## Summary
Follow-up to #623 — addresses security findings **not covered** by the
maintainer's draft PR #627. The original scope was larger; out-of-scope
changes were reverted (see `revert: drop out-of-scope changes from
security round 2`) and are **no longer part of this PR** (details under
_Reverted / not included_).
## Changes
### Rate limiting
- `routes/api.php`: authenticated API group throttled at `300,1` (per
user). An SPA with offline sync + multi-widget dashboards fans out many
requests per interaction, so a tighter cap throttled legitimate bursts.
- `routes/web.php`: unauthenticated open-banking callback throttled at
`30,1` (per IP), enough headroom for browser retries and the iOS PWA →
Safari hand-off that can fire the callback twice.
- `use-decrypt-transactions.ts`: the legacy decrypt migration loops
without backoff (~3 requests per 100 encrypted transactions), so a large
account could hit the API throttle and abort the whole migration
silently. It now honours Laravel's `Retry-After` header on 429 and
retries the same request instead of bailing.
### State token persistence on failure
- `AuthorizationController::callback`: clears `state_token` on the
connection when EnableBanking session creation fails, preventing a stale
token from being replayed.
### Trust proxies hardening
- `bootstrap/app.php`: replaced `trustProxies(at: '*')` with an
env-based `TRUSTED_PROXIES` config. When unset, no proxy is trusted
(Laravel default) instead of trusting every IP.
- ⚠️ **Deploy requirement:** production runs behind a reverse proxy /
TLS terminator (`Dockerfile.production` + nginx serve HTTP on :80). With
`TRUSTED_PROXIES` unset, Laravel stops trusting
`X-Forwarded-For`/`X-Forwarded-Proto` → client IPs collapse to the proxy
IP (contaminating logs and per-IP throttling) and HTTPS detection
breaks. `TRUSTED_PROXIES` **must** be set in the production environment
before merge, and should be added to `.env.production.example`.
### XSS-safe Blade-to-JS injection
- `app.blade.php`: replaced `{{ }}` Blade syntax inside `<script>` with
`@json()` to prevent JS injection via variable content.
### TOCTOU defense-in-depth
- `Api/TransactionController::bulkUpdate`: added `->where('user_id',
$userId)` to the per-row UPDATE as belt-and-suspenders behind the
existing `abort(403)` ownership pre-check.
## Reverted / not included
The following were in the original description but were reverted and are
**not** in the current diff:
- `block-demo` middleware on additional route groups (already present
upstream on `routes/settings.php`).
- `->limit(500)` / `has_more` / `since` validation on
`TransactionSyncController`.
## Notes
- `vite.config.ts` appears in the diff only because of an older
merge-base; it is identical to `main` and nets to no change (will vanish
on rebase).
- No tests yet for the `state_token` clearing on `createSession` failure
or for the throttles — worth adding before merge (the callback throttle
is the most exposed surface).
---------
Co-authored-by: Víctor Falcón <victoor89@gmail.com>
## Why
Transactions and account names used to be stored encrypted client-side.
They now live **unencrypted in the backend**, so the browser no longer
needs to encrypt, decrypt, or mask them. A handful of legacy accounts
may still have encrypted transactions, but the auto-run
decrypt-migration handles those — so this PR strips the now-dead
encryption machinery while keeping the migration path fully intact.
Net: **−1213 / +176** lines across 25 files.
## Removed (dead machinery)
- `setup-encryption` page, `POST /api/encryption/setup`,
`SetupEncryptionRequest`, and `encrypt()` / `generateSalt()` — new data
is never encrypted again
- `EncryptedText` and the decrypt-on-render description component →
replaced by a plaintext `TransactionDescription` that keeps the
privacy-mode fake labels
- All `isKeySet`-gated client decryption: transaction list (load /
search / sort), categorize flow, import dedup
- `isKeySet` masking / locking on amount display, app logo, import
button, add-transaction button, account page, and filters
- The unused `?encrypted=false` API filter and `isKeyPersistent()`
## Kept (legacy decrypt-migration)
- The two migration hooks, the unlock dialog, and the dashboard/login
unlock prompt
- `decrypt` / `importKey` + key derivation, key-storage,
`EncryptedMessage`, salt, `GET /api/encryption/message`,
`?encrypted=true`, and the middleware salt-cleanup
- `rule-engine` / edit / import-drawer account-name decryption —
plaintext-first (`if (!account.encrypted) return name`) legacy fallback
on the kept primitives; intentionally untouched
## Testing
- Pint ✅ · ESLint ✅ · Prettier ✅
- 184 vitest tests ✅
- 1425 PHP Feature/Unit tests ✅ (Browser suite not run locally — needs
`bun run build`; no Browser test references the encryption UI)
## Follow-up (out of scope)
`DecryptedTransaction.decryptedDescription` / `decryptedNotes` are now
just plaintext aliases. Collapsing that type touches 13+ files (rule
engine, categorizer, edit dialog) and was left as a separate cleanup.
## Summary
- Add `GET /api/transactions?encrypted=true` endpoint for paginated
listing of encrypted transactions
- Add `PATCH /api/transactions/bulk` endpoint for batch-updating
decrypted transaction data (max 50 per request, bypasses model events)
- Add `useDecryptTransactions` hook that mirrors the existing account
name decryption flow: fetches encrypted transactions page-by-page,
decrypts `description`/`notes` client-side via Web Crypto API, sends
plaintext back and clears IVs
- Wire the hook into `AppSidebarLayout` so decryption runs automatically
when the user unlocks their encryption key
- Once all transactions (and accounts) are decrypted, the encryption key
button in the header disappears automatically
## Test plan
- [x] 11 Pest tests covering encrypted/plaintext filtering, pagination,
user scoping, bulk update, authorization, validation, nullable notes,
guest access, and no-model-events behavior
- [x] Manual: create encrypted transactions, unlock encryption key,
verify transactions get decrypted and the key button disappears
Anshul Nitin
Víctor Falcón