RomanNum3ral
/
paperclip
mirror of https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip.git
1
0
Fork 0
Code Issues Packages Projects Releases Wiki Activity
paperclip/doc/LOW-TRUST-PRESETS.md

3.3 KiB
Raw Permalink Blame History

Low-Trust Presets

Paperclip ships core trust preset names so containment decisions are enforced in Community Edition even when EE policy editing is unavailable.

Presets

  • standard: the default V1 company-visible collaboration model. This preserves existing behavior for normal agents.
  • low_trust_review: an opt-in containment preset for automated work that may consume hostile or prompt-injected input, such as untrusted pull requests, external tickets, dependency diffs, or generated review output.

Boundary Model

low_trust_review is resolved from existing JSON policy fields:

  • agent permissions: permissions.trustPreset and permissions.authorizationPolicy.trustBoundary
  • project policy: executionWorkspacePolicy.authorizationPolicy.trustBoundary
  • issue/run policy: executionPolicy.authorizationPolicy.trustBoundary

The resolver intersects those sources. Narrower wins. A low-trust preset must resolve to a concrete company-local project, root issue, or issue-id scope. If a policy source names another company, uses an unsupported preset, or lacks that scope for risky access, Paperclip fails closed.

Containment, Not Privacy

This is containment for hostile automated work. It is not a general project, issue, or human privacy system.

V1 standard work remains company-visible by default: board users and in-company actors can inspect company work objects unless a separate access-control feature changes that behavior. Low-trust containment instead limits what the low-trust agent can read or mutate through the Paperclip API and prevents raw untrusted output from being automatically promoted into higher-trust agent context.

Low-trust agents cannot read or mutate agent configuration, instruction bundles, or company skill configuration through direct grants. Configuration changes from low-trust work must go through higher-trust review and promotion paths instead.

Child→Parent Reporting Under Containment

The direct-parent report comment (doc/execution-semantics.md §6, "Child→Parent Reporting") is off by default for low_trust_review: a contained run reads untrusted input, so a free-prose comment into the higher-trust parent thread is a prompt-injection promotion path. Contained reviewers report by completing their own review issue (done — the verdict is the deliverable; the issue_blockers_resolved wake carries it upward) and by the platform's system-attributed stop-only relay when they enter blocked or cancelled. Never instruct a contained delegate to comment on its parent issue.

Runtime Containment

Managed low_trust_review runs fail closed unless Paperclip can enforce the runtime boundary:

  • the selected execution environment must use the sandbox driver
  • the effective execution workspace mode must be isolated_workspace
  • the issue being run must be inside the resolved low-trust boundary
  • secret references must use binding ids explicitly allowed by the boundary
  • inline sensitive environment values such as API keys and tokens are rejected
  • workspace runtime-service mutations are denied unless the boundary explicitly grants the runtime.manage tool class

The Docker workflow in doc/UNTRUSTED-PR-REVIEW.md remains useful for manual local review, but Paperclip-managed low-trust execution requires a sandboxed environment instead of a host-local adapter process.