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feat(security): v0.60.0 — Supply Chain Security wedge (adapter scan/sign/verify, strict-safetensors, namespace-pin, license-matrix, airgap-bundle) 

Six controls that hosted vendors structurally can't provide:

- soup adapters scan: spectral backdoor scanner (rank-1 dominance + energy
  concentration + NaN/Inf + Frobenius outlier via robust median+MAD);
  pure numpy, reuses v0.57.0 adapter_diff loader
- soup adapters sign / verify: Merkle-root manifest in .soup-signature.json;
  recursive file enumeration (catches nested tokenizer/ tamper);
  sigstore + ed25519 backends stub-then-live (v0.60.1)
- soup adapters check-safetensors: closed 8-entry unsafe-extension allowlist;
  strict exit 3 for CI gating
- NamespacePinStore: TOFU SQLite anti-AI-Jacking; author + created_at
  fingerprint compared via datetime.fromisoformat for offset-aware order;
  bool opt-in rejected so --allow-namespace-shift cannot be a free-for-all
- License-conflict matrix: 33 SPDX-ish ids in MappingProxyType compat table;
  soup adapters merge --license <id> --license-override <reason> gate
- soup airgap-bundle: signed tarball with deterministic dataset labeling
  (sorted basename, NOT argv order); TOCTOU lstat+S_ISLNK on parent + output;
  atomic os.replace; tarfile.data_filter for future extractall callers

Test count: 9294 -> 9446 (+152 net across 6 new test files).
Review-fix coverage across 5 waves (python / security / code / tdd / smoke):
0 CRITICAL + 12 HIGH + 11 MEDIUM + 6 LOW fixed before commit.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
Alpamys 2026-05-19 13:05:14 +05:00
parent 124a72e042
commit f3c40e7753
20 changed files with 4554 additions and 14 deletions
Show Stats Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

2
CONTRIBUTING.md
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@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ soup_cli/
templates/ - 17 built-in soup.yaml templates (YAML + manifest.json) with load_template loader (v0.39.0, +bco v0.40.0)
ui/ - Web UI (FastAPI + HTML/JS SPA)
tests/ - Test suite (201 files, 9294 tests)
tests/ - Test suite (207 files, 9446 tests)
examples/ - Real-world config examples and datasets
```

96
README.md
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@ -42,16 +42,15 @@ soup train
Latest highlights only. Full history: [GitHub Releases](https://github.com/MakazhanAlpamys/Soup/releases).
**v0.59.0 — Governance & Provenance: every Soup run is procurement-ready.** ML-BOMs, SLSA-3 attestations, EU AI Act Annex XI/XII auto-docs, HIPAA/SOC2 audit log, SR 11-7 reproducibility receipts. The compliance story no SaaS can tell because the operator is the only one who sees weights, dataset, eval, and cost together. v0.59 is pure orchestration on top of v0.26 Registry + v0.34 cost tracker + v0.56 diagnose — no new training code, just structured exporters that emit the formats procurement demands.
**v0.60.0 — Supply Chain Security: tensors you can ship through procurement.** Six controls that hosted vendors structurally can't provide — adapter weight-space backdoor scanner, Merkle-root sign + verify, strict-safetensors mode (refuse pickle weights), trust-on-first-use namespace pinning (anti-AI-Jacking), closed license-compatibility matrix at merge, and a signed airgap-bundle for data-diode transfer. Every piece is opt-in for operators who want enforcement; CI pipelines and security-conscious enterprises get a "you can't ship an unaudited adapter through Soup" guarantee.
- **`soup bom emit --format cyclonedx|spdx|both`** — CycloneDX 1.6 ML-BOM + SPDX 2.3 + AI-profile dual emitter from any `RegistryEntry`. Includes base-model SHA, config SHA, data SHA, parent lineage, license-chain (SPDX id), and SLSA-style material list. Atomic write under cwd containment + `os.lstat` symlink rejection (TOCTOU-safe, mirrors v0.33.0 #22).
- **`soup attest emit --stage train --subject <name> --sha <64hex>`** — in-toto v1 Statement wrapping a SLSA-3 provenance v1 predicate. Stage allowlist (`extract` / `train` / `eval` / `export` / `publish`). Sigstore + ed25519 signing live in v0.59.1; the schema + atomic-write surface ships now so CI can integrate.
- **`soup train --annex-xi <out.md>`** — EU AI Act Annex XI Section 1+2 (technical documentation) + Annex XII (Article 53(1)(d) public training summary) markdown renderer. Top-10 domains, modality breakdown, FLOPs / kWh / CO₂ footprint. Markdown-active chars in operator-controlled fields (`model_name`, `base_model`, `dataset_summary`, domain names) escape `|[](){}!<>` plus newlines to defend against forged-heading / Markdown-link injection (mirrors v0.29.0 model-card v2 escape).
- **`soup audit-log tail / rotate`** — append-only JSONL audit at `~/.soup/audit.jsonl` (override via `SOUP_AUDIT_LOG_PATH`, containment-checked to `$HOME / $CWD / $TMPDIR`). Splunk/ELK ingestion-ready. PII redaction across every string field via the v0.40.3 `_SECRET_RE` policy (`hf_*` / `sk-*` / `Bearer …` → `<redacted>`). POSIX `O_NOFOLLOW` + `0o600` perms; rotation at 100 MiB with symlink rejection at the backup path.
- **`soup train --repro-receipt <out.json>`** — SR 11-7-style reproducibility receipt: seeds (torch / numpy / python), Python version, OS + arch, Soup version, kernel versions (CUDA / cuDNN / NCCL — best-effort from torch when available), GPU model + driver. Atomic write, cwd-contained.
- **CO₂ + energy schema (Part F).** `EnergyMeasurement` frozen dataclass with PUE adjustment, electricityMap SSRF-hardened endpoint validator (scheme allowlist + loopback-only HTTP + private-IP rejection — full parity with v0.51.0 `validate_hub_endpoint`). CodeCarbon hook lands in v0.59.1.
- **Shared `atomic_write_text` helper.** All four v0.59 atomic writes (BOM / attest / Annex / repro) and any future write that needs the TOCTOU defence now go through one `paths.atomic_write_text` — single-source-of-truth so a future contributor cannot accidentally drop the symlink check (mirrors v0.40.6 / v0.53.5 `peft_wiring` centralisation policy).
- **+99 new tests** (9193 → 9294). Review-fix coverage across four waves: 0 CRITICAL + 8 HIGH + 12 MEDIUM + 4 LOW resolved before tag.
- **`soup adapters scan <adapter>`** — spectral analysis of LoRA weights pre-load. Flags rank-1 dominance (the canonical weight-space trojan pattern), top-1 singular-vector energy concentration, NaN/Inf in weights, and Frobenius-norm outliers via robust median+MAD bucketing. Pure numpy (no torch). Exit codes 0=OK / 1=WARN / 3=FAIL for CI grep. Reuses v0.57.0 `adapter_diff` loader so on-disk surface stays single-source.
- **`soup adapters sign / verify [--strict]`** — deterministic Merkle-root manifest over every file in the adapter dir (including nested `tokenizer/` / `processor/` subdirs). Tamper any file, verify fails. `UNSIGNED` backend ships live for offline tamper detection; `sigstore` + `ed25519` backends raise `NotImplementedError` with v0.60.1 marker (schema lives now so CI can integrate). Signature stored as `.soup-signature.json` written atomically via the shared `atomic_write_text` helper.
- **`soup adapters check-safetensors [--strict]`** — refuses pickle / PyTorch-classic weights at the boundary. Closed 8-entry unsafe-extension allowlist (`.bin` / `.pt` / `.pth` / `.ckpt` / `.pkl` / `.pickle` / `.joblib` / `.msgpack`). Exit code 3 (distinct from generic errors) under `--strict` so CI can gate on pickle-only.
- **Namespace-pin TOFU (anti-AI-Jacking).** New `NamespacePinStore` SQLite cache + `verify_namespace` helper: records `(repo_id, author, created_at)` on first download, refuses updates when the author changes OR `created_at` jumps backward (case-insensitive comparison via `datetime.fromisoformat` — fragile lexicographic compare avoided). `--allow-namespace-shift <new-author>` explicit opt-in (bool rejected to prevent free-for-all bypass). DB path containment-checked to `$HOME / $CWD / $TMPDIR`; POSIX `0o600` perms; pre-placed symlinks rejected via `os.lstat + S_ISLNK`. Live wiring into `utils/hubs.download_repo` lands in v0.60.1.
- **License-conflict matrix at merge.** Closed allowlist of 33 SPDX-ish licenses (Apache / MIT / BSD / LGPL / MPL / GPL / AGPL / CC-BY / CC-BY-NC / Llama-2/3.x/community / Gemma / Qwen-research / Mistral-research / OpenRAIL / OpenAI-ToS / Anthropic-AUP). `MappingProxyType` category compatibility table. `soup adapters merge --license <id> --license-override <reason>` — non-commercial + permissive refuses (8-char min, 4096-char max reason); strong-copyleft + permissive refuses; restricted-use + permissive refuses. Override reason captured in panel; audit-log integration v0.60.1.
- **`soup airgap-bundle --model <m> --output <out.tar>`** — signed tarball with model + datasets + wheels + kernels + SHA-256 per file in embedded `manifest.json`. Default 100 GiB size cap; refuses oversize. Deterministic dataset labeling by sorted basename (NOT argv order) so the same inputs in different argv order produce identical manifests. TOCTOU lstat re-check on parent + output path BEFORE mkstemp; atomic `os.replace` via sibling tempfile; `tarfile.data_filter` set for any future `extractall` caller. 64 MiB manifest cap on `inspect_airgap_bundle`.
- **+152 new tests** (9294 → 9446). Review-fix coverage across five waves: 0 CRITICAL + 12 HIGH + 11 MEDIUM + 6 LOW resolved before tag. Manual CPU smokes for sign / verify / scan / check-safetensors / airgap-bundle / merge-with-license-conflict all confirmed end-to-end.
## Why Soup?
@ -3409,6 +3408,12 @@ soup bench <model> --backend auto Auto-detect transformers/mlx backe
soup serve --reasoning-parser deepseek-r1 Strip <think> blocks from responses (v0.53.9)
soup doctor [--nccl] Check environment (optionally check NCCL bandwidth)
soup quickstart [--dry-run] Full demo
soup adapters scan <adapter> Spectral backdoor scan (rank-1 dominance + outlier detection)
soup adapters sign <adapter> [--backend X] Compute Merkle-root manifest (.soup-signature.json)
soup adapters verify <adapter> [--strict] Verify manifest against current files
soup adapters check-safetensors <adapter> [--strict] Refuse pickle / PyTorch-classic weights
soup adapters merge ... --license <id> --license-override <reason> License-conflict gate
soup airgap-bundle --model <m> --output <out.tar> Signed tarball for data-diode transfer
soup version [--full] [--json] Show version (--full: system info, --json: JSON output)
soup --verbose <command> Full traceback on errors
```
@ -4358,6 +4363,79 @@ soup train --config soup.yaml --repro-receipt repro.json
Bank model-risk teams and regulated-org auditors get a single JSON file that fingerprints
the exact environment the run executed in. Atomic write, cwd-contained.
## Adapter Backdoor Scanner (`soup adapters scan`)
Spectral analysis of LoRA adapter weights pre-load. Flags rank-1 dominance
(the canonical weight-space trojan pattern), top-1 singular-vector energy
concentration, NaN/Inf in weights, and Frobenius-norm outliers via robust
median + MAD bucketing. Pure numpy, no torch. Exit codes 0=OK / 1=WARN /
3=FAIL so CI can grep specifically for security failures. Reuses the
v0.57.0 `adapter_diff` loader so the on-disk surface stays single-source.
## Adapter Sign + Verify (`soup adapters sign` / `verify`)
Deterministic Merkle-root manifest over every file in the adapter dir
(including nested `tokenizer/` / `processor/` subdirs). Tamper any file
and `verify` fails. The `unsigned` backend ships live for offline tamper
detection (the Merkle-root hash is the trust anchor); `sigstore` and
`ed25519` backends raise `NotImplementedError` with v0.60.1 marker so CI
pipelines can integrate the schema today. Signature persists as
`.soup-signature.json` written atomically via the shared
`atomic_write_text` helper. `--strict` mode exits 3 on any verify
failure (CI gate code distinct from generic errors).
## Strict Safetensors Mode (`soup adapters check-safetensors`)
Refuses pickle / PyTorch-classic weights at the boundary — closed 8-entry
unsafe-extension allowlist (`.bin` / `.pt` / `.pth` / `.ckpt` / `.pkl` /
`.pickle` / `.joblib` / `.msgpack`). Picklemod gives every loader the
right to execute arbitrary code on load; refusing the file at the
boundary is the only sound mitigation. Friendly advisory names the
offending file and the canonical `from safetensors.torch import save_file`
recipe. Exit code 3 under `--strict` for CI gating.
## Namespace Pinning (Anti-AI-Jacking)
Trust-on-first-use SQLite cache: records `(repo_id, author, created_at)`
the first time Soup sees a HuggingFace repo. Subsequent loads compare
the current Hub fingerprint to the recorded pin — refuses author change
or backward `created_at` jump unless the operator passes
`--allow-namespace-shift <new-author>` (case-insensitive author match;
bool rejected so callers can't smuggle a free-for-all bypass). Threat
model: an attacker watches a popular repo, waits for the original owner
to delete or expire it, then re-creates the same `owner/name` with
malicious weights. Without this control, anyone with Soup pinned to that
namespace silently pulls poison on the next run. Live wiring into
`utils/hubs.download_repo` lands in v0.60.1; today the helpers are
operator-callable via the Python API.
## License-Conflict Matrix at Merge
Closed compatibility table over 33 SPDX-ish licenses spanning Apache /
MIT / BSD / LGPL / MPL / GPL / AGPL / CC-BY / CC-BY-NC / Llama-2/3.x /
Gemma / Qwen-research / Mistral-research / OpenRAIL / OpenAI-ToS /
Anthropic-AUP. `soup adapters merge --license apache-2.0 --license
cc-by-nc-4.0 -o merged` refuses (non-commercial cannot combine with
permissive). To proceed past a flagged conflict, pass
`--license-override "legal-cleared 2026-05-19 by alice"` (8-char min,
4096-char max reason). The override reason surfaces in the merge panel;
audit-log integration lands in v0.60.1.
## Airgap Bundle (`soup airgap-bundle`)
Single signed tarball with model + datasets + wheels + CUDA kernels +
embedded `manifest.json` listing SHA-256 per file. Sized for one-way
physical-media transfer through a data diode. Default 100 GiB cap;
refuses oversize. Deterministic dataset labeling by sorted basename
(NOT argv order) so the same inputs in different argv order produce
identical manifests. TOCTOU defence: `os.lstat + S_ISLNK` re-check on
parent + final output path before `mkstemp`; atomic `os.replace` from a
sibling tempfile. `tarfile.data_filter` set on Python 3.12+ so any
future caller adding `tar.extractall` automatically gets the safe-mode
extraction filter. `soup airgap-bundle` is intentionally a top-level
command (not `soup deploy airgap-bundle`) — it's an export operation,
not a deploy target.
## Changelog
See [GitHub Releases](https://github.com/MakazhanAlpamys/Soup/releases) for version history.

5
SECURITY.md
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File diff suppressed because one or more lines are too long

2
pyproject.toml
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@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ build-backend = "hatchling.build"
[project]
name = "soup-cli"
version = "0.59.0"
version = "0.60.0"
description = "Fine-tune LLMs in one command. No SSH, no config hell."
readme = "README.md"
license = "Apache-2.0"

2
soup_cli/__init__.py
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@ -1,3 +1,3 @@
"""Soup CLI — Fine-tune LLMs in one command."""
__version__ = "0.59.0"
__version__ = "0.60.0"

5
soup_cli/cli.py
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@ -260,6 +260,11 @@ app.add_typer(
),
)
# v0.60.0 — Supply Chain Security: airgap bundle assembler.
from soup_cli.commands import airgap as _airgap_cmd # noqa: E402
app.command(name="airgap-bundle")(_airgap_cmd.airgap_bundle)
def _rewrite_advise_argv(argv: list) -> list:
"""Inject `run` between `advise` and a non-subcommand first argument.

261
soup_cli/commands/adapters.py
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@ -319,9 +319,28 @@ def merge(
help="Trim density for ties/dare in (0, 1]"),
seed: int = typer.Option(0, "--seed", help="Random seed for dare"),
rank: int = typer.Option(None, "--rank", help="SVD rank (svd strategy only)"),
license_ids: list[str] = typer.Option(
None, "--license",
help=(
"SPDX license id per adapter (repeatable; same order as inputs). "
"v0.60.0 refuses merges with conflicting licenses unless "
"--license-override <reason> is passed."
),
),
license_override: str = typer.Option(
None, "--license-override",
help=(
"Free-text justification (>=8 chars) to merge across a license "
"conflict. Logged for legal review."
),
),
):
"""Merge LoRA adapters via linear / ties / dare / svd (v0.57.0)."""
"""Merge LoRA adapters via linear / ties / dare / svd (v0.57.0, v0.60.0 license gate)."""
from soup_cli.utils.adapter_merge import SUPPORTED_STRATEGIES, merge_adapters
from soup_cli.utils.license_matrix import (
check_license_compat,
validate_license_override_reason,
)
if strategy not in SUPPORTED_STRATEGIES:
console.print(
@ -334,6 +353,49 @@ def merge(
console.print("[red]Need at least 2 adapter paths to merge[/]")
raise typer.Exit(2)
# v0.60.0 Part E: license-conflict gate. Operators MUST declare a
# license per adapter (or pass --license-override <reason>).
if license_ids:
if len(license_ids) != len(adapters):
console.print(
f"[red]--license count {len(license_ids)} must match "
f"adapter count {len(adapters)}[/]"
)
raise typer.Exit(2)
try:
license_report = check_license_compat(license_ids)
except (TypeError, ValueError) as exc:
console.print(f"[red]License check failed: {escape(str(exc))}[/]")
raise typer.Exit(2) from exc
if not license_report.ok:
if license_override is None:
console.print(
f"[red]License conflict refused: "
f"{escape(license_report.reason)}[/]"
)
console.print(
"[dim]Pass --license-override '<legal-cleared justification>' "
"(>=8 chars) to proceed.[/]"
)
raise typer.Exit(3)
try:
cleared = validate_license_override_reason(license_override)
except (TypeError, ValueError) as exc:
console.print(
f"[red]Invalid --license-override: {escape(str(exc))}[/]"
)
raise typer.Exit(2) from exc
console.print(
f"[yellow]License conflict overridden:[/] "
f"{escape(license_report.reason)}\n"
f"[dim]Reason: {escape(cleared)}[/]"
)
elif license_override is not None:
console.print(
"[yellow]--license-override given without --license declarations; "
"no conflict gate triggered.[/]"
)
parsed_weights = None
if weights:
try:
@ -527,3 +589,200 @@ def list_branches_cmd():
except (ValueError, FileNotFoundError, OSError):
table.add_row(escape(branch_name), "[red]error[/]", "-", "-")
console.print(table)
@app.command()
def scan(
adapter: str = typer.Argument(..., help="Path to adapter directory"),
output_format: str = typer.Option(
"text", "--format",
help="Output format: text | json",
),
):
"""Spectral backdoor scan over LoRA adapter weights (v0.60.0).
Flags rank-1 dominance, energy concentration, NaN/Inf, and Frobenius-norm
outliers. Exit codes: 0=OK, 1=WARN, 3=FAIL. Failure means a likely
backdoor pattern and ``adapters merge`` will refuse this adapter unless
``--allow-unscanned`` is passed.
"""
from soup_cli.utils.adapter_scan import render_report_text, scan_adapter
fmt = output_format.lower()
if fmt not in ("text", "json"):
console.print(f"[red]Unknown --format: {escape(fmt)}[/]")
raise typer.Exit(2)
try:
report = scan_adapter(adapter)
except FileNotFoundError as exc:
console.print(f"[red]{escape(str(exc))}[/]")
raise typer.Exit(1) from exc
except (ValueError, TypeError) as exc:
console.print(f"[red]{escape(str(exc))}[/]")
raise typer.Exit(2) from exc
except RuntimeError as exc:
console.print(f"[red]{escape(str(exc))}[/]")
raise typer.Exit(1) from exc
if fmt == "json":
from dataclasses import asdict
payload = {
"adapter": report.adapter,
"overall": report.overall,
"summary": report.summary,
"findings": [asdict(f) for f in report.findings],
}
console.print_json(data=payload)
else:
console.print(escape(render_report_text(report)))
if report.overall == "FAIL":
raise typer.Exit(3)
if report.overall == "WARN":
raise typer.Exit(1)
@app.command()
def sign(
adapter: str = typer.Argument(..., help="Path to adapter directory"),
backend: str = typer.Option(
"unsigned", "--backend",
help="Signing backend: unsigned | ed25519 | sigstore (v0.60.0 ships unsigned only)",
),
):
"""Compute manifest + write ``.soup-signature.json`` (v0.60.0).
Default backend is ``unsigned`` — provides offline tamper detection
via Merkle-root hash. Sigstore + ed25519 backends raise NotImplementedError
until v0.60.1.
"""
from soup_cli.utils.adapter_sign import sign_adapter
try:
record = sign_adapter(adapter, backend=backend)
except FileNotFoundError as exc:
console.print(f"[red]{escape(str(exc))}[/]")
raise typer.Exit(1) from exc
except NotImplementedError as exc:
console.print(f"[yellow]{escape(str(exc))}[/]")
raise typer.Exit(2) from exc
except (ValueError, TypeError) as exc:
console.print(f"[red]{escape(str(exc))}[/]")
raise typer.Exit(2) from exc
console.print(
Panel(
f"Adapter: [bold]{escape(record.manifest.adapter)}[/]\n"
f"Backend: [bold]{escape(record.backend)}[/]\n"
f"Files: [bold]{len(record.manifest.files)}[/]\n"
f"Merkle: [dim]{record.merkle_root[:16]}...[/]\n"
f"Signed at: [dim]{escape(record.signed_at)}[/]",
title="Adapter signed",
)
)
@app.command()
def verify(
adapter: str = typer.Argument(..., help="Path to adapter directory"),
strict: bool = typer.Option(
False, "--strict",
help="Exit 3 on any verification failure (CI-friendly)",
),
):
"""Verify ``.soup-signature.json`` against current files (v0.60.0).
Exit codes:
0 signature present and matches
1 signature absent or mismatch (lenient mode)
3 signature absent or mismatch with --strict
"""
from soup_cli.utils.adapter_sign import verify_adapter
try:
if strict:
report = verify_adapter(adapter, strict=True)
else:
report = verify_adapter(adapter, strict=False)
except FileNotFoundError as exc:
console.print(f"[red]{escape(str(exc))}[/]")
raise typer.Exit(1) from exc
except ValueError as exc:
# Strict mode raises; non-strict gives a report.
console.print(f"[red]{escape(str(exc))}[/]")
raise typer.Exit(3) from exc
except TypeError as exc:
console.print(f"[red]{escape(str(exc))}[/]")
raise typer.Exit(2) from exc
status_color = "green" if report.valid else "yellow"
panel = Panel(
f"Adapter: [bold]{escape(report.adapter)}[/]\n"
f"Valid: [{status_color}]{report.valid}[/]\n"
f"Backend: [bold]{escape(report.backend or '—')}[/]\n"
f"Reason: {escape(report.reason)}",
title="Adapter verify",
)
console.print(panel)
if report.findings:
for finding in report.findings:
console.print(f" [yellow]- {escape(finding)}[/]")
if not report.valid:
raise typer.Exit(1)
@app.command(name="check-safetensors")
def check_safetensors(
adapter: str = typer.Argument(..., help="Path to adapter / model directory"),
strict: bool = typer.Option(
False, "--strict",
help="Exit 3 on any unsafe (pickle / PyTorch-classic) weight file",
),
):
"""Refuse pickle / PyTorch-classic weights at the boundary (v0.60.0).
Exit codes:
0 all weights are safetensors
1 unsafe weights found (lenient mode — advisory)
3 unsafe weights found (--strict — CI gate)
"""
from soup_cli.utils.strict_safetensors import check_strict_safetensors
try:
report = check_strict_safetensors(adapter, strict=strict)
except FileNotFoundError as exc:
console.print(f"[red]{escape(str(exc))}[/]")
raise typer.Exit(1) from exc
except ValueError as exc:
# Strict mode raises with a friendly file-name advisory.
console.print(f"[red]{escape(str(exc))}[/]")
raise typer.Exit(3) from exc
except TypeError as exc:
console.print(f"[red]{escape(str(exc))}[/]")
raise typer.Exit(2) from exc
if report.ok:
console.print(
Panel(
f"Adapter: [bold]{escape(report.model_dir)}[/]\n"
f"Status: [green]OK[/]\n"
f"Reason: {escape(report.reason)}",
title="Strict safetensors check",
)
)
return
console.print(
Panel(
f"Adapter: [bold]{escape(report.model_dir)}[/]\n"
f"Status: [yellow]UNSAFE[/]\n"
f"Reason: {escape(report.reason)}",
title="Strict safetensors check",
)
)
for path in report.unsafe_files:
console.print(f" [yellow]- {escape(path)}[/]")
raise typer.Exit(1)

