paperclip/docker/agent-runtime/README.md

94 lines
4.4 KiB
Markdown

# Agent Runtime Image Family
Container images for running coding-agent harnesses in sandboxed environments (for example the kubernetes sandbox provider, stage 1 of the k8s contribution). Images are named `agent-runtime-{harness}:{version}` and published to `ghcr.io/paperclipai/` by the `agent-runtime-images` workflow. The registry is overridable: every reference flows through the `REGISTRY` bake variable.
## Image Lineup
- **`agent-runtime-base`**: Foundation. Ubuntu 22.04 + Node 24 + git + tini + non-root user (uid 1000) + the agent shim.
- **`agent-runtime-opencode`**: Extends base with `opencode-ai` globally installed.
- **`agent-runtime-pi`**: Extends base with `@mariozechner/pi-coding-agent`.
- **`agent-runtime-codex`**: Extends base with `@openai/codex`.
- **`agent-runtime-gemini`**: Extends base with `@google/gemini-cli` plus headless auth-mode settings.
- **`agent-runtime-claude`**: Extends base with `@anthropic-ai/claude-code` (symlinked as `claude-code`).
- **`agent-runtime-hermes`**: Dockerfile included in the bake group, not in the default publish scope (stub until a CLI package exists).
## Base Image Contents
**OS & Runtime:**
- Ubuntu 22.04
- Node.js 24 (via NodeSource APT repo)
- git
- tini (PID-1 init, ensures signal propagation)
- Non-root user `paperclip` (uid/gid 1000)
The NodeSource install puts `node` on the default `PATH`. The agent shim in this
image runs the harness directly with that `PATH`. The shim does not source a
login profile, and the runtime never writes a profile or an rc file. Some
sandbox providers instead wrap each command in a login shell. That shell sources
`/etc/profile` and the user profile files to read an owner-supplied `PATH`. No
exec path sources `nvm`. For the full exec-path contract, see
`packages/plugins/sandbox-providers/SANDBOX-REQUIREMENTS.md`.
**Paperclip Binaries:**
- `/usr/local/bin/paperclip-agent-shim`: Go binary compiled from `tools/agent-shim/`. Reads `/run/paperclip/runtime-command.json` and `syscall.Exec`s the harness CLI.
**Defaults:**
- `USER`: 1000:1000 (paperclip, non-root)
- `WORKDIR`: `/workspace` (mount workspace volumes here)
- `ENTRYPOINT`: `/usr/bin/tini --` (PID-1 reaper, forwards signals)
- `CMD`: `/usr/local/bin/paperclip-agent-shim`
## Building Locally
All targets build `linux/amd64` by default (see `buildx-bake.hcl`). Derived images chain off the `base` target through bake `contexts`, so the literal registry in each `FROM` line is overridden at build time and the whole family builds in one pass without pushing intermediates.
```bash
docker buildx bake -f docker/agent-runtime/buildx-bake.hcl --load
```
### Custom tag or registry
```bash
REGISTRY=myregistry VERSION=mytag \
docker buildx bake -f docker/agent-runtime/buildx-bake.hcl --load
```
## Quickstart Smoke Test
Build and verify the `agent-runtime-claude` image runs locally:
```bash
docker buildx bake -f docker/agent-runtime/buildx-bake.hcl base claude --load
docker run --rm ghcr.io/paperclipai/agent-runtime-claude:dev claude-code --version
```
## Agent Container (paperclip-agent-shim)
The main agent process runs as the shim (PID 1 under tini). The shim:
1. Reads `/run/paperclip/runtime-command.json` (path overridable via `-spec`), a JSON file mounted by whatever schedules the run
2. Parses `{ "command", "args" }`: the harness CLI and arguments
3. Resolves the command on PATH and `syscall.Exec`s it, replacing itself
4. SIGTERM from the kubelet propagates directly to the harness (no zombie processes)
**runtime-command.json Contract:**
```json
{
"command": "claude-code",
"args": ["--token", "xyz", "--workspace", "/workspace"]
}
```
The shim makes no assumptions about command structure; it is harness-agnostic. New harnesses swap the command/args; the base image stays the same.
## Security Model
- **Non-root execution**: user 1000:1000, no capability grants
- **PSS Restricted compatible**: no privileged containers, no host mounts; works with a read-only root filesystem (writable `/workspace` + `/tmp` mounts)
- **No secrets baked in**: API tokens and credentials come from per-run ephemeral Secrets mounted as env vars or files
- **Image signing**: cosign keyless OIDC in the publish workflow
## Publishing
`.github/workflows/agent-runtime-images.yml` builds and pushes the default scope (base, opencode, pi, codex, gemini, claude) on `workflow_dispatch` (with an explicit version tag) or on pushes to `master` touching these paths, then signs each digest with cosign keyless OIDC.