> **Draft on purpose.** The migration can put connections into
`Expired`, which sends `BankingConnectionExpiredEmail` to real users —
up to ~18 of them shortly after deploy. That is the right outcome (they
have been broken for weeks without being told), but outbound email to
real users should be a human's call, not an autonomous one. Everything
else here is ready.
## The bug
Sentry
[PHP-LARAVEL-3J](https://whisper-money.sentry.io/issues/PHP-LARAVEL-3J)
— `RequestException: HTTP 403` in
`EnableBankingProvider::getTransactions`. 45 events, 10 users,
regressed.
`EnableBankingProvider` classifies known upstream failures into domain
exceptions and rethrows the rest as a bare `RequestException`. Two
responses were unclassified:
- `401 {"error":"CLOSED_SESSION"}`
- `403 {"detail":{"error_name":"PsuActionRequiredException"}}`
`SyncBankingConnectionJob` reads any bare 401/403 as an auth failure:
the connection goes to `Error` with `consecutive_sync_failures =
MAX_SCHEDULED_RETRIES + 1`. Both the scheduler and `banking:sync` filter
that out, so **the connection is never dispatched again**. Enable
Banking's syncer has `notifiesOnAuthFailure() === false`, and the
"reconnect your bank" notice only counts `Expired` connections — so
nothing told the user. Their bank sync was dead, silently.
Prod confirms the damage: **18 connections across 17 users** stranded
that way, 14 with this bug's exact error message, the oldest not synced
since **2026-05-06**.
## What each response now does
**`401 CLOSED_SESSION` → expired session.** The session is genuinely
gone (revoked at the bank, or superseded by a newer authorization) and
only the user can fix it. It now joins `EXPIRED_SESSION`: connection
marked `Expired`, reconnect email sent, notice shown, not reported as an
application error.
**`403 PsuActionRequiredException` → transient.** My first pass expired
these too; the product review pulled the prod data and it says
otherwise. The nine connections that hit this on 2026-08-05 had all
synced cleanly at 18:00 the evening before, failed inside the same
**nine-minute** window, all had months of consent left, and none has
recurred in the four days since. Nine users at nine different banks do
not revoke consent inside nine minutes — that is the provider faulting
behind a generic `"Internal error."` envelope.
Expiring is a one-way door: expired connections are never dispatched,
manual sync is refused, and the only way out is a full reauthorization
with SCA. Expiring on first sight would have pushed nine users through a
re-consent they did not need. So it is classified transient: the
connection stays schedulable and self-heals next cycle, and the error
logs as a warning instead of being reported. If a PSU action really is
required, the consent lapses on its own and the 401 path takes over.
A 403 or 401 the bank sends for any other reason still surfaces exactly
as before — tested, because widening either check to "any 401/403" would
silently expire every connection during a credentials bug of our own.
## Rescuing the stranded connections
The classification fix cannot reach the 18 already-parked rows: they are
excluded from dispatch before any of this code runs. The migration
clears their failure counter so the next scheduled cycle re-evaluates
them through the fixed path — they resume, or they expire properly, with
the email and the notice the user should have had months ago.
Also: the reconnect email's five keys were missing from `lang/es.json`,
so Spanish users got it in English. Unenforced because the localization
test only scans `resources/js`.
## Tests
`tests/Feature/OpenBanking` — 319 green, including 6 new provider cases
(both new codes on `getTransactions` and `getBalances`, plus negative
cases for an unrecognised 401 code, a bare 403, and a non-object
`detail`). The job-level behaviour — `Expired` + email + not reported —
is already covered end to end in `SyncRetryAndLoggingTest`, through the
real syncer.
## Follow-ups (not in this PR)
- **`Expired` badge next to a future "Expires:" date.** `markExpired()`
doesn't touch `valid_until`, and this fix expires connections whose
window hasn't lapsed, so `settings/connections.tsx:411` will show both.
Hide the line for expired connections or backdate the field.
- **Forensics gap.** `logSyncAttempt` records no
`error_class`/`error_message` on the expired path, so a provider-wide
wave becomes indistinguishable from ordinary consent churn in
`banking_sync_logs` — that is exactly the data that disproved my first
reading here.
- **Reconnect loop.** `AuthorizationController` sets the connection back
to `Active` and syncs immediately; if the bank refuses again the user
gets a second "reconnect" email seconds later.
- **`banking:sync --connection=<id>` obeys the health filter**, so ops
has no escape hatch for a stranded connection.
- **Duplicated catch ladders** in `getTransactions`/`getBalances` — the
shape that let a code get classified in one and not the other.
Fixes PHP-LARAVEL-3J