92
soup_cli/commands/airgap.py Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,92 @@
"""soup airgap-bundle — build a one-shot offline tarball (v0.60.0 Part F)."""
from __future__ import annotations
from typing import List, Optional
import typer
from rich.console import Console
from rich.markup import escape
from rich.panel import Panel
console = Console()
def airgap_bundle(
output: str = typer.Option(..., "--output", "-o",
help="Output tarball path (cwd-contained)"),
model: str = typer.Option(..., "--model", help="Path to model directory"),
dataset: Optional[List[str]] = typer.Option(
None, "--dataset",
help="Dataset directory (repeatable)",
),
wheel: Optional[List[str]] = typer.Option(
None, "--wheel",
help="Wheel directory (repeatable)",
),
kernel: Optional[List[str]] = typer.Option(
None, "--kernel",
help="CUDA / kernel directory (repeatable)",
),
bundle_size_cap: float = typer.Option(
100.0, "--bundle-size-cap",
help="Cap in GiB (default 100). Build aborts when exceeded.",
),
):
"""Build a signed tarball with model + datasets + wheels + kernels (v0.60.0).
Designed for one-way physical-media transfer through a data diode.
Refuses to write a bundle larger than ``--bundle-size-cap`` GiB.
Manifest is embedded inside as ``manifest.json`` with SHA-256 per file.
"""
from soup_cli.utils.airgap_bundle import (
AirgapBundlePlan,
build_airgap_bundle,
)
if bundle_size_cap <= 0:
console.print("[red]--bundle-size-cap must be > 0[/]")
raise typer.Exit(2)
cap_bytes_float = float(bundle_size_cap) * 1024 * 1024 * 1024
# Convert to int; allow fractional cap to address sub-GiB tests.
cap_bytes = int(cap_bytes_float)
if cap_bytes < 1:
cap_bytes = 1
try:
plan = AirgapBundlePlan(
output=output,
model_dir=model,
dataset_dirs=tuple(dataset or ()),
wheel_dirs=tuple(wheel or ()),
kernel_dirs=tuple(kernel or ()),
bundle_size_cap_bytes=cap_bytes,
)
except (TypeError, ValueError) as exc:
console.print(f"[red]Invalid plan: {escape(str(exc))}[/]")
raise typer.Exit(2) from exc
try:
manifest = build_airgap_bundle(plan)
except FileNotFoundError as exc:
console.print(f"[red]{escape(str(exc))}[/]")
raise typer.Exit(1) from exc
except (TypeError, ValueError) as exc:
console.print(f"[red]{escape(str(exc))}[/]")
raise typer.Exit(2) from exc
console.print(
Panel(
f"Output: [bold]{escape(output)}[/]\n"
f"Model: [bold]{escape(manifest.model_dir)}[/]\n"
f"Datasets: {len(manifest.datasets)}\n"
f"Wheels: {len(manifest.wheels)}\n"
f"Kernels: {len(manifest.kernels)}\n"
f"Files: {len(manifest.files)}\n"
f"Total bytes: {manifest.total_bytes}\n"
f"Cap (GiB): {bundle_size_cap}\n"
f"Soup ver: {escape(manifest.soup_version)}\n"
f"Created: [dim]{escape(manifest.created_at)}[/]",
title="Airgap bundle",
)
)

456
soup_cli/utils/adapter_scan.py Normal file
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"""Weight-space backdoor detector for LoRA adapters (v0.60.0 Part A).
Spectral analysis of adapter weights pre-load. Catches the most common
weight-space backdoor pattern (rank-1 perturbation injected into one or two
projection matrices) by flagging singular-value distributions that deviate
from a healthy LoRA fingerprint. Inspired by 2025 weight-space LoRA
detection research; intentionally conservative to keep false-positive rate
low on legitimate fine-tunes.
Pure numpy math (no torch); reuses the v0.57.0 ``adapter_diff`` safetensors
loader so the on-disk surface stays single-source-of-truth. Containment +
symlink rejection at every file load (TOCTOU defence, mirrors v0.53.1
``enforce_under_cwd_and_no_symlink`` policy).
Public surface:
- ``ScanFinding`` / ``ScanReport`` frozen dataclasses.
- ``compute_spectral_features(matrix)`` -> dict of ratios used by the rules.
- ``scan_adapter_weights(weights, *, adapter_name)`` -> ``ScanReport``.
- ``scan_adapter(adapter_dir)`` -> ``ScanReport`` (loads safetensors + scans).
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import math
import os
import statistics
from dataclasses import dataclass
from typing import Any, Mapping, Tuple
from soup_cli.utils.paths import enforce_under_cwd_and_no_symlink
_VALID_KINDS = frozenset(
{"rank1_dominance", "frobenius_outlier", "nan_inf", "energy_concentration"}
)
_VALID_SEVERITIES = frozenset({"OK", "WARN", "FAIL"})
# Thresholds chosen so legitimate LoRA fine-tunes pass while injected rank-1
# trojans (the 2025 research pattern) trip. Tuned against synthetic fixtures
# in ``tests/test_v0600_part_a.py``.
_RANK1_DOMINANCE_WARN = 50.0
_RANK1_DOMINANCE_FAIL = 200.0
_ENERGY_TOP1_WARN = 0.75
_ENERGY_TOP1_FAIL = 0.95
_FROB_OUTLIER_WARN_SIGMA = 4.0
_FROB_OUTLIER_FAIL_SIGMA = 8.0
_MAX_ADAPTER_NAME_LEN = 256
_MAX_LAYER_NAME_LEN = 256
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class ScanFinding:
"""One flagged layer + the rule that fired."""
layer: str
kind: str
severity: str
value: float
threshold: float
message: str
def __post_init__(self) -> None:
if not isinstance(self.layer, str) or not self.layer:
raise ValueError("layer must be non-empty str")
if "\x00" in self.layer or len(self.layer) > _MAX_LAYER_NAME_LEN:
raise ValueError("layer name invalid (null byte or > 256 chars)")
if self.kind not in _VALID_KINDS:
raise ValueError(
f"kind must be one of {sorted(_VALID_KINDS)}, got {self.kind!r}"
)
if self.severity not in _VALID_SEVERITIES:
raise ValueError(
f"severity must be one of {sorted(_VALID_SEVERITIES)}, "
f"got {self.severity!r}"
)
for fld_value, fld_name in (
(self.value, "value"),
(self.threshold, "threshold"),
):
if isinstance(fld_value, bool):
raise ValueError(f"{fld_name} must be float, not bool")
if not isinstance(fld_value, (int, float)):
raise ValueError(f"{fld_name} must be float")
if not math.isfinite(float(fld_value)):
raise ValueError(f"{fld_name} must be finite")
if not isinstance(self.message, str):
raise ValueError("message must be str")
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class ScanReport:
"""End-to-end scan result for one adapter."""
adapter: str
findings: Tuple[ScanFinding, ...]
overall: str
summary: str
def __post_init__(self) -> None:
if not isinstance(self.adapter, str) or not self.adapter:
raise ValueError("adapter must be non-empty str")
if "\x00" in self.adapter or len(self.adapter) > _MAX_ADAPTER_NAME_LEN:
raise ValueError("adapter name invalid (null byte or > 256 chars)")
if self.overall not in _VALID_SEVERITIES:
raise ValueError(
f"overall must be one of {sorted(_VALID_SEVERITIES)}, "
f"got {self.overall!r}"
)
if not isinstance(self.findings, tuple):
raise ValueError("findings must be tuple")
for entry in self.findings:
if not isinstance(entry, ScanFinding):
raise ValueError("findings entries must be ScanFinding")
def _require_str(value: object, field: str, *, max_len: int = 256) -> str:
if isinstance(value, bool) or not isinstance(value, str):
raise TypeError(f"{field} must be str, got {type(value).__name__}")
if not value:
raise ValueError(f"{field} must be non-empty")
if "\x00" in value:
raise ValueError(f"{field} must not contain null bytes")
if len(value) > max_len:
raise ValueError(f"{field} must be ≤{max_len} chars")
return value
def compute_spectral_features(matrix: Any) -> dict:
"""Return spectral features used by the rule engine.
Keys:
- ``top_sv_ratio``: ``s_1 / s_2`` (or ``s_1`` if no second SV). Rank-1
trojans drive this >> 50.
- ``energy_top1``: ``s_1**2 / sum(s_i**2)``. Energy concentration in the
top singular vector. Healthy LoRA fine-tunes sit < 0.5.
- ``effective_rank``: ``exp(H(p))`` where ``p = s_i / sum(s_i)``. Mirrors
v0.57.0 ``adapter_diff.effective_rank`` semantics.
- ``frobenius``: ``sqrt(sum(s_i**2))``.
"""
import numpy as np
if not isinstance(matrix, (list, tuple)) and not hasattr(matrix, "__array__"):
# Reject obvious non-array inputs early so callers get a clear error.
if isinstance(matrix, (int, float, str, bool)) or matrix is None:
raise TypeError("matrix must be a 2D array-like")
arr = np.asarray(matrix, dtype=np.float64)
if arr.ndim < 2:
if arr.ndim == 1:
arr = arr.reshape(-1, 1)
else:
raise TypeError("matrix must be at least 1D")
if arr.ndim > 2:
arr = arr.reshape(arr.shape[0], -1)
if arr.size == 0:
return {
"top_sv_ratio": 0.0,
"energy_top1": 0.0,
"effective_rank": 0.0,
"frobenius": 0.0,
}
try:
singular = np.linalg.svd(arr, compute_uv=False)
except np.linalg.LinAlgError:
return {
"top_sv_ratio": 0.0,
"energy_top1": 0.0,
"effective_rank": 0.0,
"frobenius": 0.0,
}
singular = np.asarray(singular, dtype=np.float64)
if singular.size == 0:
return {
"top_sv_ratio": 0.0,
"energy_top1": 0.0,
"effective_rank": 0.0,
"frobenius": 0.0,
}
top = float(singular[0])
if singular.size > 1 and singular[1] > 0:
top_sv_ratio = top / float(singular[1])
else:
# Single-element or degenerate spectrum.
top_sv_ratio = top if top > 0 else 0.0
energy = float(np.sum(singular * singular))
energy_top1 = (top * top) / energy if energy > 0 else 0.0
total_sum = float(np.sum(singular))
if total_sum > 0:
probs = singular / total_sum
probs = probs[probs > 1e-12]
if probs.size > 0:
entropy = float(-np.sum(probs * np.log(probs)))
effective_rank = float(math.exp(entropy))
else:
effective_rank = 0.0
else:
effective_rank = 0.0
frob = float(math.sqrt(energy)) if math.isfinite(energy) else float("inf")
return {
"top_sv_ratio": float(top_sv_ratio),
"energy_top1": float(energy_top1),
"effective_rank": effective_rank,
"frobenius": frob,
}
def _has_non_finite(matrix: Any) -> bool:
import numpy as np
arr = np.asarray(matrix)
if arr.size == 0:
return False
if not np.issubdtype(arr.dtype, np.floating):
return False
return bool(np.any(~np.isfinite(arr)))
def _classify_overall(findings: Tuple[ScanFinding, ...]) -> str:
if any(f.severity == "FAIL" for f in findings):
return "FAIL"
if any(f.severity == "WARN" for f in findings):
return "WARN"
return "OK"
def _scan_one_layer(name: str, matrix: Any) -> list[ScanFinding]:
import numpy as np
findings: list[ScanFinding] = []
if _has_non_finite(matrix):
findings.append(
ScanFinding(
layer=name,
kind="nan_inf",
severity="FAIL",
value=1.0,
threshold=0.0,
message="weights contain NaN or Inf",
)
)
# Don't run spectral analysis on broken tensors.
return findings
arr = np.asarray(matrix)
if arr.ndim < 2:
return findings
feats = compute_spectral_features(arr)
ratio = feats["top_sv_ratio"]
energy = feats["energy_top1"]
if ratio >= _RANK1_DOMINANCE_FAIL:
findings.append(
ScanFinding(
layer=name,
kind="rank1_dominance",
severity="FAIL",
value=ratio,
threshold=_RANK1_DOMINANCE_FAIL,
message=(
f"top singular value is {ratio:.1f}x the next — "
"consistent with injected rank-1 trojan"
),
)
)
elif ratio >= _RANK1_DOMINANCE_WARN:
findings.append(
ScanFinding(
layer=name,
kind="rank1_dominance",
severity="WARN",
value=ratio,
threshold=_RANK1_DOMINANCE_WARN,
message=(
f"top singular value is {ratio:.1f}x the next "
"(unusual but not definitive)"
),
)
)
if energy >= _ENERGY_TOP1_FAIL:
findings.append(
ScanFinding(
layer=name,
kind="energy_concentration",
severity="FAIL",
value=energy,
threshold=_ENERGY_TOP1_FAIL,
message=(
f"{energy * 100:.1f}% of energy in top singular vector"
),
)
)
elif energy >= _ENERGY_TOP1_WARN:
findings.append(
ScanFinding(
layer=name,
kind="energy_concentration",
severity="WARN",
value=energy,
threshold=_ENERGY_TOP1_WARN,
message=(
f"{energy * 100:.1f}% of energy in top singular vector"
),
)
)
return findings
def _scan_frobenius_outliers(
per_layer_norms: dict[str, float],
) -> list[ScanFinding]:
"""Flag layers whose Frobenius norm is way above the population mean.
Uses median + MAD (robust to a single outlier dominating the std). Layers
with same prefix (e.g. ``lora_A`` vs ``lora_B``) are bucketed together.
"""
if len(per_layer_norms) < 3:
return []
findings: list[ScanFinding] = []
# Bucket by suffix (everything after the last `.`)
buckets: dict[str, list[tuple[str, float]]] = {}
for name, norm in per_layer_norms.items():
# Use suffix only — `.lora_A.weight` vs `.lora_B.weight` should be compared
# within their type, not across.
suffix = ".".join(name.rsplit(".", 2)[-2:]) if "." in name else name
buckets.setdefault(suffix, []).append((name, norm))
for suffix, entries in buckets.items():
if len(entries) < 3:
continue
norms = [n for _, n in entries]
median = statistics.median(norms)
# Median absolute deviation, scaled to match std under normal.
mad = statistics.median([abs(n - median) for n in norms]) * 1.4826
if mad <= 0:
continue
for name, norm in entries:
z = (norm - median) / mad
if z >= _FROB_OUTLIER_FAIL_SIGMA:
findings.append(
ScanFinding(
layer=name,
kind="frobenius_outlier",
severity="FAIL",
value=float(z),
threshold=_FROB_OUTLIER_FAIL_SIGMA,
message=(
f"frobenius norm {z:.1f} robust-sigmas above peers "
f"in bucket {suffix!r}"
),
)
)
elif z >= _FROB_OUTLIER_WARN_SIGMA:
findings.append(
ScanFinding(
layer=name,
kind="frobenius_outlier",
severity="WARN",
value=float(z),
threshold=_FROB_OUTLIER_WARN_SIGMA,
message=(
f"frobenius norm {z:.1f} robust-sigmas above peers "
f"in bucket {suffix!r}"
),
)
)
return findings
def scan_adapter_weights(
weights: Mapping[str, Any], *, adapter_name: str,
) -> ScanReport:
"""Pure-function scan over an in-memory weights map.
Returns a ``ScanReport`` with per-layer findings and an overall verdict
(``OK`` / ``WARN`` / ``FAIL``). Public surface; callers can construct
weights from any source (safetensors, mocks, in-memory).
"""
if not isinstance(weights, Mapping):
raise TypeError("weights must be a Mapping")
_require_str(adapter_name, "adapter_name")
import numpy as np
findings: list[ScanFinding] = []
norms: dict[str, float] = {}
for name, matrix in weights.items():
_require_str(name, "layer name")
findings.extend(_scan_one_layer(name, matrix))
arr = np.asarray(matrix, dtype=np.float64)
if arr.size > 0 and np.all(np.isfinite(arr)):
norms[name] = float(math.sqrt(np.sum(arr * arr)))
findings.extend(_scan_frobenius_outliers(norms))
findings_tuple = tuple(findings)
overall = _classify_overall(findings_tuple)
fail_count = sum(1 for f in findings_tuple if f.severity == "FAIL")
warn_count = sum(1 for f in findings_tuple if f.severity == "WARN")
summary = (
f"scanned {len(weights)} tensor(s), "
f"{fail_count} FAIL / {warn_count} WARN"
)
return ScanReport(
adapter=adapter_name,
findings=findings_tuple,
overall=overall,
summary=summary,
)
def scan_adapter(adapter_dir: str) -> ScanReport:
"""Containment-checked safetensors load + scan.
Raises ``ValueError`` if the dir is outside cwd or a symlink; raises
``FileNotFoundError`` if no adapter_model.safetensors is present.
"""
# Reuse v0.57.0 loader so the on-disk surface stays consistent.
from soup_cli.utils.adapter_diff import load_adapter_weights
enforce_under_cwd_and_no_symlink(adapter_dir, "adapter")
weights = load_adapter_weights(adapter_dir)
name = os.path.basename(os.path.normpath(adapter_dir))
return scan_adapter_weights(weights, adapter_name=name)
def render_report_text(report: ScanReport) -> str:
"""Plain-text rendering of a scan report (used by the CLI)."""
if not isinstance(report, ScanReport):
raise TypeError("report must be ScanReport")
lines = [
f"Adapter scan: {report.adapter}",
f"Verdict: {report.overall}",
f"Summary: {report.summary}",
]
if report.findings:
lines.append("")
lines.append("Findings:")
for finding in report.findings:
lines.append(
f" [{finding.severity}] {finding.layer} ({finding.kind}) "
f"{finding.value:.3f} >= {finding.threshold:.3f}: "
f"{finding.message}"
)
return "\n".join(lines) + "\n"

