting it — `--doctor` echoes the parsed set: ```sh sudo -u paperclip-tsbroker \ env $(cat /etc/paperclip/tailscale-https-broker.env | xargs) \ node /opt/paperclip/packages/tailscale-https-broker/dist/main.js --doctor ``` 6. **Preflight (read-only, no mutation).** ```sh sudo -u paperclip-tsbroker \ BROKER_NODE_IDENTITY=$(hostname) BROKER_SERVICE_UID=... BROKER_SERVICE_GID=... BROKER_RUNTIME_UID=... \ node /opt/paperclip/packages/tailscale-https-broker/dist/main.js --doctor ``` Verifies: supported Tailscale CLI version, Serve status is readable, the primary `:443` route is intact, the registry path is safe, and prints the node identity. Exit 0 = ready. It never mutates Serve state. 7. **Enable.** `sudo systemctl daemon-reload && sudo systemctl enable --now paperclip-tailscale-https-broker`. Confirm the socket is `0660 paperclip-tsbroker:paperclip-tsbroker-sock`. ## Upgrade Deploy new package output to `/opt/paperclip/packages/tailscale-https-broker/dist`, then `sudo systemctl restart paperclip-tailscale-https-broker`. On restart the broker re-reads its root-owned registry and adopts only exact-lease matches; a changed `BROKER_NODE_IDENTITY` (host reimage / boot-id change) forces quarantine and operator reconciliation rather than silently re-adopting. ## Uninstall / rollback / opt-out Rollback disables new exposure and removes only broker-owned listeners; it never resets Serve or changes the primary route. 1. Disable the exposure flag on the project runtime (Paperclip stops requesting `expose`). Existing previews drain on runtime stop. 2. Drain owned listeners: stop each managed runtime so Paperclip issues `remove` for its own leases (proven by handle). 3. `sudo systemctl disable --now paperclip-tailscale-https-broker`. 4. Optional cleanup: remove the state dirs and `sudo tailscale set --operator=` to drop the operator grant. Do **not** run `tailscale serve reset` — remove only the specific per-port Serve entries if any remain. ## Recovery If a mutation fails partway, the broker removes only the exact listeners it applied; if exact cleanup cannot be proven it quarantines the affected ports and reports `cleanup_pending` (partial app+HMR exposure is never reported healthy). Quarantined ports are not reused until an operator clears them. The append-only audit log at `BROKER_AUDIT_PATH` records every allow/deny and mutation outcome (peer UID/GID/PID, operation, runtime UUID, ports, decision reason, before/after state digests, quarantine/recovery) with lease handles and raw CLI output redacted. ## Tests ```sh pnpm --filter @paperclipai/tailscale-https-broker test # 72 tests pnpm --filter @paperclipai/tailscale-https-broker typecheck pnpm --filter @paperclipai/tailscale-https-broker build ```