fix(security): match IPv6 SSRF patterns against unbracketed hostnames

This commit is contained in:
jakeaturner 2026-05-20 05:39:39 +00:00 committed by Jake Turner
parent 989a401f28
commit b3dac9b324
1 changed files with 7 additions and 4 deletions

View File

@ -15,15 +15,18 @@ export function assertNotPrivateUrl(urlString: string): void {
const parsed = new URL(urlString)
const hostname = parsed.hostname.toLowerCase()
// `URL.hostname` strips the surrounding brackets from IPv6 literals
// (e.g. `http://[::1]/` → hostname `::1`), so IPv6 patterns must match
// the unbracketed form.
const blockedPatterns = [
/^localhost$/,
/^127\.\d+\.\d+\.\d+$/,
/^0\.0\.0\.0$/,
/^169\.254\.\d+\.\d+$/, // Link-local / cloud metadata
/^\[::1\]$/,
/^\[?fe80:/i, // IPv6 link-local
/^\[::ffff:/i, // IPv4-mapped IPv6 (e.g. [::ffff:7f00:1] = 127.0.0.1)
/^\[::\]$/, // IPv6 all-zeros (equivalent to 0.0.0.0)
/^::1$/, // IPv6 loopback
/^fe80:/i, // IPv6 link-local
/^::ffff:/i, // IPv4-mapped IPv6 (e.g. ::ffff:7f00:1 = 127.0.0.1)
/^::$/, // IPv6 all-zeros (equivalent to 0.0.0.0)
]
if (blockedPatterns.some((re) => re.test(hostname))) {