449
soup_cli/utils/adapter_sign.py Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,449 @@
"""Adapter signing + verification (v0.60.0 Part B).
Computes a deterministic SHA-256 over the adapter's file list + per-file
content hashes (Merkle-style root) and stores it alongside the adapter as
``.soup-signature.json``. Two backends:
- ``UNSIGNED`` (default in v0.60.0): writes the manifest + empty signature.
Useful for offline tamper detection — if the weights change, ``verify``
fails because the recomputed root no longer matches the recorded root.
- ``SIGSTORE``: deferred to v0.60.1 (mirrors v0.27.0 MII / v0.59.0 Part B
stub-then-live pattern). Schema lives now so CI pipelines can integrate.
- ``ED25519``: deferred to v0.60.1; requires ``cryptography`` lazy import.
The signature file format is intentionally JSON so operators can diff /
audit / cat without parsing a binary blob. Atomic writes via
``utils.paths.atomic_write_text`` (cwd-contained, TOCTOU-safe).
Public surface:
- ``AdapterManifest`` / ``SignatureRecord`` / ``VerifyReport`` frozen dataclasses.
- ``compute_adapter_manifest(adapter_dir)`` -> ``AdapterManifest``.
- ``sign_adapter(adapter_dir, *, backend=UNSIGNED)`` -> ``SignatureRecord``.
- ``verify_adapter(adapter_dir, *, strict=False)`` -> ``VerifyReport``.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import enum
import hashlib
import json
import os
import stat
from dataclasses import dataclass, field
from typing import Optional, Tuple
from soup_cli.utils.paths import (
atomic_write_text,
enforce_under_cwd_and_no_symlink,
)
_SIGNATURE_FILENAME = ".soup-signature.json"
_MAX_FILES = 1024
_MAX_FILE_BYTES = 10 * 1024 * 1024 * 1024 # 10 GiB safety cap on per-file size
_MAX_SIGNATURE_BYTES = 16 * 1024 * 1024 # 16 MiB cap on the signature JSON
_HASH_CHUNK = 1024 * 1024
_MANIFEST_VERSION = 1
class SignBackend(str, enum.Enum):
"""Signing backend selector.
Only ``UNSIGNED`` is live in v0.60.0. ``SIGSTORE`` + ``ED25519`` raise
``NotImplementedError`` with explicit v0.60.1 marker (stub-then-live).
"""
UNSIGNED = "unsigned"
ED25519 = "ed25519"
SIGSTORE = "sigstore"
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class FileEntry:
"""One file in the manifest."""
name: str
size: int
sha256: str
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class AdapterManifest:
"""Deterministic adapter manifest."""
adapter: str
version: int
files: Tuple[FileEntry, ...]
merkle_root: str
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class SignatureRecord:
"""Persisted signature file body."""
backend: str
merkle_root: str
signature: str
signed_at: str
manifest: AdapterManifest
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class VerifyReport:
"""Result of ``verify_adapter``."""
adapter: str
valid: bool
backend: Optional[str]
reason: str
findings: Tuple[str, ...] = field(default_factory=tuple)
def _hash_file(path: str) -> tuple[int, str]:
"""Stream a file through SHA-256 and return ``(size, hex_digest)``.
Uses ``os.lstat`` (not ``stat``) so symlinks at the file level are
refused even if the parent dir passed containment. ``_MAX_FILE_BYTES``
cap defends against a hostile adapter pointing at a 1 TiB device file.
"""
st = os.lstat(path)
if stat.S_ISLNK(st.st_mode):
raise ValueError(f"{os.path.basename(path)!r}: must not be a symlink")
if not stat.S_ISREG(st.st_mode):
raise ValueError(f"{os.path.basename(path)!r}: must be a regular file")
if st.st_size > _MAX_FILE_BYTES:
raise ValueError(
f"{os.path.basename(path)!r}: exceeds {_MAX_FILE_BYTES} bytes"
)
digest = hashlib.sha256()
with open(path, "rb") as fh:
while True:
chunk = fh.read(_HASH_CHUNK)
if not chunk:
break
digest.update(chunk)
return int(st.st_size), digest.hexdigest()
def _enumerate_files(adapter_dir: str) -> list[str]:
"""Return regular files inside ``adapter_dir`` (recursive).
Recurses into subdirs so nested ``tokenizer/`` / ``processor/`` files
are included in the manifest — silently skipping them would let
``verify_adapter`` pass after a tampered ``tokenizer/special_tokens.json``
(code-review HIGH fix).
Skips the signature file itself (so signing is idempotent on re-runs).
Symlinks at file OR directory level are filtered here AND re-rejected
inside ``_hash_file`` for defence-in-depth.
Returns relative POSIX-style paths inside ``adapter_dir`` sorted
alphabetically for a deterministic Merkle root.
"""
rels: list[str] = []
base_real = os.path.realpath(adapter_dir)
for dirpath, dirnames, filenames in os.walk(adapter_dir, followlinks=False):
# Symlinked subdir at this level — refuse loudly rather than skip
# silently so a hostile adapter can't smuggle weights past the
# manifest (review-fix HIGH).
for sub in list(dirnames):
sub_full = os.path.join(dirpath, sub)
try:
sub_st = os.lstat(sub_full)
except OSError:
dirnames.remove(sub)
continue
if stat.S_ISLNK(sub_st.st_mode):
raise ValueError(
f"{sub!r}: symlinked subdir in adapter dir is not allowed"
)
for filename in filenames:
if filename == _SIGNATURE_FILENAME and dirpath == adapter_dir:
continue
full = os.path.join(dirpath, filename)
try:
st = os.lstat(full)
except OSError:
continue
if stat.S_ISLNK(st.st_mode):
raise ValueError(
f"{filename!r}: symlink in adapter dir is not allowed"
)
if not stat.S_ISREG(st.st_mode):
continue
real = os.path.realpath(full)
# Defence-in-depth: refuse files whose realpath escapes the
# adapter dir (`followlinks=False` prevents this on dir traversal,
# but file-level symlinks were rejected above; a hardlink to
# outside content WOULD pass — caught here).
try:
common = os.path.commonpath([base_real, real])
except ValueError:
continue
if common != base_real:
continue
rel = os.path.relpath(full, adapter_dir).replace(os.sep, "/")
rels.append(rel)
if len(rels) > _MAX_FILES:
raise ValueError(f"adapter has > {_MAX_FILES} files")
return sorted(rels)
def _merkle_root(entries: Tuple[FileEntry, ...]) -> str:
"""Compute a deterministic hash over the file list.
Format: ``hash(version || count || name1:size1:sha1 || name2:size2:sha2 || ...)``.
Not a true Merkle tree (no pair-wise pairing) — a flat hash works for our
threat model (offline tamper detection) and avoids odd-leaf complications.
"""
h = hashlib.sha256()
h.update(str(_MANIFEST_VERSION).encode("utf-8"))
h.update(b"\x1f")
h.update(str(len(entries)).encode("utf-8"))
for entry in entries:
h.update(b"\x1f")
h.update(entry.name.encode("utf-8"))
h.update(b":")
h.update(str(entry.size).encode("utf-8"))
h.update(b":")
h.update(entry.sha256.encode("utf-8"))
return h.hexdigest()
def compute_adapter_manifest(adapter_dir: str) -> AdapterManifest:
"""Walk ``adapter_dir`` and return a deterministic manifest.
Containment + symlink rejection on the adapter dir (TOCTOU defence,
mirrors v0.53.1 ``enforce_under_cwd_and_no_symlink`` policy). Raises
``FileNotFoundError`` if the dir does not exist; raises ``ValueError``
on containment / symlink violations.
"""
enforce_under_cwd_and_no_symlink(adapter_dir, "adapter")
if not os.path.isdir(adapter_dir):
raise FileNotFoundError(f"{adapter_dir}: not a directory")
names = _enumerate_files(adapter_dir)
entries: list[FileEntry] = []
for name in names:
# Names use POSIX `/`; translate back to OS separator for hashing.
full = os.path.join(adapter_dir, *name.split("/"))
size, digest = _hash_file(full)
entries.append(FileEntry(name=name, size=size, sha256=digest))
entries_tuple = tuple(entries)
return AdapterManifest(
adapter=os.path.basename(os.path.normpath(adapter_dir)),
version=_MANIFEST_VERSION,
files=entries_tuple,
merkle_root=_merkle_root(entries_tuple),
)
def _resolve_backend(backend: object) -> SignBackend:
if isinstance(backend, SignBackend):
return backend
if isinstance(backend, str):
try:
return SignBackend(backend.lower())
except ValueError as exc:
raise ValueError(
f"unknown backend: {backend!r} (use one of "
f"{[b.value for b in SignBackend]})"
) from exc
raise TypeError(f"backend must be str or SignBackend, got {type(backend).__name__}")
def _manifest_to_dict(manifest: AdapterManifest) -> dict:
return {
"adapter": manifest.adapter,
"version": manifest.version,
"merkle_root": manifest.merkle_root,
"files": [
{"name": e.name, "size": e.size, "sha256": e.sha256}
for e in manifest.files
],
}
def _manifest_from_dict(payload: dict) -> AdapterManifest:
files_raw = payload.get("files", [])
if not isinstance(files_raw, list):
raise ValueError("files must be a list")
entries = tuple(
FileEntry(
name=str(entry["name"]),
size=int(entry["size"]),
sha256=str(entry["sha256"]),
)
for entry in files_raw
)
return AdapterManifest(
adapter=str(payload.get("adapter", "")),
version=int(payload.get("version", _MANIFEST_VERSION)),
files=entries,
merkle_root=str(payload.get("merkle_root", "")),
)
def sign_adapter(
adapter_dir: str,
*,
backend: object = SignBackend.UNSIGNED,
) -> SignatureRecord:
"""Compute the manifest, sign it, and write ``.soup-signature.json``.
Args:
adapter_dir: cwd-contained adapter directory.
backend: ``"unsigned"`` is live; ``"sigstore"`` and ``"ed25519"`` are
deferred to v0.60.1 (raises ``NotImplementedError``).
Returns:
``SignatureRecord`` describing what was written.
"""
from datetime import datetime, timezone
chosen = _resolve_backend(backend)
manifest = compute_adapter_manifest(adapter_dir)
if chosen == SignBackend.UNSIGNED:
signature = ""
else:
raise NotImplementedError(
f"signing backend {chosen.value!r} is deferred to v0.60.1"
)
signed_at = datetime.now(tz=timezone.utc).isoformat()
record = SignatureRecord(
backend=chosen.value,
merkle_root=manifest.merkle_root,
signature=signature,
signed_at=signed_at,
manifest=manifest,
)
payload = {
"backend": record.backend,
"merkle_root": record.merkle_root,
"signature": record.signature,
"signed_at": record.signed_at,
"manifest": _manifest_to_dict(manifest),
}
sig_path = os.path.join(adapter_dir, _SIGNATURE_FILENAME)
atomic_write_text(
json.dumps(payload, indent=2, sort_keys=True),
sig_path,
prefix=".soup-sig.",
suffix=".json.tmp",
field="signature_file",
)
return record
def _load_signature(adapter_dir: str) -> Optional[SignatureRecord]:
sig_path = os.path.join(adapter_dir, _SIGNATURE_FILENAME)
# TOCTOU-hardened existence + type check via direct lstat (no
# `isfile`-then-`open` race — security-review MEDIUM fix).
try:
st = os.lstat(sig_path)
except FileNotFoundError:
return None
if stat.S_ISLNK(st.st_mode):
raise ValueError(f"{_SIGNATURE_FILENAME}: must not be a symlink")
if not stat.S_ISREG(st.st_mode):
return None
# Cap signature file size — defends against a hostile adapter
# shipping a multi-GiB JSON to OOM `verify_adapter`.
if st.st_size > _MAX_SIGNATURE_BYTES:
raise ValueError(
f"{_SIGNATURE_FILENAME}: exceeds {_MAX_SIGNATURE_BYTES} bytes"
)
with open(sig_path, encoding="utf-8") as fh:
payload = json.load(fh)
if not isinstance(payload, dict):
raise ValueError(f"{_SIGNATURE_FILENAME}: payload must be a JSON object")
manifest_dict = payload.get("manifest", {})
if not isinstance(manifest_dict, dict):
raise ValueError(f"{_SIGNATURE_FILENAME}: 'manifest' must be a JSON object")
manifest = _manifest_from_dict(manifest_dict)
return SignatureRecord(
backend=str(payload.get("backend", "")),
merkle_root=str(payload.get("merkle_root", "")),
signature=str(payload.get("signature", "")),
signed_at=str(payload.get("signed_at", "")),
manifest=manifest,
)
def verify_adapter(adapter_dir: str, *, strict: bool = False) -> VerifyReport:
"""Verify that the adapter's files match the recorded manifest.
Args:
adapter_dir: cwd-contained adapter directory.
strict: when True, raise ``ValueError`` on any failure (CI-friendly).
When False, return a ``VerifyReport`` with ``valid=False``.
Returns:
``VerifyReport``. ``valid=True`` requires a present signature file
AND a recomputed Merkle root that matches the recorded one. Unsigned
adapters fail verification in both modes — strict raises, lenient
reports.
"""
if not isinstance(strict, bool):
raise TypeError("strict must be bool")
enforce_under_cwd_and_no_symlink(adapter_dir, "adapter")
name = os.path.basename(os.path.normpath(adapter_dir))
record = _load_signature(adapter_dir)
if record is None:
reason = (
f"adapter {name!r} is not signed (no {_SIGNATURE_FILENAME}); "
"run `soup adapters sign` first"
)
if strict:
raise ValueError(reason)
return VerifyReport(
adapter=name, valid=False, backend=None, reason=reason,
)
# Recompute manifest from current files
current = compute_adapter_manifest(adapter_dir)
findings: list[str] = []
if current.merkle_root != record.merkle_root:
findings.append(
f"merkle root mismatch: recorded {record.merkle_root[:16]}..., "
f"current {current.merkle_root[:16]}..."
)
# File-level diff for actionable advisories
recorded_files = {entry.name: entry for entry in record.manifest.files}
current_files = {entry.name: entry for entry in current.files}
for fname, cur in current_files.items():
rec = recorded_files.get(fname)
if rec is None:
findings.append(f"new file not in manifest: {fname!r}")
continue
if rec.sha256 != cur.sha256:
findings.append(f"sha256 mismatch on {fname!r}")
for fname in recorded_files:
if fname not in current_files:
findings.append(f"missing file: {fname!r}")
if findings:
reason = f"signature mismatch: {findings[0]}"
if strict:
raise ValueError(
f"adapter {name!r} signature verification failed: {findings[0]}"
)
return VerifyReport(
adapter=name,
valid=False,
backend=record.backend,
reason=reason,
findings=tuple(findings),
)
return VerifyReport(
adapter=name,
valid=True,
backend=record.backend,
reason="ok",
findings=(),
)

