fix(adapter-utils): consume escape pairs inside a quoted header value

A double-quoted header value stopped at the first backslash, so a
credential with an embedded escaped quote such as `"X-API-Key: abc\"def"`
kept its tail in the recorded text. The double-quoted branch now consumes
escape pairs and requires an unescaped opening quote, which keeps it off a
serialized diagnostic where `\"` is the JSON escape. The single-quoted
branch takes a backslash literally. Only the unquoted branch still stops at
a backslash.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01RYigf3eMFJjey9iKRApPGE

packages/adapter-utils/src/command-redaction.test.ts

@@ -276,6 +276,35 @@ describe("redactCommandText header secrets", () => {
     expect(redactDiagnosticText(once)).toBe(once);
   });
 
+  it("redacts past an escaped quote inside a double-quoted header value", () => {
+    // The shell escape does not end the argument, so the value runs on past it.
+    const input = String.raw`curl -H "X-API-Key: abc\"def" https://example.test`;
+    const output = redactCommandText(input);
+    expect(output).not.toContain("def");
+    expect(output).toBe(
+      `curl -H "X-API-Key: ${REDACTED_COMMAND_TEXT_VALUE}" https://example.test`,
+    );
+  });
+
+  it("redacts a backslash inside a single-quoted header value", () => {
+    // A shell single quote has no escapes, so the backslash is part of the value.
+    const input = String.raw`curl -H 'X-API-Key: abc\def' https://example.test`;
+    const output = redactCommandText(input);
+    expect(output).not.toContain("abc");
+    expect(output).toBe(
+      `curl -H 'X-API-Key: ${REDACTED_COMMAND_TEXT_VALUE}' https://example.test`,
+    );
+  });
+
+  it("redacts a double-quoted value that is itself an escaped quoted string", () => {
+    const input = String.raw`curl -H "Authorization: \"Bearer nested\"" https://example.test`;
+    const output = redactCommandText(input);
+    expect(output).not.toContain("nested");
+    expect(output).toBe(
+      `curl -H "Authorization: ${REDACTED_COMMAND_TEXT_VALUE}" https://example.test`,
+    );
+  });
+
   it("redacts a header secret inside a diagnostic and keeps a JSON secret field working", () => {
     const input = 'command failed: curl -H "X-API-Key: abc" -> {"token":"opaque-value"}';
     const output = redactDiagnosticText(input);

packages/adapter-utils/src/command-redaction.ts

@@ -45,11 +45,17 @@ const COMMAND_AUTHORIZATION_BEARER_RE =
 // rule agree byte for byte with the bearer rule above, so
 // `Authorization: Bearer <value>` produces the same output as before.
 //
-// Every value branch excludes the backslash. That keeps the rule off an
-// escaped-quote opener such as `Authorization: \"Bearer ...\"` in a serialized
-// diagnostic, which the caller's own authorization rules already redact. A
-// quoted value must open with a non-blank character, so an empty header
-// argument such as `-H "X-API-Key: "` stays as it is.
+// Each branch treats the backslash the way its quoting context does. A
+// double-quoted value consumes escape pairs, so an escaped quote inside the
+// argument (`"X-API-Key: abc\"def"`) does not end the value early. Its opening
+// quote must itself be unescaped, which keeps the branch off a serialized
+// diagnostic such as `\"X-API-Key: ...\"`, where the closing `\"` must survive.
+// A single-quoted value takes a backslash literally, because a shell single
+// quote has no escapes. Only the unquoted branch stops at a backslash, so an
+// escaped-quote opener such as `Authorization: \"Bearer ...\"` is left to the
+// caller's own authorization rules. A quoted value must open with a non-blank
+// character, so an empty header argument such as `-H "X-API-Key: "` stays as it
+// is.
 //
 // The schemes come from the IANA HTTP Authentication Scheme Registry, plus
 // `AWS4-HMAC-SHA256` and `Token`, which are widely used but unregistered. A
@@ -89,8 +95,8 @@ const COMMAND_SECRET_HEADER_UNQUOTED_VALUE_PATTERN =
   "`" +
   String.raw`]+)`;
 const COMMAND_SECRET_HEADER_RE = new RegExp(
-  String.raw`("${COMMAND_SECRET_HEADER_PREFIX_PATTERN})[^\s"\\][^"\\\r\n]*(")` +
-    String.raw`|('${COMMAND_SECRET_HEADER_PREFIX_PATTERN})[^\s'\\][^'\\\r\n]*(')` +
+  String.raw`(?<!\\)("${COMMAND_SECRET_HEADER_PREFIX_PATTERN})(?:\\.|[^\s"\\])(?:\\.|[^"\\\r\n])*(")` +
+    String.raw`|('${COMMAND_SECRET_HEADER_PREFIX_PATTERN})[^\s'][^'\r\n]*(')` +
     String.raw`|(\b${COMMAND_SECRET_HEADER_PREFIX_PATTERN})${COMMAND_SECRET_HEADER_UNQUOTED_VALUE_PATTERN}`,
   "gi",
 );