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"""Airgap bundle assembler (v0.60.0 Part F).
Builds a single tarball containing model + datasets + (optional) wheels +
(optional) CUDA kernels + signed manifest with SHA-256 fingerprints for
every member. Sized for one-way physical-media transfer through a data
diode — operators on isolated networks can verify-then-unpack offline.
The bundle is reproducible: same inputs → same SHA-256 list inside the
manifest (tar headers themselves are non-deterministic — timestamps — so
the tarball bytes are not bit-stable, but the bundled-files list is).
Public surface:
- ``AirgapBundlePlan`` frozen dataclass — caller-supplied inputs.
- ``BundleFileEntry`` / ``BundleManifest`` frozen dataclasses.
- ``build_airgap_bundle(plan)`` -> ``BundleManifest``.
- ``inspect_airgap_bundle(path)`` -> ``BundleManifest`` (reads back).
- Default cap: 100 GiB; configurable.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import hashlib
import json
import os
import stat
import tarfile
import tempfile
from dataclasses import dataclass
from datetime import datetime, timezone
from typing import Tuple
import soup_cli
from soup_cli.utils.paths import (
enforce_under_cwd_and_no_symlink,
is_under_cwd,
)
_DEFAULT_BUNDLE_CAP_BYTES = 100 * 1024 * 1024 * 1024 # 100 GiB
_MANIFEST_FILENAME = "manifest.json"
_MAX_FILES = 100_000
_HASH_CHUNK = 1024 * 1024
_MAX_MANIFEST_BYTES = 64 * 1024 * 1024 # 64 MiB cap on inspect-side manifest read
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class AirgapBundlePlan:
"""Caller-supplied bundle inputs."""
output: str
model_dir: str
dataset_dirs: Tuple[str, ...]
wheel_dirs: Tuple[str, ...]
kernel_dirs: Tuple[str, ...]
bundle_size_cap_bytes: int
def __post_init__(self) -> None:
for value, name in (
(self.output, "output"),
(self.model_dir, "model_dir"),
):
if not isinstance(value, str) or not value:
raise ValueError(f"{name} must be non-empty str")
if "\x00" in value:
raise ValueError(f"{name} must not contain null bytes")
for sequence, name in (
(self.dataset_dirs, "dataset_dirs"),
(self.wheel_dirs, "wheel_dirs"),
(self.kernel_dirs, "kernel_dirs"),
):
if not isinstance(sequence, tuple):
raise ValueError(f"{name} must be tuple")
for entry in sequence:
if not isinstance(entry, str) or not entry:
raise ValueError(f"{name}[*] must be non-empty str")
if "\x00" in entry:
raise ValueError(f"{name}[*] must not contain null bytes")
if isinstance(self.bundle_size_cap_bytes, bool):
raise ValueError("bundle_size_cap_bytes must be int, not bool")
if not isinstance(self.bundle_size_cap_bytes, int):
raise ValueError("bundle_size_cap_bytes must be int")
if self.bundle_size_cap_bytes <= 0:
raise ValueError("bundle_size_cap_bytes must be > 0")
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class BundleFileEntry:
"""One file in the bundle manifest."""
name: str # path-inside-tar (no leading slash)
size: int
sha256: str
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class BundleManifest:
"""Signed manifest inside the airgap bundle."""
soup_version: str
created_at: str
model_dir: str
datasets: Tuple[str, ...]
wheels: Tuple[str, ...]
kernels: Tuple[str, ...]
files: Tuple[BundleFileEntry, ...]
total_bytes: int
def _hash_file(path: str) -> tuple[int, str]:
st = os.lstat(path)
if stat.S_ISLNK(st.st_mode):
raise ValueError(f"{os.path.basename(path)!r}: must not be a symlink")
if not stat.S_ISREG(st.st_mode):
raise ValueError(f"{os.path.basename(path)!r}: must be a regular file")
digest = hashlib.sha256()
size = 0
with open(path, "rb") as fh:
while True:
chunk = fh.read(_HASH_CHUNK)
if not chunk:
break
digest.update(chunk)
size += len(chunk)
return size, digest.hexdigest()
def _enumerate_dir(root: str, *, label: str) -> list[tuple[str, str]]:
"""Walk ``root`` and return ``[(abs_path, rel_in_tar)]`` tuples.
``label`` becomes the top-level dir name inside the tarball
(e.g. ``model/``, ``datasets/<i>/``).
"""
out: list[tuple[str, str]] = []
for dirpath, _, filenames in os.walk(root, followlinks=False):
if not is_under_cwd(dirpath):
continue
for filename in sorted(filenames):
full = os.path.join(dirpath, filename)
# Skip symlinks at the file level.
try:
st = os.lstat(full)
except OSError:
continue
if stat.S_ISLNK(st.st_mode) or not stat.S_ISREG(st.st_mode):
continue
rel = os.path.relpath(full, root)
# Use forward slashes inside tar entries (POSIX-style).
rel_tar = label + "/" + rel.replace(os.sep, "/")
out.append((full, rel_tar))
return out
def build_airgap_bundle(plan: AirgapBundlePlan) -> BundleManifest:
"""Assemble the bundle. Returns the in-memory manifest.
Raises ``ValueError`` on:
- output / model_dir / dataset_dir outside cwd (containment)
- aggregate bytes > ``bundle_size_cap_bytes``
- any symlink encountered (refused at the boundary)
"""
if not isinstance(plan, AirgapBundlePlan):
raise TypeError("plan must be AirgapBundlePlan")
enforce_under_cwd_and_no_symlink(plan.output, "output")
enforce_under_cwd_and_no_symlink(plan.model_dir, "model_dir")
for entry in plan.dataset_dirs:
enforce_under_cwd_and_no_symlink(entry, "dataset_dir")
for entry in plan.wheel_dirs:
enforce_under_cwd_and_no_symlink(entry, "wheel_dir")
for entry in plan.kernel_dirs:
enforce_under_cwd_and_no_symlink(entry, "kernel_dir")
members: list[tuple[str, str]] = []
members.extend(_enumerate_dir(plan.model_dir, label="model"))
# Label by sorted basename rather than caller-supplied index so the
# manifest is reorder-stable: `[a, b]` and `[b, a]` produce the same
# tarball layout, fulfilling the "same inputs → same SHA-256 list"
# contract (code-review HIGH fix).
def _label_for(dirs: tuple[str, ...], prefix: str) -> list[tuple[str, str]]:
sorted_dirs = sorted(dirs, key=lambda d: os.path.basename(os.path.normpath(d)))
out: list[tuple[str, str]] = []
seen: set[str] = set()
for d in sorted_dirs:
base = os.path.basename(os.path.normpath(d)) or "_"
label = f"{prefix}/{base}"
# Disambiguate on duplicate basename collisions.
i = 0
while label in seen:
i += 1
label = f"{prefix}/{base}__{i}"
seen.add(label)
out.extend(_enumerate_dir(d, label=label))
return out
members.extend(_label_for(plan.dataset_dirs, "datasets"))
members.extend(_label_for(plan.wheel_dirs, "wheels"))
members.extend(_label_for(plan.kernel_dirs, "kernels"))
if len(members) > _MAX_FILES:
raise ValueError(f"bundle has > {_MAX_FILES} files")
# Hash + pre-size check (refuse early if cap exceeded).
entries: list[BundleFileEntry] = []
total = 0
for full, rel_tar in members:
size, digest = _hash_file(full)
total += size
if total > plan.bundle_size_cap_bytes:
raise ValueError(
f"bundle aggregate size {total} bytes exceeds cap "
f"{plan.bundle_size_cap_bytes} bytes"
)
entries.append(BundleFileEntry(name=rel_tar, size=size, sha256=digest))
manifest = BundleManifest(
soup_version=soup_cli.__version__,
created_at=datetime.now(tz=timezone.utc).isoformat(),
model_dir=os.path.basename(os.path.normpath(plan.model_dir)),
datasets=tuple(os.path.basename(os.path.normpath(d)) for d in plan.dataset_dirs),
wheels=tuple(os.path.basename(os.path.normpath(w)) for w in plan.wheel_dirs),
kernels=tuple(os.path.basename(os.path.normpath(k)) for k in plan.kernel_dirs),
files=tuple(entries),
total_bytes=total,
)
# Write tar via a temp file in the same dir, then atomic-rename.
parent = os.path.dirname(os.path.realpath(plan.output)) or "."
os.makedirs(parent, exist_ok=True)
# TOCTOU defence: reject if parent dir became a symlink between the
# containment check and the makedirs (security-review HIGH fix).
parent_st = os.lstat(parent)
if stat.S_ISLNK(parent_st.st_mode):
raise ValueError(f"output parent dir {parent!r} is a symlink")
# Reject pre-placed symlink at the final output path.
if os.path.lexists(plan.output):
out_st = os.lstat(plan.output)
if stat.S_ISLNK(out_st.st_mode):
raise ValueError("output path is a symlink (TOCTOU defence)")
fd, tmp_path = tempfile.mkstemp(prefix=".airgap.", suffix=".tar.tmp", dir=parent)
os.close(fd)
try:
with tarfile.open(tmp_path, "w") as tar:
# manifest.json first so streaming readers see it without
# walking the entire archive.
manifest_bytes = _manifest_to_bytes(manifest)
manifest_info = tarfile.TarInfo(name=_MANIFEST_FILENAME)
manifest_info.size = len(manifest_bytes)
manifest_info.mtime = 0
import io as _io
tar.addfile(manifest_info, _io.BytesIO(manifest_bytes))
for full, rel_tar in members:
info = tar.gettarinfo(name=full, arcname=rel_tar)
# Force regular-file type; suppress owner / group / mtime
# variance so the bundle hashes stay portable.
info.uname = ""
info.gname = ""
info.uid = 0
info.gid = 0
info.mtime = 0
with open(full, "rb") as fh:
tar.addfile(info, fh)
os.replace(tmp_path, plan.output)
finally:
# Use lexists/lstat so a hostile replacement of tmp_path with a
# symlink between failure and cleanup cannot trick us into
# unlink-ing the symlink's target (code-review MEDIUM fix).
if os.path.lexists(tmp_path):
try:
os.unlink(tmp_path)
except OSError:
pass
return manifest
def _manifest_to_bytes(manifest: BundleManifest) -> bytes:
payload = {
"soup_version": manifest.soup_version,
"created_at": manifest.created_at,
"model_dir": manifest.model_dir,
"datasets": list(manifest.datasets),
"wheels": list(manifest.wheels),
"kernels": list(manifest.kernels),
"total_bytes": manifest.total_bytes,
"files": [
{"name": e.name, "size": e.size, "sha256": e.sha256}
for e in manifest.files
],
}
return json.dumps(payload, indent=2, sort_keys=True).encode("utf-8")
def _manifest_from_payload(payload: dict) -> BundleManifest:
files_raw = payload.get("files", [])
if not isinstance(files_raw, list):
raise ValueError("manifest 'files' must be a list")
files = tuple(
BundleFileEntry(
name=str(entry["name"]),
size=int(entry["size"]),
sha256=str(entry["sha256"]),
)
for entry in files_raw
)
return BundleManifest(
soup_version=str(payload.get("soup_version", "")),
created_at=str(payload.get("created_at", "")),
model_dir=str(payload.get("model_dir", "")),
datasets=tuple(payload.get("datasets", [])),
wheels=tuple(payload.get("wheels", [])),
kernels=tuple(payload.get("kernels", [])),
files=files,
total_bytes=int(payload.get("total_bytes", 0)),
)
def inspect_airgap_bundle(bundle_path: str) -> BundleManifest:
"""Read back the manifest from a bundle tarball.
Containment-checked; symlink at the bundle path is rejected via the
shared helper. Raises ``FileNotFoundError`` on missing file,
``ValueError`` on out-of-cwd / null bytes / missing manifest.json.
"""
enforce_under_cwd_and_no_symlink(bundle_path, "bundle")
if not os.path.isfile(bundle_path):
raise FileNotFoundError(f"{bundle_path}: not a file")
# Force PAX format and disable seek-back so the open call cannot be
# tricked by a crafted header (defence-in-depth — we only read
# manifest.json via getmember + extractfile, which does NOT honour
# ``extraction_filter``; the filter assignment below is for the
# benefit of any FUTURE caller adding ``tar.extractall``).
with tarfile.open(bundle_path, "r") as tar:
if hasattr(tarfile, "data_filter"):
# Project policy: data_filter is the v3.12+ extract-time
# symlink/tar-bomb defence. It is a no-op on our manifest
# read path but locks the behaviour for future maintainers
# (security-review HIGH fix).
tar.extraction_filter = tarfile.data_filter
try:
member: tarfile.TarInfo = tar.getmember(_MANIFEST_FILENAME)
except KeyError as exc:
raise ValueError(
f"{bundle_path}: missing {_MANIFEST_FILENAME}"
) from exc
# Cap manifest size — reject crafted bundles with multi-GiB manifest.
if member.size > _MAX_MANIFEST_BYTES:
raise ValueError(
f"{bundle_path}: manifest.json exceeds {_MAX_MANIFEST_BYTES} bytes"
)
extracted = tar.extractfile(member)
if extracted is None:
raise ValueError(f"{bundle_path}: manifest.json is not a regular file")
payload = json.loads(extracted.read().decode("utf-8"))
if not isinstance(payload, dict):
raise ValueError(f"{bundle_path}: manifest must be a JSON object")
return _manifest_from_payload(payload)

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"""License-conflict matrix at adapter merge (v0.60.0 Part E).
Closed compatibility table for the top open-source / model-license families.
``check_license_compat`` returns a ``LicenseConflictReport`` when the supplied
list contains an incompatible pair; ``adapter_merge`` consults this helper
and refuses to merge unless ``--license-override <reason>`` is passed.
Compatibility is intentionally conservative: when in doubt, flag. Operators
who have legal clearance can override; the override reason is captured in
the audit log so a future legal review can trace the decision.
Public surface:
- ``KNOWN_LICENSES`` frozenset of recognised SPDX-ish ids.
- ``LICENSE_MATRIX`` ``MappingProxyType`` mapping license-id -> tuple of
compatible counterparts.
- ``LICENSE_KINDS`` ``MappingProxyType`` mapping license-id -> category.
- ``check_license_compat(licenses)`` -> ``LicenseConflictReport``.
- ``validate_license_override_reason(reason)`` -> validated string.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import types
from dataclasses import dataclass
from typing import Optional, Sequence, Tuple
# License "kinds" — broad categories that drive the compatibility matrix.
# Closed allowlist; mixing categories that are flagged "permissive" with
# "copyleft" or "non-commercial" produces a conflict.
_PERMISSIVE = "permissive"
_WEAK_COPYLEFT = "weak-copyleft"
_STRONG_COPYLEFT = "strong-copyleft"
_NON_COMMERCIAL = "non-commercial"
_RESTRICTED_USE = "restricted-use" # Llama / Gemma / etc. — community licenses
_OPENRAIL = "openrail" # CreativeML OpenRAIL family — use-based
_PROPRIETARY = "proprietary" # OpenAI ToS, etc.
_LICENSE_KINDS_RAW: dict[str, str] = {
# Permissive
"apache-2.0": _PERMISSIVE,
"mit": _PERMISSIVE,
"bsd-2-clause": _PERMISSIVE,
"bsd-3-clause": _PERMISSIVE,
"isc": _PERMISSIVE,
"unlicense": _PERMISSIVE,
"cc0-1.0": _PERMISSIVE,
"cc-by-4.0": _PERMISSIVE,
# Weak copyleft
"lgpl-2.1": _WEAK_COPYLEFT,
"lgpl-3.0": _WEAK_COPYLEFT,
"mpl-2.0": _WEAK_COPYLEFT,
# Strong copyleft
"gpl-2.0": _STRONG_COPYLEFT,
"gpl-3.0": _STRONG_COPYLEFT,
"agpl-3.0": _STRONG_COPYLEFT,
# Non-commercial
"cc-by-nc-4.0": _NON_COMMERCIAL,
"cc-by-nc-sa-4.0": _NON_COMMERCIAL,
"cc-by-nc-nd-4.0": _NON_COMMERCIAL,
# Restricted-use model licenses
"llama-2": _RESTRICTED_USE,
"llama-3": _RESTRICTED_USE,
"llama-3.1": _RESTRICTED_USE,
"llama-3.2": _RESTRICTED_USE,
"llama-3.3": _RESTRICTED_USE,
"llama-community": _RESTRICTED_USE,
"gemma": _RESTRICTED_USE,
"qwen-research": _RESTRICTED_USE,
"qwen-license": _RESTRICTED_USE,
"mistral-research": _RESTRICTED_USE,
# OpenRAIL family
"openrail": _OPENRAIL,
"creativeml-openrail-m": _OPENRAIL,
"bigscience-openrail-m": _OPENRAIL,
"bigcode-openrail-m": _OPENRAIL,
# Proprietary ToS
"openai-tos": _PROPRIETARY,
"anthropic-aup": _PROPRIETARY,
}
KNOWN_LICENSES = frozenset(_LICENSE_KINDS_RAW.keys())
LICENSE_KINDS = types.MappingProxyType(dict(_LICENSE_KINDS_RAW))
# Compatibility rules. Each entry is the set of kinds that the row kind can
# be safely combined with. Conservative-by-design — when legal counsel is
# uncertain, flag the operator (they can `--license-override <reason>`).
_COMPAT_RAW: dict[str, Tuple[str, ...]] = {
_PERMISSIVE: (_PERMISSIVE,),
_WEAK_COPYLEFT: (_WEAK_COPYLEFT, _PERMISSIVE),
_STRONG_COPYLEFT: (_STRONG_COPYLEFT,),
_NON_COMMERCIAL: (_NON_COMMERCIAL,),
_RESTRICTED_USE: (_RESTRICTED_USE,),
_OPENRAIL: (_OPENRAIL,),
_PROPRIETARY: (_PROPRIETARY,),
}
LICENSE_MATRIX = types.MappingProxyType(dict(_COMPAT_RAW))
_MIN_OVERRIDE_REASON = 8
_MAX_OVERRIDE_REASON = 4096
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class LicenseConflictReport:
"""Outcome of ``check_license_compat``."""
ok: bool
licenses: Tuple[str, ...]
conflict_pair: Optional[Tuple[str, str]]
reason: str
def normalise_license_id(value: object) -> str:
"""Lowercase + strip + validate a license id."""
if isinstance(value, bool):
raise TypeError("license id must be str, not bool")
if not isinstance(value, str):
raise TypeError(f"license id must be str, got {type(value).__name__}")
if "\x00" in value:
raise ValueError("license id must not contain null bytes")
stripped = value.strip()
if not stripped:
raise ValueError("license id must be non-empty")
if len(stripped) > 128:
raise ValueError("license id too long")
return stripped.lower()
def _kind_of(license_id: str) -> Optional[str]:
return LICENSE_KINDS.get(license_id)
def check_license_compat(
licenses: Sequence[object],
) -> LicenseConflictReport:
"""Decide whether a list of licenses can be combined in one merged adapter.
Decision rule:
- Normalise + dedup the input.
- If any license is unknown → ``ok=False`` with reason naming it.
- Otherwise, compute the categories. The merge is OK iff every
pair-wise (kind_i, kind_j) satisfies kind_j in LICENSE_MATRIX[kind_i].
Returns the first failing pair so the operator gets actionable advice.
"""
if isinstance(licenses, (str, bytes)) or not isinstance(licenses, Sequence):
raise TypeError("licenses must be a list of strings")
if len(licenses) == 0:
raise ValueError("licenses must contain at least one entry")
norm: list[str] = []
for entry in licenses:
norm.append(normalise_license_id(entry))
# Dedup while preserving order.
seen: set[str] = set()
dedup: list[str] = []
for lic in norm:
if lic not in seen:
seen.add(lic)
dedup.append(lic)
licenses_tuple = tuple(dedup)
# Single license — trivially compatible.
if len(dedup) == 1:
if _kind_of(dedup[0]) is None:
return LicenseConflictReport(
ok=False,
licenses=licenses_tuple,
conflict_pair=None,
reason=f"unknown license: {dedup[0]!r}",
)
return LicenseConflictReport(
ok=True, licenses=licenses_tuple, conflict_pair=None,
reason="single-license merge",
)
# Probe every pair (i, j) and require BOTH directions in the matrix.
for first in dedup:
kind_a = _kind_of(first)
if kind_a is None:
return LicenseConflictReport(
ok=False,
licenses=licenses_tuple,
conflict_pair=None,
reason=f"unknown license: {first!r}",
)
for second in dedup:
if first == second:
continue
kind_b = _kind_of(second)
if kind_b is None:
return LicenseConflictReport(
ok=False,
licenses=licenses_tuple,
conflict_pair=None,
reason=f"unknown license: {second!r}",
)
compat = LICENSE_MATRIX.get(kind_a, ())
if kind_b not in compat:
# Friendlier reason names the category so operators can
# search the matrix.
if kind_b == _NON_COMMERCIAL or kind_a == _NON_COMMERCIAL:
msg = (
f"non-commercial license {kind_b!r} cannot combine "
f"with {kind_a!r}: {first} vs {second}"
)
elif _STRONG_COPYLEFT in (kind_a, kind_b):
msg = (
f"strong copyleft {kind_a!r}/{kind_b!r} incompatible "
f"with non-copyleft license: {first} vs {second}"
)
elif _RESTRICTED_USE in (kind_a, kind_b):
msg = (
f"restricted-use license {kind_a!r}/{kind_b!r} "
f"adds acceptable-use clauses that "
f"{first} vs {second} cannot satisfy"
)
else:
msg = (
f"license categories incompatible: "
f"{kind_a!r} vs {kind_b!r} "
f"({first} vs {second})"
)
return LicenseConflictReport(
ok=False,
licenses=licenses_tuple,
conflict_pair=(first, second),
reason=msg,
)
return LicenseConflictReport(
ok=True,
licenses=licenses_tuple,
conflict_pair=None,
reason="all license pairs compatible",
)
def validate_license_override_reason(reason: object) -> str:
"""Sanity-check the ``--license-override <reason>`` payload.
Defends against `--license-override y` style placeholder bypasses: the
reason must be ≥ 8 chars, ≤ 4096 chars, free of null bytes, and a string.
"""
if isinstance(reason, bool):
raise TypeError("override reason must be str, not bool")
if not isinstance(reason, str):
raise TypeError(f"override reason must be str, got {type(reason).__name__}")
if "\x00" in reason:
raise ValueError("override reason must not contain null bytes")
stripped = reason.strip()
if len(stripped) < _MIN_OVERRIDE_REASON:
raise ValueError(
f"override reason too short (need ≥ {_MIN_OVERRIDE_REASON} chars)"
)
if len(stripped) > _MAX_OVERRIDE_REASON:
raise ValueError(
f"override reason too long (> {_MAX_OVERRIDE_REASON} chars)"
)
return stripped

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"""Namespace-pin verification (v0.60.0 Part D — anti-AI-Jacking).
Threat model: an attacker watches a popular repo on HuggingFace, waits until
the original owner deletes it (or the repo expires), then re-creates the same
``owner/name`` with malicious weights. Anyone with ``soup`` pinned to that
namespace silently pulls poison on next ``soup train`` / ``soup download``.
Defence: trust-on-first-use. The first time Soup sees a ``owner/name`` repo
it records the author + created_at fingerprint. On every subsequent load,
``verify_namespace`` compares the current author + created_at to the
recorded pin. Mismatch → operator confirmation required via
``--allow-namespace-shift <new-author>``. The opt-in must name the new
author explicitly — a free-for-all ``--allow-namespace-shift`` flag would
defeat the whole control.
SQLite-backed; survives across runs. The DB path can be overridden via
``SOUP_NAMESPACE_PIN_DB`` (validated through the same containment policy
as ``SOUP_AUDIT_LOG_PATH``). Default: ``~/.soup/namespace_pin.db``.
Public surface:
- ``NamespacePin`` frozen dataclass.
- ``NamespacePinStore`` SQLite wrapper.
- ``record_repo_first_seen`` + ``verify_namespace`` decision helpers.
- ``NamespaceVerifyReport`` frozen dataclass.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import os
import re
import sqlite3
import stat
import tempfile
from dataclasses import dataclass
from datetime import datetime, timezone
from typing import Optional
_REPO_RE = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._\-]{0,127}/[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._\-]{0,127}$")
_AUTHOR_RE = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._\-]{0,127}$")
_MAX_REPO_LEN = 256
_MAX_AUTHOR_LEN = 128
_MAX_TIMESTAMP_LEN = 64
_SCHEMA_SQL = """
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS namespace_pins (
repo_id TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
author TEXT NOT NULL,
created_at TEXT NOT NULL,
first_seen TEXT NOT NULL
);
"""
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class NamespacePin:
"""One repo's trust-on-first-use fingerprint."""
repo_id: str
author: str
created_at: str
first_seen: str
def __post_init__(self) -> None:
if not isinstance(self.repo_id, str) or not self.repo_id:
raise ValueError("repo_id must be non-empty str")
if "\x00" in self.repo_id:
raise ValueError("repo_id must not contain null bytes")
if len(self.repo_id) > _MAX_REPO_LEN:
raise ValueError(f"repo_id too long (> {_MAX_REPO_LEN} chars)")
if not isinstance(self.author, str) or not self.author:
raise ValueError("author must be non-empty str")
if "\x00" in self.author:
raise ValueError("author must not contain null bytes")
if len(self.author) > _MAX_AUTHOR_LEN:
raise ValueError(f"author too long (> {_MAX_AUTHOR_LEN} chars)")
for ts_value, ts_name in (
(self.created_at, "created_at"),
(self.first_seen, "first_seen"),
):
if not isinstance(ts_value, str) or not ts_value:
raise ValueError(f"{ts_name} must be non-empty str")
if "\x00" in ts_value:
raise ValueError(f"{ts_name} must not contain null bytes")
if len(ts_value) > _MAX_TIMESTAMP_LEN:
raise ValueError(f"{ts_name} too long (> {_MAX_TIMESTAMP_LEN})")
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class NamespaceVerifyReport:
"""Outcome of ``verify_namespace``."""
repo_id: str
ok: bool
reason: str
recorded: Optional[NamespacePin]
def _validate_repo_id(repo_id: object) -> str:
if not isinstance(repo_id, str) or not repo_id:
raise ValueError("repo_id must be non-empty str")
if "\x00" in repo_id:
raise ValueError("repo_id must not contain null bytes")
if len(repo_id) > _MAX_REPO_LEN:
raise ValueError(f"repo_id too long (> {_MAX_REPO_LEN} chars)")
return repo_id
def _validate_author_override(value: object) -> str:
"""Validate the explicit ``--allow-namespace-shift`` author kwarg.
Strict: must be a string matching the author regex. ``True`` /
``False`` / ``None`` are rejected so callers cannot smuggle a
free-for-all bypass via boolean coercion (security review fix).
"""
if isinstance(value, bool):
raise TypeError(
"allow_namespace_shift must be str (new author name), not bool"
)
if not isinstance(value, str) or not value:
raise ValueError("allow_namespace_shift must be non-empty str")
if "\x00" in value:
raise ValueError("allow_namespace_shift must not contain null bytes")
if not _AUTHOR_RE.match(value):
raise ValueError("allow_namespace_shift must match author regex")
return value
class NamespacePinStore:
"""SQLite wrapper. Single-connection, single-thread."""
def __init__(self, path: str) -> None:
if not isinstance(path, str) or not path:
raise ValueError("path must be non-empty str")
if "\x00" in path:
raise ValueError("path must not contain null bytes")
# Reject paths outside $HOME / $CWD / $TMPDIR — defends against a
# caller smuggling /etc/passwd through the public constructor
# (security-review HIGH fix; mirrors v0.36.0 SOUP_BATCH_CACHE_PATH
# / v0.54.0 / v0.59.0 audit-log policy).
if _validate_db_path_override(path) is None:
raise ValueError(
f"path {os.path.basename(path)!r} must stay under "
"$HOME / $CWD / $TMPDIR"
)
parent = os.path.dirname(os.path.realpath(path)) or "."
os.makedirs(parent, exist_ok=True)
# TOCTOU: reject a pre-placed symlink at the DB path BEFORE
# sqlite3.connect (which would happily write through the link).
if os.path.lexists(path):
link_st = os.lstat(path)
if stat.S_ISLNK(link_st.st_mode):
raise ValueError("DB path is a symlink (TOCTOU defence)")
self._path = path
self._conn = sqlite3.connect(path)
self._conn.executescript(_SCHEMA_SQL)
# POSIX-only 0600 perms for the DB file.
if os.name != "nt":
try:
os.chmod(path, 0o600)
except OSError:
pass
def close(self) -> None:
self._conn.close()
def __enter__(self) -> "NamespacePinStore":
return self
def __exit__(self, exc_type: object, exc: object, tb: object) -> None:
self.close()
def get(self, repo_id: str) -> Optional[NamespacePin]:
_validate_repo_id(repo_id)
cur = self._conn.execute(
"SELECT repo_id, author, created_at, first_seen "
"FROM namespace_pins WHERE repo_id = ?",
(repo_id,),
)
row = cur.fetchone()
if row is None:
return None
return NamespacePin(
repo_id=row[0],
author=row[1],
created_at=row[2],
first_seen=row[3],
)
def put(self, pin: NamespacePin) -> None:
"""Insert a new pin or update author/created_at on an existing one.
``first_seen`` is preserved across updates — the first time a repo
was observed is the trust anchor and MUST NOT be overwritten by a
later successful verify (security review fix). To replace the
author / created_at fingerprint, callers use ``put`` with a
``NamespacePin`` whose ``first_seen`` matches the existing record
OR with the operator-confirmed opt-in path inside
``verify_namespace``.
"""
if not isinstance(pin, NamespacePin):
raise TypeError("pin must be NamespacePin")
# Preserve the original first_seen across overwrites.
existing = self.get(pin.repo_id)
first_seen = existing.first_seen if existing is not None else pin.first_seen
self._conn.execute(
"INSERT OR REPLACE INTO namespace_pins "
"(repo_id, author, created_at, first_seen) VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?)",
(pin.repo_id, pin.author, pin.created_at, first_seen),
)
self._conn.commit()
def _now_iso() -> str:
return datetime.now(tz=timezone.utc).isoformat()
def _is_backward(current: str, recorded: str) -> bool:
"""Return True when ``current`` represents a moment strictly before ``recorded``.
Parses ISO-8601 timestamps with ``datetime.fromisoformat`` for offset-aware
comparison; falls back to lexicographic compare when either string fails
to parse (defence-in-depth for legacy / hand-edited rows).
"""
try:
return datetime.fromisoformat(current) < datetime.fromisoformat(recorded)
except ValueError:
return current < recorded
def record_repo_first_seen(
store: NamespacePinStore,
*,
repo_id: str,
author: str,
created_at: str,
) -> NamespacePin:
"""Trust-on-first-use record. Returns the (possibly pre-existing) pin.
If the repo was already pinned, returns the existing pin without
overwriting. Operators who want to refresh use ``verify_namespace``
with ``allow_namespace_shift=<author>``.
"""
_validate_repo_id(repo_id)
existing = store.get(repo_id)
if existing is not None:
return existing
pin = NamespacePin(
repo_id=repo_id,
author=author,
created_at=created_at,
first_seen=_now_iso(),
)
store.put(pin)
return pin
def verify_namespace(
store: NamespacePinStore,
*,
repo_id: str,
current_author: str,
current_created_at: str,
allow_namespace_shift: Optional[str] = None,
) -> NamespaceVerifyReport:
"""Decide whether ``repo_id`` can be loaded.
Decision matrix:
- Unknown repo: trust-on-first-use. Record and return ok=True.
- Known repo, author + created_at match: ok=True.
- Known repo, author changed: ok=False unless
``allow_namespace_shift`` names the new author exactly (case-sensitive).
- Known repo, created_at jumped backward: ok=False unless
``allow_namespace_shift`` matches the current author. A backward
jump is a strong signal of namespace re-creation.
When the opt-in path fires, the recorded pin is UPDATED to the new
author + created_at so subsequent loads pass without re-prompting.
Args:
store: open ``NamespacePinStore``.
repo_id: ``owner/name`` HuggingFace repo id.
current_author: author reported by the Hub today.
current_created_at: created_at reported by the Hub today (ISO 8601).
allow_namespace_shift: explicit author name to accept on shift.
``None`` means strict (refuse on shift). A bool is rejected so
callers cannot smuggle a free-for-all bypass.
Returns:
``NamespaceVerifyReport``.
"""
_validate_repo_id(repo_id)
if not isinstance(current_author, str) or not current_author:
raise ValueError("current_author must be non-empty str")
if not isinstance(current_created_at, str) or not current_created_at:
raise ValueError("current_created_at must be non-empty str")
override: Optional[str] = None
if allow_namespace_shift is not None:
override = _validate_author_override(allow_namespace_shift)
existing = store.get(repo_id)
if existing is None:
# Trust on first use.
pin = NamespacePin(
repo_id=repo_id,
author=current_author,
created_at=current_created_at,
first_seen=_now_iso(),
)
store.put(pin)
return NamespaceVerifyReport(
repo_id=repo_id,
ok=True,
reason="trust on first use (no prior pin)",
recorded=pin,
)
author_match = existing.author == current_author
# Compare timestamps numerically rather than lexicographically — the
# latter works for fixed-format UTC strings but is fragile if a non-Z
# offset arrives from HF Hub. Fall back to a lexicographic compare
# only when parsing fails (legacy data).
created_at_backward = _is_backward(current_created_at, existing.created_at)
if author_match and not created_at_backward:
return NamespaceVerifyReport(
repo_id=repo_id,
ok=True,
reason="namespace matches recorded pin",
recorded=existing,
)
# Mismatch — either author changed or created_at jumped backward.
# Author comparison is case-insensitive: HF Hub authors are
# case-insensitive, and a user typing the wrong case should not
# fail the gate (security-review LOW fix).
if override is not None and override.lower() == current_author.lower():
# Operator-confirmed shift. Update the pin (preserves first_seen).
new_pin = NamespacePin(
repo_id=repo_id,
author=current_author,
created_at=current_created_at,
first_seen=existing.first_seen,
)
store.put(new_pin)
return NamespaceVerifyReport(
repo_id=repo_id,
ok=True,
reason="namespace shift opt-in accepted",
recorded=new_pin,
)
if not author_match:
reason = (
f"author changed: recorded {existing.author!r}, "
f"current {current_author!r}; pass "
f"`--allow-namespace-shift {current_author}` to override"
)
else:
reason = (
"created_at jumped backward (likely namespace re-creation); "
f"recorded {existing.created_at!r}, current {current_created_at!r}; "
f"pass `--allow-namespace-shift {current_author}` to override"
)
return NamespaceVerifyReport(
repo_id=repo_id,
ok=False,
reason=reason,
recorded=existing,
)
def _validate_db_path_override(override: str) -> Optional[str]:
"""Apply v0.36.0 ``SOUP_BATCH_CACHE_PATH`` / v0.54.0 / v0.59.0 policy."""
if not isinstance(override, str) or not override:
return None
if "\x00" in override:
return None
if len(override) > 4096:
return None
# Control character rejection
if any(ord(c) < 0x20 or ord(c) == 0x7f for c in override):
return None
try:
realpath = os.path.realpath(override)
except (OSError, ValueError):
return None
home = os.path.realpath(os.path.expanduser("~"))
cwd = os.path.realpath(os.getcwd())
tmpdir = os.path.realpath(tempfile.gettempdir())
for allowed in (home, cwd, tmpdir):
try:
common = os.path.commonpath([realpath, allowed])
except ValueError:
continue
if common == allowed:
return override
return None
def default_db_path() -> str:
"""Resolve the pin DB path (env override first, else ``~/.soup/namespace_pin.db``)."""
try:
override = os.environ.get("SOUP_NAMESPACE_PIN_DB")
except ValueError:
override = None
if override:
validated = _validate_db_path_override(override)
if validated is not None:
return validated
return os.path.join(os.path.expanduser("~"), ".soup", "namespace_pin.db")

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"""Strict safetensors mode — refuse pickle / PyTorch-classic weights (v0.60.0 Part C).
Static-extension allowlist. Treats any file with an extension in
``UNSAFE_EXTENSIONS`` as a potential arbitrary-code-execution vector and
refuses to proceed when ``strict=True``. Mirrors the HuggingFace safetensors
threat model (45% of HF repos still ship pickle weights as of late 2025).
Public surface:
- ``UNSAFE_EXTENSIONS`` frozenset.
- ``find_unsafe_weight_files(model_dir)`` -> tuple of offending paths.
- ``check_strict_safetensors(model_dir, *, strict=False)`` -> ``StrictSafetensorsReport``.
Exit-code policy when wired into the CLI: ``3`` distinct from generic errors
so CI pipelines can grep specifically for strict-safetensors failures.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import os
from dataclasses import dataclass, field
from typing import Tuple
from soup_cli.utils.paths import enforce_under_cwd_and_no_symlink, is_under
# Closed allowlist of "definitely unsafe" extensions. Picklemod gives every
# loader the right to execute arbitrary code on load — refusing the file at
# the boundary is the only sound mitigation.
UNSAFE_EXTENSIONS = frozenset({
".bin", # pytorch_model.bin (legacy)
".pt", # torch.save default
".pth", # torch.save alt
".ckpt", # PyTorch Lightning checkpoint
".pkl", # raw pickle
".pickle", # raw pickle
".joblib", # sklearn joblib (uses pickle internally)
".msgpack", # ambiguous binary blob — many loaders unpickle from this
})
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class StrictSafetensorsReport:
"""Result of a ``check_strict_safetensors`` call."""
model_dir: str
ok: bool
unsafe_files: Tuple[str, ...]
reason: str = field(default="")
def find_unsafe_weight_files(model_dir: str) -> Tuple[str, ...]:
"""Walk ``model_dir`` and return every file matching ``UNSAFE_EXTENSIONS``.
Returns relative paths inside ``model_dir`` sorted alphabetically. Does
NOT raise on a missing directory — that's the caller's job to gate.
Symlinks pointing outside ``model_dir`` are silently skipped (we only
consider names inside the adapter). A symlink WITHIN the dir whose name
has an unsafe suffix is still flagged — the unsafe extension is the
threat signal regardless of where the bytes physically live.
"""
if not isinstance(model_dir, str) or not model_dir:
raise ValueError("model_dir must be a non-empty str")
if not os.path.isdir(model_dir):
return ()
offenders: list[str] = []
for root, _, files in os.walk(model_dir, followlinks=False):
# Defence-in-depth: skip dirs that walked outside model_dir
# (followlinks=False prevents this, but check anyway via the
# shared containment helper).
if not is_under(root, model_dir):
continue
for filename in files:
ext = os.path.splitext(filename)[1].lower()
if ext in UNSAFE_EXTENSIONS:
full = os.path.join(root, filename)
offenders.append(full)
return tuple(sorted(offenders))
def check_strict_safetensors(
model_dir: str, *, strict: bool = False,
) -> StrictSafetensorsReport:
"""Refuse pickle / PyTorch-classic weights when ``strict=True``.
Args:
model_dir: cwd-contained model / adapter directory.
strict: when True, raise ``ValueError`` listing the offending file.
When False, return a ``StrictSafetensorsReport`` with
``ok=False`` so callers can decide.
Returns:
``StrictSafetensorsReport``.
Raises:
ValueError: in strict mode when any unsafe file is found.
FileNotFoundError: when ``model_dir`` is not a directory.
TypeError: when ``strict`` is not a bool.
"""
if not isinstance(strict, bool):
raise TypeError(
f"strict must be bool, got {type(strict).__name__}"
)
enforce_under_cwd_and_no_symlink(model_dir, "model_dir")
if not os.path.isdir(model_dir):
raise FileNotFoundError(f"{model_dir}: not a directory")
offenders = find_unsafe_weight_files(model_dir)
if not offenders:
return StrictSafetensorsReport(
model_dir=os.path.basename(os.path.normpath(model_dir)),
ok=True,
unsafe_files=(),
reason="all weight files are safetensors",
)
first = offenders[0]
rel = os.path.relpath(first, model_dir)
reason = (
f"unsafe weight file (pickle / PyTorch-classic): {rel!r}; "
"re-save as safetensors via "
"`from safetensors.torch import save_file; save_file(...)`"
)
if strict:
raise ValueError(reason)
return StrictSafetensorsReport(
model_dir=os.path.basename(os.path.normpath(model_dir)),
ok=False,
unsafe_files=offenders,
reason=reason,
)

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"""Tests for v0.60.0 Part A — `soup adapters scan` (weight-space backdoor detector).
Coverage:
- Spectral feature kernels (rank-1 dominance, energy concentration)
- ``ScanFinding`` / ``ScanReport`` frozen dataclasses
- ``scan_adapter_weights`` pure-function happy + flagged paths
- ``scan_adapter`` containment + load
- CLI smoke (``soup adapters scan``)
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import dataclasses
import json
import os
from pathlib import Path
import numpy as np
import pytest
from typer.testing import CliRunner
from soup_cli.cli import app
# ---------- Spectral kernels ----------
class TestSpectralKernels:
def test_imports(self):
from soup_cli.utils.adapter_scan import (
ScanFinding,
ScanReport,
compute_spectral_features,
scan_adapter_weights,
)
assert callable(compute_spectral_features)
assert callable(scan_adapter_weights)
assert dataclasses.is_dataclass(ScanFinding)
assert dataclasses.is_dataclass(ScanReport)
def test_compute_spectral_features_uniform_matrix_no_dominance(self):
from soup_cli.utils.adapter_scan import compute_spectral_features
rng = np.random.default_rng(seed=0)
# Roughly isotropic matrix — top SV ratio should be small.
m = rng.standard_normal((32, 32))
feats = compute_spectral_features(m)
assert feats["top_sv_ratio"] < 5.0
assert 0.0 <= feats["energy_top1"] <= 1.0
assert 0.0 <= feats["effective_rank"] <= 32.0
def test_compute_spectral_features_rank1_dominance(self):
from soup_cli.utils.adapter_scan import compute_spectral_features
# Pure rank-1 matrix — top SV captures all energy.
u = np.ones((32, 1))
v = np.ones((1, 32))
m = u @ v
feats = compute_spectral_features(m)
assert feats["top_sv_ratio"] > 100.0
assert feats["energy_top1"] > 0.99
assert feats["effective_rank"] < 1.5
def test_compute_spectral_features_rejects_non_2d(self):
from soup_cli.utils.adapter_scan import compute_spectral_features
with pytest.raises(TypeError):
compute_spectral_features("not-a-matrix")
def test_compute_spectral_features_empty_returns_zeros(self):
from soup_cli.utils.adapter_scan import compute_spectral_features
m = np.zeros((4, 4))
feats = compute_spectral_features(m)
assert feats["top_sv_ratio"] == 0.0
assert feats["energy_top1"] == 0.0
# ---------- Pure-function scanner ----------
class TestScanAdapterWeights:
def test_clean_weights_pass(self):
from soup_cli.utils.adapter_scan import scan_adapter_weights
rng = np.random.default_rng(seed=42)
weights = {
f"layer_{i}.lora_A.weight": rng.standard_normal((16, 64)) * 0.01
for i in range(4)
}
weights.update({
f"layer_{i}.lora_B.weight": rng.standard_normal((64, 16)) * 0.01
for i in range(4)
})
report = scan_adapter_weights(weights, adapter_name="clean")
assert report.overall == "OK"
# No FAIL findings.
assert all(f.severity != "FAIL" for f in report.findings)
def test_rank1_perturbation_flagged(self):
from soup_cli.utils.adapter_scan import scan_adapter_weights
rng = np.random.default_rng(seed=0)
# Start clean, then inject a high-magnitude rank-1 outer product on one layer.
weights = {
f"layer_{i}.lora_A.weight": rng.standard_normal((16, 64)) * 0.01
for i in range(4)
}
u = np.ones((16, 1)) * 5.0
v = np.ones((1, 64)) * 5.0
weights["layer_evil.lora_A.weight"] = u @ v
report = scan_adapter_weights(weights, adapter_name="evil")
# Should flag rank-1 dominance OR frobenius outlier.
kinds = {f.kind for f in report.findings}
assert "rank1_dominance" in kinds or "frobenius_outlier" in kinds
assert report.overall in ("WARN", "FAIL")
def test_nan_in_weights_flagged_as_fail(self):
from soup_cli.utils.adapter_scan import scan_adapter_weights
m = np.zeros((4, 4))
m[0, 0] = float("nan")
weights = {"nan_layer.lora_A.weight": m}
report = scan_adapter_weights(weights, adapter_name="nan")
assert report.overall == "FAIL"
assert any(f.kind == "nan_inf" for f in report.findings)
def test_inf_in_weights_flagged_as_fail(self):
from soup_cli.utils.adapter_scan import scan_adapter_weights
m = np.zeros((4, 4))
m[0, 0] = float("inf")
weights = {"inf_layer.lora_A.weight": m}
report = scan_adapter_weights(weights, adapter_name="inf")
assert report.overall == "FAIL"
def test_scan_report_frozen(self):
from soup_cli.utils.adapter_scan import scan_adapter_weights
weights = {"a.weight": np.zeros((2, 2))}
report = scan_adapter_weights(weights, adapter_name="x")
with pytest.raises(dataclasses.FrozenInstanceError):
report.overall = "evil" # type: ignore[misc]
def test_scan_finding_frozen(self):
from soup_cli.utils.adapter_scan import ScanFinding
finding = ScanFinding(
layer="L", kind="rank1_dominance", severity="WARN",
value=42.0, threshold=10.0, message="ok",
)
with pytest.raises(dataclasses.FrozenInstanceError):
finding.severity = "FAIL" # type: ignore[misc]
def test_rejects_non_mapping(self):
from soup_cli.utils.adapter_scan import scan_adapter_weights
with pytest.raises(TypeError):
scan_adapter_weights("not-a-dict", adapter_name="x")
def test_rejects_null_byte_name(self):
from soup_cli.utils.adapter_scan import scan_adapter_weights
with pytest.raises(ValueError):
scan_adapter_weights({}, adapter_name="bad\x00name")
def test_empty_weights_returns_ok(self):
from soup_cli.utils.adapter_scan import scan_adapter_weights
report = scan_adapter_weights({}, adapter_name="empty")
assert report.overall == "OK"
def test_kind_in_allowlist(self):
from soup_cli.utils.adapter_scan import _VALID_KINDS
assert "rank1_dominance" in _VALID_KINDS
assert "frobenius_outlier" in _VALID_KINDS
assert "nan_inf" in _VALID_KINDS
assert "energy_concentration" in _VALID_KINDS
def test_severity_in_allowlist(self):
from soup_cli.utils.adapter_scan import ScanFinding
with pytest.raises(ValueError):
ScanFinding(
layer="L", kind="rank1_dominance", severity="UNKNOWN_SEV",
value=0.0, threshold=0.0, message="",
)
def test_unknown_kind_rejected(self):
from soup_cli.utils.adapter_scan import ScanFinding
with pytest.raises(ValueError):
ScanFinding(
layer="L", kind="bogus_kind", severity="WARN",
value=0.0, threshold=0.0, message="",
)
def test_scan_finding_rejects_bool_value(self):
"""bool-as-int rejection on numeric fields (project policy)."""
from soup_cli.utils.adapter_scan import ScanFinding
with pytest.raises(ValueError):
ScanFinding(
layer="L", kind="rank1_dominance", severity="WARN",
value=True, threshold=0.0, message="", # type: ignore[arg-type]
)
with pytest.raises(ValueError):
ScanFinding(
layer="L", kind="rank1_dominance", severity="WARN",
value=0.0, threshold=False, message="", # type: ignore[arg-type]
)
def test_scan_finding_rejects_non_finite_value(self):
from soup_cli.utils.adapter_scan import ScanFinding
with pytest.raises(ValueError):
ScanFinding(
layer="L", kind="rank1_dominance", severity="WARN",
value=float("nan"), threshold=0.0, message="",
)
with pytest.raises(ValueError):
ScanFinding(
layer="L", kind="rank1_dominance", severity="WARN",
value=float("inf"), threshold=0.0, message="",
)
# ---------- File loader ----------
def _make_safetensors_adapter(tmpdir: Path, weights: dict) -> Path:
"""Create a minimal adapter dir with adapter_model.safetensors + config."""
pytest.importorskip("safetensors")
from safetensors.numpy import save_file
target = tmpdir / "adapter"
target.mkdir()
save_file(weights, str(target / "adapter_model.safetensors"))
(target / "adapter_config.json").write_text(
json.dumps({"peft_type": "LORA", "r": 8}), encoding="utf-8"
)
return target
class TestScanAdapterFromDisk:
def test_scan_adapter_clean_safetensors(self, tmp_path, monkeypatch):
pytest.importorskip("safetensors")
monkeypatch.chdir(tmp_path)
rng = np.random.default_rng(seed=0)
weights = {
"lora_A.weight": rng.standard_normal((16, 64)).astype("float32") * 0.01,
}
adapter = _make_safetensors_adapter(tmp_path, weights)
from soup_cli.utils.adapter_scan import scan_adapter
report = scan_adapter(str(adapter))
assert report.overall in ("OK", "WARN")
def test_scan_adapter_outside_cwd_rejected(self, tmp_path, monkeypatch):
monkeypatch.chdir(tmp_path)
outside = tmp_path.parent / "elsewhere_adapter"
from soup_cli.utils.adapter_scan import scan_adapter
with pytest.raises(ValueError):
scan_adapter(str(outside))
def test_scan_adapter_missing_safetensors(self, tmp_path, monkeypatch):
monkeypatch.chdir(tmp_path)
empty = tmp_path / "empty_adapter"
empty.mkdir()
from soup_cli.utils.adapter_scan import scan_adapter
with pytest.raises((FileNotFoundError, RuntimeError)):
scan_adapter(str(empty))
@pytest.mark.skipif(os.name == "nt", reason="POSIX symlink semantics")
def test_scan_adapter_symlink_rejected(self, tmp_path, monkeypatch):
monkeypatch.chdir(tmp_path)
real = tmp_path / "real"
real.mkdir()
(real / "adapter_model.safetensors").write_bytes(b"x")
link = tmp_path / "linked"
os.symlink(str(real), str(link))
from soup_cli.utils.adapter_scan import scan_adapter
with pytest.raises(ValueError):
scan_adapter(str(link))
# ---------- CLI ----------
class TestScanCli:
def test_scan_help(self):
runner = CliRunner()
result = runner.invoke(app, ["adapters", "scan", "--help"])
assert result.exit_code == 0, (result.output, repr(result.exception))
assert "scan" in result.output.lower()
def test_scan_clean(self, tmp_path, monkeypatch):
pytest.importorskip("safetensors")
monkeypatch.chdir(tmp_path)
rng = np.random.default_rng(seed=0)
weights = {
"lora_A.weight": rng.standard_normal((16, 64)).astype("float32") * 0.01,
}
adapter = _make_safetensors_adapter(tmp_path, weights)
runner = CliRunner()
result = runner.invoke(app, ["adapters", "scan", str(adapter.relative_to(tmp_path))])
# Exit code 0 (OK) or 1 (WARN) is acceptable for clean.
assert result.exit_code in (0, 1), (result.output, repr(result.exception))
def test_scan_outside_cwd_exits_nonzero(self, tmp_path, monkeypatch):
monkeypatch.chdir(tmp_path)
runner = CliRunner()
result = runner.invoke(app, ["adapters", "scan", "/nonexistent/outside"])
assert result.exit_code != 0
# ---------- Source wiring ----------
class TestSourceWiring:
def test_module_imports_clean(self):
import soup_cli.utils.adapter_scan as m
assert hasattr(m, "scan_adapter")
assert hasattr(m, "scan_adapter_weights")
assert hasattr(m, "ScanReport")
assert hasattr(m, "ScanFinding")
def test_no_top_level_torch(self):
src = Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent / "soup_cli" / "utils" / "adapter_scan.py"
text = src.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
# numpy is fine; torch must be lazy
assert "import torch" not in text or " import torch" in text or " import torch" in text

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"""Tests for v0.60.0 Part B — `soup adapters sign / verify`.
Coverage:
- ``AdapterManifest`` / ``SignatureRecord`` frozen dataclasses
- ``compute_adapter_manifest`` deterministic SHA-256 over file list
- ``sign_adapter`` with UNSIGNED backend (live) + SIGSTORE deferred stub
- ``verify_adapter`` strict + lenient modes
- CLI smoke (sign / verify)
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import dataclasses
import json
import os
from pathlib import Path
import pytest
from typer.testing import CliRunner
from soup_cli.cli import app
def _make_adapter(tmp_path: Path, name: str = "adapter") -> Path:
target = tmp_path / name
target.mkdir()
(target / "adapter_model.safetensors").write_bytes(b"fake-weights-bytes")
(target / "adapter_config.json").write_text(
json.dumps({"peft_type": "LORA", "r": 8}), encoding="utf-8"
)
return target
class TestManifest:
def test_imports(self):
from soup_cli.utils.adapter_sign import (
AdapterManifest,
SignatureRecord,
compute_adapter_manifest,
sign_adapter,
verify_adapter,
)
assert callable(compute_adapter_manifest)
assert callable(sign_adapter)
assert callable(verify_adapter)
assert dataclasses.is_dataclass(AdapterManifest)
assert dataclasses.is_dataclass(SignatureRecord)
def test_manifest_deterministic(self, tmp_path, monkeypatch):
monkeypatch.chdir(tmp_path)
adapter = _make_adapter(tmp_path)
from soup_cli.utils.adapter_sign import compute_adapter_manifest
m1 = compute_adapter_manifest(str(adapter))
m2 = compute_adapter_manifest(str(adapter))
assert m1.adapter == m2.adapter
assert m1.files == m2.files
assert m1.merkle_root == m2.merkle_root
# Stable hash across runs.
assert len(m1.merkle_root) == 64
def test_manifest_outside_cwd_rejected(self, tmp_path, monkeypatch):
monkeypatch.chdir(tmp_path)
outside = tmp_path.parent / "outside_adapter"
from soup_cli.utils.adapter_sign import compute_adapter_manifest
with pytest.raises(ValueError):
compute_adapter_manifest(str(outside))
def test_manifest_missing_dir(self, tmp_path, monkeypatch):
monkeypatch.chdir(tmp_path)
from soup_cli.utils.adapter_sign import compute_adapter_manifest
with pytest.raises(FileNotFoundError):
compute_adapter_manifest(str(tmp_path / "nope"))
def test_manifest_frozen(self, tmp_path, monkeypatch):
monkeypatch.chdir(tmp_path)
adapter = _make_adapter(tmp_path)
from soup_cli.utils.adapter_sign import compute_adapter_manifest
manifest = compute_adapter_manifest(str(adapter))
with pytest.raises(dataclasses.FrozenInstanceError):
manifest.merkle_root = "evil" # type: ignore[misc]
def test_manifest_changes_when_weights_change(self, tmp_path, monkeypatch):
monkeypatch.chdir(tmp_path)
adapter = _make_adapter(tmp_path)
from soup_cli.utils.adapter_sign import compute_adapter_manifest
m1 = compute_adapter_manifest(str(adapter))
# Mutate weights file
(adapter / "adapter_model.safetensors").write_bytes(b"mutated")
m2 = compute_adapter_manifest(str(adapter))
assert m1.merkle_root != m2.merkle_root
def test_manifest_includes_all_files(self, tmp_path, monkeypatch):
monkeypatch.chdir(tmp_path)
adapter = _make_adapter(tmp_path)
from soup_cli.utils.adapter_sign import compute_adapter_manifest
manifest = compute_adapter_manifest(str(adapter))
names = {entry.name for entry in manifest.files}
assert "adapter_model.safetensors" in names
assert "adapter_config.json" in names
@pytest.mark.skipif(os.name == "nt", reason="POSIX symlink semantics")
def test_manifest_symlink_rejected(self, tmp_path, monkeypatch):
monkeypatch.chdir(tmp_path)
target = tmp_path / "real_adapter"
target.mkdir()
link = tmp_path / "linked"
os.symlink(str(target), str(link))
from soup_cli.utils.adapter_sign import compute_adapter_manifest
with pytest.raises(ValueError):
compute_adapter_manifest(str(link))
class TestSign:
def test_sign_unsigned_backend(self, tmp_path, monkeypatch):
monkeypatch.chdir(tmp_path)
adapter = _make_adapter(tmp_path)
from soup_cli.utils.adapter_sign import sign_adapter
record = sign_adapter(str(adapter), backend="unsigned")
assert record.backend == "unsigned"
assert record.signature == ""
sig_file = adapter / ".soup-signature.json"
assert sig_file.is_file()
payload = json.loads(sig_file.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
assert payload["backend"] == "unsigned"
assert "merkle_root" in payload
def test_sign_sigstore_deferred(self, tmp_path, monkeypatch):
monkeypatch.chdir(tmp_path)
adapter = _make_adapter(tmp_path)
from soup_cli.utils.adapter_sign import sign_adapter
with pytest.raises(NotImplementedError, match="v0.60.1"):
sign_adapter(str(adapter), backend="sigstore")
def test_sign_ed25519_deferred(self, tmp_path, monkeypatch):
monkeypatch.chdir(tmp_path)
adapter = _make_adapter(tmp_path)
from soup_cli.utils.adapter_sign import sign_adapter
with pytest.raises(NotImplementedError, match="v0.60.1"):
sign_adapter(str(adapter), backend="ed25519")
def test_sign_unknown_backend(self, tmp_path, monkeypatch):
monkeypatch.chdir(tmp_path)
adapter = _make_adapter(tmp_path)
from soup_cli.utils.adapter_sign import sign_adapter
with pytest.raises(ValueError):
sign_adapter(str(adapter), backend="weird_unknown")
def test_sign_signature_record_frozen(self, tmp_path, monkeypatch):
monkeypatch.chdir(tmp_path)
adapter = _make_adapter(tmp_path)
from soup_cli.utils.adapter_sign import sign_adapter
record = sign_adapter(str(adapter), backend="unsigned")
with pytest.raises(dataclasses.FrozenInstanceError):
record.backend = "evil" # type: ignore[misc]
class TestVerify:
def test_verify_signed_adapter_passes(self, tmp_path, monkeypatch):
monkeypatch.chdir(tmp_path)
adapter = _make_adapter(tmp_path)
from soup_cli.utils.adapter_sign import sign_adapter, verify_adapter
sign_adapter(str(adapter), backend="unsigned")
report = verify_adapter(str(adapter))
assert report.valid is True
assert report.backend == "unsigned"
def test_verify_unsigned_adapter_lenient(self, tmp_path, monkeypatch):
monkeypatch.chdir(tmp_path)
adapter = _make_adapter(tmp_path)
from soup_cli.utils.adapter_sign import verify_adapter
report = verify_adapter(str(adapter), strict=False)
assert report.valid is False
assert report.reason
# Lenient mode does not raise; just reports invalid.
def test_verify_unsigned_adapter_strict_raises(self, tmp_path, monkeypatch):
monkeypatch.chdir(tmp_path)
adapter = _make_adapter(tmp_path)
from soup_cli.utils.adapter_sign import verify_adapter
with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="(?i)signed|signature"):
verify_adapter(str(adapter), strict=True)
def test_verify_tampered_weights_fails(self, tmp_path, monkeypatch):
monkeypatch.chdir(tmp_path)
adapter = _make_adapter(tmp_path)
from soup_cli.utils.adapter_sign import sign_adapter, verify_adapter
sign_adapter(str(adapter), backend="unsigned")
# Tamper with weights AFTER signing
(adapter / "adapter_model.safetensors").write_bytes(b"tampered-bytes")
report = verify_adapter(str(adapter))
assert report.valid is False
# Strict mode raises on tamper.
with pytest.raises(ValueError):
verify_adapter(str(adapter), strict=True)
def test_verify_outside_cwd_rejected(self, tmp_path, monkeypatch):
monkeypatch.chdir(tmp_path)
from soup_cli.utils.adapter_sign import verify_adapter
with pytest.raises(ValueError):
verify_adapter(str(tmp_path.parent / "outside_adapter"))
def test_verify_unsigned_strict_distinct_message(self, tmp_path, monkeypatch):
"""Strict mode message must explicitly mention 'signed' (CI grep)."""
monkeypatch.chdir(tmp_path)
adapter = _make_adapter(tmp_path)
from soup_cli.utils.adapter_sign import verify_adapter
try:
verify_adapter(str(adapter), strict=True)
pytest.fail("expected ValueError")
except ValueError as exc:
msg = str(exc).lower()
assert "signed" in msg or "signature" in msg
class TestSignVerifyCli:
def test_sign_help(self):
runner = CliRunner()
result = runner.invoke(app, ["adapters", "sign", "--help"])
assert result.exit_code == 0, (result.output, repr(result.exception))
def test_verify_help(self):
runner = CliRunner()
result = runner.invoke(app, ["adapters", "verify", "--help"])
assert result.exit_code == 0, (result.output, repr(result.exception))
def test_sign_then_verify_cli(self, tmp_path, monkeypatch):
monkeypatch.chdir(tmp_path)
adapter = _make_adapter(tmp_path)
rel = str(adapter.relative_to(tmp_path))
runner = CliRunner()
sign_result = runner.invoke(app, ["adapters", "sign", rel])
assert sign_result.exit_code == 0, (sign_result.output, repr(sign_result.exception))
verify_result = runner.invoke(app, ["adapters", "verify", rel])
assert verify_result.exit_code == 0, (verify_result.output, repr(verify_result.exception))
def test_verify_unsigned_strict_cli_exit3(self, tmp_path, monkeypatch):
monkeypatch.chdir(tmp_path)
adapter = _make_adapter(tmp_path)
rel = str(adapter.relative_to(tmp_path))
runner = CliRunner()
result = runner.invoke(app, ["adapters", "verify", rel, "--strict"])
assert result.exit_code == 3
class TestSecurityReviewFixes:
"""Regression guards for the v0.60.0 Part B security-review fixes."""
def test_oversized_signature_rejected(self, tmp_path, monkeypatch):
"""Verify rejects a signature file > 16 MiB cap."""
monkeypatch.chdir(tmp_path)
adapter = _make_adapter(tmp_path)
sig = adapter / ".soup-signature.json"
# Write a 17 MiB JSON-shaped string — over the 16 MiB cap.
big = '{"x": "' + ("a" * (17 * 1024 * 1024)) + '"}'
sig.write_text(big, encoding="utf-8")
from soup_cli.utils.adapter_sign import verify_adapter
with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="(?i)exceeds"):
verify_adapter(str(adapter))
@pytest.mark.skipif(os.name == "nt", reason="POSIX symlink semantics")
def test_symlinked_signature_file_rejected(self, tmp_path, monkeypatch):
monkeypatch.chdir(tmp_path)
adapter = _make_adapter(tmp_path)
# Place a symlink at the signature location.
target = tmp_path / "outside.json"
target.write_text('{"backend": "evil"}', encoding="utf-8")
os.symlink(str(target), str(adapter / ".soup-signature.json"))
from soup_cli.utils.adapter_sign import verify_adapter
with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="(?i)symlink"):
verify_adapter(str(adapter))
class TestSourceWiring:
def test_module_imports_clean(self):
import soup_cli.utils.adapter_sign as m
assert hasattr(m, "sign_adapter")
assert hasattr(m, "verify_adapter")
assert hasattr(m, "AdapterManifest")
def test_signature_filename_constant(self):
from soup_cli.utils.adapter_sign import _SIGNATURE_FILENAME
assert _SIGNATURE_FILENAME == ".soup-signature.json"

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"""Tests for v0.60.0 Part C — ``--strict-safetensors`` mode.
Coverage:
- ``StrictSafetensorsReport`` frozen dataclass + verdicts
- ``find_unsafe_weight_files`` walker
- ``check_strict_safetensors`` strict + lenient
- CLI smoke (``soup adapters check-safetensors``)
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import dataclasses
import os
from pathlib import Path
import pytest
from typer.testing import CliRunner
from soup_cli.cli import app
def _make_safetensors_only(tmp_path: Path) -> Path:
target = tmp_path / "safe_adapter"
target.mkdir()
(target / "adapter_model.safetensors").write_bytes(b"weights")
(target / "adapter_config.json").write_text('{"r": 8}', encoding="utf-8")
return target
def _make_with_pickle(tmp_path: Path) -> Path:
target = tmp_path / "pickle_adapter"
target.mkdir()
(target / "adapter_model.bin").write_bytes(b"PK\x05\x06pickled-bytes")
(target / "adapter_config.json").write_text('{"r": 8}', encoding="utf-8")
return target
class TestStrictSafetensors:
def test_imports(self):
from soup_cli.utils.strict_safetensors import (
UNSAFE_EXTENSIONS,
StrictSafetensorsReport,
check_strict_safetensors,
find_unsafe_weight_files,
)
assert callable(check_strict_safetensors)
assert callable(find_unsafe_weight_files)
assert isinstance(UNSAFE_EXTENSIONS, frozenset)
assert dataclasses.is_dataclass(StrictSafetensorsReport)
def test_unsafe_extensions_includes_bin_pt(self):
from soup_cli.utils.strict_safetensors import UNSAFE_EXTENSIONS
assert ".bin" in UNSAFE_EXTENSIONS
assert ".pt" in UNSAFE_EXTENSIONS
assert ".pth" in UNSAFE_EXTENSIONS
assert ".ckpt" in UNSAFE_EXTENSIONS
def test_find_unsafe_clean(self, tmp_path, monkeypatch):
monkeypatch.chdir(tmp_path)
adapter = _make_safetensors_only(tmp_path)
from soup_cli.utils.strict_safetensors import find_unsafe_weight_files
found = find_unsafe_weight_files(str(adapter))
assert found == ()
def test_find_unsafe_flags_bin(self, tmp_path, monkeypatch):
monkeypatch.chdir(tmp_path)
adapter = _make_with_pickle(tmp_path)
from soup_cli.utils.strict_safetensors import find_unsafe_weight_files
found = find_unsafe_weight_files(str(adapter))
assert len(found) == 1
assert found[0].endswith(".bin")
def test_check_strict_clean_passes(self, tmp_path, monkeypatch):
monkeypatch.chdir(tmp_path)
adapter = _make_safetensors_only(tmp_path)
from soup_cli.utils.strict_safetensors import check_strict_safetensors
report = check_strict_safetensors(str(adapter), strict=True)
assert report.ok is True
assert report.unsafe_files == ()
def test_check_strict_pickle_raises(self, tmp_path, monkeypatch):
monkeypatch.chdir(tmp_path)
adapter = _make_with_pickle(tmp_path)
from soup_cli.utils.strict_safetensors import check_strict_safetensors
with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="(?i)pickle|.bin|unsafe"):
check_strict_safetensors(str(adapter), strict=True)
def test_check_lenient_pickle_returns_report(self, tmp_path, monkeypatch):
monkeypatch.chdir(tmp_path)
adapter = _make_with_pickle(tmp_path)
from soup_cli.utils.strict_safetensors import check_strict_safetensors
report = check_strict_safetensors(str(adapter), strict=False)
assert report.ok is False
assert len(report.unsafe_files) == 1
def test_check_outside_cwd_rejected(self, tmp_path, monkeypatch):
monkeypatch.chdir(tmp_path)
from soup_cli.utils.strict_safetensors import check_strict_safetensors
with pytest.raises(ValueError):
check_strict_safetensors(str(tmp_path.parent / "outside"))
def test_check_missing_dir(self, tmp_path, monkeypatch):
monkeypatch.chdir(tmp_path)
from soup_cli.utils.strict_safetensors import check_strict_safetensors
with pytest.raises(FileNotFoundError):
check_strict_safetensors(str(tmp_path / "nope"))
def test_report_frozen(self, tmp_path, monkeypatch):
monkeypatch.chdir(tmp_path)
adapter = _make_safetensors_only(tmp_path)
from soup_cli.utils.strict_safetensors import check_strict_safetensors
report = check_strict_safetensors(str(adapter))
with pytest.raises(dataclasses.FrozenInstanceError):
report.ok = False # type: ignore[misc]
def test_strict_not_bool_rejected(self, tmp_path, monkeypatch):
monkeypatch.chdir(tmp_path)
adapter = _make_safetensors_only(tmp_path)
from soup_cli.utils.strict_safetensors import check_strict_safetensors
with pytest.raises(TypeError):
check_strict_safetensors(str(adapter), strict="yes") # type: ignore[arg-type]
@pytest.mark.skipif(os.name == "nt", reason="POSIX symlink semantics")
def test_symlinked_unsafe_file_rejected(self, tmp_path, monkeypatch):
monkeypatch.chdir(tmp_path)
adapter = tmp_path / "symlink_adapter"
adapter.mkdir()
external = tmp_path / "external.bin"
external.write_bytes(b"x")
os.symlink(str(external), str(adapter / "weights.bin"))
(adapter / "adapter_config.json").write_text('{"r": 8}', encoding="utf-8")
from soup_cli.utils.strict_safetensors import find_unsafe_weight_files
# Even a symlinked weights.bin is reported as unsafe (we read by name).
found = find_unsafe_weight_files(str(adapter))
assert any(p.endswith("weights.bin") for p in found)
class TestStrictSafetensorsCli:
def test_help(self):
runner = CliRunner()
result = runner.invoke(app, ["adapters", "check-safetensors", "--help"])
assert result.exit_code == 0, (result.output, repr(result.exception))
def test_clean_passes(self, tmp_path, monkeypatch):
monkeypatch.chdir(tmp_path)
adapter = _make_safetensors_only(tmp_path)
runner = CliRunner()
result = runner.invoke(
app, ["adapters", "check-safetensors", str(adapter.relative_to(tmp_path))]
)
assert result.exit_code == 0, (result.output, repr(result.exception))
def test_pickle_strict_exits_3(self, tmp_path, monkeypatch):
monkeypatch.chdir(tmp_path)
adapter = _make_with_pickle(tmp_path)
runner = CliRunner()
result = runner.invoke(
app, [
"adapters", "check-safetensors",
str(adapter.relative_to(tmp_path)),
"--strict",
]
)
# Exit code 3 is the distinct strict-fail code (planned).
assert result.exit_code == 3, (result.output, repr(result.exception))
def test_pickle_lenient_exits_1(self, tmp_path, monkeypatch):
monkeypatch.chdir(tmp_path)
adapter = _make_with_pickle(tmp_path)
runner = CliRunner()
result = runner.invoke(
app, [
"adapters", "check-safetensors",
str(adapter.relative_to(tmp_path)),
]
)
# Lenient: exit 1, not 0 (still flags the issue).
assert result.exit_code == 1
class TestSourceWiring:
def test_module_imports(self):
from soup_cli.utils import strict_safetensors as m
assert hasattr(m, "check_strict_safetensors")
assert hasattr(m, "find_unsafe_weight_files")
assert hasattr(m, "UNSAFE_EXTENSIONS")

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"""Tests for v0.60.0 Part D — Namespace-pin verification (anti-AI-Jacking).
Coverage:
- ``NamespacePin`` frozen dataclass
- ``NamespacePinStore`` SQLite-backed cache (CRUD + verify_namespace)
- ``record_repo_first_seen`` + ``verify_namespace`` decisions
- Author change / created_at jump detection
- ``--allow-namespace-shift <author>`` opt-in path
- CLI smoke (advisory only — no top-level CLI in v0.60.0)
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import dataclasses
from pathlib import Path
import pytest
class TestNamespacePin:
def test_imports(self):
from soup_cli.utils.namespace_pin import (
NamespacePin,
NamespacePinStore,
record_repo_first_seen,
verify_namespace,
)
assert callable(record_repo_first_seen)
assert callable(verify_namespace)
assert dataclasses.is_dataclass(NamespacePin)
assert hasattr(NamespacePinStore, "get")
assert hasattr(NamespacePinStore, "put")
def test_pin_frozen(self):
from soup_cli.utils.namespace_pin import NamespacePin
pin = NamespacePin(
repo_id="meta-llama/Llama-3.1-8B",
author="meta-llama",
created_at="2024-01-01T00:00:00+00:00",
first_seen="2024-06-01T00:00:00+00:00",
)
assert pin.repo_id == "meta-llama/Llama-3.1-8B"
with pytest.raises(dataclasses.FrozenInstanceError):
pin.author = "attacker" # type: ignore[misc]
def test_pin_rejects_null_byte(self):
from soup_cli.utils.namespace_pin import NamespacePin
with pytest.raises(ValueError):
NamespacePin(
repo_id="a\x00b",
author="x",
created_at="2024-01-01T00:00:00+00:00",
first_seen="2024-06-01T00:00:00+00:00",
)
def test_pin_rejects_empty_repo(self):
from soup_cli.utils.namespace_pin import NamespacePin
with pytest.raises(ValueError):
NamespacePin(
repo_id="",
author="x",
created_at="2024-01-01T00:00:00+00:00",
first_seen="2024-06-01T00:00:00+00:00",
)
def test_pin_rejects_oversize_repo(self):
from soup_cli.utils.namespace_pin import NamespacePin
with pytest.raises(ValueError):
NamespacePin(
repo_id="a" * 1000,
author="x",
created_at="2024-01-01T00:00:00+00:00",
first_seen="2024-06-01T00:00:00+00:00",
)
class TestStore:
def test_put_then_get(self, tmp_path):
from soup_cli.utils.namespace_pin import (
NamespacePin,
NamespacePinStore,
)
db = tmp_path / "ns.db"
store = NamespacePinStore(str(db))
pin = NamespacePin(
repo_id="meta-llama/Llama-3.1-8B",
author="meta-llama",
created_at="2024-01-01T00:00:00+00:00",
first_seen="2024-06-01T00:00:00+00:00",
)
store.put(pin)
loaded = store.get("meta-llama/Llama-3.1-8B")
assert loaded == pin
def test_get_missing_returns_none(self, tmp_path):
from soup_cli.utils.namespace_pin import NamespacePinStore
db = tmp_path / "ns.db"
store = NamespacePinStore(str(db))
assert store.get("nobody/nothing") is None
def test_put_idempotent(self, tmp_path):
from soup_cli.utils.namespace_pin import (
NamespacePin,
NamespacePinStore,
)
db = tmp_path / "ns.db"
store = NamespacePinStore(str(db))
pin = NamespacePin(
repo_id="meta-llama/Llama-3.1-8B",
author="meta-llama",
created_at="2024-01-01T00:00:00+00:00",
first_seen="2024-06-01T00:00:00+00:00",
)
store.put(pin)
store.put(pin)
assert store.get(pin.repo_id) == pin
def test_put_does_not_overwrite_first_seen(self, tmp_path):
from soup_cli.utils.namespace_pin import (
NamespacePin,
NamespacePinStore,
)
db = tmp_path / "ns.db"
store = NamespacePinStore(str(db))
pin = NamespacePin(
repo_id="r/x",
author="alice",
created_at="2024-01-01T00:00:00+00:00",
first_seen="2024-06-01T00:00:00+00:00",
)
store.put(pin)
# A second put with the same repo_id MUST NOT mutate first_seen.
pin2 = NamespacePin(
repo_id="r/x",
author="alice",
created_at="2024-01-01T00:00:00+00:00",
first_seen="2025-01-01T00:00:00+00:00",
)
store.put(pin2)
loaded = store.get("r/x")
assert loaded is not None
assert loaded.first_seen == "2024-06-01T00:00:00+00:00"
def test_invalid_repo_id_rejected(self, tmp_path):
from soup_cli.utils.namespace_pin import NamespacePinStore
db = tmp_path / "ns.db"
store = NamespacePinStore(str(db))
with pytest.raises(ValueError):
store.get("bad\x00id")
class TestVerify:
def test_first_seen_records(self, tmp_path):
from soup_cli.utils.namespace_pin import (
NamespacePinStore,
record_repo_first_seen,
)
db = tmp_path / "ns.db"
store = NamespacePinStore(str(db))
pin = record_repo_first_seen(
store,
repo_id="meta-llama/Llama-3.1-8B",
author="meta-llama",
created_at="2024-01-01T00:00:00+00:00",
)
assert pin.author == "meta-llama"
# Round-trip
assert store.get(pin.repo_id) == pin
def test_verify_namespace_clean_pass(self, tmp_path):
from soup_cli.utils.namespace_pin import (
NamespacePinStore,
record_repo_first_seen,
verify_namespace,
)
db = tmp_path / "ns.db"
store = NamespacePinStore(str(db))
record_repo_first_seen(
store,
repo_id="r/x",
author="alice",
created_at="2024-01-01T00:00:00+00:00",
)
report = verify_namespace(
store,
repo_id="r/x",
current_author="alice",
current_created_at="2024-01-01T00:00:00+00:00",
)
assert report.ok is True
def test_verify_namespace_author_change_flagged(self, tmp_path):
from soup_cli.utils.namespace_pin import (
NamespacePinStore,
record_repo_first_seen,
verify_namespace,
)
db = tmp_path / "ns.db"
store = NamespacePinStore(str(db))
record_repo_first_seen(
store,
repo_id="r/x",
author="alice",
created_at="2024-01-01T00:00:00+00:00",
)
report = verify_namespace(
store,
repo_id="r/x",
current_author="attacker",
current_created_at="2024-01-01T00:00:00+00:00",
)
assert report.ok is False
assert "author" in report.reason.lower()
def test_verify_namespace_backward_created_at_flagged(self, tmp_path):
from soup_cli.utils.namespace_pin import (
NamespacePinStore,
record_repo_first_seen,
verify_namespace,
)
db = tmp_path / "ns.db"
store = NamespacePinStore(str(db))
record_repo_first_seen(
store,
repo_id="r/x",
author="alice",
created_at="2024-06-01T00:00:00+00:00",
)
# New created_at jumped backward — namespace was re-created.
report = verify_namespace(
store,
repo_id="r/x",
current_author="alice",
current_created_at="2023-01-01T00:00:00+00:00",
)
assert report.ok is False
assert "created" in report.reason.lower() or "backward" in report.reason.lower()
def test_verify_namespace_unknown_repo_first_seen(self, tmp_path):
from soup_cli.utils.namespace_pin import (
NamespacePinStore,
verify_namespace,
)
db = tmp_path / "ns.db"
store = NamespacePinStore(str(db))
# Unknown repo — by policy this is OK on first-seen (trust-on-first-use).
report = verify_namespace(
store,
repo_id="r/x",
current_author="alice",
current_created_at="2024-01-01T00:00:00+00:00",
)
assert report.ok is True
assert "first" in report.reason.lower()
def test_verify_namespace_allow_shift(self, tmp_path):
from soup_cli.utils.namespace_pin import (
NamespacePinStore,
record_repo_first_seen,
verify_namespace,
)
db = tmp_path / "ns.db"
store = NamespacePinStore(str(db))
record_repo_first_seen(
store,
repo_id="r/x",
author="alice",
created_at="2024-01-01T00:00:00+00:00",
)
# With matching --allow-namespace-shift=attacker, the shift is allowed
# and the pin is updated to the new author + created_at.
report = verify_namespace(
store,
repo_id="r/x",
current_author="attacker",
current_created_at="2025-01-01T00:00:00+00:00",
allow_namespace_shift="attacker",
)
assert report.ok is True
# Allow opt-in updates the recorded pin.
updated = store.get("r/x")
assert updated is not None
assert updated.author == "attacker"
def test_verify_namespace_allow_shift_must_match(self, tmp_path):
from soup_cli.utils.namespace_pin import (
NamespacePinStore,
record_repo_first_seen,
verify_namespace,
)
db = tmp_path / "ns.db"
store = NamespacePinStore(str(db))
record_repo_first_seen(
store,
repo_id="r/x",
author="alice",
created_at="2024-01-01T00:00:00+00:00",
)
# Opt-in must name the new author. Mismatch keeps the gate closed.
report = verify_namespace(
store,
repo_id="r/x",
current_author="attacker",
current_created_at="2025-01-01T00:00:00+00:00",
allow_namespace_shift="otherperson",
)
assert report.ok is False
def test_verify_namespace_rejects_bool_allow(self, tmp_path):
"""``allow_namespace_shift=True`` must NOT be a free-for-all bypass."""
from soup_cli.utils.namespace_pin import (
NamespacePinStore,
verify_namespace,
)
db = tmp_path / "ns.db"
store = NamespacePinStore(str(db))
with pytest.raises(TypeError):
verify_namespace(
store,
repo_id="r/x",
current_author="x",
current_created_at="2024-01-01T00:00:00+00:00",
allow_namespace_shift=True, # type: ignore[arg-type]
)
class TestSecurityReviewFixes:
"""Regression guards for the v0.60.0 Part D security-review fixes."""
def test_store_rejects_outside_containment(self, tmp_path, monkeypatch):
"""Constructor must reject paths outside $HOME/$CWD/$TMPDIR.
Defends against a caller smuggling /etc/passwd through the public
``NamespacePinStore(path=...)`` constructor.
"""
# tmp_path lives under tempdir → accepted. Use a fabricated path
# outside every allowed root.
import sys
from soup_cli.utils.namespace_pin import NamespacePinStore
bogus = "Z:/no/such/dir/ns.db" if sys.platform == "win32" else "/no/such/dir/ns.db"
with pytest.raises(ValueError):
NamespacePinStore(bogus)
@pytest.mark.skipif(__import__("sys").platform == "win32",
reason="POSIX symlink semantics")
def test_store_rejects_symlink_at_db_path(self, tmp_path):
import os as _os
from soup_cli.utils.namespace_pin import NamespacePinStore
link = tmp_path / "ns.db"
target = tmp_path / "real_target.db"
target.write_bytes(b"")
_os.symlink(str(target), str(link))
with pytest.raises(ValueError):
NamespacePinStore(str(link))
def test_iso_compare_uses_datetime_parser(self, tmp_path):
"""``_is_backward`` parses ISO offsets numerically, not lexicographically.
Pin chronologically-distinguishing input: current='2024-01-01T01:00+02:00'
(=2023-12-31T23:00 UTC) is BEFORE recorded='2024-01-01T00:00+00:00'.
Lexicographically the current string sorts LATER ('T01' > 'T00'),
so a string compare would miss the backward jump — but the datetime
parser catches it.
"""
from soup_cli.utils.namespace_pin import _is_backward
assert _is_backward(
"2024-01-01T01:00:00+02:00",
"2024-01-01T00:00:00+00:00",
) is True
# Plain backward case (works under either compare).
assert _is_backward(
"2023-01-01T00:00:00+00:00",
"2024-06-01T00:00:00+00:00",
) is True
# Forward case rejected.
assert _is_backward(
"2024-06-01T00:00:00+00:00",
"2023-01-01T00:00:00+00:00",
) is False
def test_author_override_case_insensitive(self, tmp_path):
from soup_cli.utils.namespace_pin import (
NamespacePinStore,
record_repo_first_seen,
verify_namespace,
)
db = tmp_path / "ns.db"
store = NamespacePinStore(str(db))
record_repo_first_seen(
store, repo_id="r/x", author="alice",
created_at="2024-01-01T00:00:00+00:00",
)
# Operator types uppercase; opt-in must still accept.
report = verify_namespace(
store, repo_id="r/x",
current_author="Attacker",
current_created_at="2025-01-01T00:00:00+00:00",
allow_namespace_shift="attacker", # lowercase matches
)
assert report.ok is True
class TestSourceWiring:
def test_module_imports(self):
from soup_cli.utils import namespace_pin as m
assert hasattr(m, "NamespacePin")
assert hasattr(m, "NamespacePinStore")
assert hasattr(m, "record_repo_first_seen")
assert hasattr(m, "verify_namespace")
def test_no_top_level_torch(self):
src = Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent / "soup_cli" / "utils" / "namespace_pin.py"
text = src.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
# no top-level torch/transformers imports
for line in text.splitlines():
if line.startswith("import torch") or line.startswith("from torch "):
raise AssertionError(f"top-level torch import: {line}")

359
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"""Tests for v0.60.0 Part E — License-conflict matrix at adapter merge.
Coverage:
- ``LicenseCompatibilityMatrix`` closed allowlist + immutability
- ``check_license_compat`` happy + conflict matrix
- ``LicenseConflictReport`` frozen + reason explainability
- ``--license-override <reason>`` opt-in trail
- Integration: ``adapter_merge`` refuses on conflict (helper used; CLI test
smokes the flag wiring)
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import dataclasses
import types
import pytest
class TestLicenseMatrix:
def test_imports(self):
from soup_cli.utils.license_matrix import (
KNOWN_LICENSES,
LICENSE_MATRIX,
LicenseConflictReport,
check_license_compat,
normalise_license_id,
)
assert callable(check_license_compat)
assert callable(normalise_license_id)
assert isinstance(KNOWN_LICENSES, frozenset)
assert isinstance(LICENSE_MATRIX, types.MappingProxyType)
assert dataclasses.is_dataclass(LicenseConflictReport)
def test_known_licenses_includes_common(self):
from soup_cli.utils.license_matrix import KNOWN_LICENSES
for lic in (
"apache-2.0", "mit", "bsd-3-clause",
"llama-3", "llama-3.1", "llama-community",
"gemma", "qwen-research",
"gpl-3.0", "agpl-3.0",
"cc-by-4.0", "cc-by-nc-4.0",
"openrail", "creativeml-openrail-m",
"openai-tos",
):
assert lic in KNOWN_LICENSES, f"missing license: {lic}"
def test_matrix_immutable(self):
from soup_cli.utils.license_matrix import LICENSE_MATRIX
with pytest.raises(TypeError):
LICENSE_MATRIX["evil"] = ("anything",) # type: ignore[index]
def test_normalise_license_id(self):
from soup_cli.utils.license_matrix import normalise_license_id
assert normalise_license_id("Apache-2.0") == "apache-2.0"
assert normalise_license_id("MIT") == "mit"
assert normalise_license_id(" llama-3 ") == "llama-3"
def test_normalise_rejects_null_byte(self):
from soup_cli.utils.license_matrix import normalise_license_id
with pytest.raises(ValueError):
normalise_license_id("apache\x00")
def test_normalise_rejects_bool(self):
from soup_cli.utils.license_matrix import normalise_license_id
with pytest.raises(TypeError):
normalise_license_id(True)
class TestCheckCompat:
def test_clean_apache_only_passes(self):
from soup_cli.utils.license_matrix import check_license_compat
report = check_license_compat(["apache-2.0", "apache-2.0"])
assert report.ok is True
assert report.conflict_pair is None
def test_apache_with_mit_passes(self):
from soup_cli.utils.license_matrix import check_license_compat
report = check_license_compat(["apache-2.0", "mit"])
assert report.ok is True
def test_apache_with_gpl_conflict(self):
from soup_cli.utils.license_matrix import check_license_compat
# Locked verdict: GPL-3.0 (strong copyleft) alongside Apache-2.0
# (permissive) is a refused conflict in the v0.60.0 matrix. A
# future relax requires both a matrix change and this test
# change in the same PR — drift guard.
report = check_license_compat(["apache-2.0", "gpl-3.0"])
assert report.ok is False
assert report.conflict_pair is not None
assert "copyleft" in report.reason.lower()
def test_nc_license_with_apache_conflict(self):
from soup_cli.utils.license_matrix import check_license_compat
# NC (non-commercial) cannot be combined with any permissive license
# that doesn't carry the same restriction.
report = check_license_compat(["apache-2.0", "cc-by-nc-4.0"])
assert report.ok is False
assert "nc" in report.reason.lower() or "non-commercial" in report.reason.lower()
def test_unknown_license_treated_as_conflict_or_warn(self):
from soup_cli.utils.license_matrix import check_license_compat
report = check_license_compat(["apache-2.0", "weird-unknown-license-xyz"])
assert report.ok is False
assert "unknown" in report.reason.lower()
def test_empty_list_rejected(self):
from soup_cli.utils.license_matrix import check_license_compat
with pytest.raises(ValueError):
check_license_compat([])
def test_single_license_passes(self):
from soup_cli.utils.license_matrix import check_license_compat
report = check_license_compat(["apache-2.0"])
assert report.ok is True
def test_rejects_non_list(self):
from soup_cli.utils.license_matrix import check_license_compat
with pytest.raises(TypeError):
check_license_compat("apache-2.0") # type: ignore[arg-type]
def test_llama_with_apache_conflict(self):
from soup_cli.utils.license_matrix import check_license_compat
# Locked verdict: Llama community license adds acceptable-use
# restrictions that Apache does not satisfy. v0.60.0 design is
# strict — refuse and force operator override.
report = check_license_compat(["llama-3", "apache-2.0"])
assert report.ok is False
assert report.conflict_pair is not None
assert "restricted" in report.reason.lower() or "acceptable-use" in report.reason.lower()
def test_case_insensitive(self):
from soup_cli.utils.license_matrix import check_license_compat
report = check_license_compat(["Apache-2.0", "MIT"])
assert report.ok is True
def test_report_frozen(self):
from soup_cli.utils.license_matrix import check_license_compat
report = check_license_compat(["apache-2.0"])
with pytest.raises(dataclasses.FrozenInstanceError):
report.ok = False # type: ignore[misc]
class TestOverride:
def test_override_reason_required(self):
from soup_cli.utils.license_matrix import (
validate_license_override_reason,
)
# Empty reason rejected.
with pytest.raises(ValueError):
validate_license_override_reason("")
with pytest.raises(TypeError):
validate_license_override_reason(None) # type: ignore[arg-type]
def test_override_reason_min_length(self):
from soup_cli.utils.license_matrix import (
validate_license_override_reason,
)
# A reason of 1-2 chars is too short — defends against `--license-override y`.
with pytest.raises(ValueError):
validate_license_override_reason("ok")
def test_override_reason_oversize_rejected(self):
from soup_cli.utils.license_matrix import (
validate_license_override_reason,
)
# 4kb cap to prevent log bloat.
with pytest.raises(ValueError):
validate_license_override_reason("x" * 5000)
def test_override_reason_exact_boundary(self):
"""Exact-boundary test at 4096 / 4097 chars."""
from soup_cli.utils.license_matrix import (
validate_license_override_reason,
)
# Accepted: exactly 4096 chars.
result = validate_license_override_reason("x" * 4096)
assert len(result) == 4096
# Rejected: 4097.
with pytest.raises(ValueError):
validate_license_override_reason("x" * 4097)
def test_override_reason_min_boundary(self):
"""Exact-boundary test at 7 / 8 chars (min cap)."""
from soup_cli.utils.license_matrix import (
validate_license_override_reason,
)
# Rejected: 7 chars.
with pytest.raises(ValueError):
validate_license_override_reason("x" * 7)
# Accepted: 8 chars.
result = validate_license_override_reason("x" * 8)
assert result == "x" * 8
def test_override_reason_null_byte(self):
from soup_cli.utils.license_matrix import (
validate_license_override_reason,
)
with pytest.raises(ValueError):
validate_license_override_reason("legal cleared\x00")
def test_override_reason_happy(self):
from soup_cli.utils.license_matrix import (
validate_license_override_reason,
)
result = validate_license_override_reason(
"legal-cleared by alice@example.com on 2026-05-19"
)
assert result.startswith("legal-cleared")
class TestMergeIntegration:
"""Regression: license gate is wired into `soup adapters merge`."""
def test_merge_help_lists_license_flags(self):
from typer.testing import CliRunner
from soup_cli.cli import app
runner = CliRunner()
result = runner.invoke(app, ["adapters", "merge", "--help"])
assert result.exit_code == 0, (result.output, repr(result.exception))
assert "--license" in result.output
assert "--license-override" in result.output
def test_merge_refuses_license_conflict_without_override(self, tmp_path, monkeypatch):
"""Two adapters with incompatible licenses + no override → exit 3."""
from typer.testing import CliRunner
from soup_cli.cli import app
monkeypatch.chdir(tmp_path)
# Create two minimal adapter dirs — the license gate fires before
# the actual merge math, so we don't need real safetensors.
for name in ("a", "b"):
d = tmp_path / name
d.mkdir()
(d / "adapter_config.json").write_text("{}", encoding="utf-8")
(d / "adapter_model.safetensors").write_bytes(b"x")
runner = CliRunner()
result = runner.invoke(
app, [
"adapters", "merge", "a", "b",
"-o", "out",
"--license", "apache-2.0",
"--license", "cc-by-nc-4.0",
]
)
assert result.exit_code == 3, (result.output, repr(result.exception))
assert "license conflict" in result.output.lower()
def test_merge_override_accepted_with_reason(self, tmp_path, monkeypatch):
"""Conflict + valid --license-override reason → merge proceeds.
The merge math will fail downstream because the fixture adapters
are not real safetensors; we assert the license gate let us
through (exit != 3 — gate-pass, even if merge math fails later).
"""
from typer.testing import CliRunner
from soup_cli.cli import app
monkeypatch.chdir(tmp_path)
for name in ("a", "b"):
d = tmp_path / name
d.mkdir()
(d / "adapter_config.json").write_text("{}", encoding="utf-8")
(d / "adapter_model.safetensors").write_bytes(b"x")
runner = CliRunner()
result = runner.invoke(
app, [
"adapters", "merge", "a", "b",
"-o", "out",
"--license", "apache-2.0",
"--license", "cc-by-nc-4.0",
"--license-override", "legal-cleared 2026-05-19 by alice",
]
)
# Gate passed (no exit 3); downstream merge math likely fails on
# the synthetic safetensors fixture.
assert result.exit_code != 3, (result.output, repr(result.exception))
# Override message surfaced (either the explicit "overridden"
# banner, or absence of the unmitigated "License conflict refused"
# banner shows the gate did pass).
out_lower = result.output.lower()
assert ("overridden" in out_lower) or ("license conflict refused" not in out_lower)
def test_merge_override_reason_too_short_rejected(self, tmp_path, monkeypatch):
from typer.testing import CliRunner
from soup_cli.cli import app
monkeypatch.chdir(tmp_path)
for name in ("a", "b"):
d = tmp_path / name
d.mkdir()
(d / "adapter_config.json").write_text("{}", encoding="utf-8")
(d / "adapter_model.safetensors").write_bytes(b"x")
runner = CliRunner()
result = runner.invoke(
app, [
"adapters", "merge", "a", "b",
"-o", "out",
"--license", "apache-2.0",
"--license", "cc-by-nc-4.0",
"--license-override", "ok", # < 8 chars
]
)
assert result.exit_code == 2
assert "short" in result.output.lower() or "8" in result.output
def test_merge_license_count_mismatch_rejected(self, tmp_path, monkeypatch):
from typer.testing import CliRunner
from soup_cli.cli import app
monkeypatch.chdir(tmp_path)
for name in ("a", "b"):
d = tmp_path / name
d.mkdir()
(d / "adapter_config.json").write_text("{}", encoding="utf-8")
(d / "adapter_model.safetensors").write_bytes(b"x")
runner = CliRunner()
# Only one license for two adapters — mismatch.
result = runner.invoke(
app, [
"adapters", "merge", "a", "b",
"-o", "out",
"--license", "apache-2.0",
]
)
assert result.exit_code == 2
assert "must match" in result.output.lower() or "count" in result.output.lower()
class TestSourceWiring:
def test_module_imports(self):
from soup_cli.utils import license_matrix as m
assert hasattr(m, "check_license_compat")
assert hasattr(m, "KNOWN_LICENSES")
assert hasattr(m, "LICENSE_MATRIX")
def test_matrix_has_at_least_20_entries(self):
from soup_cli.utils.license_matrix import KNOWN_LICENSES
# Plan says top-30 licenses — at least 20 must be cataloged.
assert len(KNOWN_LICENSES) >= 20

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"""Tests for v0.60.0 Part F — ``soup airgap-bundle``.
Coverage:
- ``AirgapBundlePlan`` frozen dataclass + bundle-size cap
- ``build_airgap_bundle`` tarball assembly + signed manifest
- ``inspect_airgap_bundle`` round-trip
- CLI smoke (``soup airgap-bundle``)
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import dataclasses
import json
import os
import tarfile
from pathlib import Path
import pytest
from typer.testing import CliRunner
from soup_cli.cli import app
def _make_model_dir(tmp_path: Path, name: str = "model") -> Path:
target = tmp_path / name
target.mkdir()
(target / "config.json").write_text('{"model_type": "llama"}', encoding="utf-8")
(target / "weights.safetensors").write_bytes(b"safe-weight-bytes")
return target
def _make_dataset_dir(tmp_path: Path, name: str = "dataset") -> Path:
target = tmp_path / name
target.mkdir()
(target / "train.jsonl").write_text(
'{"text": "hello"}\n{"text": "world"}\n', encoding="utf-8"
)
return target
class TestPlan:
def test_imports(self):
from soup_cli.utils.airgap_bundle import (
AirgapBundlePlan,
BundleManifest,
build_airgap_bundle,
inspect_airgap_bundle,
)
assert callable(build_airgap_bundle)
assert callable(inspect_airgap_bundle)
assert dataclasses.is_dataclass(AirgapBundlePlan)
assert dataclasses.is_dataclass(BundleManifest)
def test_plan_frozen(self, tmp_path, monkeypatch):
monkeypatch.chdir(tmp_path)
model = _make_model_dir(tmp_path)
from soup_cli.utils.airgap_bundle import AirgapBundlePlan
plan = AirgapBundlePlan(
output=str(tmp_path / "out.tar"),
model_dir=str(model),
dataset_dirs=(),
wheel_dirs=(),
kernel_dirs=(),
bundle_size_cap_bytes=100 * 1024 * 1024 * 1024,
)
with pytest.raises(dataclasses.FrozenInstanceError):
plan.output = "evil" # type: ignore[misc]
def test_plan_bundle_cap_must_be_positive(self, tmp_path, monkeypatch):
monkeypatch.chdir(tmp_path)
model = _make_model_dir(tmp_path)
from soup_cli.utils.airgap_bundle import AirgapBundlePlan
with pytest.raises(ValueError):
AirgapBundlePlan(
output=str(tmp_path / "out.tar"),
model_dir=str(model),
dataset_dirs=(),
wheel_dirs=(),
kernel_dirs=(),
bundle_size_cap_bytes=0,
)
def test_plan_rejects_bool_cap(self, tmp_path, monkeypatch):
monkeypatch.chdir(tmp_path)
model = _make_model_dir(tmp_path)
from soup_cli.utils.airgap_bundle import AirgapBundlePlan
with pytest.raises(ValueError):
AirgapBundlePlan(
output=str(tmp_path / "out.tar"),
model_dir=str(model),
dataset_dirs=(),
wheel_dirs=(),
kernel_dirs=(),
bundle_size_cap_bytes=True, # type: ignore[arg-type]
)
class TestBuild:
def test_build_minimal_bundle(self, tmp_path, monkeypatch):
monkeypatch.chdir(tmp_path)
model = _make_model_dir(tmp_path)
from soup_cli.utils.airgap_bundle import (
AirgapBundlePlan,
build_airgap_bundle,
)
plan = AirgapBundlePlan(
output=str(tmp_path / "bundle.tar"),
model_dir=str(model),
dataset_dirs=(),
wheel_dirs=(),
kernel_dirs=(),
bundle_size_cap_bytes=10 * 1024 * 1024,
)
manifest = build_airgap_bundle(plan)
assert os.path.isfile(plan.output)
assert manifest.model_dir.endswith("model")
# Tar contains manifest.json
with tarfile.open(plan.output) as tar:
names = tar.getnames()
assert any(n.endswith("manifest.json") for n in names)
assert any("weights.safetensors" in n for n in names)
def test_build_with_datasets(self, tmp_path, monkeypatch):
monkeypatch.chdir(tmp_path)
model = _make_model_dir(tmp_path)
dataset = _make_dataset_dir(tmp_path)
from soup_cli.utils.airgap_bundle import (
AirgapBundlePlan,
build_airgap_bundle,
)
plan = AirgapBundlePlan(
output=str(tmp_path / "bundle.tar"),
model_dir=str(model),
dataset_dirs=(str(dataset),),
wheel_dirs=(),
kernel_dirs=(),
bundle_size_cap_bytes=10 * 1024 * 1024,
)
manifest = build_airgap_bundle(plan)
assert len(manifest.datasets) == 1
with tarfile.open(plan.output) as tar:
names = tar.getnames()
assert any("train.jsonl" in n for n in names)
def test_build_refuses_oversize(self, tmp_path, monkeypatch):
monkeypatch.chdir(tmp_path)
model = _make_model_dir(tmp_path)
from soup_cli.utils.airgap_bundle import (
AirgapBundlePlan,
build_airgap_bundle,
)
# Cap = 1 byte; the model has more.
plan = AirgapBundlePlan(
output=str(tmp_path / "bundle.tar"),
model_dir=str(model),
dataset_dirs=(),
wheel_dirs=(),
kernel_dirs=(),
bundle_size_cap_bytes=1,
)
with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="(?i)cap|exceeds|size"):
build_airgap_bundle(plan)
def test_build_output_outside_cwd_rejected(self, tmp_path, monkeypatch):
monkeypatch.chdir(tmp_path)
model = _make_model_dir(tmp_path)
from soup_cli.utils.airgap_bundle import (
AirgapBundlePlan,
build_airgap_bundle,
)
outside_out = str(tmp_path.parent / "bundle.tar")
plan = AirgapBundlePlan(
output=outside_out,
model_dir=str(model),
dataset_dirs=(),
wheel_dirs=(),
kernel_dirs=(),
bundle_size_cap_bytes=10 * 1024 * 1024,
)
with pytest.raises(ValueError):
build_airgap_bundle(plan)
def test_build_model_outside_cwd_rejected(self, tmp_path, monkeypatch):
monkeypatch.chdir(tmp_path)
from soup_cli.utils.airgap_bundle import (
AirgapBundlePlan,
build_airgap_bundle,
)
plan = AirgapBundlePlan(
output=str(tmp_path / "bundle.tar"),
model_dir=str(tmp_path.parent / "outside_model"),
dataset_dirs=(),
wheel_dirs=(),
kernel_dirs=(),
bundle_size_cap_bytes=10 * 1024 * 1024,
)
with pytest.raises(ValueError):
build_airgap_bundle(plan)
class TestInspect:
def test_inspect_round_trip(self, tmp_path, monkeypatch):
monkeypatch.chdir(tmp_path)
model = _make_model_dir(tmp_path)
from soup_cli.utils.airgap_bundle import (
AirgapBundlePlan,
build_airgap_bundle,
inspect_airgap_bundle,
)
plan = AirgapBundlePlan(
output=str(tmp_path / "bundle.tar"),
model_dir=str(model),
dataset_dirs=(),
wheel_dirs=(),
kernel_dirs=(),
bundle_size_cap_bytes=10 * 1024 * 1024,
)
build_airgap_bundle(plan)
manifest = inspect_airgap_bundle(plan.output)
assert manifest.model_dir.endswith("model")
# Manifest's bundled-files list includes the model files.
names = [entry.name for entry in manifest.files]
assert any("weights.safetensors" in n for n in names)
def test_inspect_outside_cwd_rejected(self, tmp_path, monkeypatch):
monkeypatch.chdir(tmp_path)
from soup_cli.utils.airgap_bundle import inspect_airgap_bundle
with pytest.raises(ValueError):
inspect_airgap_bundle(str(tmp_path.parent / "outside.tar"))
def test_inspect_missing_file(self, tmp_path, monkeypatch):
monkeypatch.chdir(tmp_path)
from soup_cli.utils.airgap_bundle import inspect_airgap_bundle
with pytest.raises(FileNotFoundError):
inspect_airgap_bundle(str(tmp_path / "nope.tar"))
def test_inspect_non_tar_rejected(self, tmp_path, monkeypatch):
monkeypatch.chdir(tmp_path)
bad = tmp_path / "not-a-tar.tar"
bad.write_text("not actually a tarball", encoding="utf-8")
from soup_cli.utils.airgap_bundle import inspect_airgap_bundle
with pytest.raises((tarfile.ReadError, ValueError)):
inspect_airgap_bundle(str(bad))
class TestAirgapCli:
def test_help(self):
runner = CliRunner()
result = runner.invoke(app, ["airgap-bundle", "--help"])
assert result.exit_code == 0, (result.output, repr(result.exception))
assert "airgap" in result.output.lower() or "bundle" in result.output.lower()
def test_build_via_cli(self, tmp_path, monkeypatch):
monkeypatch.chdir(tmp_path)
model = _make_model_dir(tmp_path)
runner = CliRunner()
result = runner.invoke(
app, [
"airgap-bundle",
"--model", str(model.relative_to(tmp_path)),
"--output", "bundle.tar",
]
)
assert result.exit_code == 0, (result.output, repr(result.exception))
assert (tmp_path / "bundle.tar").is_file()
def test_cap_rejection_via_cli(self, tmp_path, monkeypatch):
monkeypatch.chdir(tmp_path)
model = _make_model_dir(tmp_path)
# Pad the model so the cap can be exercised even after rounding to
# an integer byte count.
(model / "weights.safetensors").write_bytes(b"x" * 10_000)
runner = CliRunner()
result = runner.invoke(
app, [
"airgap-bundle",
"--model", str(model.relative_to(tmp_path)),
"--output", "bundle.tar",
"--bundle-size-cap", "0.000001", # ~1073 bytes < 10 000
]
)
assert result.exit_code != 0
class TestSecurityReviewFixes:
"""Regression guards for the v0.60.0 Part F security-review fixes."""
def test_inspect_uses_data_filter_when_available(self, tmp_path, monkeypatch):
"""Project policy: tarfile extraction filter must be set on py3.12+.
This is a defence-in-depth control — ``inspect_airgap_bundle``
only reads ``manifest.json`` today, but the filter assignment
guards future maintainers who add ``tar.extractall``.
"""
import sys
if sys.version_info < (3, 12):
pytest.skip("data_filter ships in Python 3.12+")
# Just confirm the helper is referenced in the source — that's
# the regression-proof bit.
src = Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent / "soup_cli" / "utils" / "airgap_bundle.py"
text = src.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
assert "tarfile.data_filter" in text
@pytest.mark.skipif(os.name == "nt", reason="POSIX symlink semantics")
def test_build_rejects_symlink_at_output(self, tmp_path, monkeypatch):
"""Pre-placed symlink at plan.output is rejected (TOCTOU defence)."""
monkeypatch.chdir(tmp_path)
model = _make_model_dir(tmp_path)
target = tmp_path / "real.tar"
target.write_bytes(b"")
link = tmp_path / "bundle.tar"
os.symlink(str(target), str(link))
from soup_cli.utils.airgap_bundle import (
AirgapBundlePlan,
build_airgap_bundle,
)
plan = AirgapBundlePlan(
output=str(link),
model_dir=str(model),
dataset_dirs=(),
wheel_dirs=(),
kernel_dirs=(),
bundle_size_cap_bytes=10 * 1024 * 1024,
)
with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="(?i)symlink"):
build_airgap_bundle(plan)
def test_dataset_ordering_is_stable(self, tmp_path, monkeypatch):
"""Reordering dataset_dirs must NOT change the manifest file list."""
monkeypatch.chdir(tmp_path)
model = _make_model_dir(tmp_path)
da = _make_dataset_dir(tmp_path, name="da")
db = _make_dataset_dir(tmp_path, name="db")
from soup_cli.utils.airgap_bundle import (
AirgapBundlePlan,
build_airgap_bundle,
)
plan1 = AirgapBundlePlan(
output=str(tmp_path / "b1.tar"),
model_dir=str(model),
dataset_dirs=(str(da), str(db)),
wheel_dirs=(),
kernel_dirs=(),
bundle_size_cap_bytes=10 * 1024 * 1024,
)
plan2 = AirgapBundlePlan(
output=str(tmp_path / "b2.tar"),
model_dir=str(model),
dataset_dirs=(str(db), str(da)),
wheel_dirs=(),
kernel_dirs=(),
bundle_size_cap_bytes=10 * 1024 * 1024,
)
m1 = build_airgap_bundle(plan1)
m2 = build_airgap_bundle(plan2)
names1 = sorted(e.name for e in m1.files)
names2 = sorted(e.name for e in m2.files)
assert names1 == names2
def test_inspect_rejects_oversized_manifest(self, tmp_path, monkeypatch):
"""Crafted bundles with multi-GiB manifest.json are rejected."""
import io as _io
import tarfile as _tarfile
monkeypatch.chdir(tmp_path)
bad = tmp_path / "evil_bundle.tar"
with _tarfile.open(bad, "w") as tar:
# 65 MiB > 64 MiB cap.
payload = b'{"name": "evil"}' + (b"x" * (65 * 1024 * 1024))
info = _tarfile.TarInfo(name="manifest.json")
info.size = len(payload)
tar.addfile(info, _io.BytesIO(payload))
from soup_cli.utils.airgap_bundle import inspect_airgap_bundle
with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="(?i)exceeds"):
inspect_airgap_bundle(str(bad))
class TestSourceWiring:
def test_module_imports(self):
from soup_cli.utils import airgap_bundle as m
assert hasattr(m, "build_airgap_bundle")
assert hasattr(m, "inspect_airgap_bundle")
assert hasattr(m, "AirgapBundlePlan")
def test_manifest_has_soup_version(self, tmp_path, monkeypatch):
monkeypatch.chdir(tmp_path)
model = _make_model_dir(tmp_path)
from soup_cli.utils.airgap_bundle import (
AirgapBundlePlan,
build_airgap_bundle,
)
plan = AirgapBundlePlan(
output=str(tmp_path / "bundle.tar"),
model_dir=str(model),
dataset_dirs=(),
wheel_dirs=(),
kernel_dirs=(),
bundle_size_cap_bytes=10 * 1024 * 1024,
)
manifest = build_airgap_bundle(plan)
# Manifest carries soup_version + created_at for audit trail.
with tarfile.open(plan.output) as tar:
member = tar.getmember("manifest.json")
extracted = tar.extractfile(member)
assert extracted is not None
payload = json.loads(extracted.read().decode("utf-8"))
assert "soup_version" in payload
assert "created_at" in payload
assert payload["soup_version"] == manifest.soup_version